{ "id": 333137, "name": "MICHAEL O'KEEFE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "O'Keefe v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund", "decision_date": "1994-10-27", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201492\u20143772", "first_page": "960", "last_page": "965", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 960" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 923", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549492 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" }, { "page": "27-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 527", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6188807 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 517", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11339213 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "3206-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 327", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204748 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339-40" }, { "page": "673-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 810", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 Ill. App. 3d 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2520435 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/190/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "852 F.2d 951", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10546531 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "956" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/852/0951-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 U.S. 496", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6191246 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/457/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 577, "char_count": 12378, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.01280557283455522 }, "sha256": "1ab808423baa49716f02f424236b229c0f4575c7b739bd8e91ddc6b9ce0c72ed", "simhash": "1:0c3d75323e20d73f", "word_count": 2079 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:32:09.244505+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MICHAEL O\u2019KEEFE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CAHILL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nMichael O\u2019Keefe appeals the dismissal of his suit to recover salary, disability and medical benefits for injuries suffered as a Chicago firefighter. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.\nO\u2019Keefe was a fire department paramedic. He was injured on duty in a traffic accident while driving an ambulance on May 29, 1988. He refused to take drug and alcohol tests required of firefighters after a traffic accident which involves injuries.\nO\u2019Keefe was placed on disability leave with full salary, as required under section 7.3 of the labor contract between the City of Chicago (City) and the Chicago Fire Fighters Union. The contract requires the City to pay all hospital and medical costs of employees injured on duty.\nOn August 24, 1988, the fire department fired O\u2019Keefe for his refusal to submit to a drug and alcohol test. The City stopped paying his salary and medical bills after that date.\nO\u2019Keefe filed a grievance alleging that he was fired without cause. He sought reinstatement and also alleged that under the labor contract he was owed a full year of salary and all medical costs. The grievance went to arbitration. The arbitrator issued awards on January 9, 1991, and July 26, 1991. He upheld O\u2019Keefe\u2019s discharge, but held that O\u2019Keefe was owed salary and benefits for a full year\u2014 from May 29, 1988, to May 29, 1989. After the arbitrator\u2019s decision and until now, the City has paid O\u2019Keefe only part of one year\u2019s salary and no medical costs.\nOn September 4, 1991, O\u2019Keefe applied to the Retirement Board of Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund (Retirement Board) for duty disability benefits under section 6 \u2014 151 of the Illinois Pension Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 151). Under that section, a firefighter injured on duty is entitled to 75% of his salary for as long as he is disabled until compulsory retirement age. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 151.\nThe Retirement Board rejected O\u2019Keefe\u2019s application as untimely because he submitted it after he was fired. O\u2019Keefe filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. He then filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court. He named the Retirement Board, the City of Chicago, and Donald Stensland, a deputy fire commissioner of the fire department and a representative of the City in the discharge and arbitration proceedings, as defendants. He alleged that the City\u2019s termination of benefits and failure to pay the arbitration awards violated section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1983 (West 1988)). He also alleged that the Retirement Board\u2019s refusal to pay duty disability benefits violated section 1983 and the Illinois Pension Code.\nDefendants moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615.) The trial court granted the motion.