{ "id": 906807, "name": "In re ESTATE OF GEORGE ARCHER MUELLER, Deceased (Lyn Zielinski et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. Constantina Henke, a/k/a Constantina Mueller, et al., Respondents-Appellees (J. Arnold Mueller, Intervenor-Appellant))", "name_abbreviation": "Zielinski v. Henke", "decision_date": "1995-09-05", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201493\u20142815, 1\u201493\u20143649, 1\u201493\u20143879 cons.", "first_page": "128", "last_page": "141", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 128" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "468 Ill. App. 3d 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563948 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3473709 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 N.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 1037", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2613504 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1042" }, { "page": "1042" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/1037-01" ] }, { "cite": "611 N.E.2d 1321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5108175 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" }, { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 685", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5148089 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/239/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "621 N.E.2d 81", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 Ill. App. 3d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2919810 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/250/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3639261 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "823" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557625 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3612856 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 N.E.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill. 2d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2713409 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/7/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 1049", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3501002 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/1049-01" ] }, { "cite": "629 N.E.2d 1185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2873404 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351-52" }, { "page": "352-53" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "354-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/259/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 So. 2d 464", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7626457 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/444/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 So. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7495094 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/574/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 So. 2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7548364 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776" }, { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/548/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 732.802", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Fla. Stat. Ann.", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" }, { "page": "(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Wis. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8674486 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" }, { "page": "100" }, { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/102/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 N.E. 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3302406 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/209/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Am. St. Rep. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Am. St. Rep.", "year": 1904, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 L.R.A. 141", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L.R.A.", "year": 1904, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.W. 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1904, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Iowa 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 2103930 ], "year": 1904, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/112/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 P.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Cal. App. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App.", "case_ids": [ 2190513 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" }, { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app/115/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "Cal. Prob. Code \u00a7 252", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Cal. Code", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591518 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 N.E.2d 1093", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780289 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0527-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1173, "char_count": 31045, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.674192435675173e-08, "percentile": 0.5290306500494817 }, "sha256": "f25652ee6a8369ab718e8893dd6194755ac75cf24f607ff9e4e34dbdc04a153e", "simhash": "1:9ffa2846fd4edd55", "word_count": 5129 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:19:22.263448+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ESTATE OF GEORGE ARCHER MUELLER, Deceased (Lyn Zielinski et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. Constantina Henke, a/k/a Constantina Mueller, et al., Respondents-Appellees (J. Arnold Mueller, Intervenor-Appellant))." