{ "id": 680647, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE WEALER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wealer", "decision_date": "1994-06-29", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201493\u20140034", "first_page": "6", "last_page": "19", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "264 Ill. App. 3d 6" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738201 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 F.3d 183", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10524086 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/16/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 U.S. 432", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6161761 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" }, { "page": "451" }, { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/352/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179718 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50-51" }, { "page": "362" }, { "page": "2640" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 444", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12123840 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "2485" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 517", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11339213 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" }, { "page": "401" }, { "page": "3199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 U.S. 520", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1780223 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" }, { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/441/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 S. 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Supp. 842", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5761471 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/763/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187389 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" }, { "page": "667-68" }, { "page": "1396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 U.S. 675", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11300009 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "613" }, { "page": "1573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/470/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599286 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" }, { "page": "341" }, { "page": "341-42" }, { "page": "346" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 U.S. 602", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12032926 ], "weight": 28, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613-14" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "1411" }, { "page": "616" }, { "page": "659" }, { "page": "1413", "parenthetical": "\"obvious that *** physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable\"" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "1414" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "1414" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "620-21" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "621-22" }, { "page": "622" }, { "page": "622" }, { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12047531 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" }, { "page": "918" }, { "page": "1834", "parenthetical": "administration of blood tests constitutes a search of the person and depends antecedently upon seizures of persons within the meaning of the fourth amendment" }, { "page": "771" }, { "page": "920" }, { "page": "1836" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "856 P.2d 1076", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1091", "parenthetical": "concurring opinion" }, { "page": "1088" }, { "page": "1086" }, { "page": "1086" }, { "page": "1091", "parenthetical": "Utter, J., concurring" }, { "page": "1092" }, { "page": "1093", "parenthetical": "Utter, J., concurring" }, { "page": "1093" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Wash. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1363523 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "94" }, { "page": "94" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "105" }, { "page": "107" }, { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/122/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "962 F.2d 302", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10520781 ], "weight": 11, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313", "parenthetical": "concurring opinion" }, { "page": "304" }, { "page": "307" }, { "page": "313", "parenthetical": "Murnaghan, J., concurring" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/962/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "Wash. Rev. Code Ann. \u00a7 43.43.754", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Wash. Rev. Code Ann.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 19.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Va. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, \u00a7 584", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Okla. Stat. Ann.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Nev. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 176.111", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Nev. Rev. Stat.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ga. Code Ann. \u00a7 24", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ga. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 17", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 290.