{ "id": 252848, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THADDEUS A. PUDLO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Pudlo", "decision_date": "1995-06-01", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201493\u20141891", "first_page": "1002", "last_page": "1007", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 1002" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3142311 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448796 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 N.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 Ill. App. 3d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2966399 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/252/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 U.S. 299", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5719289 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" }, { "page": "309" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "304" }, { "page": "309" }, { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/284/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S. Ct. 2849", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 L. Ed. 2d 556", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "509 U.S. 688", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778574 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 435", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605295 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2900792 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 U.S. 299", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5719289 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/284/0299-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 671, "char_count": 14228, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.0011153170616546e-08, "percentile": 0.31339529833592616 }, "sha256": "b0b825f55e87c3acb9fe18423620922e5da1e7956f553548925e6b92ef5c2a23", "simhash": "1:f9cefba44f2197a1", "word_count": 2397 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:46:33.224419+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THADDEUS A. PUDLO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SHEILA O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn May 15, 1992, the State filed a criminal information charging defendant, Thaddeus Pudlo, with violating section 6 of the Litter Control Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 86 \u2014 6 (now 415 ILCS 105/6 (West 1992))) by allowing \"litter to accumulate upon [his property at 1651-1653 West Hubbard] in such a manner as to constitute a public nuisance or in such a manner that the litter may be blown or otherwise carried by the natural elements on to the real property of another person.\u201d The State contended defendant allowed the litter to accumulate from May 20, 1991, to May 8, 1992. Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to two years\u2019 probation and fined $500. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the information on double jeopardy grounds. We aifirm.\nIn his motion to dismiss filed April 26, 1993, defendant argued that on November 17, 1992, the trial court found he had committed 113 violations of the Chicago Municipal Code by allowing various forms of rubbish and debris to accumulate on his property at 1649-1653 West Hubbard. The violations occurred between May 21, 1991, and July 22, 1992, and the trial court imposed a fine of $3,625,050. Defendant contended the trial court should dismiss the criminal information on double jeopardy grounds because his violations of the Municipal Code constituted the same conduct which formed the basis of the criminal charge. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion and later convicted him of violating the Litter Control Act.\nOn appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the criminal information based on double jeopardy. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides no person shall \"be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.\u201d (U.S. Const., amend. V.) The Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides \"[n]o person shall *** be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. L, \u00a7 10.) The double jeopardy clause protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. People v. Levin (1993), 157 Ill. 2d 138, 144, 623 N.E.2d 317.\nThe third of these protections is the subject of this appeal. Defendant argues his violation of section 6 of the Litter Control Act from May 21, 1991, to May 8, 1992, involves the same conduct as 13 of his Municipal Code violations over the same time period. Defendant contends his fine for the 13 Municipal Code violations and his two-year probation term and $500 fine for violating section 6 of the Litter Control Act constitute multiple punishments for the same offense and, thus, violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.\nThe State argues the fine imposed by the trial court under the Municipal Code is a civil penalty which does not constitute \"punishment\u201d for double jeopardy analysis. We need not address that issue since, for the reasons that follow, we hold none of defendant\u2019s 13 Municipal Code violations constitutes the same offense as his violation of the Litter Control Act.\nIn United States v. Dixon (1993), 509 U.S. 688, 125 L. Ed. 2d 556, 113 S. Ct. 2849, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 76 L. Ed. 306, 52 S. .Ct. 180, governs what constitutes the same offense for double jeopardy, purposes. Under Blockburger, two offenses are the same if they hav.e identical statutory elements or if one offense is a lesser included offense of the other. (Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 76 L. Ed. at 309, 52 S. Ct. at 182.) Two offenses are different if each requires proof of an element the other does not have. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 76 L. Ed. at 309, 52 S. Ct. at 182.\nTherefore, we begin our analysis by comparing the elements of section 6 of the Litter Control Act with the elements of the 13 Municipal Code, sections defendant violated. Section 6 provides:\n\"No person shall allow litter to accumulate upon real property, of which the person charged is the owner or tenant in control, in such a manner as to constitute a public nuisance or in such a manner that the litter ,may be blown or otherwise carried by the natural elements on to the real property of another person.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 86 \u2014 6 (now 415 ILCS 105/6 (West 1992)).\nTwelve of the Municipal Code sections defendant violated contain elements not required in section 6 of the Litter Control Act. (See Chicago Municipal Code, \u00a7\u00a7 15 \u2014 4\u2014970 and 13 \u2014 196\u2014580(d) (prohibiting forms of trash which constitute a fire hazard), 7 \u2014 28\u2014060 and 5 \u2014 4\u2014090 (prohibiting buildings infected with disease), 13 \u2014 196\u2014 620(a) (requiring family units be in a \"safe\u201d condition), 13 \u2014 196\u2014 630(b) (requiring owners to maintain and repair their equipment), 5 \u2014 4\u2014080 (requiring floor beneath any water closet be kept in good repair), 7 \u2014 28\u2014720 (prohibiting.forms of trash unless placed on open racks at least 18 inches above the ground), 7 \u2014 28\u2014040 (prohibiting abandonment of refrigerators and iceboxes with attachable doors in any place accessible to children), 7 \u2014 28\u2014240, 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(a), and 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(b) (requiring owner to .remove refuse, as opposed to the Litter Control Act\u2019s prohibition against allowing litter to accumulate in the first place) (1990).) Also, unlike section 6 of the Litter Control Act, none of those 12 Municipal Code sections specifically prohibits litter which can be blown on to the real property of another person. Since each of the 12 Municipal Code sections contains elements not required in section 6 of the Litter Control Act, and vice versa, they are not the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes.\nDefendant failed to provide us the text of the thirteenth municipal ordinance he violated, section 4 \u2014 344\u2014610. In its absence, we presume section 4 \u2014 344\u2014610 is not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes as section 6 of the Litter Control Act. See Glater v. Fabianich (1993), 252 Ill. App. 3d 372, 377, 625 N.E.2d 96 (it is the appellant\u2019s duty to provide a complete record containing all matters relevant to the issues he raises on appeal, and any doubt arising from an incomplete record is resolved against him).\nPursuant to People v. Nicholls (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 166, 374 N.E.2d 194, and People v. Agnew (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 275, 473 N.E.2d 1319, we grant the State\u2019s request for $150 in costs for defending this appeal and incorporate it as part of our judgment.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SHEILA O\u2019BRIEN" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN,\ndissenting:\nThe majority correctly states the standard to be employed in determining whether a second prosecution violates the prohibitions against double jeopardy contained in the Constitution of the United States (U.S. Const., amend. V), and the Constitution of the State of Illinois (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 10). But I believe the majority has misapplied that standard under the facts of this case.\nAlthough the prosecution of a municipal ordinance violation is considered civil in nature, successive State and municipal prosecutions for the same conduct can constitute double jeopardy (People v. Allison (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 147, 263 N.E.2d 80), when the potential penalty for the ordinance violation is punitive in nature (see United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487, 109 S. Ct. 1892). In this case, the defendant was prosecuted and found guilty of 113 violations of the Municipal Code of Chicago (Code). His fines totaled $3,625,050. After he was convicted of violating the Code, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced for violating section 6 of the Litter Control Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 86 \u2014 6).\nOne of the sections of the Code that the defendant was found to have violated and for which he was fined was section 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(b), which provides:\n\"The owner, occupant, agent or person in possession or control of any residence or business (owner) shall remove or cause to be removed any garbage, debris, refuse, litter and miscellaneous waste located upon his property or place of business. Unremoved material of such nature is hereby declared to be a public nuisance. Any owner or other person found in violation of this section shall be fined not less than $200.00 and not more than $1,000.00 for each offense. Each day on which such an offense shall continue shall constitute a separate and distinct offense.\u201d (Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(b) (1990).)\nIn finding the defendant guilty, the court held: \"From May 21, 1991 to July 22, 1992, defendant is guilty of violating the following provisions of the Code: *** section 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(b) in that defendant has failed to remove garbage, abandoned vehicles, lumber, wood, bricks and electrical parts from the subject property ***.