{ "id": 252002, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONNA REID, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Reid", "decision_date": "1995-04-24", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201493\u20141350", "first_page": "301", "last_page": "311", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 301" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5156464 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 N.E.2d 1135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5784153 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/235/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 1187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12124559 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 N.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2724498 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2543073 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 N.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3598772 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2554736 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0631-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 1021", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3612660 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1027" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/1021-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 613", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 1078", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2491865 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/1078-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 N.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5782533 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/236/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 N.E.2d 1360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887234 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 N.E.2d 992", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781338 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 N.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592622 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 1020", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5477512 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" }, { "page": "392" }, { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2488892 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 N.E.2d 1247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294736 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 N.E.2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5203160 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 N.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. App. 3d 952", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3508250 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "954" }, { "page": "954" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/162/0952-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 N.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5264544 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887221 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "975" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0961-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249117 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 N.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2932686 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "413" }, { "page": "415" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0401-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1043, "char_count": 21168, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0066835290029031e-07, "percentile": 0.5408637723666515 }, "sha256": "a601cba2690410955dfd95bd2114a87f769328372758f2ad68833da3c0156ccb", "simhash": "1:2b073f62df6b6cb1", "word_count": 3683 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:46:33.224419+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONNA REID, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDrug prosecutions can stir emotions in prospective jurors. It happened here. They also can cause prosecutors to engage in rhetorical overkill. That, too, happened here. The defendant contends these events and an evidentiary ruling concerning her proposed character witnesses fatally infected her jury trial.\nWe affirm her conviction of delivery of a controlled substance and her sentence of nine years\u2019 imprisonment.\nJURY SELECTION\nThe defendant had used five of her seven allotted peremptory challenges when the trial judge began questioning prospective juror Richard Kwiecinski. The relevant questions and answers were:\n\"Q. Did you ever know anybody who had a problem with drugs? A. Unfortunately quite a few people. My former partner in the commodities ended up having a very serious cocaine problem that led us to dissolve our company, and my wife\u2019s two brothers have had drug problems. One of them had to go to Forest Hospital for treatment, and the other, one is also involved in commodities, and currently I think he has licked the habit, but there is still a problem with commodities.\nQ. Do you know anybody that has actually been involved with a drug abuse program?