\nWe first address the dismissal of O\u2019Keefe\u2019s section 1983 claim against the City. The complaint alleged that O\u2019Keefe was deprived of procedural due process when the City paid only part of the arbitration awards. The trial court ruled that O\u2019Keefe\u2019s complaint stated a cause of action against the City for the balance due on the arbitration awards, but did not state a cause of action under section 1983 because his remedies under State law were adequate. The court then granted O\u2019Keefe leave to file an amended complaint to enforce the arbitration awards. As of the filing of this appeal, O\u2019Keefe has not amended his complaint or filed a separate action to compel the City to pay the arbitration awards.\nO\u2019Keefe argues that the trial court\u2019s dismissal of his section 1983 claim is error because he is not required to exhaust his State remedies before filing a section 1983 claim, either in Federal or State court. (Patsy v. Board of Regents (1982), 457 U.S. 496, 73 L. Ed. 2d 172, 102 S. Ct. 2557.) We disagree. O\u2019Keefe\u2019s procedural due process claim under section 1983 is defective, not because he failed to exhaust State remedies, but because he has not shown that they are inadequate under a due process analysis. See Kauth v. Hartford Insurance Co. (7th Cir. 1988), 852 F.2d 951; Towne v. Town of Libertyville (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 563, 546 N.E.2d 810.\nIn Kauth, the Seventh Circuit confirmed what has become a settled rule in section 1983 actions alleging a denial of procedural due process: a complaint does not state a cause of action unless it challenges the fundamental fairness of the State\u2019s procedures. (Kauth, 852 F.2d at 956, citing Daniels v. Williams (1986), 474 U.S. 327, 339-40, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662, 673-74, 106 S. Ct. 662 (Stevens, J., concurring), and Hudson v. Palmer (1984), 468 U.S. 517, 539, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393, 411, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3206-07.) In Towne, this court affirmed the dismissal of a section 1983 action. The plaintiff failed to pursue State eminent domain proceedings and then failed to allege that they were inadequate in his section 1983 complaint that his property was taken without just compensation. Towne, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 568.\nIf the process available in the State action is adequate, due process is satisfied, and no section 1983 claim can lie. Parratt v. Taylor (1981), 451 U.S. 527, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420, 101 S. Ct. 1908.\nO\u2019Keefe does not allege that the grievance and arbitration procedures available to discharged firefighters are constitutionally inadequate, nor could he: with an arbitration award in hand, O\u2019Keefe has several State law alternatives for relief. The simple and direct approach is an action to reduce the awards to a judgment under the Uniform Arbitration Act (710 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 1992)).\nWe next address the claims against the Retirement Board. O\u2019Keefe\u2019s complaint contains two allegations which attack the Retirement Board\u2019s denial of duty disability benefits: (1) that the denial relied on an erroneous interpretation of the Pension Code and (2) interfered with O\u2019Keefe\u2019s rights under section 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act. These claims are intertwined, and the trial court rejected them both, relying on Di Falco v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen\u2019s Pension Fund of the Wood Dale Fire Protection District No. One (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 22, 521 N.E.2d 923. Di Falco holds that a firefighter has no right to disability benefits under article 4 of the Pension Code unless he applies for those benefits while still employed.\nDi Falco was a probationary firefighter in Du Page County, Illinois. In October 1982, Di Falco injured his spine while working. He began disability leave on December 2, 1982. The fire commissioners discharged him on May 26, 1983. On May 24, 1984, Di Falco submitted an application for a duty-related pension under the Pension Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 110). His application was denied because he submitted it after he was discharged. The supreme court affirmed, interpreting article 4 of the Pension Code to require that a firefighter submit an application for benefits before discharge. Di Falco, 122 Ill. 2d at 33.\nOur case differs from Di Falco. O\u2019Keefe filed for disability under article 6 of the Pension Code. Because of the differences between articles 4 and 6, we believe that the court\u2019s analysis in Di Falco does not control the outcome of O\u2019Keefe\u2019s claim.\nArticle 4 governs firefighters who work in municipalities of less than 500,000 people (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 101 et seq.), and section 4 \u2014 110 governs their right to receive a duty-related disability benefit (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 110). Article 6 governs firefighters who work in Chicago (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 101 et seq.), and section 6 \u2014 151 governs duty-related disability benefits (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 151). The supreme court analyzed Di Falco\u2019s entitlement to a duty disability benefit under section 4 \u2014 106, which defines a \"fireman\u201d as \"any person *** employed by a city in its fire service as a fireman.