{ "id": 258727, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRYL BELL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bell", "decision_date": "1995-06-21", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201491\u20141684", "first_page": "439", "last_page": "446", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 439" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3139376 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1296" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499200 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 N.E.2d 999", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1004" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3523432 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 1139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1146" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3543723 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "775" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1114" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549886 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 N.E.2d 1179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1181-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 888", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5784499 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/235/0888-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 1062", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152531 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0472-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 672, "char_count": 15797, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.010259671509806171 }, "sha256": "c3585d2fefbf2875ac3f6b0eab7a840149f9275bb127a75cc90424ad0d1de6dc", "simhash": "1:0721db2d560e9de5", "word_count": 2653 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:25:46.120982+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRYL BELL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RIZZI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA jury convicted defendant Darryl Bell of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and armed violence. He was sentenced to 60 years\u2019 imprisonment and judgment was entered. We vacate the armed violence conviction and affirm the remainder of the judgment.\nAt 7 a.m. on December 29, 1989, Chicago police officer Ashley Miller received a radio call to meet a battery victim at a specified location. He responded and met with the victim, Deborah Robinson. She told him that defendant had beaten her and that he was at her apartment at 71st and Bennett, although he did not live there. She also said that he was violent. Miller called for a back-up officer, and Officer Stanley Gas responded. The three of them then went to the apartment.\nAfter Robinson opened the apartment door with her key, she and the police officers saw defendant slouched on the couch in his underwear and a T-shirt. Robinson said, \"That\u2019s him.\u201d Defendant appeared to be in an unconscious state. Near the defendant, there was a valise with a gun handle sticking out.\nMiller grabbed defendant and placed him under arrest. Miller then searched the valise and found a .38-caliber revolver with five live rounds of ammunition, $3,985 in cash, two clear bags of a white powder substance, glass drug pipes, a scale, a letter, two receipts and an address book. Both receipts, the letter, and the address book had defendant\u2019s name on them.\nDefendant was taken to the third district police station, along with the evidence. At the police station, all items were inventoried and placed in a safe.\nAt trial, a Chicago police department forensic chemist, Arthur Kruske, testified that the white powder in the two bags was cocaine and that the two bags of cocaine weighed 210.71 grams and 49.77 grams, respectively. Defendant did not testify.\nOn appeal, defendant first contends that the trial court erred in not complying with the supreme court\u2019s holding in People v. Zehr (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 472, 469 N.E.2d 1062. In Zehr, the court held that the trial court\u2019s failure to ask three voir dire questions by the defense constituted reversible error. These three Zehr questions are:\n\"1. If at the close of all the evidence and after you have heard arguments of counsel you believe that the State has failed to sustain the burden of proof and has failed to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, would you have any hesitation whatsoever in returning a verdict of Not Guilty?\n2. If the defendant, Mr. Zehr, decides not to testify in his own behalf, would you hold it against him?\n3. Do you understand that the defendant is presumed innocent and does not have to offer any evidence in his own behalf, but must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by the State?\u201d 103 Ill. 2d at 476, 469 N.E.2d at 1063-64.\nIn the present case, the trial court questioned the venire en masse as follows:\n\"Anybody have any quarrel with the principle of law which requires the state to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? Any problem with that?\nThe defendant may or may not testify. He is not required to do so. He may or may not present witnesses on his behalf. Will this create any prejudice in your mind against the defendant? Do you have any quarrel with the principle of law that the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?\nDo you have any bias or prejudice against the defendant simply because he has been charged with a crime?\nWill all of you keep an open mind until you have heard all the evidence in the case? In other words, we wouldn\u2019t want you deciding this case halfway through the evidence. You will wait until you heard all the evidence and all the arguments of counsel before arriving at a decision? Of course, through your deliberations. Any problem with that at all?\nAs you sit there now, is there anything about the nature of this case which would prevent you from being fair and impartial jurors and in deciding this case on the evidence and on the instructions of the law?