{ "id": 381818, "name": "In re ESTATE OF HAROLD BEIDER, Deceased", "name_abbreviation": "In re Estate of Beider", "decision_date": "1994-12-30", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201493\u20144053", "first_page": "1094", "last_page": "1098", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 1094" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "370 A.2d 1301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1304" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Conn. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 529178 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/171/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.W.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10596214 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/443/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 N.E.2d 878", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5282889 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/217/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3131814 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/241/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 1309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 817", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5641685 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0817-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 N.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 2d 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2562375 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/80/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 N.E.2d 1024", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3234869 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/80/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 N.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 1077", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3109867 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1080" }, { "page": "1081" }, { "page": "1081" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/1077-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 523, "char_count": 9584, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.059989733099374e-07, "percentile": 0.5563361029928772 }, "sha256": "4827239a5e9f5953175a941e89cbb189e52071e724f3b94bc0e3fe2e92307808", "simhash": "1:2ac779047b21c34f", "word_count": 1626 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:15:47.504806+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ESTATE OF HAROLD BEIDER, Deceased." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RAKOWSKI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers) filed a petition to reopen the estate of Harold Beider (Harold) and for leave to file a claim against the estate. Travelers contended that it was a creditor of the estate, that it did not receive timely notice of Harold\u2019s death, and that it only became aware of Harold\u2019s death after the estate was closed. The trial court granted Marlys Beider\u2019s (co-executor of the estate, hereafter Marlys) section 2\u2014619 motion to dismiss the petition. (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619 (West 1992).) We aflirm.\nOn November 14, 1984, Harold Beider signed a promissory note. Harold agreed to make quarterly payments beginning on January 10, 1985, and concluding on October 10, 1991. Pursuant to its financial guarantee bond with Harold\u2019s lender, Greycas, Inc., Travelers acted as a surety with respect to Harold\u2019s obligations under the promissory note, agreeing to pay Greycas, Inc., the amounts due in the event of Harold\u2019s default. Harold defaulted on April 10, 1988, July 10, 1989, January 10, 1990, April 10, 1990, July 10, 1990, and October 10, 1990. Following each of these defaults, Travelers paid the amounts due and demanded indemnity from Harold by mailing a letter to his residence at 1100 North Michigan in Wilmette, Illinois. On September 23, 1990, Harold indemnified Travelers for the amount Travelers paid as a result of his January 10, 1990, default.\nOn October 12, 1990, Harold died. Harold\u2019s wife, Marlys Beider, and Theodore Borkan were named independent co-representatives of Harold\u2019s estate and petitioned the circuit court of Cook County for the admission of Harold\u2019s will to probate and for the issuance of letters testamentary. Marlys published notice of probate to unknown creditors in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin on October 29, 1990, November 5, 1990, and November 12, 1990.\nSubsequent to Harold\u2019s death, Travelers continued to send demand letters to Harold at the Wilmette address. On April 30, 1991, the six-month period for filing claims expired under section 18\u20143 of the Probate Act of 1975 (Act) (755 ILCS 5/1\u20141 et seq. (West 1992)) and on July 15, 1992, the estate was closed. On November 4, 1992, still unaware that Harold was deceased, Travelers filed a law division suit against Harold, personally, to recover the $54,976 owed. Finally, in December 1992, when it first learned of Harold\u2019s death, Travelers filed its petition to reopen the estate and for leave to file a claim.\nSection 18\u201412 states in part:\n\"Limitations on payment of claims, (a) Every claim against the estate of a decedent, except expenses of administration and surviving spouse\u2019s or child\u2019s award, is barred as to all of the decedent\u2019s estate if:\n(1) Notice is given to the claimant as provided in Section 18\u20143 and the claimant does not file a claim with the representative or the court on or before the date stated in the notice; or\n(2) Notice of disallowance is given to the claimant as provided in Section 18\u201411 and the claimant does not file a claim with the court on or before the date stated in the notice; or\n(3) The claimant or the claimant\u2019s address is not known to or reasonably ascertainable by the representative and the claimant does not file a claim with the representative or the court on or before the date stated in the published notice as provided in Section 18\u20143.\n(b) Unless sooner barred under subsection (a) of this Section, all claims which could have been barred under this Section are, in any event, barred 2 years after decedent\u2019s death, whether or not letters of office are issued upon the estate of the decedent.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/18\u201412(a), (b) (West 1992).