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE CAMPBELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is a consolidated appeal. Initially, we are called upon to address the interlocutory appeal by appellants Lyn Zielinski, George Frederick Mueller, Phillip Randy Mueller and Daniel Archer Mueller of an August 4, 1993, order of the circuit court of Cook County, determining the method for the administration and distribution of the estate of their deceased father, George Archer Mueller (Mueller). The trial court certified the following question of law to the appellate court, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (134 Ill. 2d R. 308):\n\"Whether individuals who are named as contingent beneficiaries in a will may take property under that will when the original taker is precluded under Section 2\u20146 of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act), (755 ILCS 5/2\u20146 (West 1992)), and the contingent takers are heirs of the precluded person but not of the testator.\u201d\nWe answer this question in the negative.\nIn addition, J. Arnold Mueller (J. Arnold), Mueller\u2019s twin brother, appeals a separate order of the circuit court, entered on September 16, 1993, denying his petition to intervene in the estate proceedings. We affirm this order of the circuit court.\nThe record reveals the following relevant facts. Mueller married respondent Constantina Henke (Henke) in November 1984. At that time, Henke had two children from a previous marriage, Nicholous and Konstandina Henke (Henke children).\nOn March 19, 1985, Mueller executed a last will and testament (Will) purporting to leave a house in Frankfort, Illinois, and 50% of his estate to Henke. The balance of the residue of his estate was to pass to appellants. Article VII of the Will provides as follows:\n\"Should, however, my wife CONSTANTINA MUELLER, predecease me or fail to survive me by (30) days, then the gifts, devises and bequests to CONSTANTINA MUELLER shall fail and be of no effect, and in that event, I give, devise and bequeath her share of the residue of my estate, including the house at 910 Ab-botsford Lane, Frankfort, Illinois whether real, personal or mixed, of every kind, nature and description whatsoever, and wherever situated, which I may now own or hereafter acquire, or have the right to dispose of at the time of my death, by the power of appointment or otherwise, to her children, KONSTANDINA HENKE, NICHOLOUS HENKE who survive me, absolutely and in fee simple, share and share alike.\u201d\nMueller subsequently executed a codicil to the Will (Codicil) on September 10, 1985, purporting to increase Henke\u2019s share of the estate from 50% to 60% with a corresponding decrease from 50% to 40% to appellants.\nOn March 28, 1986, Mueller was shot dead at his place of business in Blue Island, Illinois.\nOn April 10, 1986, J. Arnold filed a petition to admit into probate a prior will of Mueller\u2019s dated February 25, 1971. At that time, the court issued letters of administration to J. Arnold.\nHowever, upon Henke\u2019s petition, the probate court revoked the letters of office issued to J. Arnold and admitted to probate on May 15, 1986, Mueller\u2019s Will and Codicil.\nAppellants filed a petition contesting the Will and Codicil on October 17, 1986.\nOn July 15, 1987, Henke and Blue Island police officer Ronald Tellez were arrested and charged with Mueller\u2019s murder. Subsequently, the probate court granted appellants\u2019 motion to remove Henke as executrix of Mueller\u2019s estate and on July 27, 1987, appointed Richard Cowen as special administrator of Mueller\u2019s estate.\nAppellants filed a petition to strike portions of the Will and Codicil on December 4, 1989. Four days later, the probate court appointed Theodore Rodes, Jr., guardian ad litem (Guardian) for Hen-ke\u2019s minor children.\nOn December 13, 1989, Henke entered into a plea of guilty for the solicitation to commit Mueller\u2019s murder, stipulating that she in fact arranged for Tellez to kill Mueller so that she could collect 60% of Mueller\u2019s estate. Henke received a sentence of 10 years\u2019 imprisonment, pursuant to a prior agreement. On January 5, 1990, the Guardian filed a motion to strike and dismiss appellants\u2019 petition to strike portions of the Will and Codicil.\nA hearing commenced on both parties\u2019 motions to strike on July 7, 1993. At the hearing, appellants\u2019 counsel revealed that one of the Henke children was no longer a minor and that Henke was no longer in prison. Counsel further indicated that the Henke children never lived with Mueller and suggested that the marriage was in fact a \"sham.\u201d\nOn August 4, 1993, the trial court made the following findings of fact: On December 13, 1989, Henke was convicted of solicitation to commit the murder of Mueller and was sentenced to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. Henke is now released from prison. Pursuant to section 2\u20146 of the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/2\u20146 (West 1992)), Henke intentionally and unjustifiably caused Mueller\u2019s death and is therefore precluded from receiving any property, benefit or other interest under Mueller\u2019s Will. Mueller\u2019s Will provides that if Henke predeceases him, her portion of the estate passes in its entirety to Henke\u2019s children, who are not Mueller\u2019s natural heirs. Appellants are Mueller\u2019s natural heirs. Pursuant to section 2\u20146 of the Act, Hen-kc\u2019s children are not precluded from receiving any property, benefit or other interest under Mueller\u2019s Will.