\u201d\nNothing in this record suggests that the potential fines provided in section 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(b) are remedial in nature or intended to defray the city\u2019s costs of enforcement. To the contrary, the Code provides, in addition to the penalties that may be assessed, whenever any work such as \"cleaning up\u201d is done at city expense, the city\u2019s buildings commissioner shall issue a warrant for collection from the owner of the property. (Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 13 \u2014 8\u2014120 (1990).) From an examination of the record and the applicable ordinances, I conclude that the penalties provided for a violation of section 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(b) are punitive in nature.\nGuided by the standard articulated in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 76 L. Ed. 306, 52 S. Ct. 180, the next step is to determine if a violation of section 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(b) of the Code has the same elements as a violation of section 6 of the Act, or if one offense is the lesser included offense of the other.\nThe majority concludes that the defendant\u2019s prosecution for a violation of section 6 was not an impermissible successive prosecution for the same offense for which he was fined for violating section 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(b). This conclusion rests on a finding that a violation of either section requires proof of an element not required for a violation of the other. I disagree.\nThe owner of real property violates section 6 of the Act by allowing litter to accumulate upon the property in such a manner as to constitute a public nuisance or by allowing litter to accumulate in such a manner that it may be blown or otherwise carried onto the real property of another by natural elements. (111. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 86 \u2014 6.) The Act does not define the term \"public nuisance,\u201d but it does define the term \"litter.\u201d Litter may include:\n\"any garbage, trash, refuse, debris, rubbish, grass clippings or other lawn or garden waste, newspaper, magazines, glass, metal, plastic or paper containers or other packaging construction material, abandoned vehicle ***, motor vehicle parts, furniture, oil, carcass of a dead animal, any nauseous or offensive matter of any kind, any object likely to injure any person or create a traffic hazard, or anything else of an unsightly or unsanitary nature, which has been discarded, abandoned or otherwise disposed of improperly.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 86 \u2014 3.\nSection 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(b) declares that a violation of its provisions is a public nuisance, and the defendant was found guilty of a violation of that section for having failed to remove garbage and abandoned vehicles from the property at 1651-1653 West Hubbard Street. Section 6 prohibits an accumulation of litter, which includes debris and abandoned vehicles, in such a manner as to constitute a public nuisance. The defendant was found guilty of a violation of section 6 in part upon the testimony of a Chicago building inspector that he maintained junk cars and debris on the property and that the accumulation was a \"nuisance to the public.\u201d\nThe majority draws a distinction between the enactments because section 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(b) is violated by one who fails to remove litter from the property, whereas section 6 proscribes its accumulation. I find the distinction to be without a difference. One allows litter to accumulate by failing to remove it. The majority finds a further distinction based on the language of section 6 which prohibits the accumulation of litter that may be blown or otherwise carried by natural elements onto the real property of another. However, there was no testimony in this record relating to litter blowing onto the property of another. Because the statute is stated in the disjunctive, merely allowing litter to accumulate in such a manner as to constitute a public nuisance is sufficient to constitute a violation.\nIn sum, I disagree with the majority in its finding that the elements necessary for a violation of section 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(b) are different from those necessary to constitute a violation of section 6. If a violation of section 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(b) is established against the owner of property, nothing more need be proven to establish a violation of section 6. Further, the State\u2019s own witness in the instant action testified that the property conditions that he testified to were the same as those he testified to in the proceeding in which the defendant was fined for violating section 7 \u2014 28\u2014450(b).\nBased upon the foregoing analysis, I find that the defendant was subjected to successive prosecutions for the same conduct under an ordinance and a statute, neither of which required proof of any additional fact which the other did not, in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy in the United States and State Constitutions. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Dennis Doherty, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Janet Powers Doyle, and Abigail Abraham, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THADDEUS A. PUDLO, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 93\u20141891\nOpinion filed June 1, 1995.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied July 19, 1995.\nHOFFMAN, P.J., dissenting.\nDennis Doherty, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Janet Powers Doyle, and Abigail Abraham, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1002-01", "first_page_order": 1020, "last_page_order": 1025 }