{ "id": 365854, "name": "In re MICHAEL MARTENS, a Person Alleged to be Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Michael Martens, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Martens", "decision_date": "1995-02-16", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201493\u20141026", "first_page": "324", "last_page": "329", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 324" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5297703 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591886 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738342 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2929946 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 911", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3540187 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5203917 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 1055", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5079488 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/1055-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5195234 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0334-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 482, "char_count": 9202, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4741821076627976e-07, "percentile": 0.6598458056821074 }, "sha256": "f681b1dffd167e2af13cd31bb3cd9b1b64c6551c8f1528dd952fc4006e70ec15", "simhash": "1:6962ee4022514e41", "word_count": 1508 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:33.308788+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MICHAEL MARTENS, a Person Alleged to be Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Michael Martens, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THOMAS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe respondent, Michael Martens, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Kane County which involuntarily committed him to the Elgin Mental Health Center (the Center). The respondent contends that the order must be reversed because notice of the involuntary commitment proceedings was not given to the respondent\u2019s guardian as required by sections 3 \u2014 609 and 3 \u2014 611 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (the Code) (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 609, 3 \u2014 611 (West 1992)). He also contends that the order should be reversed because it was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.\nThe record shows that the respondent was voluntarily admitted to the Center on April 24, 1993. On July 28, 1993, he submitted a written notice to be discharged pursuant to section 3 \u2014 403 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 403 (West 1992)). On August 2, 1993, a petition for involuntary commitment was filed alleging that the respondent was mentally ill and as a result was unable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself against serious harm. The petition was accompanied by two certificates signed by psychiatrists at the Center. The petition specifically listed the names and addresses of the respondent\u2019s guardians. The Center\u2019s \"Master Treatment Plan\u201d also noted that the guardians listed were guardians of the respondent\u2019s person and estate. The matter was scheduled for hearing August 6, 1993, and respondent was given notice of the time and place of the hearing. However, the respondent\u2019s guardians were not given notice of the hearing and they did not appear. The respondent appeared at the hearing and did not raise an issue with respect to the validity of the notice.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the respondent was a person subject to involuntary admission and ordered him to be hospitalized with the Center for 180 days.\nOn appeal, we must first address the respondent\u2019s contention that the failure to give notice to the respondent\u2019s guardians rendered the trial court\u2019s order invalid for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.\nWe find that the respondent\u2019s contention must be rejected. It is well settled that when a court\u2019s power to act is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction, which means that the court\u2019s power is limited by the language of the statute. (In re Long (1992), 233 Ill. App. 3d 334, 337.) Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power of a particular court to hear the general type of case before it. (In re Devine (1991), 214 Ill. App. 3d 1, 3.) Section 3 \u2014 100 of the Code provides that circuit courts have jurisdiction over persons not charged with a felony who are subject to involuntary admission to a mental health facility. (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 100 (West 1992).) Under this statute, circuit courts are empowered to hear involuntary commitment cases, and this power is not affected by alleged deficiencies in the notice of the hearing. In re Long, 233 Ill. App. at 337.\nApplying the above-mentioned principles, we find that the lack of notice to the respondent\u2019s guardians did not affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court. In re Guardianship of Sodini (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 1055, relied upon by the respondent, is distinguishable. There, the court found that failure to give notice of a guardianship hearing under section 11a \u2014 10(f) of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/lla \u2014 10(f) (West 1992)) was a jurisdictional defect. In so finding, the court relied heavily upon the fact that a prior statute had required notice to relatives listed in the petition but expressly provided that failure to do so was nonjurisdictional. The statute was then replaced by a statute deleting the language making failure to provide notice nonjurisdictional. The court concluded that this change evinced an intent by the legislature to make service of notice jurisdictional. Our case, in contrast, does not involve a change in the statute or a guardianship proceeding. Moreover, the case law specifically holds that defects in notice do not affect the power of the court to hear involuntary commitment cases.