\nSection 18\u201412 was adopted for the purpose of facilitating early settlement of estates. (In re Estate of Hoheiser (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1080, 424 N.E.2d 25; see also In re Estate of Garawany (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 401, 399 N.E.2d 1024; Messenger v. Rutherford (1967), 80 Ill. App. 2d 25, 225 N.E.2d 94.) \"The filing of a claim within the period specified by section 18\u201412 is mandatory ***.\u201d (Hoheiser, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 1081.) A failure to file a claim within the statutory period is a bar to the claim, even if the executor had personal knowledge of the claim. (Garawany, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 404.) \"[N]o exception to the filing period may be engrafted by judicial decision.\u201d (Hoheiser, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 1081; see also In re Estate of Ito (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 817, 365 N.E.2d 1309.) \"A probate court cannot authorize an administrator to pay a claim after the claim has been barred from payment under the statute. 'To authorize payment under these circumstances would in effect nullify the provision in the statute.\u2019 \u201d Messenger, 80 Ill. App. 2d at 29, quoting Yaple v. Mahy (1926), 241 Ill. App. 446, 453.\nIn the instant case, whether Travelers is a known creditor, unknown creditor, a party that received notice or one that did not, does not matter. Section 18\u201412(b) states that all claims are barred two years after the decedent\u2019s death. Here, Harold died on October 12, 1990. Neither the law division suit against Harold (assuming arguendo that it constituted a claim against the estate), nor the petition to reopen the estate was filed within the two-year limit. The only actions taken within the two-year limit were Travelers\u2019 demand letters to Harold. As such, and as conceded by Travelers\u2019 counsel during oral argument, unless these letters constitute a claim against the estate, Travelers is barred by section 18\u201412(b) of the Act.\nThe letters were mailed both before and after Harold\u2019s death to the Beiders\u2019 Wilmette residence. Marlys remained in the residence after Harold died. The letters were addressed to and made demand of Harold Beider.\nTravelers refers to section 18\u20142 of the Act and In re Matter of Estate of Wagler (1991), 217 Ill. App. 3d 526, 577 N.E.2d 878, to support its contention that these letters are sufficient to state a claim against the estate. Section 18\u20142 states that \"[e]very claim filed must be in writing and state sufficient information to notify the representative of the nature of the claim or other relief sought.\u201d (755 ILCS 5/18\u20142 (West 1992).) Travelers notes that under Wagler technical legal form is not required in the presentation of a claim against an estate because the allowance of a claim is not governed by the technical rules which apply to a formal suit at law. The argument, however, is without merit. Section 18\u20142 and Wagler deal with the language or form of a claim as opposed to who the claim must be made against. The issue sub judice is whether the post-mortem demand against Harold can be interpreted as a claim against the estate. The parties have not cited, nor has our research located, Illinois authority on this issue.\nWe find Harter v. Lenmark (Minn. 1989), 443 N.W.2d 537, supportive of the position that correspondence sent to Harold personally was not notice to Marlys of Travelers\u2019 claim against the estate. In Harter, a husband and wife had each signed promissory notes. The court held that the demand letters the creditor had sent to the husband in his individual capacity as a co-debtor were insufficient to constitute a claim against his wife\u2019s estate, of which he was the executor. The court noted:\n\"[T]he two letters did not request or demand payment from the estate, but only from [the estate\u2019s representative] individually. While it can be assumed that *** [the] personal representative of the estate, was aware of [the decedent\u2019s] participation and obligations under at least one of the notes, no claim or demand for payment from the estate was asserted. Moreover, there is no indication that the letters were written in response to the published notice to creditors ***.\u201d Harter, 443 N.W.2d at 539.\nLikewise, we find that State v. Griffin (1976), 171 Conn. 333, 370 A.2d 1301, supports Marlys\u2019 position. In Griffin, the administratrix acknowledged that she received a letter, addressed to her, from the creditor, albeit she had not yet been appointed administratrix, nor applied for letters of administration. The court found that the letter made it clear that there was an intention that the letter serve as notice to the future administratrix of the claim against the estate because the letter conveyed the exact amount of the claimed indebtedness, identified the creditor, stated an unequivocal intention to pursue the claim, and an expectation that the recipient would apply for letters of administration. Griffin, 171 Conn, at 338-39, 370 A.2d at 1304.\nIn the instant case, Travelers made a claim against Harold under the mistaken belief that he was still alive. The letters were addressed to and made demand of Harold. That Travelers was making a claim against Harold rather than the estate is borne out by the law division suit. We cannot equate a post-mortem demand against Harold, under the mistaken belief that he was alive, with an intention to pursue a claim against the estate.\nBecause we conclude that Travelers\u2019 demand letters to Harold do not constitute a claim against the estate, the trial court did not err in dismissing Travelers\u2019 petition to reopen the estate and for leave to file a claim.\nAffirmed.\nEGAN, P.J., and McNAMARA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RAKOWSKI" } ], "attorneys": [ "Baker & McKenzie, of Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey, Michael A. Pollard, John M. Murphy, and Amalia S. Rioja, of counsel), for appellant.", "Much, Shelist, Freed, Denenberg & Ament, P.C., of Chicago (Howard M. Cohen and Jeffrey S. Wilson, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ESTATE OF HAROLD BEIDER, Deceased.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201493\u20144053\nOpinion filed December 30, 1994.\nBaker & McKenzie, of Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey, Michael A. Pollard, John M. Murphy, and Amalia S. Rioja, of counsel), for appellant.\nMuch, Shelist, Freed, Denenberg & Ament, P.C., of Chicago (Howard M. Cohen and Jeffrey S. Wilson, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1094-01", "first_page_order": 1112, "last_page_order": 1116 }