\nSo you are all telling me you will give all the parties a fair and impartial trial, right?\nNow, I will instruct you as to the law at the close of the case. Will you apply this law without regard to what your personal feelings may be about that law, and if I tell you this is the law, this is the law you have to apply, will anybody have a problem doing that, even though you may figure I don\u2019t think that law is fair. If I tell you that\u2019s the law, will you apply it? Okay.\nOne other question. Do any of you have any members of your immediate family who have received treatment for chemical dependency such as alcohol or drugs?\nNow, the fact that you may have had this problem, I will bring it up again, is this in any way going to affect your ability to listen to the evidence, and of course, base your decision fairly and impartially on the evidence and the law as you hear and see it? Is that going to affect your ability to be fair and impartial? You can all be fair and impartial?\n* * *\nI\u2019m going to say this for the benefit of all the jurors both in and out, and you can indicate by raising your hand if you have a problem.\nIf the state carries its burden and they prove that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, would anybody have a problem signing a guilty verdict? The other side, if the state fails to carry their burden and they do not prove that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, would anybody have a problem signing a not guilty verdict? Okay.\u201d\nThere was no negative response to the trial court\u2019s inquiry. Nonetheless, defense counsel asked the trial court to ask each of the prospective jurors individually the following questions:\n\"Do you understand the law presumes the defendant to be innocent and the indictment is not any evidence of guilt?\nDo you have any problem with that rule law?\nWould you hold it against the defendant if he elects not to testify in this case?\nWould you believe *** he has something to hide?\nIs there anything about the nature of the charges themselves, particularly narcotics, which prejudices you one way or another?\u201d\nThe trial court refused defense counsel\u2019s request. The trial court concluded that the subject matters of the questions posed by defense counsel were covered sufficiently when it questioned the jury en masse.\nDefendant argues that the trial court did not comply with Zehr because it refused to question the prospective jurors individually rather than en masse and because it refused to ask: \"Would you believe *** he has something to hide?\u201d In addition, defendant argues that Zehr was not complied with because the trial court did not ask the prospective jurors individually: \"Is there anything about the nature of the charges themselves, particularly narcotics, which prejudices you one way or another.\u201d We disagree with defendant.\nZehr does not require the trial court to question the venire individually and there is no such rule in the law. Plainly, the trial court has the discretion to question the venire individually or en masse. (People v. Volkman (1992), 235 Ill. App. 3d 888, 890, 601 N.E.2d 1179, 1181-82.) In addition, it is clear that the subject matters of all the questions posed by defense counsel were amply covered in the trial court\u2019s interrogation of the jury en masse and there is nothing to indicate that further inquiry was needed. (See People v. Emerson (1987), 122 Ill. 2d 411, 426, 522 N.E.2d 1109, 1114.) As a result, there is no merit to defendant\u2019s first contention.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting the narcotics into evidence because \"the chain of custody of the exhibits was not properly established.\u201d The narcotics in question involved the cocaine that was found in the two white bags.\nMiller and Kruske testified as to the chain of custody of the cocaine. Miller testified that he put the cocaine in the safe after it was inventoried in accordance with police department procedures. The cocaine was given to Kruske in an evidence envelope by a department supervisor. Kruske received the evidence for examination. After testing, Kruske returned the cocaine in the evidence envelope to the safe. Miller testified that all the items that were inventoried at the police station were in substantially the same condition as when he put them into the safe. Kruske testified that the evidence envelope was in the same or substantially same condition as it was when he returned it after testing.\nDefendant was allowed to fully cross-examine Miller and Kruske with regard to their initials that were placed on the inventory packages and any perceived discrepancies in their testimony. Moreover, defendant cannot point to and does not even allege any alteration, tampering or contamination of the evidence.\nUnder the circumstances presented here, the issue of the sufficiency of the chain of custody for admission of the narcotics evidence is properly left to the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Holman (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 764, 775, 510 N.E.2d 1139, 1146.) Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court\u2019s ruling will not be disturbed. (People v. Irpino (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 767, 773, 461 N.E.2d 999, 1004.) Since there is no showing of an abuse of discretion in the present case, the defendant\u2019s contention that the chain of custody of the narcotics evidence was not sufficiently established is unavailing. The trial court\u2019s ruling will not be disturbed.\nDefendant also contends that \"the State should not have been permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant had beaten Deborah Robinson.\u201d Prior to trial, defendant made a motion to bar the State from introducing evidence that Robinson had been beaten by defendant. The motion was denied. Defendant claims that the denial of the motion was error because it improperly allowed evidence of other crimes to be introduced at trial. We disagree with defendant\u2019s claim.