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 106.) The court noted that section 4 \u2014 101 provides that the pension fund was established for the benefit of firefighters, defined as persons employed by a city in its fire service. The court stated, \"a discharged fire fighter is obviously not 'employed,\u2019 in any sense of the word, by a city in its fire service and the pension fund was not established for his benefit.\u201d Di Falco, 122 Ill. 2d, at 27-28.\nThe article 6 definition of \"fireman\u201d differs from that in article 4. A \"fireman\u201d under article 6 is \"[a]ny person who *** was, is, or shall be employed by a city in its fire service as a fireman.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 106.) The difference in definitions is apparent. Section 6 \u2014 101 provides: \"a firemen\u2019s annuity and benefit fund shall be created, set apart, and maintained, for the benefit of its firemen.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 101.) Since the definition of an article 6 fireman includes a person who was employed as a fireman, O\u2019Keefe, even after discharge, is entitled to apply for a pension benefit.\nThere is additional statutory support for this analysis. In considering whether Di Falco was entitled to benefits under section 4 \u2014 110 when he applied after discharge, the supreme court emphasized that the section contained only the term \"fireman,\u201d earlier defined as firefighters employed. Section 6 \u2014 151 on the other hand uses two terms: \"fireman\u201d and \"active fireman.\u201d An \"active fireman\u201d is defined as \"[a]ny person employed and receiving salary as a fireman.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 109.\nThe Retirement Board argues the term \"active fireman\u201d applies both to the time when a fireman is injured and when he applies for benefits. O\u2019Keefe contends the section mandates that a fireman be \"active\u201d only at the time of his injury, not at the time he claims duty disability benefits.\nWe agree with O\u2019Keefe\u2019s reading. Under the first paragraph of section 6 \u2014 151, a person who is an \"active fireman\u201d when injured may receive a duty disability benefit, but only if he is not receiving a salary. Since an active fireman is defined as one who is employed and receiving a salary, he is ineligible under section 6 \u2014 151 to receive a duty disability benefit. We conclude section 6 \u2014 151 mandates that a fireman be active only at the time of injury to have a right to a duty disability benefit. Under the Retirement Board\u2019s analysis, an active fireman would be required to apply for a duty disability benefit before he becomes eligible and before he may even know he is eligible. A \"catch 22\u201d reading of the statute should give us pause.\nO\u2019Keefe contends that he was an active fireman when injured and a fireman, though discharged, when he applied for a duty disability benefit. It is a contention that avoids an absurd result, and we are persuaded by it. We find that O\u2019Keefe states a cause of action under the statute and the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against the Retirement Board.\nFinally, O\u2019Keefe argues that the Retirement Board should have been required to file the administrative record as its answer under section 3 \u2014 106 of the Administrative Review Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 106). Our decision disposes of the motion to dismiss the claims against the Retirement Board as one granted in error because we distinguish Di Falco. That being the case, the cause is reversed and remanded to the trial court and the Retirement Board will be required to proceed under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.\nHOFFMAN, P.J., and JOHNSON, J\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CAHILL" } ], "attorneys": [ "J. Peter Dowd and Linda Wyetzner, both of Dowd & Bloch, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Fagel & Haber, of Chicago (Steven J. Teplinsky, Maynard B. Russell, and Lawrence T. Krulewich, of counsel), for appellees Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago and Donald Stensland.", "Susan S. Sher, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Jean Dobrer, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees City of Chicago and Donald Stensland." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MICHAEL O\u2019KEEFE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201492\u20143772\nOpinion filed October 27, 1994.\nJ. Peter Dowd and Linda Wyetzner, both of Dowd & Bloch, of Chicago, for appellant.\nFagel & Haber, of Chicago (Steven J. Teplinsky, Maynard B. Russell, and Lawrence T. Krulewich, of counsel), for appellees Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago and Donald Stensland.\nSusan S. Sher, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Jean Dobrer, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees City of Chicago and Donald Stensland." }, "file_name": "0960-01", "first_page_order": 978, "last_page_order": 983 }