{ "id": 365937, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES BYRON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Byron", "decision_date": "1995-01-13", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201494\u20140402", "first_page": "449", "last_page": "454", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 449" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "600 N.E.2d 1169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291537 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 N.E.2d 1004", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780290 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 N.E.2d 1050", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5247031 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578898 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 N.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5247147 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3468153 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 N.E.2d 1376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 938", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5252027 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0938-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3492006 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 N.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2926773 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 N.E.2d 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599674 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0201-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 572, "char_count": 12436, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.207966869300525e-08, "percentile": 0.3262871696380754 }, "sha256": "fb858a3aec3f6a100d8bd384b54f981b9983429b8b92994b2d20e39fbd804fe6", "simhash": "1:e95048a1466066a6", "word_count": 2031 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:33.308788+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES BYRON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, James Byron, was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 16(c)(l)(i).) He was sentenced to a two-year term of conditional discharge. He appeals, and we affirm.\nAt trial, the victim, T.C., testified that on the morning of July 10, 1991, he went with his brother and his grandfather to the defendant\u2019s farm. When they arrived at the farm, the defendant and T.C. \"jogged a horse\u201d together. T.C. explained that when someone \"jogs a horse\u201d he rides in a cart that is attached to the horse. He stated that a usual jog for a horse takes about 30 minutes to complete.\nAccording to T.C., when he and the defendant jogged the horse, T.C. sat between the defendant\u2019s legs with his feet in the stirrups. After they jogged the first horse, T.C.\u2019s brother and grandfather left the farm.\nT.C. and the defendant then jogged another horse. After about four or five laps around the track, the defendant placed his hand underneath T.C.\u2019s.underwear and began rubbing T.C.\u2019s penis. The defendant continued rubbing his penis until they had completed jogging the horse. While the defendant did so, he told T.C. that it was their own little secret and not to tell anyone.\nT.C. further testified that Jack Pfeiffer and the defendant\u2019s cousin, Peggy Chapman, were in the barn when T.C. and the defendant returned from the track. T.C. did not tell them what had happened because he was scared. T.C. then watched the defendant jog another horse until the defendant drove him home.\nAs soon as he arrived home, T.C. told his sister that he had been with the defendant and the defendant had grabbed his penis. She immediately called T.C.\u2019s mother at work. T.C. then talked to his mother on the phone. At this point in T.C.\u2019s testimony, the defendant objected to any further testimony regarding these conversations. Specifically, the defendant argued that no proper foundation had been laid for that testimony. He also argued that T.C.\u2019s testimony was inadmissible hearsay since the State was trying to bolster T.C.\u2019s credibility through the use of self-serving statements. The trial court overruled the defendant\u2019s objection.\nT.C. then continued to testify about the conversation that he had on the phone with his mother. He stated that he told his mother that the defendant had reached into his pants and rubbed his penis. He also noted that he was interviewed by police officers at 5 p.m. and again a few hours later. He did not testify to the substance of those conversations.\nOn cross-examination, T.C. admitted that he did not speak to anyone after the incident until he returned home and spoke to his sister.\nAfter T.C. testified, the court held a hearing to determine whether certain hearsay statements were admissible pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 10). At the hearing, T.C.\u2019s mother and sister testified to the statements T.C. made to each of them. Their testimony was consistent with T.C.\u2019s testimony about what he had told them. Additionally, T.C.\u2019s sister testified that although she did not know what time T.C. got home that day, she thought that it was sometime in the afternoon. T.C.\u2019s mother testified that when she talked to T.C. on the phone at around 12:30 p.m. he was very upset. The trial court overruled the defendant\u2019s objection to the admission of the testimony of T.C.\u2019s mother and sister.\nLater in the trial, the court held a second section 115 \u2014 10 hearing concerning the statements that T.C. made to two police officers. Officer Terry Kreimeier testified that he spoke to T.C. at 3 p.m. on the day of the incident for 30 minutes. Kreimeier\u2019s testimony concerning T.C.\u2019s statement to him was consistent with T.C.\u2019s testimony about what happened that day. Officer Joseph Farmer testified that he spoke to T.C. at 7:30 p.m. on the day of the incident. Farmer\u2019s testimony was also consistent with T.C.\u2019s testimony. The trial court overruled the objection to the admission of the police officers\u2019 testimony.\nOn appeal, the defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial by the admission of T.C.\u2019s statements into evidence. The defendant first argues that T.C.\u2019s in-court testimony about his statements to his mother, sister, and the police were self-serving and improperly bolstered T.C.\u2019s credibility.\nThe State responds by noting that the testimony is not hearsay, and, in the alternative, argues that the testimony is admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Although the State did not argue at trial that the testimony was a spontaneous declaration, we note that an appellee may assert any argument to sustain a judgment as long as that argument is supported by the record. People v. Hamm (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 201, 595 N.E.2d 540.\nIt is well established that proof of a prior consistent statement made by a witness is hearsay and therefore inadmissible to bolster the witness\u2019 trial testimony. (People v. Powell (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 465, 292 N.E.2d 409.) However, a prior consistent statement may be admitted if the statement was a spontaneous declaration. (People v. Davis (1984), 130 Ill. App. 3d 41, 473 N.E.2d 387.) To constitute a spontaneous declaration, three factors must be present: (1) an occurrence which is sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous unreflecting statement; (2) the absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. (People v. Potts (1992), 224 Ill. App. 3d 938, 586 N.E.2d 1376.) The admissibility of spontaneous declarations should be determined on a case-by-case basis after considering all relevant factual considerations. People v. Hatfield (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 401, 514 N.E.2d 572.