\nEvidence of other crimes or wrongful conduct is not admissible to show the defendant\u2019s character or propensity to commit a crime or wrongful act. Where evidence has no value beyond the inference that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime charged, the evidence is excluded. The law distrusts the inference that because a man has committed other crimes, he is more likely to have committed the crime charged. Evidence of other crimes is admissible, however, if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the defendant\u2019s character or propensity to commit a crime. Thus, evidence of other crimes is admissible to show the circumstances or context of defendant\u2019s arrest. People v. Kimbrough (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 481, 484-85, 485 N.E.2d 1292, 1296.\nHere, Miller testified that he responded to a radio call to meet a battery victim at a specified location. When he arrived at the location where he was to meet the victim, he met Robinson. She told him that she was beaten by defendant and that defendant was violent. She also told him that defendant was at her apartment. Miller called for a back-up police officer, and both officers went to the apartment to determine whether defendant should be arrested. Upon entering the apartment, the police officers saw defendant, a gun and the narcotics evidence. Under the circumstances, evidence that Robinson had been beaten by defendant was relevant and properly admitted to show the circumstances and context of defendant\u2019s arrest in the apartment. The trial court\u2019s ruling was therefore proper.\nNext, defendant claims that the prosecutor committed error during closing argument to the jury. During his closing argument, defense counsel told the jury:\n\"I do not know why the State did not want to share it with you, but I don\u2019t suspect any policeman in this case or anybody else for this matter has seen or heard of this Debra Robinson before or after December 29, 1989.\u201d\nIn response to defense counsel\u2019s statement, the prosecutor told the jury that Robinson may have fled, i.e., was not available for trial, because she was afraid of defendant. Defendant\u2019s claim that the prosecutor\u2019s statement to the jury was improper is without merit because the statement was properly made in response to what was said by defense counsel.\nDefendant also complains that during his closing argument the prosecutor told the jury that the defendant was a dangerous person. However, a prosecutor may comment on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. Here, the prosecutor\u2019s comment was a reasonable inference from the evidence at trial. No error was committed.\nIn addition, defendant claims that the prosecutor erred when in his closing argument he told the jury that the police officers risked their lives when they entered the apartment. Here again, the prosecutor\u2019s comment was a reasonable inference from the evidence at trial and was therefore not by itself improper. We find no error in the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument to the jury.\nLastly, defendant contends that the prosecutor committed reversible error during his closing argument when he made the following statements:\n\"Ladies and gentlemen, the only evidence before you is the officers who testified \u2014 .\n* * *\nThe only evidence you have, ladies and gentlemen, is that this is pure cocaine, and the only evidence you have before you, ladies and gentlemen \u2014 .\n* * *\nHe must be found guilty, ladies and gentlemen *** because the evidence from the witness stand, the evidence before you ***.\u201d\nDefendant argues that the prosecutor\u2019s statements \"drew attention to the defendant\u2019s failure to testify.\u201d We disagree with defendant\u2019s conclusion and argument.\nA defendant\u2019s right to remain silent is not violated by a prosecutor unless a direct or indirect reference is made to defendant\u2019s failure to testify and that reference is designed to draw the jury\u2019s attention to the fact that defendant chose not to testify. The prosecution may, however, describe the State\u2019s evidence as uncontradicted, provided the statement was not intended or calculated to direct the attention of the jury to the defendant\u2019s failure to testify. See People v. Lyles (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 373, 389-90, 478 N.E.2d 291, 297.\nIn the present case, the prosecutor merely made reference to the fact that the State\u2019s evidence was uncontradicted. He did so apparently in response to defense counsel\u2019s comments that \"there is no way you can find this man guilty unless, in fact, you believe that tale.\u201d We find no error in the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument to the jury.\nAfter the jury returned verdicts of guilty on the charges of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and armed violence, the trial judge stated that \"on Count II there will not be a judgment on the armed violence *** that should merge into the possession with intent to deliver.\u201d Nonetheless, the judgment erroneously provides that defendant was convicted and sentenced on the armed violence conviction.\nSince a defendant may not be convicted of more than one offense where one physical act forms the basis for both offenses, and in the present case the trial judge clearly intended not to sentence on the armed violence charge, we vacate defendant\u2019s conviction for armed violence. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.\nAccordingly, that part of the judgment for conviction and sentencing of armed violence is vacated; the remainder of the judgment is affirmed.\nVacated in part; affirmed in part.\nTULLY and CERDA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RIZZI" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Cutrone, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Katherine Schweit, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRYL BELL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201491\u20141684\nOpinion filed June 21, 1995.\nJames J. Cutrone, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Katherine Schweit, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0439-01", "first_page_order": 459, "last_page_order": 466 }