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Cal. Code", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 13", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1310, "char_count": 33473, "ocr_confidence": 0.81, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.677229311522156e-07, "percentile": 0.696896035251476 }, "sha256": "65558273c4f9dc7006a5b13948401555b2fc459cb3069273de3deec469462786", "simhash": "1:690c13138bc3c7a7", "word_count": 5422 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:49:29.319239+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE WEALER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DOYLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Clarence Wealer, entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 16(c)(l)(i) (now 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 16(c)(l)(i) (West 1992))) in the circuit court of Lake County and was sentenced to 81/a years\u2019 imprisonment. Following sentencing, the State moved for an order to obtain blood and saliva samples from defendant pursuant to section 5 \u2014 4\u20143(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20143 (now codified, as amended, at 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20143 (West 1992))). Defendant objected, contending that section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 mandated the taking of blood and saliva samples in contravention of his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. (U.S. Const., amend. IV; 111. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 6.) The trial court granted the State\u2019s motion, denied defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider, and granted defendant a temporary stay of enforcement pending his application to this court for a stay pending appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and this court granted defendant\u2019s motion to stay the order for blood and saliva samples pending the outcome of his appeal.\nIn this case of first impression, we are asked to consider whether section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 of the Unified Code of Corrections, which requires persons convicted of certain enumerated sex offenses to submit blood and saliva specimens to the Illinois Department of State Police for analysis and categorization into genetic marker groupings (commonly known as DNA testing), mandates State conduct violative of defendant\u2019s Federal and State constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.\nWith recent advances in biotechnology, public officials have recognized with increasing frequency the value and potential of DNA testing in the context of criminal law enforcement. As a result, the Illinois legislature in 1989 amended the Uniform Code of Corrections to mandate that persons convicted of certain sex offenses submit blood and saliva specimens to the Illinois Department of State Police for analysis and categorization into genetic marker groupings. (See 111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20143 (now codified, as amended, at 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20143 (West 1992)).) Section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 provides, in relevant part:\n\"\u00a7 5 \u2014 4\u20143. (a) Any person convicted of, or who received a disposition of court supervision for, a sexual offense or attempt of a sexual offense *** shall, regardless of the sentence imposed, be required to submit specimens of blood and saliva to the Illinois Department of State Police ***.\n* * *\n(d) The *** State Police shall provide all equipment and instructions necessary for the collection of blood and saliva samples. *** The samples shall *** be forwarded to the *** Division of Forensic Services and Identification! ] for analysis and categorizing into genetic marker groupings.\n* * *\n(g) *** '[S]exual offense\u2019 means any violation of Sections 11 \u2014 11, 12 \u2014 13, 12 \u2014 14, 12 \u2014 15 or 12 \u2014 16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 ***.\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005^ \u2014 3 (now 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20143 (West 1992)).)\nThe sexual offenses enumerated in section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 are sexual relations within families (section 11 \u2014 11); criminal sexual assault (section 12 \u2014 13); aggravated criminal sexual assault (section 12 \u2014 14); criminal sexual abuse (section 12 \u2014 15); and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (section 12 \u2014 16).\nThe statute provides further that blood samples may be taken only by a physician authorized to practice medicine, a registered nurse, or other person qualified by the Department of Public Health. (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20143(d) (now 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 4 \u2014 3(d) (West 1992)).) Additionally, the genetic marker grouping analysis information is strictly confidential and generally can be released only to law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies. 111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20143(f) (now 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20143(f) (West 1992) ).\nWe note that several other States have enacted similar statutes. (See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 13 \u2014 4438 (1993); Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 290.2 (West 1993); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 17 \u2014 2\u2014201 (West 1993); Ga. Code Ann. \u00a7 24 \u2014 4\u201460 (1994); Mo. Ann. Stat. \u00a7 65\u00d3.055 (Vernon 1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 176.111 (1993); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A \u2014 266.4 (Supp. 1993) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, \u00a7 584 (West Supp. 1993); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. \u00a7 23 \u2014 5\u201414 (1994); Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 19.2 \u2014 310.2 (Michie 1990); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. \u00a7 43.43.754 (West 1994).) As discussed below, two of those statutes have been unsuccessfully challenged on grounds similar to those urged before this court. See Jones v. Murray (4th Cir. 1992), 962 F.2d 302 (Virginia); State v. Olivas (1993), 122 Wash. 2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076.