{ "id": 291593, "name": "VETERANS ASSISTANCE COMMISSION OF WILL COUNTY, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. THE COUNTY BOARD OF WILL COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Veterans Assistance Commission v. County Board", "decision_date": "1995-06-15", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201494\u20140392", "first_page": "32", "last_page": "37", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 32" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "157 N.E. 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5188493 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/326/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499702 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 N.E.2d 1302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3073942 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "415 Ill. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2682317 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/415/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 N.E.2d 311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5649817, 5649925 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/319/0255-01", "/ill-app/319/0255-02" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 1283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236540 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 N.E.2d 1035", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780281 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0210-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 681, "char_count": 13566, "ocr_confidence": 0.722, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.378631306375088e-08, "percentile": 0.4420663135186646 }, "sha256": "5fa20eeee1b089a715d055f386dbd84c9679010b1525dbd2e6780adcaa95ada0", "simhash": "1:13f58da656d2a0db", "word_count": 2198 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:30.839378+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "VETERANS ASSISTANCE COMMISSION OF WILL COUNTY, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. THE COUNTY BOARD OF WILL COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Veterans Assistance Commission of Will County (the VAC) brought this declaratory judgment action against the County Board of Will County (the board) to determine which party possessed authority to establish benefit levels for needy veterans, establish salary levels for the VAC\u2019s personnel and promulgate rules pertaining to the operations of the VAC under the Military Veterans Assistance Act (the Act) (330 ILCS 45/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)). The trial judge found for the county board, and the VAC appealed. The trial judge also ruled that the VAC\u2019s attorney should not be disqualified for a conflict of interest and that the board must transfer VAC funds to the budgetary line for professional services to permit payment of the VAC\u2019s attorneys. The board cross-appealed on these issues.\nFACTS\nThe plaintiff veterans assistance commission is a local governmental unit established under Military Veterans Assistance Act (330 ILCS 45/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)). Defendant county board is a local governmental unit organized and operated under the executive form of government pursuant to the County Executive Law (55 ILCS 5/2\u2014 5001 et seq. (West 1992)).\nThe parties stipulate that the VAC has no authority to levy taxes or generate revenue. Instead, VAC funds may be drawn from a number of sources, including the county\u2019s general corporate fund, a tax levied to support plaintiff\u2019s operations and/or moneys from the Illinois Department of Public Health. In Will County, the board has chosen to fund the VAC through the county\u2019s general corporate fund. The parties also stipulate that Will County has no established guidelines for the compensation of county employees.\nOn November 18, 1993, the board passed resolution 93 \u2014 272, which set monthly benefits for veterans in need of assistance. On November 29, 1993, the VAC set identical monthly benefits for food, personal needs, utilities, telephone and transportation. However, the benefit amounts for shelter assistance were different. The board established monthly benefit levels for shelter at $100 for a single person and $200 for a family; the VAC set monthly shelter assistance at $165 for a single person and $265 for a family. The defendants then refused to distribute shelter assistance in the amounts prescribed by the VAC.\nFor the fiscal year ending November 30, 1994, the VAC approved an annual salary of $46,000 for its superintendent, but the board appropriated $23,700; while the VAC approved an annual salary of $19,500 for its secretary/assistant, the board appropriated $16,640. The defendants then refused to pay the superintendent and secretary/ assistant the amounts authorized by the VAC.\nOn December 8, 1993, the county executive signed an order appointing the county auditor to oversee the distribution of money and supplies to veterans and their families. On January 20, 1994, the board adopted resolution 94 \u2014 24, which purported to amend parts of the VAC\u2019s handbook, including the standards for determining need, veterans\u2019 benefit levels and VAC rules.