{ "id": 258557, "name": "In re PHIL DENBY, a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Phil Denby, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Denby", "decision_date": "1995-07-11", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201494\u20140671", "first_page": "287", "last_page": "292", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 287" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "646 N.E.2d 285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365856 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2588128 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" }, { "page": "499" }, { "page": "499" }, { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2488040 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/0413-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 529, "char_count": 10794, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0581727503502983e-07, "percentile": 0.5558827947111975 }, "sha256": "d6797ae6807acfdd1a85f82b2af199440964e5bea70f565b9154837cdb2b79a7", "simhash": "1:21fbd42e66679d64", "word_count": 1696 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:25:46.120982+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re PHIL DENBY, a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Phil Denby, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn July 15, 1994, the trial court determined respondent Phil Denby remained in need of involuntary admission for mental health treatment following a hearing on respondent\u2019s petition for discharge. Respondent appeals that determination, contending the trial court improperly allowed respondent to represent himself at the hearing. We affirm.\nRespondent\u2019s petition for discharge, filed July 7, 1994, requested that respondent be released from the McFarland Mental Health Center and offered the following as the reason:\n\"Formal Discharge 'U.S. Army\u2019\nScotch Scotish [sic] Guard and British War Ministry[.]\u201d\nAt the beginning of the hearing, respondent\u2019s counsel, William Conroy, stated respondent had indicated he did not wish to be represented by Conroy. When the trial judge asked respondent if this was true, respondent replied, \"That\u2019s correct.\u201d The court noted respondent\u2019s brother, a lawyer, who was serving as respondent\u2019s guardian, was present. The following exchange then took place:\n\"THE COURT: Again, Mr. Denby, did you indicate to Mr. Con-roy that you do not wish him to represent you?\n[Respondent]: I did.\nTHE COURT: And are you going to represent yourself or how do you wish to proceed?\n[Respondent]: I wish to represent myself.\nTHE COURT: All right, you are here in no other capacity than as his brother, the other Mr. Denby?\n[William Denby]: I am in my capacity as guardian for Phil.\u201d\nConroy continued to remain at counsel table during the entire proceedings. When the court ordered respondent to proceed and inquired if respondent had any further evidence he wished to offer, respondent stated he had presented all his evidence in his petition for discharge. Upon the court\u2019s inquiry, William Denby stated he would join in respondent\u2019s petition if he had some medical information, or if someone from the staff had indicated that respondent was ready to be discharged.\nThe State\u2019s only witness, Sharon Peters, a licensed clinical social worker, testified respondent suffered from schizophrenia, disorganized type. He remained very delusional, took medication reluctantly, and still needed the supervision he received as an inpatient. She noted there had been some improvement in respondent\u2019s condition as a result of his medication, but \"not as much as would be desired yet.\u201d Respondent required prompting to bathe, eat, and dress, and Peters opined hospitalization was currently the least restrictive treatment alternative for respondent.\nThe court inquired if respondent wished to cross-examine Peters. Following respondent\u2019s refusal, the court asked Peters if she was familiar with respondent\u2019s routine when he was discharged from McFarland and went to live in the community. Peters noted respondent, upon discharge, usually went to independent living and stopped taking his medication when he left the hospital. The court then inquired, \"[Djoes the guardian have some questions?\u201d William Denby asked Peters several questions concerning whether a change in respondent\u2019s medication would enable respondent to leave McFarland.\nThe trial court denied respondent\u2019s petition for discharge. This appeal followed.\nThe Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) guarantees all persons subject to involuntary commitment a right to counsel. (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 805 (West 1992).) Counsel can be waived by a respondent only if the court is satisfied respondent has the capacity to make an informed waiver. (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 805 (West 1992).) The determination to allow a respondent to waive his or her right to counsel is a discretionary matter which rests with the trial court. In re Click (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 413, 419, 554 N.E.2d 494, 497.\nInitially, the State contends respondent did not waive his right to counsel, but proceeded through the hearing with assistance of counsel. In Click, this court summarized the factors other courts have used to determine whether a defendant or respondent has waived the right to counsel and has proceeded without assistance of counsel. These factors include: (1) whether respondent asked for counsel to remain and assist him; (2) whether respondent incompetently or vigorously defended himself; and (3) whether the public defender was silent during the hearing or assisted respondent in a meaningful way. (Click, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 422, 554 N.E.2d at 499.) In Click, the court determined respondent waived his right to counsel, because (1) he did not ask the court for the public defender\u2019s assistance; (2) he did not put on any defense other than a rambling oration; (3) the public defender remained silent during the entire hearing; and (4) the court expressly stated, \" T will find you knowingly waive your right to counsel.\u2019 \u201d Click, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 422, 554 N.E.2d at 499.