{ "id": 251982, "name": "MICHAEL SILVERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ECONOMY FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Silverman v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.", "decision_date": "1995-05-08", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201493\u20141334", "first_page": "490", "last_page": "494", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 490" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 1031", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333106 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/1031-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 1062", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3126478 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1065" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/1062-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 1043", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3570918 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/1043-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 N.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2493150 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5196594 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 N.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 909", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5387081 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/246/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "618 N.E.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5411446 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 N.E.2d 1281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. App. 3d 1015", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2466025 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/199/1015-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467299 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0652-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 501, "char_count": 8522, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1128616541767388e-07, "percentile": 0.5711242238447106 }, "sha256": "56cd83288087ba3fcd2570c8f7e3bb0b57eb7b0d489d00d9a2c96ae9eb49c316", "simhash": "1:32549cf6e3ccf0fd", "word_count": 1376 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:46:33.224419+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MICHAEL SILVERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ECONOMY FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nSometimes it\u2019s not the words that matter, it\u2019s how dark they are. This insurance coverage case turns on our analysis of boldface type.\nOn February 19, 1984, Economy Fire and Casualty Company (Economy) issued a renewal of an automobile liability insurance policy to Michael Silverman\u2019s business. About five months later, on July 27, Silverman was seriously injured when his car collided with the car driven by Thomas Casale.\nOn June 7, 1985, Silverman sued Casale, who was covered by a policy with a limit of $100,000.\nOn September 19, 1990, Casale\u2019s insurer offered the entire $100,000 to settle the case with Silverman. On that same date, Sil-verman made a claim for benefits to Economy under its underinsured motorist and medical pay provisions. Economy refused to honor the claim for underinsured motorist coverage, claiming Silverman failed to make a demand for arbitration within two years of the accident.\nThe lawsuit against Casale was settled on January 31, 1991. Less than a month later, on February 20, Silverman filed this declaratory judgment suit against Economy. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Economy\u2019s motion, holding that Silverman did not file his lawsuit or make a written demand for arbitration within two years of the loss, as required by the policy. (Economy never has claimed it received untimely notice of the accident.)\nThat order is the subject of this appeal. The issue presented is whether the time of \"loss\u201d for this claim is the date of the accident or the date that Silverman\u2019s lawsuit against Casale was resolved. We reverse the order granting Economy\u2019s motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.\nTHE INSURANCE POLICY\nThe Economy policy, in part I, reads as follows:\n\"WORDS AND PHRASES WITH SPECIAL MEANING-READ THEM CAREFULLY\nThe following words and phrases have special meaning throughout this policy and appear in boldface type when used ***\nH. \u2019Loss\u2019 means direct and accidental damage or loss.\u201d\nThe uninsured motorists insurance amendatory endorsement, which applies to underinsured motorist coverage, contains the limitation clause at issue in this case:\n\"3. No suit, action or arbitration proceedings for the recovery of any claim under Uninsured Motorists Coverage shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless the insured shall have fully complied with all of the terms of this policy, nor unless commenced within two (2) years after the occurrence of the loss.\u201d\nSection III of the endorsement provides:\n\"The conditions, exclusions, and general provisions of the policy applicable to Family Protection Coverage / Uninsured Motorists Coverage shall apply to this endorsement except the 'Limits of Liability\u2019 provisions.\u201d\nDECISION\nEconomy contends, and the trial court agreed, that the definition of \"loss\u201d in the section entitled \"WORDS AND PHRASES WITH SPECIAL MEANING\u201d (WPSM) is specific and controlling.\nSince this lawsuit was not filed within two years of the date of the accident, says Economy, it was not filed within two years of the \"direct and accidental damage or loss\u201d and therefore is untimely.\nSilverman, of course, does not agree. He contends the definition of the boldface \"loss\u201d in the WPSM does not apply to the non-boldface type \"loss\u201d in the limitation clause of the endorsement. What\u2019s more, he says, the non-boldface \"loss\u201d is ambiguous and should be construed against the insurer.