{ "id": 872594, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL A. GOYER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Goyer", "decision_date": "1994-07-26", "docket_number": "No. 4-93-0244", "first_page": "160", "last_page": "171", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 160" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 1138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1143" }, { "page": "1143" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173780 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" }, { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 N.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2534550 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 N.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" }, { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5246365 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757" }, { "page": "757" }, { "page": "758" }, { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2959864 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780-81" }, { "page": "781" }, { "page": "783" }, { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 452", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39831 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456-57" }, { "page": "369-70" }, { "page": "2354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 U.S. 682", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173132 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" }, { "page": "417" }, { "page": "1882" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/406/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 N.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5388124 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/246/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 171", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108476 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177-78" }, { "page": "168" }, { "page": "2208-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" }, { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5410959 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" }, { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338811 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "3151" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 U.S. 318", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1147005 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319-22" }, { "page": "296-98" }, { "page": "1527-29" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "298" }, { "page": "1529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/511/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2510866 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 N.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2871871 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/259/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 N.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2991886 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254905 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 N.E.2d 1175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1178" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597446 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 U.S. 377", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6170914 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" }, { "page": "1259" }, { "page": "976" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/390/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" }, { "page": "706" }, { "page": "1612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 941", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "948" }, { "page": "948" }, { "page": "948" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599731 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" }, { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 1349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1353" }, { "page": "1353" }, { "page": "1354" }, { "page": "1354" }, { "page": "1354" }, { "page": "1353" }, { "page": "1354" }, { "page": "1356-57" }, { "page": "1356" }, { "page": "1356-57", "parenthetical": "officer's subjective intent relevant only to extent it affects his behavior as reasonably perceived by the defendant" }, { "page": "1356-57" }, { "page": "1353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2553951 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468-69" }, { "page": "472-73" }, { "page": "472-73" }, { "page": "472-73" }, { "page": "472-73" }, { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0461-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1000, "char_count": 23640, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.127953496211696e-07, "percentile": 0.7654567891796008 }, "sha256": "a7340b3a226aaa0b57c8cca629d63ee2ffab5238bd4d47e1754e10d86f3ceab7", "simhash": "1:9b8c14ac374cc5d0", "word_count": 3908 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:16:00.157691+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL A. GOYER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn June 1992, the State charged defendant, Paul A. Goyer, with aggravated arson (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 20 \u2014 1.1). After a February 1993 bench trial, the trial court convicted defendant of that offense and later sentenced him to eight years in prison. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) refusing to suppress his statements, and (2) improperly considering conduct implicit in the offense of which he was convicted when imposing his sentence.\nWe affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nDuring the early hours of May 28, 1992, defendant started a fire in the basement of Carle Hospital in Urbana, Illinois, that primarily damaged part of the hospital\u2019s electrical system. Around 5:30 a.m., Officer Raymond Hutcherson of the Urbana police department was dispatched to Crystal Lake Park in Urbana with a description of defendant. Hutcherson found defendant wandering around the park near Carle Hospital and stopped defendant and asked him for identification. While checking his identification, Hutcherson explained to defendant that he was not under arrest, but that Hutcherson wanted to ask him a few questions. Soon thereafter, two other officers arrived.