\nOn February 22, 1994, the VAC filed a complaint for declaratory relief in order to ascertain the respective authority of the VAC and the board. On April 29, 1994, the trial judge ruled that: (1) the Act authorized the county board to establish veterans\u2019 benefit levels and VAC salaries; (2) the VAC\u2019s authority was limited to providing input for consideration by the board; (3) resolutions 93 \u2014 272 and 94 \u2014 24 constituted lawful exercises of the board\u2019s authority; (4) the statutory bilateral oversight of the VAC and the board was subject to the board\u2019s rules pertaining to the operations of the VAC; and (5) the VAC had no authority to adopt rules that conflict with those promulgated by the board. The VAC appeals from these findings.\nANALYSIS\nThe primary rule in interpreting and construing a statute is that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect; a court should first look to the statutory language as the best indication of legislative intent. (Envirite Corp. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 210, 632 N.E.2d 1035.) The purpose of the Military Veterans Assistance Act is to provide needed assistance to honorably discharged veterans, their families, and the families of deceased veterans. (330 ILCS 45/2 (West 1992).) The Act authorizes the organization of veterans assistance commissions (VACs), consisting of one delegate and one alternate from each post, camp, unit, chapter and ship of each legally recognized military veterans organization within the county. (330 ILCS 45/9 (West 1992).) When properly organized, a VAC constitutes a local governmental unit under the Illinois Public Aid Code. (305 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 14 (West 1992).) In interpreting the Act, we must construe it \"so that the [VAC] shall provide needed services to eligible veterans.\u201d 330 ILCS 45/9 (West 1992).\nThe executive powers of each VAC are vested in an elected superintendent. (330 ILCS 45/10 (West 1992).) Subject to rules formulated by the VAC, the superintendent can select employees from among honorably discharged military veterans or their surviving spouses. (330 ILCS 45/10 (West 1992).) The VAC\u2019s superintendent and employees are not considered employees of the county, and they are exempt from the provisions of civil service acts and laws of the State. 330 ILCS 45/10 (West 1992).\nSection 2 of the Act mandates that upon the recommendation of the VAC, \"the county board shall provide such sums of money as may be just and necessary\u201d to assist veterans and their families. (330 ILCS 45/2 (West 1992).) Although the board has discretion to provide additional funds, it has no discretion over the threshold \"just and necessary\u201d sum. Section 2 of the Act states that a VAC superintendent may seek a writ of mandamus when the county board fails to appropriate just and necessary amounts for veterans\u2019 benefits. (330 ILCS 45/2 (West 1992).) The word \"shall\u201d also indicates a mandatory legislative intent. See Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 54, 566 N.E.2d 1283.\nUpon the recommendation of the VAC, the county board must approve and appropriate additional sums to compensate the VAC\u2019s superintendent and employees. (330 ILCS 45/10 (West 1992).) Where, as here, the county has no established employee salary guidelines, the board is required to compensate the VAC superintendent and employees in \"a just manner.\u201d (330 ILCS 45/10 (West 1992).) While the word \"approve\u201d connotes the exercise of discretion, judicial relief will lie in cases where the power to approve has been abused by unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory action. Gustafson v. Wethersfield Township High School District 191 (1943), 319 Ill. App. 255, 49 N.E.2d 311.\nThe defendants justify the board\u2019s setting of benefits and salaries and the amending of the VAC handbook by citing the following provision of section 9 of the Act:\n\"The [VAC] superintendent and the president or chairman of the county board, or some other county officer appointed by him, shall have general oversight of the distribution of all moneys and supplies appropriated by the county for the benefit of military veterans and their families, subject to such rules, regulations, administrative procedures or audit reviews as are necessary as approved by the county board to carry out the spirit and intent of this Act. No warrant authorized under this Act may be issued for the payment of money without the presentation of an itemized statement or claim, approved by the superintendent of the [VAC].\u201d (Emphasis added.) (330 ILCS 45/9 (West 1992).)\nWe believe the above reference to \"rules, regulations, administrative procedures and audit reviews\u201d concerns procedural oversight in the distribution of funds and supplies, not the broad exercise of powers claimed by the board in this case. This portion of section 9 speaks of rules, regulations, administrative procedures or audit reviews \"as approved by the county board.\u201d (330 ILCS 45/9 (West 1992).) The term \"approve\u201d is not the same as the words \"formulate,\u201d \"enact\u201d or \"authorize.\u201d To \"approve\u201d is to \"confirm, ratify, sanction, or consent to some act or thing done by another.\u201d (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 94 (5th ed. 1979); see also Gustafson, 319 Ill. App. 255, 49 N.E.2d 311 (which defines the power of approval as the option to sanction or disapprove an act submitted).) The rules and regulations provision of section 9 authorizes the board to approve or disapprove VAC procedures pertaining to the oversight and the distribution of money and supplies; it does not empower the board to create rules that unilaterally alter veterans\u2019 benefit levels, VAC salary levels or VAC rules.