\nThe respondent next argues that even if the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction, its judgment must be reversed because of the failure to provide the guardians with notice. In response, the State argues that the respondent waived the issue by failing to raise it in the trial court.\nInvoluntary commitment proceedings invade a patient\u2019s liberty interest; thus, the statutory sections of the Code should be construed strictly in favor of the patient. (In re Houlihan (1992), 231 Ill. App. 3d 677, 681.) Inherent in the civil commitment proceeding are the distinct interests of providing patients with necessary treatment as well as protecting society from dangerous conduct. (In re Williams (1987), 151 Ill. App. 3d 911, 919.) Errors demonstrating noncompliance with the statutory provisions that appear on the face of the record may render a judgment erroneous even if not raised at trial; furthermore, such errors may be considered on appeal under a doctrine analogous to plain error. In re La Touche (1993), 247 Ill. App. 3d 615, 618.\nThe State relies on In re Nau (1992), 153 Ill. 2d 406, and In re Splett (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 225, in support of its argument that the respondent waived the issue. In those cases, the supreme court determined that faulty notice of a commitment hearing did not require reversal where the respondents received actual notice and appeared at the hearing, thereby satisfying the purpose of the notice requirement. We find that the State\u2019s reliance on In re Nau and In re Splett is misplaced. In our case, there was a complete lack of notice instead of a mere defect in the notice. More importantly, the guardians in the instant case did not receive actual notice and did not appear at the hearing. Additionally, the error is apparent from the face of the record. The petition specifically lists the names and addresses of the respondent\u2019s guardians and the Center\u2019s \"Master Treatment Plan\u201d expressly stated that they were guardians of the respondent\u2019s person and estate. Moreover, the lack of notice to the guardians was not harmless here because some of the factors relied upon by the trial court to find the respondent subject to involuntary commitment related to the guardians\u2019 statutory duties, e.g., the respondent\u2019s inability to manage money and to provide for his financial needs. Accordingly, we find that the respondent did not waive the issue.\nTurning to the merits, we note that section 3 \u2014 611 provides that the court shall direct notice of the time and place of the hearing be served upon the respondent, his responsible relatives, and the persons entitled to receive a copy of the petition pursuant to section 3 \u2014 609. (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 611 (West 1992).) Section 3 \u2014 609 lists the respondent\u2019s guardian, if any, as a person entitled to receive a copy of the petition. 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 609 (West 1992).\nDespite these clear statutory notice requirements, the State argues that they are not applicable to this situation because section 3 \u2014 403 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 403 (West 1992)) does not specifically mention them. The State\u2019s argument completely misconstrues the statutory scheme. Section 3 \u2014 403 deals with a voluntary patient\u2019s right to request discharge in writing and specifically refers to the State\u2019s duty to file a petition pursuant to section 3 \u2014 601 if it seeks to involuntarily commit the patient. (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 403 (West 1992).) The notice requirements of sections 3 \u2014 609 and 3 \u2014 611 clearly refer to the State\u2019s petition to involuntarily commit the respondent.\nWe also find unpersuasive the State\u2019s complaints that the record was uncertain about whether the respondent\u2019s guardians were court appointed and that return of service was not required. The record clearly showed that the respondent had a guardian of his person and estate. Under the circumstances, we find that the State had the burden of having the record reflect that the guardians were served or offering an excuse for lack of service. Thus, we hold that the State failed to meet the statutory requirements for notice pursuant to sections 3 \u2014 611 and 3 \u2014 609 of the Code. Because we reverse based on the lack of notice to the respondent\u2019s guardians, we find it unnecessary to address the remaining issues raised by the parties.\nAccordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County which involuntarily committed the respondent.\nReversed.\nBOWMAN and DOYLE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THOMAS" } ], "attorneys": [ "William E. Coffin, of Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, and Teresa L. Berge, of Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Rockford, for appellant.", "David R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (William L. Browers, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MICHAEL MARTENS, a Person Alleged to be Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Michael Martens, Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201493\u20141026\nOpinion filed February 16, 1995.\nWilliam E. Coffin, of Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, and Teresa L. Berge, of Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of Rockford, for appellant.\nDavid R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (William L. Browers, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0324-01", "first_page_order": 344, "last_page_order": 349 }