{ "id": 365887, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL ABT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Abt", "decision_date": "1995-02-09", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201492\u20142423", "first_page": "831", "last_page": "841", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 831" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "627 N.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2977702 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 N.E.2d 1304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 1051", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5209456 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/1051-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" }, { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 947", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5368972 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3125912 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 1275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3205896 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "881" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811404 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 N.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2598548 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/212/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515728 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545221 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 573", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777746 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" }, { "page": "651" }, { "page": "1380" }, { "page": "583" }, { "page": "648" }, { "page": "1378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 200", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531819 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" }, { "page": "833" }, { "page": "2254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477765 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" }, { "page": "547-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481541 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171-72" }, { "page": "169-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255347 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3091979 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "363-64" }, { "page": "370-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0359-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 961, "char_count": 22908, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.291040926635258e-08, "percentile": 0.387470080301979 }, "sha256": "6e2dee0d34d0cb4988423ddbe946a99479cd29f3ff1f022666be926c605b8261", "simhash": "1:ba52f6837bcab364", "word_count": 3747 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:33.308788+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL ABT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THEIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, the defendant, Michael Abt, was found guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 561/2, par. 1401(a)(2)) and possession of cannabis (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 561h, par. 705(d)), and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of six years and one year, respectively. The defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erroneously denied his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, and (2) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We conclude that the warrantless arrest did not violate the defendant\u2019s fourth amendment right because exigent circumstances were present. We also conclude that the defendant failed to meet his initial burden of showing an unlawful search and seizure; therefore, the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress. Finally, we find that the defendant was not deprived of his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we affirm.\nFACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\nMichael Abt was charged by information with one count of possession of more than 15 grams but less than 100 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver and one count of possession of more than 30 grams but less than 500 grams of cannabis with intent to deliver. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence seized by the arresting officers. The defendant argued that his arrest was illegal because the officers failed to obtain a warrant prior to entering his home without consent and that exigent circumstances were absent.\nAt the hearing on the motion, the defendant testified to the following sequence of events. At approximately 1 a.m. on April 14, 1989, his friend Alan Schmidt knocked on the back door of his home. Schmidt had visited Abt\u2019s home a few minutes prior to this, but Abt had not given him anything. When Abt opened the door, two police officers entered his home. Prior to the officers\u2019 entry, neither the defendant nor anyone else spoke. Then, one officer raced down the flight of stairs into Abt\u2019s basement, while the other held him against the wall with a gun to his throat. The officer then brought him into the basement. The defendant also stated that he did not consent to the officers\u2019 entry.\nNext, Officer Richard Anderson testified that on April 14, 1989, he was conducting a surveillance of Abt\u2019s home with two other officers, Peter Bukiri and Thomas Wiggins, as part of a narcotics investigation. He stated that the police had been observing the defendant\u2019s residence for about four days prior to his arrest. Anderson testified that during the four days, he witnessed people pulling up in cars, walking to the rear of the defendant\u2019s home, returning a short time later and then driving away. On cross-examination, Anderson admitted that at the preliminary hearing he testified that he only saw two people approach the defendant\u2019s door during the four days of surveillance.\nAnderson further testified that on the night of April 13, 1989, he saw Schmidt knock on the defendant\u2019s back door. He stated that he heard Schmidt ask the defendant for a \"16th\u201d and saw Schmidt hand over money to the defendant. Schmidt then entered the house and reemerged a short time later. The officer stated that he observed Schmidt and the defendant from a position that was approximately 25 to 30 feet from the defendant\u2019s back door. Anderson indicated that he was unable to determine whether a controlled substance exchanged hands, but believed that a drug transaction was in progress.