\nDefendants also cite Ickes v. Board of Supervisors (1953), 415 Ill. 557, 562, 114 N.E.2d 669, 671, where the supreme court stated, \"What is a proper compensation is certainly within the discretion of the board.\u201d However, the holding in Ickes does not give pervasive authority to the board to unilaterally establish or change benefit levels, salaries or rules. At the time that Ickes was decided, the Act provided maximum VAC salary levels based upon the size of the county. The supreme court held that a circuit court could not order the board to appropriate this maximum amount. The salary ceilings have since been deleted. The issue before us today is not whether the VAC is entitled to the appropriation of the maximum amount allowed by statute, but what remedy, if any, is available when a VAC believes that its county board has failed to fulfill its minimal funding obligations.\nWhile our conclusion that the board exceeded its authority is based in part upon statutory language and structure, we are also mindful of our obligation to construe the Act so that VACs shall provide needed services to eligible veterans. (330 ILCS 45/9 (West 1992).) This is not the first conflict between a county board and VAC over the meaning and interpretation of the Act. (See Ickes v. Board of Supervisors (1953), 415 Ill. 557, 114 N.E.2d 669; Makowicz v. County of Macon (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 308, 399 N.E.2d 1302; Hazen v. County of Peoria (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 836, 485 N.E.2d 1325.) Here, the board seeks to reduce benefits to veterans in need. If we were to adopt defendants\u2019 assertion that section 9 gives the board supremacy over the VAC, we would be granting the board the power to thwart the very purpose of the Act. This we cannot do.\nWhether determining the amount of veterans\u2019 benefits or the compensation of VAC personnel, the procedure to be followed is the same. Initially the VAC makes a recommendation of an amount that it believes to be appropriate under the law. The county board then acts upon that recommendation, either to approve or disapprove the recommendation. (Gustafson, 319 Ill. App. 255, 49 N.E.2d 311.) If the board approves the VAC\u2019s recommendation, the matter is resolved. If the board disapproves the recommendation, the VAC then has two options: it may submit a new recommendation for a different amount or the superintendent may seek judicial relief for mandamus. After listening to the views of the parties, the circuit court may issue a writ of mandamus for either the amount sought by the VAC or a different amount. People ex rel. City of Chicago v. Board of Review (1927), 326 Ill. 124, 141, 157 N.E. 186 (\"Under a petition for writ of mandamus the court is not bound to grant it for all the relief asked but may grant the relief so far as relators show a right to it\u201d).\nIn this case, we express no opinion as to whether the VAC\u2019s recommendations are proper, nor do we determine what sums would be \"just and necessary\u201d under the statute.\nWe reverse that portion of the circuit court\u2019s judgment concerning the authority of the VAC and board.\n(The discussion of the remaining issues is not to be published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 15 (July 20, 1994), R. 23, eff. July 1, 1994).)\nCONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part, and reversed in part.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nHOLDRIDGE and McCUSKEY, JJ., concur.\nWhen funds are allocated pursuant to the Illinois Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1 et seq.(West 1992)), the Military Veterans Assistance Act mandates compliance with the Illinois Public Aid Code and the regulations of the Department of Public Aid (330 ILCS 45/9, 10 (West 1992)). Since funding in this case is provided through the county\u2019s general corporate fund, the parties agree that these provisions are not applicable.\nSection 2 of the Act explicitly discusses relief by mandamus, while section 10 does not; nonetheless, as discussed above, terms and language found within both sections indicate a mandatory requirement that the board provide the necessary threshold sums for veterans\u2019 benefits and VAC salaries. 330 ILCS 45/2, 10 (West 1992).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Burmila & Thomas, P.C., of Joliet (Edward A. Burmila, Jr., and Charles E. Thomas, of counsel), for appellant.", "Stephen S. Swofford, of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Chicago (Nancy G. Lischer, of counsel), for appellees.", "James P. Brown, of Will County Legal Assistance Program, Inc., of Joliet, and James T. Scott, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville, for amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VETERANS ASSISTANCE COMMISSION OF WILL COUNTY, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. THE COUNTY BOARD OF WILL COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201494\u20140392\nOpinion filed June 15, 1995.\n\u2014 Modified on denial of rehearing August 29, 1995.\nBurmila & Thomas, P.C., of Joliet (Edward A. Burmila, Jr., and Charles E. Thomas, of counsel), for appellant.\nStephen S. Swofford, of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Chicago (Nancy G. Lischer, of counsel), for appellees.\nJames P. Brown, of Will County Legal Assistance Program, Inc., of Joliet, and James T. Scott, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville, for amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0032-01", "first_page_order": 50, "last_page_order": 55 }