\nThe trial court entered an order granting in part and denying in part appellants\u2019 motion to strike portions of Mueller\u2019s Will and Codicil. The trial court ordered that Mueller\u2019s estate be administered and distributed as if Henke had died prior to Mueller and subject to a determination of a will contest. The trial court further ordered that the Henke children are eligible to receive the distributions due them pursuant to Mueller\u2019s Will. Finally, the trial court found that a question of law exists as to whether individuals who are named as contingent beneficiaries in a will may take property under that will when the original taker is precluded under section 2\u20146 of the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/2\u20146 (West 1992)), and the contingent takers are heirs of the precluded person but not of the testator, and allowed an immediate appeal to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (134 Ill. 2d R. 308).\nAppellants filed their application for leave to appeal the question of law posed by the trial court pursuant to Rule 308(b) on August 17, 1993, and this court granted a permissive interlocutory appeal on October 6, 1993. The record shows that appellants filed an additional appeal of the trial court\u2019s order on November 5, 1993.\nMeanwhile, on July 2,1993, J. Arnold filed a petition to intervene in the estate proceedings. Following a hearing on September 16, 1993, the trial court denied J. Arnold\u2019s petition.\nJ. Arnold filed his timely appeal of the trial court\u2019s order on October 14, 1993. This court consolidated the parties\u2019 appeals.\nInitially, appellants contend that the trial court erred in determining that the Henke children are eligible to receive the distributions due them pursuant to Mueller\u2019s Will. Appellants argue that the question of law posed by the trial court, \"whether individuals who are named as contingent beneficiaries in a will may take property under that will when the original taker is precluded under section 2\u20146 of the Probate Act and the contingent takers are heirs of the precluded person but not of the testator,\u201d must be answered in the negative. The facts of this case present a case of first impression in Illinois.\nSection 2\u20146 of the Probate Act precludes a person who unjustifiably causes the death of another from inheriting the property of the decedent. (755 ILCS 5/2\u20146 (West 1992).) This statute, commonly known as a \"slayer statute,\u201d provides in pertinent part as follows:\n\"\u00a7 2\u20146. Person causing death. A person8 who intentionally and unjustifiably causes the death of another shall not receive any property, benefit, or other interest by reason of the death, whether as heir, legatee, beneficiary, joint tenant, survivor, appointee or in any other capacity and whether the property, benefit, or the interest passes pursuant to any form of title registration, testamentary or nontestamentary instrument, intestacy, renunciation, or any other circumstance. The property, benefit, or other interest shall pass as if the person causing the death died before the decedent, provided that with respect to joint tenancy property the interest possessed prior to the death by the person causing the death shall not be diminished by the application of this Section. *** A person convicted of first degree murder or second degree murder of the decedent is conclusively presumed to have caused the death intentionally and unjustifiably for purposes of this Section.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/2\u20146 (West 1992).\nIn interpreting section 2\u20146, this court is guided by certain well-established principles of statutory construction. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. (Eagan v. Chicago Transit Authority (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 527, 531, 634 N.E.2d 1093.) Legislative intent is best determined by the statutory language, which should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Eagan, 158 Ill. 2d at 531-32, citing Thomas v. Greer (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 271, 278.\nAppellants contend that the trial court improperly failed to extend the application of section 2\u20146 to the Henke children, so that they could not obtain property pursuant to Mueller\u2019s Will. In support, appellants look to cases outside of this jurisdiction.\nAppellants rely initially on section 252 of the California Probate Code, entitled \"Life Insurance and other beneficiary designations\u201d (Cal. Prob. Code \u00a7 252 (West 1991)), and its accompanying law revision commission comments. Section 252 provides:\n\"A name beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy or other contractual arrangement who feloniously and intentionally kills the principal obligee or the person upon whose life the policy is issued is not entitled to any benefit under the bond, policy or other contractual arrangement, and it becomes payable as though the killer had predeceased the decedent.\u201d (Cal. Prob. Code \u00a7 252 (West 1991).)\nThe law revision commission comments to section 252 state:\n\"Under Sections 252 and 253, if the killer is treated as having predeceased the decedent for the purpose of life insurance or other contractual heir, the killer\u2019s heirs are similarly disqualified. See Meyer v. Johnson, 115 Cal. App. 646, 2 P.2d 456 (1931).