\nAnderson recalled that as Schmidt walked toward the front of the house, the officers approached him and identified themselves as police officers. Schmidt then \"broke down and began crying\u201d and handed the officers two colored packets containing white powder. After they placed Schmidt under arrest, he agreed to return to the defendant\u2019s home to participate in a controlled buy by attempting to purchase narcotics from the defendant in the officers\u2019 presence.\nSchmidt promptly returned to the defendant\u2019s back door, with Anderson and Bukiri positioned against the wall of the house on either side of the door. When the defendant answered the door, Schmidt asked for either a \"16th\u201d or \"dope.\u201d Anderson further testified that the defendant indicated that if Schmidt had the money, he could come in. As Abt began walking down the stairs to the basement, the officers followed. Anderson identified himself as a police officer and arrested Abt at the bottom of the stairs.\nAt the end of the suppression hearing, the trial court found that the defendant was not aware of the officers\u2019 presence during the controlled buy and that the officers merely followed Schmidt into the defendant\u2019s home. The court also noted that the defendant did not invite the officers in or consent to their entry. Nonetheless, the court found that the officers entered the home peacefully because the defendant opened the door to Schmidt. The court finally concluded that given the evidence presented, there were exigent circumstances which paralleled the situation in People v. Eichelberger (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 359, 438 N.E.2d 140. Therefore, it denied the defendant\u2019s motion.\nAt trial, Officer Richard Anderson again testified. His description of the investigation and events leading up to the arrest was substantially similar to that given at the hearing on the motion to quash and suppress. He could not specifically recall whether there was another individual in the basement at the time of the arrest. He further testified that, he and the other officers confiscated various pieces of evidence from the defendant\u2019s basement which included the following: plastic bags containing cannabis, a clear plastic bag containing cocaine, a triple-beam scale, a smoking pipe, a spoon with burnt residue, an oil can, $1,556, a container of pills and three pieces of the defendant\u2019s identification. Anderson testified that he could see all of the above-listed items from where he stood in the basement following the defendant\u2019s arrest.\nOfficer Peter Bukiri also testified at trial on behalf of the State. His testimony was essentially the same as that of Anderson, except that Bukiri believed that he, Anderson, and Wiggins were in the basement at the time of the defendant\u2019s arrest. Also, Bukiri stated that after the defendant received his Miranda warnings, he told the officers that he was selling narcotics to offset the cost of his habit.\nValar ie O\u2019Bryan testified as part of the case in chief for the defense. O\u2019Bryan, the mother of the defendant\u2019s two sons, testified that she visited Abt shortly before midnight on April 13, 1989. She explained that she entered Abt\u2019s home through the back door and that Bobby Hackett, an individual with arm and leg braces, was in the basement with the defendant. She recalled that Schmidt arrived after she did. She also testified that the defendant was \"very high\u201d that night and that he had a severe cocaine habit.\nMichael Abt testified in his own defense that he was smoking cocaine in his basement with Bobby Hackett on the night of April 13, 1989. He explained that he had been a cocaine addict for about 10 years and that the narcotics confiscated from the home were solely for his personal consumption. He also admitted to using cannabis and barbiturates.\nAbt further testified that Schmidt came over on the night of April 13, 1989, to sell him barbiturates, which he purchased. He explained that he did not sell Schmidt any cocaine and that the money which was found by the police was to be used to pay Bobby Hackett for the cocaine.\nOfficers Bukiri and Anderson testified in rebuttal. Both stated that they did not observe a woman with two children approach the back door of the home on the night of April 13, 1989. They also testified that they did not see anyone fitting Bobby Hackett\u2019s description in the basement at the time of the defendant\u2019s arrest. The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of possession of more than 15 grams but less than 100 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver and possession of more than 30 but less than 500 grams of cannabis. Abt was sentenced to serve six years in prison.\nDISCUSSION\nI. WARRANTLESS ENTRY TO ARREST\nOn appeal, the defendant challenges the propriety of the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. First, we will examine the arrest aspect of the motion. Specifically, the defendant contends that the trial court erroneously concluded that under People v. Eichelberger (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 359, 438 N.E.2d 140, exigent circumstances justified the officers\u2019 warrantless, nonconsensual entry into his home to arrest him. The defendant maintains that a de novo standard of review is warranted in this case. The question of whether exigent circumstances are present is a question of law when neither the facts nor credibility of witnesses is questioned. (People v. Foskey (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 66, 554 N.E.2d 192; People v. Abney (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 543.) Thus, we agree with the defendant that a de novo standard of review applies here.\nThe fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects the \"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.\u201d (U.S. Const., amend. IV.) The amendment seeks to balance the interest of citizens in being free from unreasonable interferences with privacy and the interest of fair law enforcement for the community\u2019s protection. People v. James (1994), 163 Ill. 2d 302, 311, citing Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 208, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 833, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2254.\nWarrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless one of the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement is found to be applicable. (Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 586, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 651, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380.) However, where exigent circumstances are present, officers need not obtain a warrant in order to execute an arrest. Payton, 445 U.S. at 583, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 648, 100 S. Ct. at 1378.