\nDefendant contends that section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 violates the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution because the blood and saliva sampling it mandates involves an unreasonable search and seizure. Relying primarily on Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (warrantless nonconsensual extraction of blood supported by probable cause that individual was intoxicated held to be lawful search incident to arrest), defendant maintains that section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 allows the State to conduct a search and seizure on the \"mere chance\u201d that he might commit a crime in the future and that the stored data might provide evidence which might identify him. Accordingly, because probable cause or individualized suspicion would be lacking relative to some future offense, the statute violates defendant\u2019s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.\nThe fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that \"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.\u201d (U.S. Const., amend. IV.) Its salutary purpose is to ensure \"privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction.\u201d Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives\u2019 Association (1989), 489 U.S. 602, 613-14, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 657, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1411.\nAs a threshold matter, we note that neither party disputes that the collection and testing of a blood sample from an individual pursuant to the statute at issue implicates the fourth amendment. (See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 659, 109 S. Ct. at 1413 (\"obvious that *** physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable\u201d); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 918, 86 S. Ct. at 1834 (administration of blood tests constitutes a search of the person and depends antecedently upon seizures of persons within the meaning of the fourth amendment).) Nor do the parties dispute that the taking of saliva samples implicates fourth amendment concerns, although it seems that the level of intrusion necessary to obtain a saliva sample would on its face appear lower than that required for extracting blood. Because defendant focuses his challenge primarily on the extraction of blood, we will assume for the purposes of our analysis that if the statutory taking of blood samples withstands constitutional scrutiny, it would stand to reason that taking saliva samples would likewise be upheld as reasonable.\nWe are of the view that the statutorily mandated taking of blood samples implicates the fourth amendment in two respects: first, drawing the blood sample intrudes on an individual\u2019s bodily integrity; and second, conducting additional analysis on the sample further implicates fourth amendment interests. (See People v. Adams (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 331, 340.) Accordingly, it is necessary to consider further whether the DNA sampling procedure satisfies the constitutional requirement of reasonableness.\nIt is well accepted that \"the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, *** only those that are unreasonable.\u201d (Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 661, 109 S. Ct. at 1414; United States v. Sharpe (1985), 470 U.S. 675, 682, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 613, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1573.) \"[T]he permissibility of a particular practice 'is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual\u2019s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.\u2019 \u201d Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 661, 109 S. Ct. at 1414, quoting Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 654, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667-68, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396.\nAs we noted above, only two jurisdictions, thus far, have considered fourth amendment challenges to statutorily mandated DNA testing of convicted offenders. Although both jurisdictions have upheld the constitutionality of their respective statutes, the analytical basis for doing so has differed not only between the two jurisdictions, but there has also existed a difference of opinion among members of the respective courts.\nA reading of Jones, at the appellate and trial levels, and Olivas, reveals that three approaches have been espoused as the appropriate constitutional basis on which to uphold the validity of DNA testing statutes similar to the one at issue in the present case: (1) \"special needs\u201d analysis (see Jones v. Murray (W.D. Va. 1991), 763 F. Supp. 842; State v. Olivas (1993), 122 Wash. 2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076 (majority view)); (2) diminished privacy rights of prisoners and probationers (Jones v. Murray (4th Cir. 1992), 962 F.2d 302); and (3) \"traditional principles\u201d of fourth amendment law (see Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 103, 856 P.2d at 1091 (concurring opinion); see also Jones, 962 F.2d at 313 (concurring opinion)). We will examine each of these approaches.\nAs a general principle of fourth amendment jurisprudence, the balance struck between an intrusion on an individual\u2019s fourth amendment interests and the promotion of a legitimate governmental interest requires that a search or seizure be conducted under the authority of a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. (Adams, 149 Ill. 2d at 341.) As an exception to the general rule, \"special needs\u201d analysis recognizes that the warrant and probable cause requirements are not always necessary to sustain the validity of a governmental intrusion challenged on fourth amendment grounds. (See Adams, 149 Ill. 2d at 341-42, citing New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), 469 U.S. 325, 340-41, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 733-34, 105 S. Ct. 733, 742.) Originally set forth in T.L.O., and reiterated in subsequent cases, the exception states that \"where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual\u2019s privacy expectations against the Government\u2019s interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.