{ "id": 365963, "name": "ROLLIN FOODS, INC., as General Partner of Cody Coyotes Restaurant, Ltd., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE VILLAGE OF GLENDALE HEIGHTS, Defendant-Appellant (Du Page County State's Attorney, Defendant; Illinois Liquor Control Commission, Intervenor-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Rollin Foods, Inc. v. Village of Glendale Heights", "decision_date": "1995-02-01", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201493\u20141251", "first_page": "351", "last_page": "359", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 351" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3087032 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 Ill. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2509352 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/390/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2851659 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780294 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780263 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780289 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780274 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780286 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 Ill. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2634795 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/406/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783186 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0233-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 708, "char_count": 18035, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.013707362861695797 }, "sha256": "adca67aa4f1088e880682e46e7180d87c8fdceaf117e850a21c0d26c2dbc7cf2", "simhash": "1:833f5500ee8efef2", "word_count": 2931 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:33.308788+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROLLIN FOODS, INC., as General Partner of Cody Coyotes Restaurant, Ltd., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE VILLAGE OF GLENDALE HEIGHTS, Defendant-Appellant (Du Page County State\u2019s Attorney, Defendant; Illinois Liquor Control Commission, Intervenor-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DOYLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case arose after police officers arrested three employees of a restaurant and bar for allegedly violating the \"Happy hours prohibited\u201d statute, section 6 \u2014 28 of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (Act) (235 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1992)). Following the arrests, plaintiff, Rollin Foods, Inc., filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunction in the circuit court of Du Page County. At issue is whether section 6 \u2014 28 of the Act prohibited plaintiff from conducting a ladies\u2019 buffet night in its restaurant and bar.\nDefendant, the Village of Glendale Heights (Village), and intervenor, the Illinois Liquor Control Commission (Commission) (collectively, defendants), appeal from an order of the circuit court in favor of plaintiff. The order determined that the relevant subsections of section 6 \u2014 28 were constitutional and that section 6 \u2014 28 did not prohibit the ladies\u2019 buffet night. On appeal, the sole issue is whether the trial court was correct in its judgment that section 6 \u2014 28 did not prohibit the ladies\u2019 buffet night.\nCody Coyotes is a restaurant and bar in the Village. Plaintiff is the general partner in a limited partnership which owns and operates Cody Coyotes.\nOn the evening of August 13, 1992, Cody Coyotes offered a \"Ladies\u2019 Buffet Night\u201d for the first time. During the ladies\u2019 buffet night, women, as they entered Cody Coyotes, could pay $3 to purchase a buffet dinner with unlimited alcoholic drinks included. Women who purchased the buffet received a plastic cup as they entered. The women could use the plastic cup for unlimited free drinks for the night. Men who entered Cody Coyotes that night were required to pay a $3 cover charge, but they could not partake of the buffet, and they were required to pay the regular price for drinks. Women could enter Cody Coyotes without paying the cover charge, but they could not partake of the buffet and did not receive a plastic cup entitling them to free drinks.\nThe buffet was set up on a counter approximately 15 feet long near the kitchen in Cody Coyotes. The buffet consisted of bratwurst, hot dogs, egg rolls, Swedish meatballs, pizza, chicken nuggets, and various salads. A Cody Coyotes employee oversaw the buffet.\nDuring the ladies\u2019 buffet night, four Village police officers in plain clothes entered Cody Coyotes. The officers each paid $3 to enter. Upon entering, Cody Coyotes\u2019 employees gave each of the two female officers an empty plastic cup which they used to obtain an unlimited number of drinks of alcoholic liquor without additional payments. Cody Coyotes\u2019 employees informed the two male officers that the plastic cups were for women only. In order to get a drink of alcoholic liquor, the male officers were required to pay for each individual drink they ordered at the regular price. The police officers subsequently arrested three Cody Coyotes employees and charged them with violating section 6 \u2014 28.\nOn August 25, 1992, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against the Du Page County State\u2019s Attorney and the Village. The circuit court later dismissed the State\u2019s Attorney with prejudice. The Commission subsequently intervened.