\nA court should consider several factors when deciding whether exigent circumstances exist. Factors which indicate the reasonableness of a police officer\u2019s actions under the circumstances include: (1) the officer acted upon a clear showing of probable cause, (2) the defendant was clearly identified, (3) there was a strong reason to believe that the defendant was on the premises, and (4) the entry was peaceful. (Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d at 368, 438 N.E.2d at 144; Abney, 81 Ill. 2d at 171-72, 407 N.E.2d at 549.) The court may also consider the following: (1) the need for prompt action (including the recentness of the offense), (2) the absence of any deliberate or unjustified delay by the officers during which time a warrant could have been obtained, and (3) the belief that the suspect was violent or armed. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d at 367, 438 N.E.2d at 144; Abney, 81 Ill. 2d at 169-71, 407 N.E.2d at 547-48.\n\"All of these factors are guidelines, and not cardinal maxims to be applied rigidly in each case.\u201d (People v. White (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 194, 217, 512 N.E.2d 677, 685.) Therefore, the presence of all factors in a given situation is not necessary; rather, they must be satisfied on balance. People v. Cobb (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 465, 484, 455 N.E.2d 31, 39.\nWe now turn to an examination of People v. Eichelberger. In Eichelberger, the police conducted a surveillance of the defendant\u2019s hotel room as part of a narcotics investigation. The officers set up a controlled buy in which an informant asked the defendant whether he had any \"grams.\u201d As the officers stood outside of a partially opened door which led into the defendant\u2019s room, the defendant responded that he had narcotics in his possession and was willing to sell to the informant. At that point, the officers entered the room and placed the defendant under arrest. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d at 363-64, 438 N.E.2d at 142.\nThe court in Eichelberger first concluded that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room. The court then held:\n\"[T]he warrantless entry into defendant\u2019s hotel room for the purpose of effecting an arrest did not violate defendant\u2019s fourth amendment right since the police officers reasonably believed that a felony was being committed in their presence.\u201d Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d at 370-71, 438 N.E.2d at 145.\nWe agree with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the circumstances in Eichelberger parallel the present case. However, the defendant claims that unlike the situation in Eichelberger, the officers in this case had probable cause prior to the controlled buy. The defendant contends that probable cause was established following Schmidt\u2019s arrest, and therefore, the officers should have ceased their investigation to obtain a warrant before proceeding with the controlled buy.\nRegardless of whether the police had probable cause following Schmidt\u2019s arrest, the controlled buy constituted a separate felony in progress in the officers\u2019 presence. At the hearing on the motion, Officer Anderson testified that Schmidt asked the defendant for either \"dope\u201d or a \"16th,\u201d and the defendant indicated that if Schmidt had the money he could come in. In Illinois, the possession of narcotics with the intent to deliver is a felony. (See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56h, par. 1401.) Therefore, the officers acted upon a clear showing of probable cause because the defendant was committing a felony in their presence.\nThe defendant further suggests that the controlled buy was a police-created exigency which does not constitute sufficient justification for the warrantless entry to arrest. The defendant cites People v. Galdine (1991), 212 Ill. App. 3d 472, 571 N.E.2d 182, in support of his proposition that the officers should have ceased their investigation following Schmidt\u2019s arrest in order to obtain a warrant for the defendant\u2019s arrest.\nIn Galdine, the court held that exigent circumstances were not present where police officers set up a controlled buy, but noted that its decision was governed by the circumstances of that case. (Galdine, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 483, 571 N.E.2d at 190.) However, Galdine presents a vastly different set of circumstances from the situation leading up to the defendant\u2019s arrest in the case at bar.\nIn Galdine, prior to the defendant\u2019s arrest, the police informant had already purchased cocaine from the defendant twice during the previous month. Additionally, on the day of the planned controlled buy, the price and amount of narcotics to be sold had been predetermined by the defendant and the informant. Also, on the day of the controlled buy, 16 officers from different agencies met regarding the case, and a photojournalist was summoned. The officers then proceeded with the controlled buy and arrest of the defendant without a warrant.\nIn the present case, the officers proceeded with the controlled buy shortly following Schmidt\u2019s arrest, a point which the defendant concedes. Also, the details of the purchase, such as the amount or price, were not prearranged. Prior to Schmidt\u2019s arrest, he had not been working in connection with the police. Moreover, the controlled buy in Galdine occurred after significant, long-term planning, while all of the events in the present case occurred at virtually the same time. Accordingly, we reject the defendant\u2019s argument and conclude that under People v. Eichelberger the officers had a right to make a warrantless entry to arrest the defendant because they reasonably believed that a felony was being committed in their presence.\nII. SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE\nWe also conclude that the court below properly denied the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence seized following the arrest. On a motion to suppress evidence, \"the burden of proving that the search and seizure were unlawful shall be on the defendant.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 114\u201412(b).) This statute requires the defendant to make a prima facie showing that there was a search and that it was illegal. People v. Berg (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 65, 68, 364 N.E.2d 880, 881.