\nHutcherson and one of the other officers, Jeffrey Welborn, asked defendant several questions about the fire at the hospital. Defendant said that he was an employee of the hospital, but he had just quit because he was not allowed to take a cigarette break. During the conversation, Welborn indicated to defendant that they would like to talk to him further at the hospital. Welborn told defendant that he was not under arrest and that he could leave if he wanted to. Defendant agreed to accompany the officers back to the hospital. Before getting into a squad car, Welborn frisked defendant and found a disposable lighter and some matches in his pockets.\nWelborn drove defendant to the hospital, arriving around 6 a.m. He left defendant in an interview room unattended while he spoke in the hallway with assistant chief Robert Pettyjohn of the Urbana fire department. Defendant was not handcuffed or restrained in any way, the door to the room was not locked, and no guard was posted. When Welborn and Pettyjohn came into the room, Welborn told defendant that he wanted to ask him some questions but that he was not under arrest and was free to leave at any time. Defendant made no response.\nWelborn and Pettyjohn conducted the interview while Hutcherson silently observed from the back of the room. Welborn started by telling defendant that they were investigating a fire at the hospital. He again told defendant that he was not under arrest, was free to leave at any time, and that he would not he placed under arrest that morning regardless of any statement he might make. As the interview progressed, defendant admitted that he was not an employee at the hospital; instead, he was a patient there. Earlier that morning, he was in a basement area of the hospital and smelled smoke.\nAt this point in his statement, defendant said that he might wish to talk to an attorney. Pettyjohn responded that he simply wanted to learn more about the fire and was hoping defendant could help them do that. Thereafter, defendant essentially confessed to setting the fire.\nAt the conclusion of the interview, defendant was told that he was free to go, and he left. At no time was he given the Miranda warnings.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statements, finding as follows:\n\"Well, it\u2019s uncontroverted that the defendant was advised any number of times during the course of this whole episode that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave. I think a couple of the points that [the prosecutor] makes about returning the lighter to him, [and] about the fact that *** [defendant was], for all practical purposes, abandoned in this conference room at the emergency room with no one standing guard over him [are significant]. It\u2019s uncontroverted that he willingly consented to go from Crystal Lake Park to [the hospital] to discuss the matter.\nI think the indicia are that this is a non-custodial interview, and there\u2019s nothing to contradict that. Because of that, I think it\u2019s not necessary to touch the question of the attorney ***. I think all the characteristics of what happened, the way it\u2019s all been described here and that\u2019s not controverted, show this was clearly non-custodial and the motion to suppress [defendant\u2019s]. confession is denied.\u201d\nAs stated earlier, the trial court later found defendant guilty in a bench trial of aggravated arson.\nII. DEFENDANT\u2019S STATEMENTS\nA. Was the Interview Custodial for Miranda Purposes?\nDefendant first argues that he was in custody when he made his statements to the police. Therefore, because the officers did not give him the Miranda warnings, the trial court erred in not suppressing those statements. We disagree.\nInitially, we note that the ultimate issue before this court is whether to uphold the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion to suppress. A court of review will not disturb the trial court\u2019s decision on such a motion unless that decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Gorman (1991), 207 Ill. App. 3d 461, 468, 565 N.E.2d 1349, 1353.\nA defendant\u2019s entitlement to Miranda warnings during a police interview is triggered when he is in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. (People v. Melock (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 423, 439, 599 N.E.2d 941, 948, quoting Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612.) A defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes when either he is placed under formal arrest or his freedom of movement is restrained to the degree normally associated with a formal arrest. (Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 468, 565 N.E.2d at 1353.) Another way of stating this test is to objectively consider whether a reasonable person in the defendant\u2019s position, innocent of any crime, would believe himself to be in custody. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 440, 599 N.E.2d at 948.\n1. Defendant\u2019s Burden of Production\nIn Gorman, this court noted the threshold issue implicit in any defendant\u2019s motion to suppress a statement: did the defendant subjectively believe that he was in custody during the interview? (Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 469, 565 N.E.2d at 1354.) As we noted in Gorman, this issue is all too often ignored because defendants typically testify that they believed themselves to be in custody. In this case, however, no such testimony was offered.\nel Without affirmative evidence that the defendant believed he was in custody, the trial court need not consider what a reasonable person in the same position would have believed and can simply deny the motion to suppress. This is because \u2014 in addition to the objective requirement \u2014 the defendant must actually believe himself to be in custody in order for the safeguards enunciated in Miranda to apply. Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 469, 565 N.E.2d at 1354.\nThe following hypothetical clarifies the issue: if a defendant testifies that he believed he was not in custody but instead free to leave any time he wished during his questioning by the police, would the trial court need to consider what a reasonable person in that defendant\u2019s circumstances would believe? We think not, and we hold that when a defendant makes a motion to suppress his statements because he was in custody and not advised of his Miranda rights, before the trial court can conclude that defendant was in custody, it must first find that (1) defendant subjectively believed he was in custody, and (2) a reasonable person in defendant\u2019s position, innocent of any crime, would also believe himself to be in custody. (Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 469, 565 N.E.2d at 1354.) Thus, a defendant bringing such a motion to suppress bears the burden of production to show that he subjectively believed himself to be in custody during the police questioning.\nThis burden of production simply requires the defendant to introduce evidence that he believed he was in custody. We note that requiring this of a defendant does not interfere with his fifth amendment right not to testify at trial because the State is prohibited from introducing a defendant\u2019s testimony from a pretrial hearing during its case in chief at trial. (Simmons v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 377, 394, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247, 1259, 88 S. Ct. 967, 976; M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 104.4, at 43 (6th ed. 1994).) We further note that the great majority of defendants currently testify in support of their motions to suppress that they believed they were in custody.\nWe find analogous a defendant\u2019s burden in asserting self-defense in a murder case. Self-defense has two prongs: (1) the defendant\u2019s subjective belief that his killing was justified, and (2) the objective reasonableness of that belief. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 7 \u2014 1.) If the defendant did not subjectively believe his actions were justified as self-defense, his claim at trial of self-defense must fail no matter how third parties might have viewed the circumstances confronting defendant at the time he killed the deceased. In other words, it is irrelevant under those circumstances whether the killing might have been done objectively in self-defense. Similarly, if a defendant\u2019s motion seeks to suppress his statements on the grounds that he was in custody during the police interview, yet the defendant himself testifies that he did not believe himself in custody, it is irrelevant whether a reasonable person similarly situated would agree.\nThis analysis comports with the purpose of Miranda, whose warnings are designed to combat the compulsive and coercive aspect of custodial interrogation. (People v. Patterson (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 445, 451, 588 N.E.2d 1175, 1178.) If the defendant being questioned does not feel compelled or coerced into making a statement, whether a reasonable person would have felt the same is irrelevant, and the defendant\u2019s statements cannot be deemed the product of a compulsive and coercive environment the defendant never felt.\nHowever, in this case, the State failed to argue this threshold issue before the trial court. Furthermore, neither party briefed this issue on appeal. Accordingly, we decline to resolve defendant\u2019s claim on this basis.\n2. Custody\nIn this case, defendant clearly was not placed under formal arrest. Thus, in deciding whether he was nonetheless \"in custody,\u201d we must focus (as did the trial court) on whether he was deprived of his freedom of movement to the degree normally associated with a formal arrest. Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 468, 565 N.E.2d at 1353.\nCourts look to the following factors to evaluate whether a reasonable person in the defendant\u2019s position would believe himself to be in custody: (1) the location, mood, and length of the interview; (2) the number of police officers present; (3) the presence or absence of the defendant\u2019s family or friends; (4) any indicia of formal arrest, such as physical restraint, the show of weapons or force, booking, or fingerprinting; and (5) the manner by which the defendant arrived at the place of the interview. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 440, 599 N.E.2d at 948; Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 468-69, 565 N.E.2d at 1354.\nDefendant argues that several of these factors, including \"the extent of the knowledge of the police officers *** and the intentions of the officers,\u201d support his contention that he was in custody. We disagree and take this opportunity to clarify the very limited relevancy of a police officer\u2019s intent, knowledge, or focus. See Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 472-73, 565 N.E.2d at 1356-57.\n\u20222 Many courts have routinely mentioned the interrogating police officer\u2019s intent, knowledge, or focus at the time of the defendant\u2019s interview as factors to consider in determining whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda. (See, e.g., People v. Brown (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 116, 125, 554 N.E.2d 216, 220; People v. Holmes (1994), 255 Ill. App. 3d 271, 286, 626 N.E.2d 412, 423; In re C.A.G. (1994), 259 Ill. App. 3d 595, 597, 631 N.E.2d 473, 475; People v. Davis (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 163, 169, 547 N.E.2d 568, 572.) However, the United States Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion recently reaffirmed its custody holdings regarding Miranda as follows:\n\"We hold, not for the first time, that an officer\u2019s subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment whether the person is in custody.