\u201d Cal. Prob. Code \u00a7 252, Law Review Commission Comments, 1990 (West 1991).\nIn Meyer v. Johnson (1931), 115 Cal. App. 646, 2 P.2d 456, an insurance policy issued on the life of Hazel Johnson, naming her husband, Granville, as primary beneficiary. Granville murdered Hazel and was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment and therefore deemed ineligible to recover on the insurance policy. The trial court made this determination based on public policy grounds and case law, as California apparently had no slayer statute at that time. (Meyer, 115 Cal. App. at 646, 2 P.2d at 456.) The trial court determined that the insurance proceeds became the property of Gran-ville\u2019s heirs, rather than Hazel\u2019s sole heir, her minor son Robert William Paul, who was not an heir of Granville.\nThe appeals court reversed, finding that the insurance proceeds were properly payable to Hazel\u2019s estate, for the benefit of Paul, Hazel\u2019s heir, and not to Granville\u2019s heirs. The court based its judgment on cases outside of its jurisdiction which addressed the payment of insurance proceeds in the situation where the beneficiary murdered the insured, and the policy designated no beneficiary:\n\"If the beneficiary murders the member, and so loses his rights as such *** the fund may be recovered by such other persons (clearly the heirs of the insured) as would take had no beneficiary been designated.\u201d Meyer, 115 Cal. App. at 648, 2 P.2d at 456-57 citing Schmidt v. Northern Life Association (1900), 112 Iowa 41, 83 N.W. 800, 51 L.R.A. 141, 84 Am. St. Rep. 323, and Supreme Lodge Knights & Ladies of Honor v. Menkhausen (1904), 209 Ill. 277, 70 N.E. 567 (heirs of husband who murdered wife cannot recover on insurance policy naming husband as beneficiary; rather, proceeds are payable to wife\u2019s heirs).\nAppellants further rely on In re Estate of Safran (1981), 102 Wis. 2d 79, 306 N.W.2d 27. Safran involved the distribution of the estate of Helen Safran. In her will, Helen gave all of her estate to her son Bernard in trust, and further provided that if Bernard predeceased Helen without issue, the estate be equally divided among other relatives. Bernard was convicted of causing Helen\u2019s death by reckless conduct. At the time, Wisconsin had no slayer statute. The trial court determined that Bernard was disqualified from inheriting under Helen\u2019s will, based on the common law maxim, \"no one can attain advantage by his own wrong.\u201d (Safran, 102 Wis. 3d at 82, 306 N.W.2d at 29.) However, the trial court found that although Bernard had no children at the time of Helen\u2019s death, the entirety of Helen\u2019s estate must be held in trust for the benefit of any issue that might be born to Bernard.\nOn appeal, the court remanded the cause for a determination of whether Bernard is guilty of intentional homicide, holding that, if so, Bernard would be disqualified from inheriting under the will. In addition, the court specifically stated:\n\"The rule that persons directly related to the murderer are disqualified with him, is premised on the indirect benefits that would thereby flow to the murderer himself. Although we do not foreclose the possibility that the rule would not be applied in every situation, we consider the interests of children neither born nor conceived to be too remote to consider an exception under the facts of this case.\u201d Safran, 102 Wis. 2d at 100, 306 N.W. 2d at 37.\nIn the present case, the trial court opined that Illinois law was closer to Florida law and the cases relied upon by appellees. Florida has a slayer statute as follows:\n\"A surviving person who unlawfully and intentionally kills or participates in procuring the death of the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under the Florida Probate code, and the estate of the decedent passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. Property appointed by the will of the decedent to or for the benefit of the killer passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent.\u201d Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 732.802(1) (West 1985).\nAppellees initially rely on In re Estate of Benson (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), 548 So. 2d 775. There, the court determined the beneficiaries of the estate of Margaret Benson, the mother of Carol, Steven and Scott. Steven murdered both Margaret and Scott and was convicted of their murders. Margaret\u2019s will bequeathed her property to all three children. Scott died intestate, and by law Carol and Steven were his legal heirs. Under the Florida slayer statute, Steven was precluded from participating as a beneficiary in either Margaret\u2019s will or Scott\u2019s estate. This left Carol as sole beneficiary unless Steven\u2019s children were allowed to participate. The trial court determined that the statute did not prevent Steven\u2019s minor children from inheriting their father\u2019s share under either estate. Benson, 548 So. 2d at 776.\nOn appeal, Carol argued that the public policy of Florida required that Florida\u2019s slayer statute be extended to prevent Steven\u2019s children from sharing in either Margaret\u2019s or Scott\u2019s estate. The appeals court rejected Carol\u2019s contention, stating as follows:\n\"We find the statutory language clear and unambiguous. If there is to be declared in Florida such a public policy as appellant urges, it must be accomplished by a legislative amendment to the Slayer Statute and not by a pronouncement of this court.