{ "id": 872584, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Phillips", "decision_date": "1994-06-30", "docket_number": "No. 1-91-1332", "first_page": "438", "last_page": "450", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 438" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 1092", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1098" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 1089", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599420 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/1059-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 N.E.2d 1269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1274" }, { "page": "1278" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543454 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 N.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 1023", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3558888 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 N.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5219367 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/228/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 U.S. 154", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1769234 ], "weight": 21, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" }, { "page": "681" }, { "page": "2684" }, { "page": "155-56" }, { "page": "672" }, { "page": "2676" }, { "page": "155-56" }, { "page": "672" }, { "page": "2676" }, { "page": "156" }, { "page": "672" }, { "page": "2676" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/438/0154-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1068, "char_count": 29651, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5247884464385898e-07, "percentile": 0.6699270884132627 }, "sha256": "ea8b678be31780ab4dbdd9bc00f2d2a73c03d38b9f56564e2cd56cf1cfa1b171", "simhash": "1:225bb4441bc285d5", "word_count": 4929 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:16:00.157691+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THEIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn January 6, 1989, an anonymous informant, \"John Doe,\u201d appeared before a judge on a request that a search warrant be executed. In the complaint for a search warrant, John Doe stated that earlier that day he had purchased one-half ounce of cocaine from the defendant, John Phillips, at 4712 North Paulina. Based on the informant\u2019s statement to the judge, the police obtained a search warrant for the apartment of the defendant, John Phillips. Upon executing the search warrant, the police discovered over 250 grams of cocaine and $18,550 located in a safe in the closet of the defendant\u2019s bedroom. The defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Before the trial, the defendant filed several motions to produce the informant and to suppress the evidence. All the motions were denied. After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver more than 100 grams but not more than 400 grams of cocaine, a controlled substance. The defendant was sentenced to 18 years in prison. He now appeals his conviction and sentence. We affirm.\nFACTS\nPretrial Motions\nBefore the trial, the defendant filed three motions. The first motion that the defendant filed was a motion to produce the informant. In this motion, he alleged that failing to produce the informant would prevent him from obtaining due process of law and effective assistance of counsel. The motion to produce the informant made reference to the second motion which the defendant filed on that same date, the motion to suppress evidence. The motion to suppress evidence alleged that the search warrant complaint contained false material statements which were necessary to the finding of probable cause. In this motion, the defendant requested a Franks evidentiary hearing. Franks v. Delaware (1978), 438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct. 2674.\nIn support of the motion to suppress evidence, the defendant filed affidavits prepared by the defendant and the defendant\u2019s mother. The defendant alleges that he also filed the affidavit of his friend, Daniel Crossland. Although Crossland\u2019s affidavit does not appear in the record, we will consider it because it is apparent that the trial court reviewed this document.\nThe defendant\u2019s affidavit stated that the defendant had been in the apartment all day but had slept from 6 a.m. until 9:30 or 10 p.m. According to the defendant, no one had come to the apartment that day. The defendant\u2019s mother stated in her affidavit that she had also been in the apartment all day. During the day, she had watched TV, read the paper, talked on the phone and prepared meals. She stated that her son had been home sleeping all day and no one had come to the apartment to buy drugs. Crossland\u2019s affidavit stated that he had been in the apartment at 4712 North Paulina all day. He stated that he had returned to the apartment at 6 a.m. and had gone to sleep. He slept all day, awakening at 9 or 10 p.m. He further stated that no one had come to the apartment that afternoon.\nThe defendant also filed a supplemental motion to suppress. In this motion, the defendant asserted that all evidence in the case should be suppressed because the complaint for a search warrant contained no statement of the reliability of the informant.