{ "id": 365961, "name": "MICHAEL DOTTO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANIEL OKAN, DefendantAppellee", "name_abbreviation": "Dotto v. Okan", "decision_date": "1995-02-01", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201492\u20142382", "first_page": "808", "last_page": "811", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 808" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "423 N.E.2d 1309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1315" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499161 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477547 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 N.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2909419 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 400", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2513201 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" }, { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 N.E.2d 1294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1296-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5388650 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/246/0323-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 575, "char_count": 9019, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.928371468949638e-08, "percentile": 0.5007822849903605 }, "sha256": "0ac51ab4d26bface7030618a8f9a1ea3102e158a3bc9eb6012bffaf4561ece91", "simhash": "1:7b900ea4f24411bf", "word_count": 1469 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:33.308788+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MICHAEL DOTTO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANIEL OKAN, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RIZZI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is a negligence action in which plaintiff, Michael Dotto, sustained serious injuries when he fell from a motor boat being operated by defendant, Daniel Okan, on Lake Paw Paw in the State of Michigan on July 14, 1984. Judgment was entered on a not guilty jury verdict, from which plaintiff has appealed. We reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial or further proceedings as warranted.\nPlaintiff has raised six issues on appeal. We address, however, only the issue of whether the trial court committed reversible error when it barred plaintiff\u2019s expert witness from testifying. We agree with plaintiff that the trial court committed reversible error, which entitles plaintiff to a new trial.\nAt the time of the occurrence there were five people in the boat, all of whom were eyewitnesses to what happened. Plaintiff, defendant, and two of the other passengers testified at trial. Generally, their composite testimony evinces that while the boat was in a stationary position, defendant was at the helm and plaintiff sat in a carpeted area in the front of the boat. As the boat remained stationary, there was a conversation between plaintiff and defendant, and plaintiff got up and turned the steering wheel to the left. Plaintiff then went back to his prior position and told defendant to \"gun it.\u201d Defendant made a series of left turns at high speed.\nAs the boat was circling toward the left, plaintiff leaned out of the left side while holding onto the rail with his left hand; he placed his right hand in the water and splashed water on another passenger. Meanwhile, defendant turned the steering wheel sharply back towards the right. At this point plaintiff fell out of the boat, and the boat continued in a right turn. The back of the boat \"swung around\u201d and went over plaintiff, and he got caught in the operating propeller blades. As a result, plaintiff\u2019s \"arms were mangled\u201d and \"very badly chopped up.\u201d\nThere was disputed testimony as to whether the boat hit a wave just before plaintiff fell from the boat. Plaintiff testified, however, that it was defendant\u2019s sharp right turn while making circular maneuvers to the left that caused him to fall from the boat. Defendant testified that he \"didn\u2019t actually turn right, I straightened the boat out.\u201d Defendant further testified that \"it never made a turn, though. It was straight.\u201d Defendant admitted that it would not be safe for a boat operator to make a right turn if a person in the front of the boat was leaning toward the left side during a hard left turn, and that such a passenger would be \"vulnerable.\u201d\nPrior to trial, plaintiff\u2019s expert witness, Scott Anderson, reviewed the depositions and physically inspected, measured and photographed the boat. During the course of the trial, plaintiff called Anderson to testify as an expert witness. Although defendant stipulated that Anderson was an expert in the field of mechanical engineering, the court barred Anderson from testifying. While plaintiff\u2019s counsel was attempting to explain to the trial court the nature of Anderson\u2019s testimony, the court stated: \"Gentlemen, I\u2019m ready to rule. You said it, okay? This is like a reconstruction expert. You have eyewitness testimony. The witness is barred.\u201d The trial court also refused plaintiff\u2019s request to reserve its ruling as to whether or not Anderson could testify as a rebuttal witness. The trial court stated: \"I\u2019m not reserving any ruling. I\u2019ve made my ruling.\u201d Plaintiff made an offer of proof, but the trial court maintained its ruling which barred Anderson from testifying.