\u201d (Emphasis added.) National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989), 489 U.S. 656, 665-66, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685, 702, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390-91.\nConcluding that special needs analysis was the better reasoned approach, a majority of the Supreme Court of Washington, with two justices concurring in the result only, upheld a statute allowing non-consensual blood extraction from convicted sex offenders for the purpose of DNA identification analysis. (Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 98, 856 P.2d at 1088.) Following a detailed review of the trial and appellate level decisions in Jones, the majority concluded that special needs analysis was superior because it affirmed general privacy rights by requiring the government to demonstrate a need \"beyond normal law enforcement\u201d before it could draw blood from convicted persons without probable cause or individualized suspicion. (Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 94, 856 P.2d at 1086.) Although the court expressly recognized that the explicit statutory purpose of DNA testing was for future identification and prosecution of criminal offenders, it was apparently persuaded by the district court\u2019s opinion in Jones, which identified the establishment of a DNA data bank for use in solving future crimes as a \"special\u201d law enforcement need (see Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 845). The court further concluded that the majority rationale set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Jones was deficient because, by not requiring a special need, the appeals court had unnecessarily diminished the privacy rights of convicted persons. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 94, 856 P.2d at 1086.\nBecause defendant raises no significant challenge to the warrant-less nature of the search contemplated under section 5 \u2014 4\u20143, instead focusing on the quantum of evidence necessary to support the intrusion, it is convenient to categorize the special needs cases into two classes: (1) those that found at least some quantum of individualized suspicion extant or necessary (see T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733 (school teacher\u2019s report that student was violating school rule prohibiting smoking); Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987), 483 U.S. 868, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (tip from police officer that probationer\u2019s apartment contained guns); O\u2019Connor v. Ortega (1987), 480 U.S. 709, 94 L. Ed. 2d 714, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (need to maintain workplace efficiency justified warrantless searches supported by reasonable suspicion)); and (2) those which have required no particularized suspicion as a predicate to the conduct of a warrantless search (see Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (drug testing of railway employees); Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (drug testing of Federal employees)).\nThe dominant feature of cases utilizing special needs as an exception to the general warrant and probable cause requirements is the court\u2019s identification of an administrative justification independent of a law enforcement purpose. (See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733 (school discipline); O\u2019Connor, 480 U.S. 709, 94 L. Ed. 2d 714, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (workplace efficiency); Griffin 483 U.S. 868, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (supervision of probationers); Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (railway safety); Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (integrity of drug interdiction personnel).) This is understandable because the special needs exception appears to be rooted in the administrative search doctrine. (See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 731, 105 S. Ct. at 740, citing Camara v. Municipal Court (1967), 387 U.S. 523, 536-37, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 940, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1735.) Furthermore, where the court has upheld warrantless, suspi-cionless searches of bodily fluids, the court has clearly and unambiguously articulated the urgent and compelling nature of an administrative justification independent of a law enforcement purpose. (Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 661-62, 109 S. Ct. at 1414-15; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 702, 109 S. Ct. at 1391.) Moreover, in the employee drug testing cases, the court expressly noted the absence of a law enforcement purpose underlying the particular regulations at issue. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 662, 109 S. Ct. 1415 (\"FRA has prescribed toxicological tests, not to assist in the prosecution of employees but rather 'to prevent accidents\u2019 \u201d); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 702, 109 S. Ct. at 1391 (urine test results unavailable in a criminal prosecution of employee without employee\u2019s consent).\nWe note that the supreme court has upheld searches under the special needs exception which produced evidence for use in a criminal proceeding. In those cases, however, the use of such evidence was allowed because the evidence was discovered incidental to a constitutionally permissible search under the special needs exception. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 738, 105 S. Ct. at 745-46 (special need to maintain school discipline allowed school official\u2019s search of student\u2019s purse for evidence of school rule prohibiting cigarette smoking leading to discovery of controlled substance).