\nCount I of plaintiff\u2019s complaint sought declaratory relief. Count II sought injunctive relief. Plaintiff contended that subsection (c) of section 6 \u2014 28 was unconstitutionally vague and sought a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional. Alternatively, plaintiff contended that even if the statute was not unconstitutional, it did not prohibit the ladies\u2019 buffet night.\nOn June 30, 1993, the trial court issued an oral ruling. The court stated that it had concluded that section 6 \u2014 28 was constitutional on its face and that plaintiff\u2019s conduct in offering the ladies\u2019 buffet night did not violate the statute. The trial judge directed the parties to draft an order in accordance with his ruling. However, the trial judge did not sign a written order at that time.\nOn September 28, 1993, after the parties had filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial judge signed and entered a written order. The order stated that the relevant subsections of section 6 \u2014 28 were constitutional, that plaintiff\u2019s conduct did not violate section 6 \u2014 28, and that plaintiff\u2019s conduct conformed to section 6 \u2014 28. This appeal followed.\nSection 6 \u2014 28 of the Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\"(b)\nNo retail licensee or employee or agent of such licensee shall:\n***\n(2) sell, offer to sell or serve to any person an unlimited number of drinks of alcoholic liquor during any set period of time for a fixed price, except at private functions not open to the general public;\n(3) sell, offer to sell or serve any drink of alcoholic liquor to any person on any one date at a reduced price other than that charged other purchasers of drinks on that day where such reduced price\nis a promotion to encourage consumption of alcoholic liquor, except as authorized in paragraph (7) of subsection (c) [relating to cover charges for special entertainment];\n* * *\n(c) Nothing in subsection (b) shall be construed to prohibit a licensee from:\n***\n(2) including drinks of alcoholic liquor as a part of a meal package.\u201d 235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 28(b)(2), (b)(3), (c)(2) (West 1992).\nDefendants contend that section 6 \u2014 28 prohibits activities such as those of Cody Coyotes in offering its ladies\u2019 buffet night. Defendants assert that section 6 \u2014 28 prohibits such activities because they violate the legislative intent of section 6 \u2014 28 to promote moderation in the use of alcoholic liquors and place limits on the sale or service of alcoholic drinks to individuals. Defendants argue that this legislative intent is apparent from: (1) the plain language of section 6 \u2014 28; (2) other provisions of the Act which provide for liberal construction of the Act; and (3) the legislative history of section 6 \u2014 28.\nPlaintiff responds that section 6 \u2014 28, by its plain language, does not prohibit activities such as the ladies\u2019 buffet night. Plaintiff asserts that by resorting to other provisions in the Act and the legislative history of section 6 \u2014 28 in order to discern legislative intent purportedly prohibiting such activities defendants are really improperly attempting to enlarge the plain language of section 6 \u2014 28. Plaintiff further argues that because section 6 \u2014 28 creates new liability for liquor licensees in that a violation of the statute is grounds for revocation or suspension of a license, the statute must be strictly construed.\nThe parties\u2019 arguments require us to construe the pertinent subsections of section 6 \u2014 28. It is well established that, when interpreting a statute, the primary rule, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain the true intent of the legislature. (See, e.g., In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation (1994), 161 Ill. 2d 233, 246; Krimmel v. Eielson (1950), 406 Ill. 202, 206.) To determine legislative intent, the court must read the statute as a whole, consider all relevant parts (People v. Lewis (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 386, 389), and construe each provision in connection with every other section (Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397). The best determination of legislative intent is the statutory language, which should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. (Eagan v. Chicago Transit Authority (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 527, 531-32.) Where the statutory language is clear, the court must give it effect without resorting to other aids for construction. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc. (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81.\nWith these principles in mind, we will construe section 6 \u2014 28 of the Act by examining its language with a particular focus on the relationship between subsections (b) and (c). It is readily apparent from the language of section 6 \u2014 28 that subsection (b) consists of a list of prohibited conduct regarding retail liquor licensees and that subsection (c) consists of a list of conduct not prohibited by subsection (b). Nonetheless, the question remains whether section 6 \u2014 28 means that a retail liquor licensee engaging in conduct listed in subsection (c) can disregard the prohibitions of subsection (b).