{ "id": 249152, "name": "OLIVIA MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BECKY GAIMARI, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Martinez v. Gaimari", "decision_date": "1995-04-24", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201494\u20140653", "first_page": "879", "last_page": "884", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 879" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2851011 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781336 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 Ill. App. 3d 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2864449 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/260/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5792476 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5296752 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" }, { "page": "164" }, { "page": "164" }, { "page": "164" }, { "page": "163-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 526, "char_count": 12583, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.6946178151855905e-07, "percentile": 0.9285294239162206 }, "sha256": "60eacf34ed46260546b25765ec541d184436140a2ebebfb8bc68639ab70c20cb", "simhash": "1:cfeac1067f03a175", "word_count": 2065 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:52:56.134317+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "OLIVIA MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BECKY GAIMARI, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COLWELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Becky Gaimari, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Du Page County which barred her from rejecting an arbitration award in favor of plaintiff, Olivia Martinez, and which entered a judgment on the award. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in (1) barring defendant from rejecting the award, (2) entering judgment on the award, and (3) failing to strike plaintiff\u2019s motion to bar defendant from rejecting the award. We affirm.\nThis case arose from a September 16, 1992, automobile accident involving plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint sought a $7,887.23 judgment. The cause was assigned to mandatory arbitration, and the arbitration hearing commenced on January 7, 1994. The arbitrators found in favor of plaintiff and awarded her $7,887.23.\nThe arbitrators also unanimously found that defendant failed to participate in the hearing in good faith and in a meaningful manner. The arbitrators\u2019 factual basis for this finding reveals that plaintiff never served defendant with a notice requesting defendant to appear at the arbitration hearing. (See 134 Ill. 2d R. 237(b).) Defendant\u2019s counsel appeared at the hearing, but defendant did not. Although defendant\u2019s answer disputed liability, defense counsel did not present any evidence at the hearing. However, defense counsel cross-examined plaintiff and made legal arguments. On January 18, 1994, defendant filed a notice of rejection of the award and paid the $200 fee.\nOn February 18, 1994, plaintiff moved, pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 910b) and 219(c) (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 14,1993), R. 91(b), eff. June 1, 1993; 134 Ill. 2d R. 219(c)), for an order barring defendant from rejecting the award. Plaintiff also requested that the court enter judgment on the award. Neither plaintiff nor her attorney appeared at the April 12 hearing on plaintiff\u2019s motion. A secretary of plaintiff\u2019s counsel appeared, explained that plaintiff\u2019s attorney could not appear because he was engaged in a trial in another county, and requested a continuance. Defendant objected to a continuance. The trial court continued the matter to May 9 and ordered plaintiff\u2019s counsel to file within 14 days an affidavit stating that, on April 12, he in fact was engaged in a trial \"with jurors or witnesses sworn.\u201d\nAt the May 9 hearing, defendant tendered her affidavit, which stated that she did not attend the arbitration hearing because her one-year-old son had an extremely high fever. She took her son to the hospital, and the doctor subsequently diagnosed defendant\u2019s son as having bronchitis. Also, defendant, noting that plaintiff\u2019s attorney never filed the required affidavit, moved to strike plaintiff\u2019s motion to bar defendant from rejecting the arbitration award. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion and ordered plaintiff\u2019s counsel to file the affidavit within seven days. The court then granted plaintiff\u2019s motion and entered a judgment on the arbitration award.\nPlaintiff\u2019s counsel filed his affidavit on May 20. The affidavit stated that, on April 12, 1994, counsel had two jury trials scheduled in another county. This timely appeal followed.\nDefendant\u2019s principal argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in barring defendant from rejecting the arbitration award. Plaintiff has not filed an appellee\u2019s brief. Therefore, we will address defendant\u2019s contentions under the standards set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133.\nDefendant relies on our decision in Weisenburn v. Smith (1991), 214 Ill. App. 3d 160. In Weisenburn, the plaintiff filed, pursuant to Rule 237, a notice requesting the defendant to be available to testify as an adverse witness at the arbitration hearing. The defendant did not appear, but his counsel was present. The trial court entered judgment on the arbitration award in the plaintiff\u2019s favor, finding that the defendant\u2019s notice of rejection was waived because he failed to appear at the arbitration hearing.\nWe reversed, relying on Supreme Court Rules 91 and 93. Rule 91 provided that \"[t]he failure of a party to be present, either in person or by counsel, at an arbitration hearing shall constitute a waiver of the right to reject the award.\u201d (134 Ill. 2d R. 91(a).) Rule 93 provided that \"any party who was present at the arbitration hearing, either in person or by counsel, may file *** a written notice of rejection of the award and request to proceed to trial.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 93(a).\nWe recognized that, pursuant to Rule 237, a party may be required to attend the hearing in person and that sanctions may be imposed for failing to attend. (Weisenburn, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 164.) However, we held that, in light of the language of Rules 91 and 93(a), such a failure to appear cannot be deemed a waiver of the party\u2019s right to reject the award. (Weisenburn, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 164.) To hold otherwise would effectively read parts of Rules 91 and 93 out of the arbitration scheme. (Weisenburn, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 164.) Because the defendant in Weisenburn had counsel present at the hearing, he preserved his right to reject the arbitration award. Weisenburn, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 164; see also Allstate Insurance Co. v. Pena (1992), 227 Ill. App. 3d 348, 349.