\nA. Yes, one of my brother-in-laws.\nQ. Do you know of anyone who has ever died as a result of a drug overdose?\nA. Well, my wife\u2019s sister, her husband\u2019s brother had \u2014 she was on cocaine and had a baby that died from that, and also my wife is in charge of the Snowflake Program or Operation Snowflake at River Trails Grade School which is an anti-drug program, and they\u2019re also involved with doing fund raisers for the Merriville Columbia Hospital for, you know, deformed babies from cocaine.\nQ. *** This defendant is charged with delivery of a controlled substance: to-wit, cocaine. Do you think that gives you any preconceived notions about the case at all?\nA. I would try not to think it would. I don\u2019t know what might happen when the trial starts ***.\nq *** Do you think that you are able to keep an opened [sic] mind, to listen to the State\u2019s case, and the defense case as to what extent they want to present any evidence, listen to the evidence and the arguments and listen to the law as they instruct you and then based upon that form your decision?\nA. Well, I think I could, yes.\nQ. So you think basically you would really try to give both sides a fair trial?\nA. Right.\nQ. And if you feel the State proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, would you have any problems signing a guilty verdict?\nA. No, I wouldn\u2019t.\nQ. And if they failed to do so, would you have any problems signing a not guilty verdict?\nA. No.\u201d\nThen the defendant\u2019s lawyer asked the prospective juror:\n\"Q. *** She will testify. Would your decision on her credibility be influenced on what happened to your business?\nA. I would try not to let it influence me, but it did have a major effect on my life, and I would try not to have that affect me.\nQ. But you don\u2019t know if it would or not until we actually start?\nA. Exactly.\u201d\nThe next prospective juror was Donald O\u2019Meara. After he was questioned by court and counsel, the defense exercised its sixth per remptory challenge against a prospective juror named Salazar. Then it asked that juror Kwiecinski be challenged for cause. The judge refused, holding that the juror\u2019s answers demonstrated an open mind. The defense then used its final peremptory challenge on Kwiecinski.\nWhen the defense asked for an additional peremptory challenge for juror O\u2019Meara, the trial judge said: \"It\u2019s seven and seven. That\u2019s what you are entitled to. That\u2019s what you get.\u201d\nThe trial proceeded with Donald O\u2019Meara on the jury.\nWhile Donna Reid\u2019s jury trial took place, the judge heard code-fendant Charles Dean\u2019s case as a bench trial.\nEVIDENCE AT TRIAL\nMost of the State\u2019s case came from James Perille, an undercover narcotics officer for the Schaumburg police department. He testified:\nOn March 21, 1991, he telephoned codefendant Charles Dean and asked if he had four ounces of cocaine. Dean told Perille that while he did not have the cocaine at that time, he would contact \"his guy\u201d and obtain it the following day. Dean then told Perille to pick him up at his apartment at 3 p.m. the following day.\nBefore meeting Dean, Perille briefed his partner and other investigators about the narcotics transaction and obtained $7,600 from the Schaumburg police department to purchase the narcotics. Perille proceeded to Dean\u2019s apartment, where Dean entered Perille\u2019s car and informed him that he needed to contact his source to obtain the cocaine. After talking with someone on a cellular telephone, Dean directed Perille to drive to a parking lot on Damen Avenue.\nApproximately 10 minutes after he arrived at that location, Per-ille observed a red car enter the parking lot and park behind him. Dean then said, \"Here\u2019s my guy,\u201d exited the car, walked over to the red car, and had a conversation with the driver of that vehicle. Per-ille looked at his rear-view mirror and observed a man, two women and an infant inside the red car. Dean then returned to Perille\u2019s car and informed him that one of the women would come over to count the money.\nMoments later, the defendant, Donna Reid, walked over to Per-ille\u2019s trunk and counted out $5,000 that Perille had placed inside. After counting the money, the defendant placed it back into the trunk and walked back to the red car where she talked to the driver. Both the driver and the defendant then walked to a nearby telephone booth. Dean returned to Perille\u2019s car and told him they had to proceed to another location to receive the cocaine.\nAbout 10 minutes after Perille and Dean reached a second parking lot, the red car arrived. Dean then told Perille, \"My guy is here. Let\u2019s get the money ready. It\u2019s going to go.\u201d Perille and Dean then left the car and opened the trunk.\nWhile they were walking toward Perille\u2019s car, the driver of the red car handed something to the defendant. The defendant then walked to Perille\u2019s trunk and placed four plastic bags containing a white powdery substance into the trunk. Perille handed the defendant a bundle of money which she placed in her pocket as she began to walk away. Perille then activated a prearranged signal and surveillance units converged at the scene. Officer Reninger yelled \"Stop, police,\u201d but the defendant continued to run until she was apprehended by officers.