\nIn the instant case, T.C.\u2019s testimony concerning his conversations with his mother and sister on the day of the incident was admissible under the spontaneous declaration rule. Certainly the occurrence was startling enough to produce an unreflecting statement. Additionally, there was only a brief passage of time between the occurrence and the statements, and T.C. reported the occurrence to his mother and sister at the first opportunity. Finally, the statement was directly related to the occurrence. Therefore, we find no error in the admission of T.C.\u2019s testimony about his statements to his mother and sister.\nFurthermore, T.C.\u2019s testimony that he spoke to two police officers does not constitute hearsay. A witness may testify that he had a conversation with an individual as long as the witness does not reveal the substance of the conversation. (See People v. Batson (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 157, 587 N.E.2d 549.) Since T.C. did not testify to the substance of the conversations, his testimony was admissible.\nWithin his first argument, the defendant contends that it was reversible error to hold the section 115 \u2014 10 hearings about T.C.\u2019s testimony after T.C. had testified. However, we note that the record does not support the defendant\u2019s allegations that the section 115 \u2014 10 hearings were held to determine the admissibility of T.C.\u2019s in-court testimony. From our reading of the record, the hearings were held to determine whether T.C.\u2019s mother, sister, and the two police officers could testify about the statements that T.C. had made before trial. Consequently, we find no error in holding the hearings after T.C.\u2019s testimony.\nNext, the defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial by the repetition of T.C.\u2019s statements by T.C., his mother, his sister, and the police. As noted, T.C.\u2019s prior consistent statements were admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception. T.C.\u2019s mother, sister, and the police, however, testified pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10. Regarding the repetitive nature of such testimony, the appellate court has stated:\n\"The legislature by enacting section 115 \u2014 10 obviously determined that a corroborative complaint is sufficiently reliable to enjoy an exemption from the rule against hearsay evidence. [Citation.] A second or third complaint is no less reliable or credible. True, there is opportunity for exaggeration or embellishment ***. This factor is remedied though through cross-examination ***.\nYouthful victims *** obviously become more credible, reliable and understandable when supported by corroborative complaint testimony from adults. Those who are close to the victim or who have interviewed the victim and investigated the alleged incident should not be curtailed from testifying and aiding the victim merely because of their numbers ***.\u201d (People v. Branch (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 338, 340-41, 511 N.E.2d 872, 873-74.)\nNevertheless, a defendant may be granted a new trial based on the admission of repetitive testimony when the case is closely balanced and it appears that the scales of justice have been unfairly tilted by the sheer weight of repetition. People v. Anderson (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 636, 587 N.E.2d 1050.\nAs was noted in Branch, people who are close to the victim or who have interviewed the victim should not be barred from testifying simply because of their numbers. Each individual that corroborated T.C.\u2019s testimony was subject to a thorough cross-examination. Most important, this case was not so closely balanced that the defendant should be awarded a new trial because of repetitive testimony. The record shows that T.C. gave very consistent and credible testimony. The admission of T.C.\u2019s statements was not unnecessarily duplicative, prejudicial, or cumulative.\nFinally, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting T.C.\u2019s statements into evidence because they failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for a section 115 \u2014 10 hearing. Specifically, he argues that there is nothing in the statements themselves that establishes their reliability. As previously noted, since T.C.\u2019s in-court testimony was not subject to a section 115 \u2014 10 hearing, and we found his testimony independently admissible, we will only address the testimony given by T.C.\u2019s mother, his sister, and the police.\nSection 115 \u2014 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 10) permits testimony of out-of-court statements by victims of sexual offenses who are under 13 years of age. In a hearing conducted pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10, the testimony shall only be admitted if the court finds that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 115\u2014 10(b)(1).) Some factors which may be considered to determine reliability are: the child\u2019s spontaneous and consistent repetition of the incident, the child\u2019s mental state, the use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and the lack of a motive to fabricate. (People v. West (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 155, 632 N.E.2d 1004.) A trial court has considerable discretion in determining the admissibility of hearsay statements. (People v. Zwart (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 37, 600 N.E.2d 1169.) Thus, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial court\u2019s finding absent an abuse of discretion. People v. West (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 155, 632 N.E.2d 1004.\nHere, the testimony of T.C.\u2019s mother, sister, and the police satisfied the statutory requirements for a section 115 \u2014 10 hearing. As previously noted, T.C.\u2019s statements to his mother and his sister were made soon after the incident. Further, T.C.\u2019s mother testified that T.C. was very upset when he told her what had happened. Additionally, T.C. spoke to both police officers on the same day of the incident. The officers\u2019 testimony regarding T.C.\u2019s statements was substantially similar to T.C.\u2019s testimony. Finally, nothing in the record suggests that the interviews were coercive or threatening. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these statements into evidence.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTOUDER, P.J., and McCUSKEY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Bartholomew Markese, of Naughton & Markese, of Joliet, for appellant.", "James Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES BYRON, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201494\u20140402\nOpinion filed January 13, 1995.\nBartholomew Markese, of Naughton & Markese, of Joliet, for appellant.\nJames Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0449-01", "first_page_order": 469, "last_page_order": 474 }