\nAt a hearing held on June 5, 1990, the trial court denied all motions. After the arguments on the motion to produce the informant, the court found that a sufficient showing had not been made to reveal the informant or his identity. The trial judge also denied the motions to suppress the evidence. The court found that the affidavits were from interested parties and \"this factor *** would tend to weaken or could tend to weaken the effect of the affidavits.\u201d The court also found that the judge who issued the search warrant had the opportunity to observe the John Doe informant when he appeared before the court and could make an assessment as to whether that informant was credible and whether the search warrant should be issued. Based upon the totality of the circumstances before the judge, then, he concluded that the defendant had not made a substantial preliminary showing that an evidentiary hearing was necessary.\nTHE TRIAL\nThe defendant\u2019s trial began on February 27, 1991. Officer Bocconcelli, the first witness called, related the events leading up to the defendant\u2019s arrest. Officer Bocconcelli testified that on January 7, 1989, he had a search warrant authorizing him to search 4712 North Paulina, second floor. The officer stated that he first found the defendant in a bar and, after identifying himself as a police officer, told the defendant that he had a search warrant for his apartment. Officer Bocconcelli and the defendant then went to the apartment; Officer Bocconcelli found a safe in the closet of the defendant\u2019s bedroom and opened it. In the safe were several bags of white powder which the officer believed to be cocaine and $18,550 in United States currency. Officer Bocconcelli then stated that he placed the defendant under arrest. This testimony was substantially similar to the testimony offered by Officer Bertuca, who accompanied Officer Bocconcelli to the defendant\u2019s apartment on the night in question. The substance taken from the defendant\u2019s apartment was identified at trial as being over 250 grams of cocaine.\nThe defense rested its case without presenting any witnesses or evidence. After deliberating, the jury found the defendant guilty of the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver more than 100 grams but not more than 400 grams of cocaine, a controlled substance. On April 10, 1991, the judge denied all post-trial motions, including a motion for a new trial. The parties then proceeded to a sentencing hearing.\nThe Sentencing Hearing\nAt the sentencing hearing, the State described the defendant\u2019s history of convictions for narcotics offenses. The State also noted that the defendant was convicted of possessing a large amount of cocaine. Defense counsel, however, characterized the defendant\u2019s prior convictions as \"minor\u201d offenses. Defense counsel also noted that, although the defendant was arrested on similar charges after the arrest at issue in this case, he had not yet been tried or sentenced on those charges.\nThe judge elected to sentence the defendant to 18 years in prison, noting that the defendant had a more substantial involvement with drug trafficking than most individuals.\nThe defendant now appeals the sentence and conviction. We address the issues raised in turn.\nANALYSIS\nThe defendant does not challenge any of the proceedings at trial. Nonetheless, the defendant raises numerous issues in his brief concerning the pretrial motions and sentencing. We will discuss separately the issues raised with respect to each of the pretrial motions and then, finally, we will address the question of the propriety of the sentence.\nMotion to Produce the Informant\nInitially, the defendant raises the issue of whether the trial court properly denied his motion to produce the informant.\nThe motion to produce the informant asks the court to order the State to turn over sufficient information to enable the defendant to locate the confidential informant. In support of this motion, the defendant stated that he filed a Franks motion alleging that the affiant of the search warrant intentionally misrepresented facts or acted in reckless disregard of the truth. The defendant also asserted that the failure to identify the John Doe informant will prevent the defendant from receiving due process of law.\nSupreme Court Rule 412(j)(ii) concerns when it is proper to compel the discovery of the identity of an informant. (134 Ill. 2d R. 412(j)(ii).) The rule states, in part:\n\"(ii) Informants. Disclosure of an informant\u2019s identity shall not be required where his identity is a prosecution secret and a failure to disclose will not infringe the constitutional rights of the accused.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 412(j)(ii).\nIt is the defendant\u2019s burden to show a need for the disclosure of the identity of the informant. People v. McBee (1992), 228 Ill. App. 3d 769, 773, 593 N.E.2d 574, 576; People v. Stoica (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 660. 666. 516 N.E.2d 909. 913.\n\u20221 When a trial court is presented with a motion to produce an informant, it must work to balance conflicting concerns. On the one hand, the court must consider the public interest in protecting the flow of information from informants to the government. This consideration must be weighed against a defendant\u2019s need for disclosure of the identity of the informant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. (Roviaro v. United States (1957), 353 U.S. 53, 62, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639, 646, 77 S. Ct. 623, 628-29.) Therefore, during a trial, when the issue is the defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence, the trial court may sometimes find it necessary to order the State to disclose the identity of the informant or to produce the informant. The trial court may order disclosure of an informant\u2019s identity when \"the disclosure of an informer\u2019s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause.\u201d Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61, 1 L. Ed. 2d at 645, 77 S. Ct. at 628.\nHowever, the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court \"distinguish[ ] between the standard for disclosure of an informant\u2019s identity at trial as opposed to a preliminary hearing.\u201d (People v. Vauzanges (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 509, 519.) When a trial court is presented with a motion to produce an informant at a pretrial suppression hearing, the trial court is to exercise a discretionary standard. (Vauzanges, 158 Ill. 2d at 519-20.) In other words, the trial court is not required to produce the informant at a pretrial suppression hearing, but may elect to do so.\nIn this case, the defendant argues that he has a need to know the identity of the informant in order to assist him in making a \"substantial preliminary showing\u201d that the warrant was based on falsehood. The defendant must make a \"substantial preliminary showing\u201d that a false statement was knowingly or intentionally included in the affidavit to support the search warrant in order to obtain a Franks evidentiary hearing. (Franks v. Delaware (1978), 438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct. 2674.) However, it is firmly established in Illinois that a defendant does not have the right to the production of an informant prior to the time that it is found that he has made a \"substantial preliminary showing.\u201d People v. Martine (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 429, 478 N.E.2d 262; People v. Lesure (1990), 195 Ill. App. 3d 437, 552 N.E.2d 363; People v. Freeman (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 460 N.E.2d 125.\nIn People v. Martine, the Illinois Supreme Court was faced with a similar argument as that presented to this court today. Martine, the defendant, sought to have the informant produced in order that she might be able to make her substantial preliminary showing. The court began its discussion of this issue by looking at the language found in Franks:\n\" '*** [B]ecause we are faced today with only the question of the integrity of the affiant\u2019s representations as to his own activities, we need not decide, and we in no way predetermine, the difficult question whether a reviewing court must ever require the revelation of the identity of an informant once a substantial preliminary showing of falsity has been made\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Martine, 106 Ill. 2d at 437, 478 N.E.2d at 265, quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 170, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 681, 98 S. Ct. at 2684.\nThe Martine court then concluded that the substantial preliminary showing must be made before the informant must be produced. (Martine, 106 Ill. 2d at 437, 478 N.E.2d at 265.) The defendant in this case has not yet made a substantial preliminary showing. We therefore affirm the decision of the trial court to refuse to order the State to produce the informant.\nNor do we conclude that it is proper to order an in camera hearing in this case, as the defendant suggests. As Vauzanges states, \"[w]hen considering whether to order the production of the informant and/or the police file for an in camera examination or inspection, the trial court is concerned with the existence of the informant and with maintaining the integrity of the judicial process.\u201d (Vauzanges, 158 Ill. 2d at 520.) We are not concerned in this instance with whether the informant exists. The informant appeared before the judge issuing the search warrant in this case. Therefore, there is no need to order an in camera hearing to determine whether the informant exists.\nThe defendant also argues that the informant was not credible or reliable and that, therefore, his name should he disclosed. However, in this case, as noted above, the informant appeared before the judge issuing the search warrant. The judge had an opportunity to witness the informant\u2019s demeanor and to assess the credibility of the informant. Therefore, we do not find the defendant\u2019s argument to be persuasive.\nWe conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to produce the informant.\nMotion for a Franks Evidentiary Hearing\nThe defendant also filed a motion to suppress evidence, in which he requested a Franks evidentiary hearing. In support of this motion, the defendant attached several affidavits. These affidavits essentially stated that the defendant did not sell drugs to any individual on the day in question.\nAn affidavit in support of a search warrant is presumed valid. (People v. Lucente (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 133, 147, 506 N.E.2d 1269, 1274, quoting Franks v. Delaware (1978), 438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct. 2674; People v. McCoy (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 482 N.E.2d 200.) However, in Franks v. Delaware, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant may challenge the veracity of a search warrant affiant. As we have previously noted, to obtain an evidentiary hearing to challenge the search warrant affidavit, the defendant must make a \"substantial preliminary showing.