\u201d Benson, 548 So. 2d at 777.\nBenson is distinguishable from the present case in that the inheriting heirs at issue are the blood relatives of the testator and would stand to inherit from Margaret in the absence of a will. In the present case, the Henke children are not the blood relatives of Mueller and would not inherit from him under probate law, absent Mueller\u2019s Will.\nAppellees further rely on Lopez v. Rodriguez (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), 574 So. 2d 249. There, the Florida Appeals Court determined that the proceeds of a Totten trust account held by Clemente and Isabel Rodriguez were properly released to Carlos Rodriguez, Clemente\u2019s natural son, after Clemente murdered Isabel and then committed suicide. Carlos was not Isabel\u2019s natural heir, and Isabel did not adopt him. The accounts were held in trust for Carlos. Lourdes Lopez, a personal representative of Isabel\u2019s estate, contended that Clemente\u2019s act of killing Isabel revoked the trusts, thereby entitling Isabel\u2019s heirs to receive 50% interest in the funds.\nThe court held that the Florida slayer statute did not provide that the killing effects a revocation or disaffirmance of a Totten trust and that to rule in favor of Lopez would in effect improperly rewrite section 732.802(2) of the Florida statute, which provides as follows:\n\"Any joint tenant who unlawfully and intentionally kills another joint tenant effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the decedent passes as the decedent\u2019s property and the killer has no rights by survivorship.\u201d (Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 732.802(2) (West 1989).)\nThe court stated:\n\"The statute seeks to insure that !no person should be permitted to benefit from his own wrong,\u2019 [citations], and terminates the killer\u2019s rights by survivorship. Carlos, the killer\u2019s son, was not alleged to be culpable in Isabel\u2019s death. We decline to hold that the legislature intended the statute to deprive an innocent beneficiary of the trust proceeds.\u201d Lopez, 574 So. 2d at 250.\nLopez is also distinguishable from the present case. Because Clem-ente committed suicide after he murdered Isabel, there was no danger that he could benefit indirectly from Isabel\u2019s estate through Carlos. That danger is inherent in the present case.\nLastly, appellees rely on In re Estate of Fairweather (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), 444 So. 2d 464. There John Fairweather\u2019s will devised his entire estate to his second wife and in the event she predeceased him to appellees, the children of John and his second wife. John died from a gunshot wound inflicted by his second wife, who subsequently pied guilty to second degree murder. The trial court found that by operation of section 732.802, John\u2019s entire estate would pass to appel-lees. Appellants, a half-brother, brother, and John\u2019s children of his first marriage, argued on appeal that John\u2019s property should be distributed in accordance with the laws of intestate succession.\nThe appeals court disagreed and affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the statute then in effect, which provided as follows:\n\"A person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled to inherit from the decedent or to take any part of his estate as a devisee. The part of the decedent\u2019s estate to which the murderer would otherwise be entitled shall pass to the persons entitled to it as though the murderer had died during the lifetime of the decedent.\u201d (Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 732.802 (West 1981).)\nThe court stated:\n\"[T]he statute itself is clear. The decedent\u2019s estate 'shall pass as though the murdered [the second wife] had died during the lifetime of [the] decedent.\u2019 Id. Appellees are entitled to the entire estate under the will.\u201d Fairweather, 444 So. 2d at 465.\nFairweather is similarly distinguishable because the inheriting parties were the natural children of John by his second marriage. Thus, they would be eligible to inherit notwithstanding John\u2019s will.\nWe find the Florida cases inapplicable to the present case. Although section 2 \u2014 6 does not specifically address the fact pattern currently before this court, we find that the public policy of Illinois prohibits the Henke children from taking under Mueller\u2019s Will under the specific facts and circumstances of this case. The record indicates that Henke is still alive and is the guardian of her minor child. Under these circumstances, there exists a danger that Henke could take property through her child, derived from Mueller, despite her wrongful and criminal act of murder.\nThe recent case of In re Estate of Vallerius (1994), 259 Ill. App. 3d 350, 629 N.E.2d 1185, is instructive. There, Douglas White murdered his grandmother, Adella Vallerius. On the same day, Douglas\u2019 brother, Craig White, murdered his grandmother\u2019s friend, Carroll Pieper. Douglas was convicted of Vallerius\u2019 murder, and Craig was convicted the murder of Carroll Pieper.\nVallerius\u2019 will named Douglas and Craig as her sole beneficiaries. Vallerius\u2019 only natural heir was her daughter, Renie White, Douglas and Craig\u2019s mother. Two and one-half months after Vallerius\u2019 murder, White died intestate, leaving Douglas and Craig as her natural heirs.