\nInitially, we will determine whether paragraph (3) of subsection (b), by itself, prohibited the ladies\u2019 buffet night activities conducted by plaintiff. We will not make the same determination with respect to paragraph (2) of subsection (b) because a question whether paragraph (2) of subsection (b) is unconstitutionally vague has been raised. It is well settled that constitutional questions will not be considered if the cause can be determined on other grounds. (People ex rel. Waller v. 1990 Bronco (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 460, 464; Exchange National Bank v. Lawndale National Bank (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 316, 321.) In making this determination, we disregard, for the moment, subsection (c). If paragraph (3) of subsection (b), by itself, prohibited the ladies\u2019 buffet night activities, then we must determine whether subsection (c) provides exceptions to the prohibitions of paragraph (3) of subsection (b).\nParagraph (3) of subsection (b) prohibits a retail licensee and his or her agent or employee from selling, offering to sell, or serving \"any drink of alcoholic liquor to any person on any one date at a reduced price other than that charged other purchasers of drinks on that day where such reduced price is a promotion to encourage consumption of alcoholic liquor, except as authorized in paragraph (7) of subsection (c) [relating to a cover charge to offset the cost of special entertainment not regularly scheduled]\u201d (235 ILCS 5/6\u2014 28(b)(3) (West 1992)). Paragraph (3) of subsection (b), by itself, therefore prohibited the ladies\u2019 buffet night activities because women who purchased the buffet were served alcoholic drinks at a price other than that charged to men who purchased alcoholic drinks on that night, and a cover charge related to special entertainment was not involved in the ladies\u2019 buffet night. In addition, we agree with defendants that the reduced price encouraged the consumption of alcoholic liquor.\nThus, paragraph (3) of subsection (b), standing alone, prohibited the ladies\u2019 buffet night. However, subsection (c)(2) of section 6 \u2014 28 provides that \"[n]othing in subsection (b) shall be construed to prohibit a licensee from: *** (2) including drinks of alcoholic liquor as part of a meal package.\u201d (235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 28(c)(2) (West 1992).) In view of this language in subsection (c), the question before us is whether the prohibitions of paragraph (3) of subsection (b) lose their effect in the face of the activities allowed by subsection (c).\nHere, the parties agree that the ladies\u2019 buffet night, as conducted by plaintiff, constituted a meal package which included drinks of alcoholic liquor. Specifically, then, the question before us is whether the prohibitions of paragraph (3) of subsection (b) lost their effect because the drinks involved were part of a meal package.\nWe conclude that the language of section 6 \u2014 28 shows a legislative intent for the subsection (b) prohibitions to remain effective in the face of the activities listed in subsection (c). The language in subsection (c) simply states that \"[n]othing in subsection (b) shall be construed to prohibit a licensee from\u201d engaging in any of the activities listed in subsection (c). We read the plain meaning of this language to be that the activities listed in subsection (c) are not per se prohibited by subsection (b). However, we do not read this language to mean, as plaintiff urges, that the subsection (c) activities are exceptions to the subsection (b) prohibitions in the sense that a licensee engaging in subsection (c) activities may disregard the subsection (b) prohibitions.\nThe fact that the legislature made one of the subsection (c) activities a specific exception to one of the subsection (b) prohibitions supports our interpretation. The legislature made paragraph (7) of subsection (c) a specific exception to paragraph (3) of subsection (b) (see 235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 28(b)(3) (West 1992)). This leads us to conclude that the legislature did not regard the other activities listed in subsection (c) as exceptions to the subsection (b) prohibitions in the sense urged by plaintiff. If the legislature had regarded the subsection (c) activities as exceptions in that sense, it would have been unnecessary for the legislature to make paragraph (7) of subsection (c) a specific exception as it did because it would have already been such an exception.\nIn summary, based on the plain language of section 6 \u2014 28, we conclude that the legislature did not intend paragraph (2) of subsection (c) to be an exception to the prohibitions of paragraph (3) of subsection (b). Rather, the legislature intended to list in subsection (c) activities which subsection (b) did not per se prohibit. Thus, paragraph (3) of subsection (b) does not prohibit the inclusion of alcoholic drinks as part of a meal package. However, paragraph (3) of subsection (b) prohibits the selling, offering to sell, or serving of alcoholic drinks to persons on any one date at a reduced price other than that charged other purchasers of drinks on that day where the reduced price promoted or encouraged the consumption of alcoholic liquor, even if this occurs as part of a meal package, as it did in the ladies\u2019 buffet night. For these reasons, we conclude that paragraph (3) prohibited the ladies\u2019 buffet night as conducted by plaintiff.