\nThe second approach to examining the nonconsensual extraction of bodily fluids for the purpose of establishing a DNA data bank was articulated by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Jones v. Murray (4th Cir. 1992), 962 F.2d 302. Declining to apply the special needs exception, as the court below had done to uphold the validity of the statute (see Jones, 763 F. Supp. 842), the fourth circuit rejected a challenge to a Virginia statute which required all convicted felons, including sex offenders, to provide the State with a blood sample for DNA analysis and storage. (962 F.2d at 304.) Viewing the cases which involve the fourth amendment rights of prison inmates as a class of cases separate from those requiring a special need, the court reasoned that the diminished privacy rights of prisoners and probationers combined with the minimally intrusive nature of taking a blood sample were outweighed by the State\u2019s interest in determining identification characteristics for the purpose of improved law enforcement. Jones, 962 F.2d at 307.\nAlthough the court indicated in a footnote that it found support for its holding \"in the fact that the Supreme Court has not categorically required individualized suspicion\u201d in every search which advances a law enforcement objective, the Jones majority relied principally on Bell v. Wolfish (1979), 441 U.S. 520, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861, which upheld suspicionless body cavity searches of prison inmates following contact visits with persons from outside the institution (Jones, 962 F.2d at 307 n.2); Hudson v. Palmer (1984), 468 U.S. 517, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 104 S. Ct. 3194, where the court determined that a prison inmate had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his jail cell and thus was afforded no fourth amendment protection from random, suspicionless shakedown searches of his cell; and Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987), 483 U.S. 868, 871, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 716, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3167, which upheld a warrantless search of a probationer\u2019s apartment following a tip from a police officer that the probationer\u2019s apartment contained guns. In upholding the searches in Bell and Hudson, the court stated that practical considerations related to prison administration necessitated the prison officials\u2019 actions. (Hudson, 468 U.S. at 524, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 401, 104 S. Ct. at 3199; Bell, 441 U.S. at 546, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 473, 99 S. Ct. at 1877-78.) In Griffin, the court determined that the probation system\u2019s special need to supervise closely probationers provided sufficient justification to search a probationer\u2019s apartment on less than probable cause. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 718, 107 S. Ct. at 3169.\nThe third approach, articulated in both the Jones and Olivas concurring opinions, relies primarily on the perceived willingness of the United States Supreme Court, under certain circumstances, to relax or eliminate any requirement of probable cause or individualized suspicion where the nature of the intrusion occasioned by a particular search or seizure is minimal and the government\u2019s interest significant. (See Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (1990), 496 U.S. 444, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 638, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 673, 109 S. Ct. at 1424-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Jones, 962 F.2d at 313 (Murnaghan, J., concurring); Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 104, 856 P.2d at 1091 (Utter, J., concurring).) Under this approach, a reviewing court may balance the government\u2019s interest in conducting the search, the degree to which the search actually advances that interest, and the gravity of the intrusion upon personal privacy to determine whether the search is reasonable. (Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 105, 856 P.2d at 1092, citing Brown v. Texas (1979), 443 U.S. 47, 50-51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640.) We disagree with defendant that Sitz is merely another case applying the special needs exception. In Sitz, the court expressly rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that the State was required to demonstrate a special governmental need \"beyond normal law enforcement needs\u201d before engaging in a balancing analysis. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 420, 110 S. Ct. at 2485.\nAlthough this approach has not been applied outside the context of police stops of motorists on public highways, and it requires us to interpret broadly existing precedent, we choose to follow it for several reasons. First, in the absence of a clearly articulated administrative justification independent of a law enforcement purpose, we are reluctant to extend the special needs line of cases to the present statute, which has an ostensible law enforcement purpose. Furthermore, it does not require us to identify some \"special\u201d or extranormal law enforcement need \"beyond the normal needs of law enforcement.\u201d\nSecond, while the prisoner / probationer cases are instructive on the issue of individual privacy rights, these cases, in our view, are nothing more than special needs cases. (See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. 520, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (prison administration); Griffin, 483 U.S. 868, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709,107 S. Ct. 3164 (probation supervision); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (court cites Griffin and Bell as examples of where it was willing to apply special needs exception). But see Jones, 962 F.2d 302 (prisoner/ probationer cases are a distinct category).) Furthermore; practical considerations of prison administration, as an underlying justification, cannot be reconciled with the express language of section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 which mandates taking samples regardless of whether the convicted sex offender is ultimately incarcerated. See 111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20143 (now codified, as amended, at 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20143 (West 1992)).