\u201d (Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 672, 98 S. Ct. at 2676; People v. Lucente (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 133, 506 N.E.2d 1269.) Whether the defendant has made a sufficient \"substantial preliminary showing\u201d is a matter within the trial court\u2019s discretion. (People v. Castro (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 227, 236-37, 546 N.E.2d 662, 668.) Once the defendant makes a \"substantial preliminary showing,\u201d the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 672, 98 S. Ct. at 2676.) If the defendant is successful in making a \"substantial preliminary showing,\u201d then the search warrant is voided. People v. Vauzanges (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 509, 517, citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 156, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 672, 98 S. Ct. at 2676.\nm2 In the case at bar, the trial court refused to grant a Franks hearing. We agree that these affidavits do not rise to the level of having made a \"substantial preliminary showing\u201d of a deliberate falsehood and, therefore, the defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.\nAs the trial judge noted, these affidavits were all from interested parties. An affidavit of an interested party tends to be weaker support for a motion to quash the warrant. (See People v. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 154, 506 N.E.2d at 1278.) Obviously, the defendant had an interest in denying the assertions of the John Doe informant. The defendant\u2019s mother and friend also had an interest in seeing that the defendant was not incarcerated.\nMore importantly, the affidavits do not establish that the defendant could not have sold cocaine to the informant on the day in question. First, the defendant\u2019s mother stated that she was in the apartment all day and she did not observe any drug sales. However, as the trial judge noted, there is no indication of the layout of the apartment in the affidavit and there is no reference concerning whether Mrs. Phillips had a clear view of the door and the remainder of the premises at all times.\nSecond, Daniel Crossland asserted that he was asleep the entire day. If he was asleep, then any person could have entered the apartment at any time and Crossland would not have been aware of the party\u2019s presence.\nThe final affidavit is from the defendant himself. A self-serving denial of the assertions contained in the affidavit supporting the complaint for a search warrant and an alibi of \"I was asleep the whole time\u201d cannot serve to create enough doubt concerning the truthfulness of the affidavit presented to support the search warrant.\nIn concluding that the affidavits do not rise to the level of creating a sufficient substantial preliminary showing, we look to People v. Tovar (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 986, 523 N.E.2d 1178, as support. In To-var, the police officer obtained a search warrant based upon the statements of an informant. Tovar argued, however, that he deserved a Franks evidentiary hearing. To support this motion, Tovar presented two affidavits. One was his own affidavit, saying that he went to work on that day, returned at 4:45 p.m., had dinner with his family, went out at 6 p.m. to visit friends, and did not return until 10:30 p.m. Tovar also presented the affidavit of his wife which stated virtually the same thing.\nThe Tovar court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. It compared and distinguished Lucente, noting that in both cases the affidavits were from interested parties. However, in Tovar, the affidavits did not establish that it was impossible for an informant to have access to the apartment; the affidavits were akin to \"I didn\u2019t do it\u201d affidavits. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the trial court that the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Franks.\nAs in Tovar, we are here presented with affidavits from interested parties. Like Tovar, the affidavits presented by the defendant in this case do not establish that it was impossible for an informant to have access to an apartment. Therefore, we conclude that the defendant has not made a substantial preliminary showing, as required by Franks.\nThe defendant contends that a \"different standard\u201d should be applied when analyzing information supplied by a drug addict who is, in the words of the defendant, \"presumptively unreliable.\u201d In his argument, the defendant compares the informants in Franks, who were ordinary citizens, with the informant in this case. The defendant states that the Franks court held that a challenge to the officer\u2019s affidavit must establish that the officer had lied or had acted with reckless disregard for the truth. However, the defendant asserts that the standard in this case should instead be one which allows defendants to attack the credibility of the informant.