\nEconomy relies on Shelton v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 652, 515 N.E.2d 235. Shelton stands for the proposition that a clearly expressed limitation provision for uninsured motorist coverage will be enforced. But in that case the limitations clause specifically provided: \"Further, any suit, action or arbitration will be barred unless commenced within two years after the date of the accident.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (161 Ill. App. 3d at 655.) The limitations clause in the instant case does not contain the clear language of the policy in Shelton.\nSilverman relies on Butler v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1990), 199 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 557 N.E.2d 1281. In that case, as here, the phrase \"occurrence of the loss\u201d appeared in the limitations clause. The court held the limitations period had not begun to run because the liability and the sufficiency of policy coverage of the personal injury defendants had not yet been determined. In Butler, unlike the policy in this case, there was no definition of \"loss\u201d anywhere in the policy. The holding in Butler has been followed consistently. Cowens v. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund (1993), 249 Ill. App. 3d 214, 618 N.E.2d 873; Glenn v. Prestige Casualty Co. (1993), 246 Ill. App. 3d 909, 617 N.E.2d 84; McCray v. Merit Insurance Co. (1992), 233 Ill. App. 3d 36, 598 N.E.2d 366.\nThe rules of contract construction apply to insurance policies. Courts interpret these policies as a matter of law. (Heneghan v. State Security Insurance Co. (1990), 195 Ill. App. 3d 447, 453, 552 N.E.2d 406.) This question of law can be decided on review independently of the trial court\u2019s judgment. Butler v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1990), 199 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 557 N.E.2d 1281.\nTo interpret the provisions of this insurance contract, we are required to examine the entire document, considering the language of the policy as well as the subject matter and purpose of the contract. Jeczala v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 1043. 1047. 497 N.E.2d 514.\nWe reject Economy\u2019s argument that \"loss\u201d has the same meaning everywhere it appears in the policy, boldface type or not. The policy carefully and sensibly limits the applicability of the defined \"loss.\u201d For example, the word appears in boldface type throughout parts VII and VIII of the policy.\nPart VII refers to physical damage insurance, where there is no reason to wait for information about the tortfeasor\u2019s liability or coverage.\nPart VIII concerns the insured\u2019s duties of notice and cooperation after an \"accident or loss.\u201d Requiring the insured to act promptly after the accident is a reasonable condition for coverage.\nWe believe Economy\u2019s decision to place a non-boldface type \"loss\u201d in the limitations clause was \"purposefully inserted and that the language was not employed idly.\u201d State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Schmitt (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1065, 419 N.E.2d 601.\nIt was not a typographical oversight. There is no good reason to start running the time for lawsuit or arbitration until the tort liability of the underinsured motorist has been established by judgment or settlement. Until then, the insured would not know the extent of his claim against his own insurance company.\nIf Economy wanted the word \"loss\u201d to mean \"accident\u201d in the limitations clause, it could have used the word \"accident,\u201d as it did in other parts of the policy. (See Cowens v. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund (1993), 249 Ill. App. 3d 214, 219, 618 N.E.2d 873.) Use of the word \"accident\u201d in a limitations clause is common in the insurance industry. See Hermanson v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1994), 267 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 642 N.E.2d 857.\nThe accident in this case took place July 27, 1984. That would mean, under Economy\u2019s current view, that either the written demand for arbitration or this lawsuit would have to have been filed by July 27, 1986. The tort case against Casale was not settled until January 31, 1991. Nothing much would have happened for 41/a years. We do not believe that is what the parties had in mind when they entered into this insurance contract.\nCONCLUSION\nThe words at issue in this case are not ambiguous. Our reading of the entire policy compels the conclusion that the clock on the non-boldface \"loss\u201d contained in the limitations clause did not start running until the case against Casale was resolved. For that reason, we reverse the trial judge\u2019s grant of summary judgment to Economy and remand for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded for further proceedings.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and BRADEN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Fishman & Fishman & Saltzberg, P.C., of Chicago (Gerald B. Saltzberg, John C. Pendergast, Scott D. Stephenson, and Carol Collins, of counsel), for appellant.", "Williams & Montgomery, Ltd., of Chicago (James K. Horstman, Barry L. Kroll, and Lloyd E. Williams, Jr., of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MICHAEL SILVERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ECONOMY FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 93\u20141334\nOpinion filed May 8, 1995.\nFishman & Fishman & Saltzberg, P.C., of Chicago (Gerald B. Saltzberg, John C. Pendergast, Scott D. Stephenson, and Carol Collins, of counsel), for appellant.\nWilliams & Montgomery, Ltd., of Chicago (James K. Horstman, Barry L. Kroll, and Lloyd E. Williams, Jr., of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0490-01", "first_page_order": 508, "last_page_order": 512 }