\nAfter being transported to the police station and being informed of her Miranda rights, the defendant was given a blank sheet of paper and asked to write her version of the events surrounding her arrest. Perille testified that the defendant wrote that she gave the man the \"ting.\u201d When asked by officers to clarify this statement, the defendant said she was referring to cocaine but did not know how to spell the word. Perille then spelled \"cocaine\u201d orally while the defendant printed the word in her statement.\nCatherine Hunt, a forensic scientist, testified that the bags placed by the defendant into Perille\u2019s car trunk contained 117 grams of a substance containing cocaine.\nAt the end of the State\u2019s case, the State objected to the defendant\u2019s proposed use of character witnesses. Defendant said she would testify to her truth, honesty, reputation for law and order, and her naivete and predisposition to be influenced by others. She said her two character witnesses would then testify to her reputation in her family for those traits. They also would say they had never seen her use cocaine. The trial judge excluded the defendant\u2019s character witnesses.\nThe defense consisted almost entirely of the defendant\u2019s testimony. She testified:\nOn March 21, 1991, she was on her way to the hospital when Seymour Hunter, whom the defendant knew as \"Bunny,\u201d offered her a ride. She accepted the offer and she and her child entered Hunter\u2019s red car.\nOn the way to the hospital, Hunter asked her if she would count some money for him. Hunter then drove to a parking lot and directed her to Perille\u2019s car where she counted the money contained in the trunk. Hunter then motioned for her to join him near a telephone booth and asked her if the money was in the trunk. She told Hunter that there was $5,000 in Perille\u2019s trunk. She and Hunter then drove to another parking lot where Hunter told her to give her child to the rear-seat passenger. The rear-seat passenger then exited the car and took her child into a store.\nAt Hunter\u2019s request, the defendant then left the red car and entered a dark car driven by another man. The driver handed her four plastic bags and instructed her to place them in her pocket. She complied and was then driven to another parking lot where she exited the car and, recognizing only Perille, walked toward him. When Dean asked her if she had the \"stuff,\u201d she responded that she had the \"ting.\u201d Perille then opened his trunk and told her to place the \"stuff\u201d inside. She removed the plastic bags from her pocket and placed them in the trunk. Dean then handed her some money and she began to walk away. When someone yelled \"Police, freeze,\u201d she did not understand what was happening and began to run.\nFINAL ARGUMENT\nThe defendant raises several issues concerning the State\u2019s final argument. We set out one portion of the State\u2019s argument:\n\"Ladies and gentlemen, as I was saying, you can\u2019t tell family members of people who have been destroyed by drugs that it is a victimless crime. And you can\u2019t tell people who have their cars broken into or who have their homes burglarized or who have been mugged that drug offenses are victimless crimes because drugs make people happy, especially those who use it.\nAnd it makes them so happy that they want the drugs real bad, and they are illegal, and they cost because four ounces of that garbage, as you heard from this trial, costs $5,000. And right now, there is [szc] 18,000 Marines in Somalia who are there to feed millions of people who are starving over there and risking their lives. And they are risking their lives because the people of Somalia, who are in a position to do something and distribute the food that other nations have sent there would rather chew that new drug Khat *** and ride around in Jeeps with machine guns than to do anything to help their own people.\nAnd you don\u2019t have to look as far as Somalia to figure out what drugs are doing to society and whether or not it\u2019s a victimless crime or not. All you have to do is pick up a local paper.\n* * *\nNow, I will tell you one last thing. If you allow your sympathy or your minds to be clouded by other than the facts in this case, then you are not the solution to the problem with drugs today. You will become part of that problem.\u201d\nDECISION\nJURY SELECTION\nThe principles we must bear in mind are contained in People v. Cole (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 401, 298 N.E.2d 705.\nThe right to an impartial jury is so fundamental to due process that an infringement of that right requires reversal by a reviewing court. Cole, 54 Ill. 2d at 413.\nImpartiality is not a technical concept; rather, it is a \"state of mind.\u201d Cole, 54 Ill. 2d at 411.\nThe burden of showing that the juror possesses a disqualifying state of mind is on the party challenging the juror. That party must show the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror \"as will raise the presumption of partiality.\u201d Cole, 54 Ill. 2d at 413.\nMore than a mere suspicion of bias must be demonstrated. Cole, 54 Ill. 2d at 415.