\nWe agree with plaintiff that the trial court improperly barred Anderson from testifying. The rule barring a reconstruction expert from testifying merely because there are eyewitnesses to the occurrence is an anachronism which must be allowed to rest in peace rather than being resurrected. (See Palmer v. Craig (1993), 246 Ill. App. 3d 323, 327-28, 615 N.E.2d 1294, 1296-97; Augenstein v. Pulley (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 664, 681, 547 N.E.2d 1345, 1356.) The order of the day for the admission of all expert opinion evidence is simple: Expert testimony is admissible if the proffered expert is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in a field that has at least a modicum of reliability, and the testimony will tend to assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. The general acceptance test for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence is no longer the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony. In addition, the basic standard of relevance is a liberal one, and the focus must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993), 509 U.S. 579, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (on remand (9th Cir. 1995), 43 F.3d 1311); Augenstein, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 681, 547 N.E.2d at 1356.) Moreover, expert opinion testimony is admissible even though a lay person would also have some knowledge of the subject matter and even though the expert\u2019s opinion relates to an ultimate issue in the case. Ketchum v. Dura-Bond Concrete, Inc. (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 820, 831, 534 N.E.2d 1364, 1371; Carlson v. City Construction Co. (1992), 239 Ill. App. 3d 211, 239-40, 606 N.E.2d 400, 417-18; Merchants National Bank v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 118, 120, 273 N.E.2d 809, 810-11.\nHere, defendant stipulated that Anderson was an expert in the field of mechanical engineering. The record reveals that Anderson\u2019s testimony would have explained the type of maneuver necessary to produce a force sufficient to propel plaintiff\u2019s body out of the boat and into the water; it would have explained why the boat\u2019s propeller blades could not have struck plaintiff in the water unless defendant had made a sharp right turn while still in the process of turning left; and Anderson would have testified that the propeller blades could not have struck plaintiff in a straightening out maneuver, thereby refuting defendant\u2019s testimony. In addition, aspects of Anderson\u2019s testimony involved an explanation and analysis of centripetal {i.e., directed toward the center, as opposed to centrifugal) force, lateral acceleration and forces of motion, which are plainly theories accepted by the mechanical engineering community. (See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (9th Cir. 1995), 43 F.3d 1311.) These explanations would have tended to assist the jury in resolving conflicting testimony of some of the witnesses.\nIt is plain that based upon the test for the admission of expert opinion testimony, the trial court erred in barring Anderson from testifying. In addition, while we recognize that expert witnesses are hired guns and ordinarily not disinterested witnesses, the day has come when many if not most major cases are decided solely on the bases of the opinions of expert witnesses. (See Taylor v. Kohli (1994), 162 Ill. 2d 91, 642 N.E.2d 467; Sanchez v. Black Brothers Co. (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 264, 271, 423 N.E.2d 1309, 1315.) Moreover, whether or not we acknowledge it judicially, the reality is that today jurors not only rely on but in most instances expect to hear expert witnesses testify in jury cases. Thus, improperly barring an expert witness from testifying will, most likely, wrongfully take the heart out of a party\u2019s case or defense. The present case is a good example of this perception. Here, it is manifest that by barring the plaintiff\u2019s expert from testifying, the trial court significantly affected the plaintiff\u2019s ability to prove his theory of the case. It follows that the trial court\u2019s ruling was reversible error.\nIn addition, on appeal but not at trial, defendant contends that Anderson\u2019s testimony was properly barred because plaintiff failed to respond to defendant\u2019s Rule 220 interrogatories. (134 Ill. 2d R. 220.) Contrary to defendant\u2019s contention, however, the record shows that in March of 1991, 19 months prior to trial, plaintiff disclosed to defendant that Anderson would be an expert witness pursuant to Rule 220, and that defendant was given a copy of Anderson\u2019s report in compliance with Rule 220. Also, the offer of proof made by plaintiff shows that Anderson\u2019s testimony was consistent with the opinions expressed in his report. Moreover, defendant was given ample opportunity to take Anderson\u2019s deposition prior to trial, but opted not to do so. Defendant\u2019s contention on appeal is therefore untenable.\nAccordingly, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nGREIMAN, P.J., and CERDA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RIZZI" } ], "attorneys": [ "William S. Wojcik, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Sandra Young, Paul V. Kaulas, and John P. O\u2019Malley, all of Purcell & Wardrope, Chartered, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MICHAEL DOTTO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANIEL OKAN, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201492\u20142382\nOpinion filed February 1, 1995.\nWilliam S. Wojcik, of Chicago, for appellant.\nSandra Young, Paul V. Kaulas, and John P. O\u2019Malley, all of Purcell & Wardrope, Chartered, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0808-01", "first_page_order": 828, "last_page_order": 831 }