\nDefendant argues that the same result should obtain here. However, after we decided Weisenburn, Rule 91 was amended to include a new subsection (b). That provision provides:\n\"All parties to the arbitration hearing must participate in the hearing in good faith and in a meaningful manner. If a panel of arbitrators unanimously finds that a party has failed to participate in the hearing in good faith and in a meaningful manner, the panel\u2019s finding and factual basis *** shall be prima facie evidence that the party failed to participate in the arbitration hearing in good faith and in a meaningful manner and a court, when presented with a petition for sanctions or remedy therefor, may order sanctions as provided in Rule 219(c), including, but not limited to, an order debarring that party from rejecting the award ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 14, 1993), R. 91(b), eff. June 1, 1993.\nMoreover, Rule 93(a) was amended to provide that \"[t]he filing of a notice of rejection shall not be effective as to any party who is debarred from rejecting an award.\u201d (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 14, 1993), R. 93(a), eff. June 1, 1993.) The impetus for the amendments was complaints by arbitrators that some parties and attorneys would merely attend the arbitration hearing and would refuse to participate in arbitration. Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 14, 1993), R. 91(b), Committee Comments, eff. June 1, 1993.\nWe agree with defendant that, because she was present at the hearing by counsel, she cannot be deemed to have waived her right to reject the arbitration award. However, under the recent amendment to Rule 91, the trial court clearly had the authority to impose, as a sanction, an order barring defendant from rejecting the arbitration award. We disagree with defendant that this interpretation creates an illogical inconsistency. Rule 91(b) provides for a variety of sanctions, and imposing Rule 91(b) sanctions is not warranted every time a party fails to appear in person at the arbitration hearing. Sanctions are appropriate only when the party\u2019s failure to appear in person constitutes a failure to participate in good faith and in a meaningful manner.\nDefendant argues that, nevertheless, the trial court erred in finding that she failed to participate in the hearing in good faith and in a meaningful manner. According to defendant, because she had to respond to a medical emergency involving her son, she had a valid excuse for not attending the hearing. The arbitration panel\u2019s finding that defendant failed to participate in the hearing in good faith and in a meaningful manner constitutes prima facie evidence of that fact. (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 14, 1993), R. 91(b), eff. June 1, 1993.) Whether defendant presented evidence sufficient to rebut this prima facie evidence is a question of fact. Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court\u2019s ruling unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Fletcher v. Marshall (1994), 260 Ill. App. 3d 673, 675.\nDefendant was an eyewitness to the events allegedly giving rise to her liability, and, therefore, her participation in the arbitration hearing was most likely essential. Moreover, the record reveals that defendant did not offer the medical excuse until she was faced with the prospect of being barred from rejecting the award. The arbitrators and the trial court reasonably could have concluded that, by not requesting that the hearing be continued so that defendant could be present, defendant never intended to participate in good faith and in a meaningful manner.\nEven if defendant\u2019s excuse for failing to attend the hearing is valid, the trial court\u2019s ruling is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. What is most important is that defendant failed to present any evidence to rebut plaintiff\u2019s case in chief. It is highly unlikely that defendant would have proceeded in this manner if the cause had gone to trial. The purpose of the amendments to Rules 91 and 93 was to emphasize that \"[arbitration must not be perceived as just another hurdle to be crossed in getting the case to trial.\u201d (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 14, 1993), R. 91(b), Committee Comments, eff. June 1, 1993.) Where, as here, a defendant fails to subject the plaintiff\u2019s case to the type of adversarial testing that would be expected at a trial, the mandatory arbitration process loses its value entirely. The amendments to Rules 91 and 93 constitute an attempt to allay this problem. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not commit error when, as a sanction, it barred defendant from rejecting the arbitration award.\nWe also reject defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in entering a judgment on the arbitration award. Rule 92(c) provides that any party may move for judgment if none of the parties files a notice of rejection. (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 1 (January 5, 1994), R. 92(c), eff. January 1, 1994.) Defendant claims that the trial court had no authority to entertain plaintiff\u2019s motion because defendant had already filed a notice of rejection.\nDefendant\u2019s argument ignores Rule 93(a), which states that the filing of a notice of rejection is not effective as to any party who is debarred from rejecting an award. (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 14, 1993), R. 93(a), eff. June 1, 1993.) We must interpret the mandatory arbitration rules harmoniously (Weisenburn, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 163-64), and must avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd results (Baker v. Miller (1994), 159 Ill. 2d 249, 262). It would be incongruous to adopt an interpretation of Rule 92(c) which would allow a party to frustrate the purpose underlying the amendments to Rules 91 and 93 simply by filing a notice of rejection before another party has a chance to move for an order debarring that party from rejecting the award. When the trial court entered the order debarring defendant from rejecting the award, defendant\u2019s notice of rejection was no longer of any effect. Therefore, the trial court properly entered judgment on the award.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention is that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s request to strike plaintiff\u2019s motion to bar defendant from rejecting the arbitration award. According to defendant, because plaintiff\u2019s counsel failed to file his affidavit in accordance with the trial court\u2019s April 12, 1994, order, the proper remedy was to strike plaintiff\u2019s motion. Defendant fails to cite any authority in support of this argument. Therefore, this contention is waived. (145 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); Ollivier v. Alden (1994), 262 Ill. App. 3d 190, 199.) Furthermore, because counsel eventually filed his affidavit, we fail to see how the trial court\u2019s ruling prejudiced defendant.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.\nAffirmed.\nMcLAREN, P.J., and BOWMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COLWELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Keely Truax and Ross Roloff, both of Parrillo, Weiss & O\u2019Halloran, of Chicago, for appellant.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "OLIVIA MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BECKY GAIMARI, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201494\u20140653\nOpinion filed April 24, 1995.\nRehearing denied May 17, 1995.\nKeely Truax and Ross Roloff, both of Parrillo, Weiss & O\u2019Halloran, of Chicago, for appellant.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0879-01", "first_page_order": 899, "last_page_order": 904 }