{ "id": 291520, "name": "SUSAN SHEPARD et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JEFFERY HANLEY et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Shepard v. Hanley", "decision_date": "1995-08-23", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201494\u20140880", "first_page": "442", "last_page": "445", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 442" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "367 U.S. 643", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1785580 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" }, { "page": "1092" }, { "page": "1694" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/367/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 F.3d 106", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10507055 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/7/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 103", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11925002 ], "weight": 15, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113-14" }, { "page": "504-05" }, { "page": "574" }, { "page": "114" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "575" }, { "page": "115-16" }, { "page": "506" }, { "page": "575" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "504" }, { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 N.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2498721 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2548491 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 485, "char_count": 7082, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.011757442229257382 }, "sha256": "ad9ca18cb97de15717a5124e1c79c55f8ea23102b6d7864ef66a262ec1909b3d", "simhash": "1:ff4b13e67eb4cdbe", "word_count": 1188 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:30.839378+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SUSAN SHEPARD et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JEFFERY HANLEY et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs filed suit alleging violations of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (1988)). After the judge directed a verdict for the plaintiffs, the jury assessed only nominal damages. The judge then awarded attorney fees to plaintiffs, and defendants filed this appeal. We affirm.\nI. FACTS\nResponding to a complaint of loud music, Shorewood policemen Jeffery Hanley and Kenneth Rafter arrived at the home where Susan Shepard resided with her sons, Michael and Matthew. When no one responded to the doorbell, the officers looked in a basement window and saw 15-year-old Michael consuming beer. Returning to the front door, the policemen spoke to Michael and his 16-year-old brother Matthew. The brothers told the officers that they were babysitting two infants. They entered the house and observed the children sleeping on a couch. The officers then went to the basement, where the Shepard brothers admitted that they had been drinking, and arrested the boys.\nThe Shepards filed suit pursuant to section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (1988)). Counts I and III alleged that Hanley and Rafter violated the United States and Illinois Constitutions\u2019 proscription against unreasonable search and seizure. Count II alleged that Hanley used unlawful force against Michael Shepard.\nAt the trial, the judge found that the officers had improperly entered the basement and granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a directed verdict on counts I and III. The jury awarded plaintiffs $1 in compensatory damages, denied plaintiffs\u2019 request for punitive damages and found for the defense on count II.\nSubsequently, plaintiffs filed a petition for attorney fees of $36,177 plus costs pursuant to section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988 (1988)). The trial judge awarded plaintiffs $14,297 in attorney fees and costs.\nII. ANALYSIS\nSection 1988 of the Civil Rights Act provides that a trial judge may award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party in civil rights litigation. (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988 (1988).) A fee award under section 1988 is within the discretion of the trial court, and we review the determination under the highly deferential \"abuse of discretion\u201d standard. (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988 (1988); Tampam, Inc. v. Property Tax Appeal Board (1991), 208 Ill. App. 3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 905.) We will also review an award to see if the trial judge erred as a matter of law. Beverly Bank v. Board of Review of Will County (1989), 193 Ill. App. 3d 130, 550 N.E.2d 567.\nIn Farrar v. Hobby (1992), 506 U.S. 103, 121 L. Ed. 2d 494, 113 S. Ct. 566, the United States Supreme Court addressed the propriety of awarding attorney fees to a civil rights plaintiff who obtains a judgment for nominal damages. The Court concluded that a civil rights plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a \"prevailing party\u201d under section 1988; however, the degree of a plaintiff\u2019s overall success should be considered as a factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113-14, 121 L. Ed. 2d at 504-05, 113 S. Ct. at 574.\nIn Farrar, the Supreme Court reversed an award of $280,000 in attorney fees where the plaintiff sued for $17 million but recovered only $1. The trial judge erred when he simply calculated \"the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate *** without engaging in any measured exercise of discretion.\u201d (Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, 121 L. Ed. 2d at 505, 113 S. Ct. at 575.) The Supreme Court reversed the award because the judge had failed to consider the relationship between the extent of success and the amount of the fee award. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115-16, 121 L. Ed. 2d at 506, 113 S. Ct. at 575.\nIn this case, the record shows that the trial judge analyzed the plaintiffs\u2019 petition for fees in light of Farrar. He reduced counsel\u2019s hourly rate from $150 per hour to $125 per hour, reduced the total number of hours in light of the verdict on count II, and then cut the remaining fee in half, considering the degree of plaintiff\u2019s success in the underlying action. Unlike Farrar, where the fee award was figured by the rigid application of a mathematical formula, the trial judge\u2019s decision in this case was based on a well-reasoned application of judicial discretion.\nNonetheless, the defendants argue that the attorney fee award cannot stand in light of the post-Aarrar test enunciated in Cartwright v. Stamper (7th Cir. 1993), 7 F.3d 106. In Cartwright, the court of appeals held that when a trial court reviews attorney fee petitions in nominal award cases, it should consider (1) the difference between the amount sought by the plaintiff and the judgment actually obtained, (2) the significance of the legal issue upon which the plaintiff prevailed, and (3) the public purpose served by the litigation. Cartwright, 7 F.3d at 109.\nIn this case, defendants contend that the award was inappropriate because there exists a substantial difference between the nominal amount actually awarded by the jury and the recovery sought by plaintiffs, who claimed damages \"in excess of $15,000.\u201d However, Illinois rules, unlike Federal civil procedure, require plaintiffs who desire full discovery to plead damages in excess of $15,000. (134 Ill. 2d R. 222.) The recovery sought in this case is not comparable to the $17 million sought in Farrar.\nMoreover, plaintiffs prevailed on a significant legal issue and the litigation served an important public purpose. Even a verdict of nominal damages for violations of procedural due process recognizes the importance to society that this right be scrupulously observed. (Far-rar, 506 U.S. at 112, 121 L. Ed. 2d at 504, 113 S. Ct. at 574.) After noting that the evidence in this case was so overwhelming as to merit directed verdicts on counts I and III, the trial judge stated:\n\"IDf I were not to award fees in some significant amount, I would be sending a signal to [police] officers who are inclined to take a pass on picky rules of the constitution, to go ahead and do it, because there\u2019s nothing effective anybody is going to be able to do about it. *** Well, I\u2019m not going to send that signal.\u201d\nWe agree. \"Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.\u201d (Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 659, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1092, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1694.) In awarding attorney fees and costs, the trial judge neither abused his discretion nor erred as a matter of law.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCUSKEY and SLATER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "David J. Silverman and George M. Ferreti, both of Herschbach, Tracy, Johnson, Bertani & Wilson, of Joliet (George F. Mahoney, of counsel), and John Gilbert, of Schippers, Gilbert & Bailey, of Chicago, for appellants.", "Frank P. Andreano, of Joliet, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SUSAN SHEPARD et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JEFFERY HANLEY et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201494\u20140880\nOpinion filed August 23, 1995.\nDavid J. Silverman and George M. Ferreti, both of Herschbach, Tracy, Johnson, Bertani & Wilson, of Joliet (George F. Mahoney, of counsel), and John Gilbert, of Schippers, Gilbert & Bailey, of Chicago, for appellants.\nFrank P. Andreano, of Joliet, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0442-01", "first_page_order": 460, "last_page_order": 463 }