\n\u20223 Franks did not address the question which the defendant raises here concerning whether a reviewing court should apply a lower standard where the informant is not an ordinary citizen. The defendont cites us to no cases decided after Franks which concluded that a different standard should be applied. Moreover, we do not believe that this is the proper case in which to raise this issue. In this case, the informant appeared before the judge issuing the search warrant and the judge was able to assess the credibility of the informant. After observing the informant, the judge issued the search warrant.\nAs previously noted, this search warrant is presumed to be valid. The defendant has shown no reason why this presumption should be challenged in this case. For the above reasons, then, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.\nThe Supplemental Motion to Suppress Evidence\nIn the supplemental motion to suppress evidence, the defendant contends that all evidence should be suppressed for essentially two reasons. First, the defendant argues that there was no showing that the informant was credible. Then, the defendant\u2019s argument evolves into an assertion that the police made no attempt to corroborate any of the informant\u2019s allegations.\nIn raising these issues, the defendant asserts that this court should apply the test established in Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317. Gates set forth what has come to be known as the \"totality of the circumstances\u201d analysis. The Gates Court set forth the test as follows:\n\"The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity\u2019 and 'basis of knowledge\u2019 of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... concluding]\u2019 that probable cause existed.\u201d Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 548, 103 S. Ct. at 2332, quoting Jones v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 271, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 708, 80 S. a. 725, 736.\nThe \"totality of the circumstances\u201d standard which was established in Gates was adopted in Illinois in People v. Tisler (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 226, 469 N.E.2d 147.\nFirst, the defendant states that there was no indication in the search warrant that the informant was reliable. Therefore, the defendant argues that the evidence obtained from the search should be suppressed. As support for this argument, the defendant relies primarily upon Illinois v. Gates, which involves an affidavit which was based upon the hearsay statements of an informant.\n\u20224 In this case, however, there is no question that the informant appeared before the judge who issued the search warrant and the warrant was based on the informant\u2019s personal observations. The complaint for the search warrant contains the unequivocal statement, \"I John Doe [sic] appear before this court and relate the following ***,\u201d and the complaint for the search warrant was signed by \"John Doe.\u201d Additionally, at oral argument, counsel for the defendant acknowledged that the informant probably appeared before the judge issuing the search warrant.\nDespite the defendant\u2019s attempts to have us apply the analysis presented in Gates, cases which concern the credibility of hearsay informants have no relevance to a case such as that presented here, where the informant appears before the issuing judge. (See, e.g., People v. O\u2019Neal (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 448, 450-51, 352 N.E.2d 282, 284.) When the informant appears before the judge issuing the search warrant, the informant is under oath and any statement which he makes is subject to that oath; moreover, the judge has the opportunity to personally observe the demeanor of the informant and to assess the informant\u2019s credibility. (See J. Haddad, Arrest, Search and Seizure ch. 15, \u00a7 15.14 (Ill. Inst. for Cont. Legal Educ. 1985 & Supp. 1990).) Therefore, \"[w]here the informant himself is the affiant to the complaint and he recites facts that he personally observed, a showing of the reliability of the informant is not constitutionally required.\u201d People v. Skinner (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 119, 121, 483 N.E.2d 399, 401. See also People v. Evans (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1049-50, 373 N.E.2d 524, 528.\nThe second point which the defendant raises is that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant because the affidavit did not indicate that the police had made an attempt to corroborate any of the informant\u2019s allegations. We conclude that this argument is also without merit.\nCorroboration was not needed in this case where the informant appeared before the judge issuing the search warrant. We recognize the value of independent police corroboration of an informant\u2019s tip. (See Gates, 462 U.S. at 241, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 550, 103 S. Ct. at 2334.) However, the analysis set forth in Gates is based upon affidavits which rely upon hearsay. Therefore, the analysis applied in Gates is not applicable to the set of facts presently before this court.\nThis case is different because the informant appeared before the judge issuing the search warrant. Therefore, we do not need corroboration of the informant\u2019s allegations because the judge issuing the search warrant had an opportunity to assess the informant\u2019s veracity and to determine the basis of his knowledge. The judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. In this case, corroboration by the police of the information included in the warrant affidavit was not necessary.