\nOur decisions make clear that the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Stansbury v. California (1994), 511 U.S. 318, 319-22, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 296-98, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1527-29.\nThus, the objective determination of custody involves an analysis of the circumstances surrounding the interview as a reasonable person in the defendant\u2019s position, innocent of any crime, would perceive them. Factors beyond the perception of the defendant, such as the private thoughts of the police, are irrelevant. See Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 472-73, 565 N.E.2d at 1356.\nIf undisclosed, the officer\u2019s knowledge, suspicion, intent, focus, subjective view, or thought of any kind can neither influence the defendant nor affect the coercive atmosphere of the interview in any way. (Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 472-73, 565 N.E.2d at 1356-57 (officer\u2019s subjective intent relevant only to extent it affects his behavior as reasonably perceived by the defendant).) Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Gorman that, if undisclosed, an officer\u2019s subjective thoughts and beliefs are irrelevant to the assessment whether the defendant is in custody. Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 472-73, 565 N.E.2d at 1356-57; see Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 298, 114 S. Ct. at 1529; see also Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 442, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 336, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 (\"A policeman\u2019s unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was 'in custody\u2019 at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect\u2019s position would have understood his situation\u201d).\nFurthermore, in light of Stansbury, we conclude that those cases discussing an officer\u2019s undisclosed subjective intent or beliefs are inconsistent with the Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Miranda and its progeny. The Supreme Court in Stansbury has clarified that those cases are overruled to the extent they direct \u2014 or even permit \u2014 the consideration of such factors.\n\u20223 In this case, defendant was interviewed by the police at the hospital, not the police station, for less than an hour. The trial court found that he voluntarily accompanied the police to the hospital to be questioned about the fire. Moreover, at each stage of defendant\u2019s contact with the police, they informed him that he was not under arrest and was free to leave at any time. He was also told that he would not be arrested that morning regardless of any statement he might make. Perhaps most significantly, defendant was never handcuffed or physically restrained in any way, or subjected to any indicia of formal arrest, such as fingerprinting or booking.\nDefendant argues, as he did to the trial court, that the number of police officers present during his interview constituted a \"show of force\u201d that convinced him he was under arrest. The trial court considered that argument in light of all the evidence and found that a reasonable person in defendant\u2019s position would not have believed himself to be in custody. We cannot say that the trial court\u2019s determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence and, accordingly, decline to reverse its ruling. See Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 468, 565 N.E.2d at 1353.\nB. Defendant\u2019s \"Request for Counsel\u201d\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in not suppressing the statements he made after his \"request for counsel\u201d during the interview. He claims that his request was clear and unequivocal, and the police therefore violated his rights by continuing the interview. We disagree.\n\u20224 Even assuming arguendo that defendant\u2019s \"request for counsel\u201d was unequivocal, it is irrelevant. If defendant was in custody during this interview, all of his statements from that interview would have to be suppressed because the officers never informed defendant of his Miranda rights. On the other hand, if the interview was noncustodial, no right to counsel exists for defendant to invoke. The fifth amendment right to counsel relates only to custodial interrogation. (People v. McDaniel (1993), 249 Ill. App. 3d 621, 632, 619 N.E.2d 214, 224; McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991), 501 U.S. 171, 177-78, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 168, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2208-09.) Because defendant was not in custody, his statement regarding an attorney, even if considered a clear and unequivocal request, does not implicate any constitutionally protected right, and the officers were consequently not required to end the interview. McDaniel, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 633, 619 N.E.2d at 224.\nFurthermore, we note that no sixth amendment right to counsel was available for defendant to invoke either. The right to counsel under the sixth amendment attaches only when judicial proceedings are initiated against the defendant. (People v. Laliberte (1993), 246 Ill. App. 3d 159, 164, 615 N.E.2d 813, 817; Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 U.S. 682, 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 417, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882.) The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this point in Davis v. United States (1994), 512 U.S. 452, 456-57, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 369-70, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354, wherein the Court held as follows:\n\"The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings, [citation], and before proceedings are initiated a suspect in a criminal investigation has no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.