\nAppellees, other grandchildren of Vallerius, contested the distribution of both Vallerius\u2019 and White\u2019s estates. After a hearing, the trial court determined that under both statute (section 2\u20146) and common law, the public policy of Illinois has long been to prevent wrongdoers from profiting from intentionally committed wrongful acts. (Vallerius, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 351-52, citing State Farm Life Insurance Co. v. Davidson (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 495 N.E.2d 520.) The trial court determined that Douglas and Craig were prohibited from obtaining any inheritance either through Vallerius\u2019 will or through White\u2019s estate. Vallerius, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 352-53.\nThis court affirmed, finding that section 2 \u2014 6 prohibited Craig from receiving any benefit by reason of the death of Vallerius, \"whether through her estate directly or indirectly through the estate of her daughter, Renie White.\u201d (Vallerius, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 355.) This court found that to allow Craig to receive any property, benefit, or interest from the estate of Renie White would directly contravene the statute\u2019s \"unambiguous mandate that he not receive any property by reason of his grandmother\u2019s death in any capacity or by any circumstance, because Craig White is one who caused the death of Mrs. Vallerius.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Vallerius, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 354.) The court explained:\n\"We cannot construe the broad language of the statute in so technical and rigid a fashion that its application violates longstanding public policy or serves to unjustly increase the estate of one who participates in murder. (Bradley v. Fox (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699.) Furthermore, the catchall words, [in section 2 \u2014 6] 'in any other capacity\u2019 and 'any other circumstance,\u2019 are intended to apply to unique factual circumstances such as this. Statutes, by their very nature, must apply to a broad range of factual scenarios. Moreover, the legislature certainly cannot be expected to prophesy and list in advance the infinite ways in which a statute such as this may need to be applied in the future. We will not read into the statute words of limitation that are not there, particularly since the limitation espoused by appellants would be directly contrary to the strong public policy that murderers should be denied the fruits of their crimes. Bradley v. Fox (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699.\u201d Vallerius, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 354-55.\nThe present case reveals unique facts and circumstances which require application of section 2 \u2014 6 to prohibit the Henke children from taking under Mueller\u2019s Will. We therefore answer the trial court\u2019s question in the negative and reverse the judgment of the trial court ordering distribution of the Mueller estate to the Henke children. In light of our decision, we need not reach appellants\u2019 further contention that this matter be remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the testator\u2019s intent.\nWe now turn to J. Arnold\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in denying his petition to intervene in the Mueller estate proceedings.\nBefore addressing the merits of this appeal, we have an obligation to determine whether we have jurisdiction, even though the issue was not raised by the parties. (In re Marriage of Betts (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 327, 330, 511 N.E.2d 732, 734.) The jurisdiction of the appellate court is limited to the review of appeals from final judgments, subject to statutory or supreme court exceptions. In re Marriage of Verdung (1989), 126 Ill. 2d 542, 553, 535 N.E.2d 818, 823.\nSupreme Court Rule 304(a) provides for discretionary appeals from final judgments that do not dispose of an entire proceeding, \"only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.\u201d (134 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).) Although the trial court\u2019s order did not include the special language of the rule, J. Arnold cites as a basis for jurisdiction Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1), which provides as follows:\n\"(b) Judgments and Orders Appealable Without Special Finding. The following judgments and orders are appealable without the finding required for appeals under paragraph (a) of this rule:\n(1) A judgment or order entered in the administration of an estate, guardianship, or similar proceeding which finally determines a right or status of a party.\u201d (134 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(1).)\nRule 304(b)(1) promotes efficiency and provides certainty by allowing appeal as to some issues as those issues are resolved during the lengthy procedure of estate administration. (See Yardley v. Yardley (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 747, 750-51, 484 N.E.2d 873, 876.) For purposes of appellate jurisdiction, only those orders which \"finally\u201d determine the right or status of a party are subject to Rule 304(b)(1). In re Estate of Nelson (1993), 250 Ill. App. 3d 282, 621 N.E.2d 81; In re Estate of Devey (1993), 239 Ill. App. 3d 630, 607 N.E.2d 685.\nIn the present case, the trial court\u2019s order of September 16, 1993, finally determines J. Arnold\u2019s right to participate in the estate proceedings. Therefore, the judgment entered by the trial court is a final and appealable order and is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court under Rule 304.