\nFor these reasons, we conclude that the supplemental motion to suppress evidence was properly denied.\nTHE PROPRIETY OF THE SENTENCE\nAfter a sentencing hearing at which the trial judge was presented with both aggravating and mitigating factors, the defendant was sentenced to 18 years\u2019 incarceration. The defendant argues that his sentence was excessive, specifically alleging that the court overlooked mitigating factors.\nThe State argues that this issue is waived. The defendant did not raise any objection at the sentencing hearing. The defendant also did not raise any issue with respect to sentencing in a post-trial motion. However, we note that the State\u2019s argument is no longer viable, in light of the recent decision rendered by the Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Lewis (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 386.\n\u20225 Nonetheless, we find that the defendant\u2019s position has no merit. A trial judge\u2019s decision with respect to sentencing is entitled to great weight. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154, 368 N.E.2d 882, 884; People v. Kirkman (1993), 241 Ill. App. 3d 959, 965, 609 N.E.2d 827, 832.) The trial court is in the best position to determine an appropriate sentence because of its ability to hear evidence and view witnesses. (People v. Jones (1992), 236 Ill. App. 3d 244, 251, 603 N.E.2d 619, 624.) Therefore, \"the imposition of a sentence is a matter of judicial discretion and ***, absent an abuse of this discretion, the sentence of the trial court may not be altered upon review.\u201d Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 153, 368 N.E.2d at 883. See also People v. Houston (1992), 240 Ill. App. 3d 754, 767, 608 N.E.2d 46, 54.\nMoreover, a sentence which is within the statutory guidelines will not be disturbed upon review unless it is grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. (People v. Moore (1988), 178 Ill. App. 3d 531, 542, 533 N.E.2d 463, 470.) The offense of possession of more than 100 but less than 400 grams of a controlled substance with intent to deliver is punishable by a prison term of not less than 9 years and not more than 40 years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 561/2, par. 1401.1(1).) The defendant was sentenced to 18 years\u2019 incarceration. This sentence is squarely within the sentencing guidelines established in the statute. We do not find that the trial judge abused his discretion in this matter.\nThe defendant argues that the court failed to consider such factors as his educational background and his employment history in mitigation. \"When a court hears evidence in mitigation, it is presumed that a court considered that evidence. (People v. Whitehead (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 900, 908, 525 N.E.2d 1084, 1089.) The record in this case indicates that the court stated at sentencing that it considered the factors which the parties presented in aggravation and mitigation. Specifically, the court stated:\n\"Having considered] the factors in aggravation and mitigation that\u2019s been [sz'c] presented during this sentencing hearing as well as the pre-sentence report that\u2019s been filed ***, I believe a proper sentence in this case would be that of 18 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections, and that\u2019s the sentence I\u2019m going to impose upon you.\nThe amount of narcotics involved was substantial, and that in conjunction with your prior background indicates to me that you have had more involved connection with drug trafficking than most individuals. ***\nYour background is also substantial, and I believe a sentence such as this is warranted.\u201d\nBased upon this statement by the trial judge, we believe that the trial court properly considered all factors in aggravation and mitigation.\nThe defendant also argues that an 18-year sentence reduces the chances of rehabilitation of this defendant. However, \"a trial court is not required to give rehabilitative potential more weight than it gives the seriousness of an offense.\u201d (People v. Tatum (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 821, 826, 537 N.E.2d 875, 878.) The prime responsibility for determining the proper balance between the two factors lies with the trial court. (People v. Greene (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1099, 513 N.E.2d 1092, 1098.) We will not disturb the trial court\u2019s decision in this matter.\nCONCLUSION\nIn conclusion, we affirm the decision of the trial court. We find that the trial court properly denied the motion to produce the informant. The trial court also properly dismissed the motion to suppress evidence and the supplemental motion to suppress evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to 18 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nAffirmed.\nHOFFMAN, P.J., and CAHILL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THEIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas Peters, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and Laura Bertucci, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201491\u20141332\nOpinion filed June 30, 1994.\nThomas Peters, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and Laura Bertucci, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0438-01", "first_page_order": 458, "last_page_order": 470 }