\nHere, respondent did not ask his court-appointed attorney to remain and assist him, although Conroy remained at counsel table. Respondent did not vigorously defend himself, and Conroy was silent following respondent\u2019s declaration that he wished to represent himself. However, after asking respondent whether he would like to question Peters, the court asked Peters several questions. William Denby then questioned Peters.\nDue to William\u2019s vigorous cross-examination of Peters, the State asserts William entered his appearance on behalf of respondent and thus served as respondent\u2019s attorney. However, the case the State cites for this proposition, In re Marriage of Pitulla (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 103, 559 N.E.2d 819, contravenes the State\u2019s assertion. Pitulla noted that an attorney\u2019s written appearance on behalf of a client before any court in Illinois binds the attorney to continue to represent that client until the court grants leave for the attorney to withdraw. (Pitulla, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 120, 559 N.E.2d at 832.) In the instant case, there is no evidence that William entered a written appearance on behalf of respondent; on the contrary, William expressly stated he was present at the hearing in his capacity as guardian for respondent. We therefore hold respondent did waive his right to counsel.\nWe now must decide whether the trial court\u2019s apparent failure to determine whether respondent was competent to waive his counsel was error. In Click, this court held the trial court erroneously allowed the respondent to waive his right to counsel despite respondent\u2019s obvious confusion about the ramifications of that waiver, stating: \"The very nature of the hearing, respondent\u2019s confusion, and respondent\u2019s actions during the hearing should have made the court question whether respondent had the capacity to make an informed waiver of counsel.\u201d (Click, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 423, 554 N.E.2d at 500.) In In re Tiffin (1995), 269 Ill. App. 3d 581, 646 N.E.2d 285, the trial court had granted respondent\u2019s motion to waive counsel and dismissed the public defender. Respondent\u2019s attempted cross-examination and objections to evidence were overruled or found to be irrelevant, and respondent\u2019s testimony consisted of reciting some songs and poems he had written while at McFarland. The court also noted the State\u2019s evidence that respondent was subject to involuntary commitment was not strong. For these reasons, the court in Tiffin determined the trial court\u2019s failure to inquire into respondent\u2019s knowledge of the consequences of waiving his right to counsel prejudiced respondent, and the trial court\u2019s abuse of discretion required reversal of its commitment order. Tiffin, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 586, 646 N.E.2d at 288.\nHere, although the trial court allowed respondent to waive his right to counsel without questioning respondent to determine whether respondent was competent to make that waiver, we find respondent was not prejudiced by his waiver of counsel. Unlike the respondents in Click and Tiffin, respondent did not offer any testimony to the court which clearly manifested his mental illness. Moreover, respondent\u2019s guardian and the trial judge both questioned the State\u2019s witness to determine whether respondent was in fact subject to involuntary commitment and whether hospitalization remained the least restrictive treatment alternative for respondent. We recognize this is a close case, but we are unwilling to say the trial court abused its discretion given the facts of this case. While the better policy is for the trial court to ask a few questions of the respondent to make certain the respondent understands the consequences of waiving his or her counsel, we cannot say reversal is required on every occasion in which the trial court has failed to do so.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGREEN, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COOK" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT,\ndissenting:\nThe trial court erred when it permitted respondent to waive his right to counsel without determining whether he was competent to do so. This case involves a petition for discharge by a respondent who had previously been involuntarily admitted. Thus, the trial court knew it was confronted with someone who had been proved to be mentally ill and in need of treatment.\nIn addition, the respondent\u2019s petition for discharge showed a delusional thought process with reference to the United States Army, the Scotch Guard and the British War Ministry. Further, another trial court had previously found respondent to be in need of a guardian.\nEven if none of these factors were present, it is the obligation of the trial court to determine whether a respondent has the capacity to make an informed waiver of counsel (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 805 (West 1992)). A previously committed, delusional respondent who has a court-appointed guardian is unlikely to be an effective pro se advocate.\nIt is reversible error to permit any respondent to waive counsel without determining his understanding of the purpose of counsel and the proceedings. It is an egregious error in this case to permit a waiver because all that was known by the court, without any inquiry, should have resulted in refusing the waiver. It was an abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion to fail to make any inquiry into respondent\u2019s understanding of the consequences of waiving his right to counsel and representing himself.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT," } ], "attorneys": [ "John B. Lower and Jeff Plesko, both of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, for appellant.", "Donald M. Cadagin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Joseph J. Ciaccio, Sr., all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re PHIL DENBY, a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Phil Denby, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201494\u20140671\nOpinion filed July 11, 1995.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied August 15, 1995.\nKNECHT, P.J., dissenting.\nJohn B. Lower and Jeff Plesko, both of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, for appellant.\nDonald M. Cadagin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Joseph J. Ciaccio, Sr., all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0287-01", "first_page_order": 307, "last_page_order": 312 }