\u201d\nClearly, in this case, no judicial proceedings had been initiated against defendant when he mentioned the subject of counsel. As a result, defendant cannot find refuge in the sixth amendment.\nAccordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly found that \"it\u2019s not necessary to touch the question of [defendant\u2019s statement regarding an] attorney,\u201d and committed no error in its ruling.\nIII. DEFENDANT\u2019S SENTENCE\nLast, defendant argues that his sentence must be vacated because the trial court improperly considered in aggravation conduct implicit in the offense of which he was convicted. We again disagree.\nThe trial court is in the best position to make a reasoned judgment as to an appropriate sentence, and this court will not reverse the trial court absent an abuse of discretion in its decision. (People v. Nussbaum (1993), 251 Ill. App. 3d 779, 780-81, 623 N.E.2d 755, 757.) The trial court enjoys wide latitude in imposing sentence, and this court gives great deference and weight to the sentence that court thought appropriate. (Nussbaum, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 781, 623 N.E.2d at 757.) Moreover, a sentence that falls within statutory limits will not be disturbed on review unless it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Nussbaum, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 783, 623 N.E.2d at 758.\nIn imposing sentence, the trial court may not consider the bare elements of the offense as an aggravating factor. (People v. Miller (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 92, 104, 589 N.E.2d 617, 625.) However, \"[t]he gravity of the offense and surrounding circumstances are primary matters to consider.\u201d (People v. Andrews (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 474, 483, 569 N.E.2d 192,198.) Thus, the court may reflect upon the nature of the offense, including the circumstances and extent of each element as committed. (Miller, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 104, 589 N.E.2d at 625.) Additionally, section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(a)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides that the trial court may consider that the defendant\u2019s conduct threatened serious harm as an aggravating factor. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(a)(1).) Ultimately, the severity of the sentence depends upon the degree of harm inflicted, and that fact may therefore be considered as an aggravating factor, even if it is implicit in the offense. People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256, 269, 497 N.E.2d 1138, 1143.\nAt defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing, the trial court stated as follows:\n\"Weighed against all the factors of mitigation that operate in favor of [defendant] here, I think it\u2019s correct to focus down and pinpoint the nature and circumstances of the offense, as counsel has done, as a more serious aggravating factor. *** [T]hose fires were deliberately set. They may not have been *** on a hospital floor where there were patients, but certainly they were set in an area where any reasonable person could have contemplated in setting those fires that they had the potential for significant harm to a number of other people. Because of that factor, and it is a factor which I think outweighs the factors of mitigation here, I think that a minimum sentence to the Department of Corrections is not appropriate.\u201d\nThe trial court then sentenced defendant to eight years in prison.\nIn this case, defendant points to the trial court\u2019s comments regarding the presence of other people in the hospital when he set the fire, claiming that those comments indicate that the court improperly relied upon this fact when imposing sentence. Aggravated arson requires the defendant to know of the presence of other persons in the building. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 20 \u2014 1.1(a)(1).) Thus, defendant argues that the presence of other people in the hospital is an element of the offense, and the trial court therefore cannot rely upon it as an aggravating factor in sentencing.\n\u20225 Even assuming that the presence of other people is implicit in aggravated arson, the trial court\u2019s comments reveal that it was appropriately concerned about the vast harm defendant\u2019s actions could have caused. It did not rely upon the bare elements of the offense, but instead considered the degree to which defendant\u2019s conduct threatened serious harm to many others and the potential extent of that harm. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u2014 3.2(a)(1); Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d at 269, 497 N.E.2d at 1143.\nFurthermore, we note that aggravated arson is a Class X felony with a sentencing range of six to 30 years in prison. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 20 \u2014 1.1.(b), 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(3).) The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years, only two years more than the minimum sentence and well below the maximum. Clearly, this sentence is not \"manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.\u201d (Nussbaum, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 783, 623 N.E.2d at 758.) Accordingly, we hold that the sentence imposed by the trial court does not constitute an abuse of discretion.\nIV. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and\nsentence.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, P.J., and LUND, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Lawrence J. Essig, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Elliott Turpin, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL A. GOYER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201493\u20140244\nOpinion filed July 26, 1994.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Lawrence J. Essig, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Elliott Turpin, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0160-01", "first_page_order": 180, "last_page_order": 191 }