\nThe determination of whether a prospective juror is biased is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Cole, 54 Ill. 2d at 414.\nIn this case, prospective juror Kwiecinski\u2019s life had been touched by cocaine. He seemed to be saying he was starting out as fair and impartial, that he would \"try\u201d not to let his experience affect his judgment on the defendant\u2019s credibility, but that he could not know until after the trial started whether his personal experience with cocaine would have an impact on his view of the defendant\u2019s testimony.\nJuror Kwiecinski\u2019s remarks must be considered as a whole. He need not express himself with \"meticulous preciseness.\u201d People v. Martin (1995), 271 Ill. App. 3d 346, 354.\nIn Martin, a murder case, the juror was asked:\n\"Q. Is there anything about this type of case that would prevent you from being fair and impartial?\nA. I don\u2019t think so.\u201d Martin, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 353.\nWhen pressed for a more specific answer, the juror said: \"Like I said, I don\u2019t think so. I haven\u2019t heard any testimony yet.\u201d Martin, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 353.\nThe trial judge refused to strike the juror for cause. We held that ruling was not an abuse of discretion.\nOther decisions stand for the proposition that a juror\u2019s state of uncertainty does not necessarily mean the juror is unqualified to serve. In People v. Barragan (1993), 266 Ill. App. 3d 961, 975, 641 N.E.2d 535, a murder case, the juror was asked:\n\"Q. Do you feel that you could listen to all the evidence before you made up your mind?\nA. It would be kind of tough.\nQ. Do you think you could not be fair to either the State or the defense?\nA. It would be hard.\u201d\nThat juror, like the juror in this case, did not express any fixed opinion as to the defendant\u2019s guilt. In other answers, that juror, like the juror in this case, expressed a willingness to follow the law and give both sides a fair trial. The court held the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he refused to excuse the juror for cause.\nThe potential juror in People v. Tipton (1991), 222 Ill. App. 3d 657, 664, 584 N.E.2d 310, a sexual assault case, was asked whether the fact that her sister had been raped five years earlier would influence her consideration of the case. Her answer: \"I don\u2019t know. I honestly don\u2019t know. I would try to *** Do my best.\u201d It was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to dismiss the juror for cause.\nPeople v. Johnson (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 952, 954, 516 N.E.2d 343, was another case where a juror\u2019s willingness to \"try\u201d was enough to overcome a challenge for cause. That prospective juror was a gun control advocate. The charge was armed robbery. When asked if she would follow the law, she said: \"I would try.\u201d When asked if she would be fair and impartial, she said: \"I would try.\u201d Since the trial judge \"was in a position to evaluate this response and fairly decide its candor,\u201d the denial of the defendant\u2019s challenge for cause was not an abuse of discretion. 162 Ill. App. 3d at 954.\nThe facts before us approach, but do not reach, the situation in People v. Delgado (1992), 231 Ill. App. 3d 117, 596 N.E.2d 149, a case relied on by the defendant.\nIn Delgado, a controlled substance case, a close friend of the juror had died as a result of a drug overdose. The trial judge and the defense repeatedly asked him if he could be fair and impartial. Each time, he equivocated. The refusal to excuse the juror for cause was held to be error.\nSimilar equivocal and self-doubting responses concerning fairness and impartiality have been held to be sufficient reasons to excuse potential jurors for cause. See People v. Johnson (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 713, 575 N.E.2d 1247; People v. Harris (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 663, 554 N.E.2d 367; People v. Washington (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 386, 432 N.E.2d 1020.\nAfter a careful examination of the voir dire proceedings in general, and juror Kwiecinski\u2019s interrogation in particular, we cannot say the trial judge in this case abused his discretion when he denied the challenge for cause.\nThis is a close case. Trial judges should not give grudging acceptance to the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Since this is a matter for \"sound discretion\u201d (People v. Seuffer (1991) , 144 Ill. 2d 482, 502, 582 N.E.2d 71), and not de novo review, we find no error.\nWhether the trial judge, in fact, had the inherent authority to grant an additional peremptory challenge has never been decided by the supreme court. Some appellate decisions have held that the trial court does have that discretionary power. (See People v. Delgado (1992), 231 Ill. App. 3d 117, 121, 596 N.E.2d 149; People v. Washington, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 392.) But in People v. Hohley (1994), 159 Ill. 2d 272, 637 N.E.2d 992, the supreme court expressly declined to consider whether trial judges have discretion to grant peremptory challenges in addition to those provided by Supreme Court Rule 434(d).