\nIn this case, the parties dispute the location of the defendant\u2019s arrest. The defendant maintains that he was arrested on the landing at the top of the stairs, and the officers contend that the arrest occurred at the bottom of the stairs. Anderson testified that he could see the evidence in question from the bottom of the stairwell. The trial court found that the testimony of both witnesses (the defendant and Anderson) at the suppression hearing had the \"ring of believability.\u201d The court subsequently concluded that because the defendant failed to meet his burden on the motion to suppress, the evidence would be admitted.\nOn appeal, the defendant argues that under People v. Montgomery (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 695, 405 N.E.2d 1275, the State had the burden of proving that the evidence seized was in plain view. However, Montgomery is inapposite, as the defendant in that case successfully established the location of his arrest in relation to the evidence seized. In the case at bar, the defendant has failed to meet this initial burden. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence.\nIII. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL\nFinally, the defendant argues that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The defendant cites two major defects in his defense which he contends rise to the level of constitutional violations: (1) trial counsel conceded that the defendant possessed controlled substances for personal consumption due to an addiction to cocaine, and (2) counsel failed to call certain witnesses at the suppression hearing.\nThe defendant maintains that trial counsel did not subject the State\u2019s case to \"meaningful adversarial testing\u201d and, specifically, that counsel \"completely conceded\u201d that the defendant possessed controlled substances for his own personal consumption. The defendant argues that given trial counsel\u2019s concession, the law presumes incompetence, and references People v. Hattery (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 449, 488 N.E.2d 513, as support for his argument. The defendant also charges that his addiction to cocaine is not a legal defense to the crimes charged; therefore, trial counsel improperly presented this fact as part of his defense.\nContrary to the defendant\u2019s argument, prejudice is only presumed where defense counsel has unequivocally conceded every significant aspect of the defendant\u2019s guilt, without the defendant\u2019s consent. (People v. Lindsay (1994), 263 Ill. App. 3d 523, 635 N.E.2d 551; see also People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253, 538 N.E.2d 1118.) Because counsel did not concede the defendant\u2019s guilt concerning his intent to deliver narcotics, we conclude that the State\u2019s case was subjected to meaningful adversarial testing, and the presumption of incompetency does not apply.\nTherefore, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that trial counsel\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052; People v. Altanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246.) Second, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel\u2019s errors, the result of the trial would have been different. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.) A \"reasonable probability\u201d is defined as a probability sufficient to undermine the outcome. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.) Also, trial counsel\u2019s tactical decisions are afforded great deference on review. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.\nAt trial, the defendant testified at length regarding the severity of his addiction and his intent to consume the narcotics in his possession. The ultimate decision of whether to testify at trial is left to the defendant\u2019s discretion. (People v. Brocksmith (1994), 162 Ill. 2d 224, 642 N.E.2d 1230; People v. Anderson (1994), 266 Ill. App. 3d 947, 641 N.E.2d 591.) However, certain matters involving trial strategy are left to the discretion of trial counsel, such as: whether to offer certain evidence, whether to call particular witnesses, which defense theory to present at trial, and whether and how to conduct cross-examination. Anderson, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 956-57, 641 N.E.2d at 599.\nThe defendant had a fundamental right to decide to testify on his own behalf (Anderson, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 956, 641 N.E.2d at 599), and he does not contend, nor does the record show, that his decision to take the stand was not his own. Consequently, trial counsel had to proceed in light of the defendant\u2019s statements at trial. We find that counsel had few strategic alternatives given the fact that the motion to suppress was denied, and the evidence clearly demonstrated the defendant\u2019s guilt with respect to the possession aspect of the charge. Therefore, we conclude that defense counsel\u2019s strategy did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness given the overwhelming evidence that the defendant possessed controlled substances. See People v. Nilsson (1992), 230 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 595 N.E.2d 1304.\nFinally, we turn to the defendant\u2019s argument that trial counsel should have called Alan Schmidt and Bobby Hackett to testify during the suppression hearing. Notably, the defendant failed to present any evidence that either individual was capable of providing exculpatory testimony. Also, trial counsel is given wide latitude in deciding which witnesses to call at trial. (People v. Moleterno (1993), 254 Ill. App. 3d 615, 627 N.E.2d 129.) We are not faced with a situation in which counsel failed altogether to call any witnesses at the suppression hearing, as the defendant testified on his own behalf. We conclude, therefore, that counsel\u2019s decision was strategic and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons stated above, and after a thorough examination of the briefs and record in this case, the defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOFFMAN, P.J., and S. O\u2019BRIEN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THEIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Martin J. Carlson, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, and Teri Lee Ferro, of Winston & Strawn, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, William John Healy, and Robert Robertson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL ABT, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201492\u20142423\nOpinion filed February 9, 1995.\nMartin J. Carlson, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, and Teri Lee Ferro, of Winston & Strawn, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, William John Healy, and Robert Robertson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0831-01", "first_page_order": 851, "last_page_order": 861 }