\nApplying the third approach to the present circumstances, we conclude that the nonconsensual extraction of blood and saliva from persons convicted of the sex offenses enumerated in section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 of the Unified Code of Corrections does not offend traditional fourth amendment principles. Although defendant raises no issue directed to the warrant requirement, we will touch upon it briefly in the interest of completeness.\nThe warrant requirement protects privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not random or arbitrary acts of government. (Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 663, 109 S. Ct. at 1415-16.) It assures a citizen that the intrusion is authorized by law and that the search is narrowly limited in its objectives and scope. (Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 663, 109 S. Ct. at 1416.) \"A warrant *** provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, and thus ensures an objective determination whether an intrusion is justified in any given case.\u201d Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 663, 109 S. Ct. at 1416.\nSection 5 \u2014 4\u20143 adequately addresses the concerns underlying the warrant requirement. The statute provides for an objective determination because it entirely divests a court or public official of any discretion. The statute expressly mandates that \"[a]ny person convicted of *** a sexual offense *** shall *** be required to submit specimens.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005\u2014 4 \u2014 3(a) (now 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20143(a) (West 1992)).) Its scope and objective are narrowly limited because it provides for nonconsensual sampling for the purpose of maintaining a data bank, and the information is kept strictly confidential and is made available only to law enforcement officials. (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20143(f) (now 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20143(f) (West 1992)).) Furthermore, any risk that the statute might be applied in an arbitrary or oppressive fashion is precluded because its application is uniformly applied to a narrow class of individuals (i.e., persons convicted of certain sex offenses). (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005-^3(a) (now 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u2014 3(a) (West 1992)).) Accordingly, the requirement of a warrant would provide little, if any, additional protection in addition to the \"assurances of certainty and regularity\u201d already inherent in section 5 \u2014 4\u20143. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 664, 109 S. Ct. at 1417.\nHaving satisfied the warrant requirement, it is necessary to consider further whether the suspicionless nature of the sampling mandated under section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 further runs afoul of the general principle requiring that searches and seizures be supported by probable cause. The mere fact that section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 mandates warrantless, suspicionless sampling, however, does not necessarily render the search unreasonable because \"a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable.\u201d Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 664, 109 S. Ct. at 1417.\nThe physical intrusion imposed by the testing mandated under section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 is relatively slight and poses no threat to the health or safety of the individual tested. (Cf. People v. Adams (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 331, 346 (statute mandating that persons convicted of certain offenses undergo blood testing for presence of HIV); see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 86 S. Ct. at 1836; Breithaupt v. Abram (1957), 352 U.S. 432, 436, 1 L. Ed. 2d 448, 451, 77 S. Ct. 408, 410.) Furthermore, the collection of samples must be performed in a medically approved manner, and only certain qualified medical personnel are permitted to withdraw blood. (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u20143(d) (now 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20143 (West 1992)).) Because the blood testing mandated under section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 is minimally intrusive, it is necessary to balance the government\u2019s interest in conducting nonconsensual blood testing of convicted sex offenders, the degree to which section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 furthers that interest, and the magnitude of the intrusion on a convicted sex offender\u2019s privacy rights.\nIt is beyond dispute that the State has a legitimate interest in deterring and prosecuting recidivist acts committed by sex offenders. Its interest is especially compelling when we consider that sex offenders frequently target children as their victims. Additionally, the State has an interest in establishing the identity of convicted sex offenders where traditional methods of identification might prove otherwise inadequate or inconclusive. Moreover, in addition to solving future crimes, the use of DNA evidence can be used to aid identification of repeat offenders who attempt to otherwise conceal or alter their identity. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 308.\nThe statutorily mandated DNA testing scheme is closely related to the State\u2019s interest in deterring and prosecuting recidivist acts committed by sex offenders because it provides an improved technological method for identifying and eliminating potential suspects.