\nUnder the above principles, in order to determine legislative intent, we must read the statute as a whole and consider all relevant parts. Accordingly, we must consider section 1 \u2014 2 of the Act (235 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 2 (West 1992)), which expressly provides for the correct way to construe the Act. Section 1 \u2014 2 furnishes additional support for the above construction of section 6 \u2014 28. Section 1 \u2014 2 provides as follows:\n\"This Act shall be liberally construed, to the end that the health, safety and welfare of the People of the State of Illinois shall be protected and temperance in the consumption of alcoholic liquors shall be fostered and promoted by sound and careful control and regulation of the manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic liquors.\u201d 235 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 2 (West 1992).\nThe above construction of section 6 \u2014 28 is in line with the purpose of the Act as expressed in section 1 \u2014 2. This construction of section 6 \u2014 28 will tend to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the people of the State of Illinois and foster and promote temperance in the consumption of alcoholic liquors. A construction such as that urged by plaintiff would tend to encourage the binge drinking of alcoholic liquors and all of the deleterious consequences which flow from that, a result obviously contrary to the purpose of the Act as expressed by the legislature when it set out the guidelines for construction of the Act in section 1 \u2014 2.\nPlaintiff\u2019s argument that we must strictly construe section 6 \u2014 28 because it creates new liability for retail liquor licensees does not change our view of section 6 \u2014 28. Plaintiff asserts that section 6 \u2014 28 creates new liability for licensees because it provides that a violation of the statute shall be grounds for the suspension or the revocation of the retailer\u2019s license (235 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 28(d) (West 1992)). Plaintiff cites Anderson v. Board of Education of School District No. 91 (1945), 390 Ill. 412, 422, for the proposition that a court must strictly construe a statute creating new liability in favor of parties who could be subjected to the operation of the statute and must not extend or enlarge the liability by construction. Although plaintiff\u2019s argument is sound, it is unpersuasive because we have already done what plaintiff asks, i.e., we have strictly construed the statute. As seen above, the plain language of the statute supports our construetion of the statute. Accordingly, we need not change our construction of section 6 \u2014 28 on the ground that it creates new liability for retail liquor licensees.\nFinally, plaintiff relies on Dock Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm\u2019n (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 673, as authority for its position that section 6 \u2014 28 does not prohibit a licensee from offering price differentials for alcoholic drinks on the basis of gender. However, the court in that case did not construe section 6 \u2014 28. The statute in Dock Club provided that no person should be denied \" 'the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any premises in which alcoholic liquors\u2019 \u201d are sold. (Dock Club, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 673-74, quoting section 12b of the Dramshop Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 43, par. 133).) This is much different from paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of section 6 \u2014 28, which prohibits reduced prices for drinks to some persons but not others as a promotion to encourage the consumption of alcoholic liquor. Consequently, we find plaintiff\u2019s reliance on Dock Club misplaced.\nBased on the foregoing, we hold that paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of section 6 \u2014 28 of the Act prohibited plaintiff\u2019s conduct in offering the ladies\u2019 buffet night. For this reason, we reverse the trial court order in favor of plaintiff.\nReversed.\nBOWMAN and COLWELL, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DOYLE" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (William K. Blanchard, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant Illinois Liquor Control Commission.", "Michael K. Durkin, of Storino, Ramello & Durkin, of Rosemont, for appellant Village of Glendale Heights.", "William J. Wylie, of Wylie, Mulherin, Rehfeldt & Varchetto, P.C., and Anthony F. Mannina, both of Wheaton, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROLLIN FOODS, INC., as General Partner of Cody Coyotes Restaurant, Ltd., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE VILLAGE OF GLENDALE HEIGHTS, Defendant-Appellant (Du Page County State\u2019s Attorney, Defendant; Illinois Liquor Control Commission, Intervenor-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201493\u20141251\nOpinion filed February 1, 1995.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (William K. Blanchard, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant Illinois Liquor Control Commission.\nMichael K. Durkin, of Storino, Ramello & Durkin, of Rosemont, for appellant Village of Glendale Heights.\nWilliam J. Wylie, of Wylie, Mulherin, Rehfeldt & Varchetto, P.C., and Anthony F. Mannina, both of Wheaton, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0351-01", "first_page_order": 371, "last_page_order": 379 }