\nAssuming, arguendo, the trial judge in this case had such discretion, there would be no prejudicial error. The defendant made no showing that an \"objectionable juror\u201d was forced on her after she exhausted her peremptory challenges. See People v. Marts (1994), 266 Ill. App. 3d 531, 540, 639 N.E.2d 1360; People v. Washington, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 392.\nAn \"objectionable juror\u201d has been defined as \"a juror who should have been dismissed for cause \u2014 one who would prejudice the case.\u201d (Flynn v. Edmonds (1992), 236 Ill. App. 3d 770, 782, 602 N.E.2d 880.) The defendant takes the position that an \"objectionable juror\u201d is anyone she did not want on her jury. We do not agree. There must be some attempt to persuade the trial judge that a juror the defendant was required to accept could not be fair and impartial. The failure to make such a showing forecloses further consideration of the issue. People v. Washington, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 392.\nEXCLUSION OF THE DEFENDANT\u2019S CHARACTER WITNESSES\nThe decision to admit character evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on review unless there is an abuse of discretion. People v. Batinich (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 554 N.E.2d 613.\nEvidence of a good reputation in the community must relate to a particular character trait involved in the oifense charged. People v. Hall (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 1027, 513 N.E.2d 429.\nIn this State, character must be proved by general reputation based on the witness\u2019 contact with the defendant\u2019s neighbors and associates, not on the witness\u2019 personal opinion. People v. Sargent (1990), 207 Ill. App. 3d 631, 638, 566 N.E.2d 318.\nEvidence of good reputation for truth and veracity is permissible only when the credibility of the defendant has been attacked. People v. Doll (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 495, 467 N.E.2d 335.\nSpecific instances of relevant conduct may not be used to establish good or bad character. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 405.1 (6th ed. 1994).\nApplying these principles to this case, we find no error in the trial judge\u2019s exclusion of the defendant\u2019s character witnesses.\nPeople v. Perez (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 457, 568 N.E.2d 250, relied on by the defendant, does not apply here. Perez was an entrapment case, where the defendant\u2019s readiness to violate the law was an issue. Here, evidence of naivete, manipulability, and lack of experience with narcotics would have little or nothing to do with the charge of delivery of a controlled substance. Further, we seriously doubt whether these are the kinds of character traits the law envisions in any case.\nThe defendant testified freely to her mental state and knowledge at the time of the offense. She was allowed to testify to her own truthfulness and honesty in the community. The trial judge properly refused to extend the established boundaries for character evidence.\nTHE STATE\u2019S FINAL ARGUMENT\nThe defendant complains of several comments made by the State during its final argument. Some of the claimed errors were waived by a failure to object at the time. Some comments were invited responses. Some words, such as those we set out above, would have been better left unsaid.\nWe recognize that prosecutors have been authorized to argue the evils of drug abuse and the need to punish drug dealers. People v. Lopez (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 237, 139 N.E.2d 724; People v. Bianchi (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 113, 117, 420 N.E.2d 1187.\nThe argument in this case went beyond a call for a victory in the \"war on drugs.\u201d The prosecutor\u2019s remarks ranged from \"the family members of people who have been destroyed by drugs\u201d to \"18,000 Marines in Somalia who are there to feed millions of people.\u201d\nThis court expressed discomfort with these kinds of comments in People v. Loferski (1992), 235 Ill. App. 3d 675, 688-90, 601 N.E.2d 1135. Here, as there, we note that the courts of this State have upheld similar arguments. In addition, the defendant in this case cannot demonstrate that the result of her trial would have been different had these or any of the other prosecution comments not been made. People v. Moreno (1992), 238 Ill. App. 3d 626, 634, 606 N.E.2d 514.\nCONCLUSION\nWe affirm, the defendant\u2019s conviction.\nJudgment affirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and BRADEN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Beth I. Solomon and Bruce Landrum, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Andrea Bonin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONNA REID, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 93\u20141350\nOpinion filed April 24, 1995.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Beth I. Solomon and Bruce Landrum, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Andrea Bonin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0301-01", "first_page_order": 319, "last_page_order": 329 }