\nNext, the privacy interest that a convicted sex offender has in his or her identity is minimal. The analogy to fingerprints is convincing because the blood and saliva sampling mandated under section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 infringes on similar privacy interests. See Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 107, 856 P.2d at 1093 (Utter, J., concurring).\n\"[W]hen a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim privacy in it. We accept this proposition because the identification of suspects is relevant not only to solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future crimes. This becomes readily apparent when we consider the universal approbation of 'booking\u2019 procedures that are followed for every suspect arrested for a felony, whether or not the proof of a particular suspect\u2019s crime will involve the use of fingerprint identification. *** While we do not accept even this small level of intrusion for free persons without Fourth Amendment constraint [citation], the same protections do not hold true for those lawfully confined to the custody of the state.\u201d Jones, 962 F.2d at 306.\nFurthermore, to the extent that they are relevant in the present context, the prisoner/probationer cases lend persuasive support for the notion that convicted persons, although not ultimately incarcerated, maintain a diminished level of privacy rights as compared to free persons. Our supreme court has previously recognized that \"offenders necessarily have reduced expectations of privacy.\u201d (Adams, 149 Ill. 2d at 348.) Similar to the HIV testing statute at issue in Adams, section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 \"operates only at that point in the proceedings when a defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence but instead stands at the threshold of incarceration, probation, or other significant curtailment of personal freedom.\u201d (See Adams, 149 Ill. 2d at 348.) A person convicted of the sex offenses enumerated in section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 is not compelled to provide blood and saliva samples unless a previous plea of guilty had been entered or that person was proved guilty of an enumerated offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, because we consider the sampling mandated under section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 as functionally equivalent to fingerprinting, which also necessarily intrudes a convicted sex offender\u2019s diminished privacy interest (Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 107, 856 P.2d at 1093), we hold that the suspicionless blood and saliva sampling of persons convicted of the sex offenses enumerated in section 5 \u2014 4\u20143, regardless of the sentence imposed, does not violate the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. We recognize, however, that persons convicted of criminal offenses may not necessarily surrender all of their constitutional rights (see Canedy v. Boardman (7th Cir. 1994), 16 F.3d 183, 185) and accordingly limit our holding to the circumstances in the present case.\nDefendant contends next that section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 violates article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Defendant maintains that the express provision for protection against \"invasion of privacy\u201d in article I, section 6, necessarily affords convicted persons greater constitutional protection than the fourth amendment. Defendant cites no authority and presents no compelling argument in support of his contention that convicted sex offenders are afforded greater protection under our State Constitution than that provided under the United States Constitution. Instead, defendant relies solely on King v. Ryan (1992), 153 Ill. 2d 449, wherein the court struck down an implied consent statute which required motorists involved in an accident resulting in death or personal injury of any person to submit to suspicionless alcohol and drug testing.\nWe find King readily distinguishable. Unlike the statute at issue here, which mandates sampling after conviction, the statute in King allowed drug and alcohol testing when a motorist who was involved in an accident was neither charged with an offense nor was there probable cause to believe the motorist was intoxicated. (See King, 153 Ill. 2d at 464-65.) Additionally, in Adams, wherein HIV testing of certain sex offenders following conviction was upheld on fourth amendment and State constitutional grounds, the court expressed no opinion as to whether article I, section 6, of our State Constitution afforded convicted sex offenders any protection greater than that provided under the fourth amendment.\nIn the absence of any compelling argument from defendant, we decline to theorize on a question of uncertain constitutional dimension. Because any doubts concerning a statute\u2019s constitutionality will be resolved in favor of its validity (Adams, 149 Ill. 2d at 338), we hold that section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 of the Unified Code of Corrections does not violate the prohibition against unreasonable searches or invasions of privacy contained in article I, section 6, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court compelling defendant to provide blood and saliva samples under the statutory mandate of section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 of the Unified Code of Corree-tions. AdditionaEy, this court\u2019s order granting defendant a stay of enforcement of the circuit court\u2019s order pending appeal is vacated.\nAffirmed; motion to stay pending appeal vacated.\nMcLAREN and PECCARELLI, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DOYLE" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (William L. Browers and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE WEALER, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201493\u20140034\nOpinion filed June 29, 1994.\nG. Joseph Weller and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (William L. Browers and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0006-01", "first_page_order": 24, "last_page_order": 37 }