\nJ. Arnold argues that he is Mueller\u2019s heir at law and therefore has an absolute right to intervene as an interested party and a legatee under a prior will.\nIntervention may be permissive or as a matter of right. A party is allowed to intervene as of right when a statute confers the unconditional right to intervene, when a party who will be bound by an order or judgment in the action will not be adequately represented by existing parties, or when a party will be adversely affected by the disposition of property subject to the control of the court. (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014408(a) (West 1992).) Permissive intervention is subject to the court\u2019s discretion and may be allowed when a statute confers a conditional right to intervene or when an applicant\u2019s claim and the main action concern a common question of law or fact. (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014408(b) (West 1992).) In the case of both permissive intervention and intervention as of right, the application to intervene must be made in a timely manner. (People ex rel. Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n (1993), 243 Ill. App. 3d 544, 548, 611 N.E.2d 1321.) Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the trial court\u2019s judgment in these matters will not be reversed on appeal. Hartigan, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 548.\nJ. Arnold argues that his unconditional right to intervene in the will contest is derived from section 8 \u2014 1(d) of the Probate Act, which grants a right to contest the validity of a will to \"the heir, legatee, representative, grantee or assignee of the person entitled to institute the proceeding.\u201d (755 ILCS 5/8\u20141(d) (West 1992).) J. Arnold\u2019s argument fails because he is not an \"heir at law.\u201d Section 2 \u2014 1 of the Probate Act sets forth the rules of descent and distribution as follows:\n\"The intestate real and personal estate of a resident decedent and the intestate real estate in this State of a nonresident decedent, after all just claims against his estate are fully paid, descends and shall be distributed as follows:\n(b) If there is no surviving spouse but a descendant of the decedent: the entire estate to the decedent\u2019s descendants per stirpes.\u201d (755 ILCS 5/2\u20141(b) (West 1992).)\nAs such, appellants, Mueller\u2019s natural children, are Mueller\u2019s heirs at law.\nAs stated above, all rights of intervention must be timely. (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014408(a) (West 1992).) Section 8 \u2014 1 provides that a contest must be made within six months after the admission of the will to probate. (755 ILCS 5/8\u20141 (West 1992).) The determination of the timeliness of a petition to intervene is left to the discretion of the trial court. (RTS Plumbing Co. v. DeFazio (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1042, 536 N.E.2d 836.) Factors considered in making this determination include: when the intervenors became aware of the litigation; the amount of time that elapsed between the initiation of the action and the filing of the petition to intervene; and the reason for the party\u2019s failure to seek intervention at an earlier date. RTS, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 1042.\nIn the present case, the record shows that Mueller\u2019s Will was admitted to probate on May 15, 1986. The appellants filed a petition contesting Mueller\u2019s Will on October 17, 1986, and J. Arnold was aware of the appellants\u2019 petition. J. Arnold failed to seek leave to intervene in the Will until July 2, 1993, and has provided no reason for his delay.\nJ. Arnold\u2019s reliance on In re Estate of Keener (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 270, 521 N.E.2d 232, and In re Estate of Watson (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 186, 468 Ill. App. 3d 836, is misplaced. In both cases, the plaintiffs filed timely petitions contesting a will.\nHere, the facts show that J. Arnold\u2019s petition to intervene came many years too late. In addition, J. Arnold has failed to provide support for his contentions that he is either a necessary or interested party, or for his alleged absolute right to intervene. We therefore find that the trial court properly denied J. Arnold\u2019s petition to intervene.\nFor the reasons stated above, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.\nReversed in part; affirmed in part.\nBUCKLEY and WOLFSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE CAMPBELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Novack & Macey, of Chicago (P. Andrew Fleming, of counsel), for appellants Lyn Zielinski, George Frederick Mueller, Phillip Randy Mueller, and Daniel Archer Mueller.", "Phillip J. Schmidt, of Chicago, for appellant J. Arnold Mueller.", "Porikos, Rodes & Economos, P.C., of Arlington Heights (Theodore Rodes, Jr., of counsel), for appellees.", "Cowen, Crowley & Nord, P.C., of Chicago (Richard A. Cowen and Daniel J. Fumagalli, of counsel), for Estate of George Archer Mueller." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ESTATE OF GEORGE ARCHER MUELLER, Deceased (Lyn Zielinski et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. Constantina Henke, a/k/a Constantina Mueller, et al., Respondents-Appellees (J. Arnold Mueller, Intervenor-Appellant)).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNos. 1\u201493\u20142815, 1\u201493\u20143649, 1\u201493\u20143879 cons.\nOpinion filed September 5, 1995.\nNovack & Macey, of Chicago (P. Andrew Fleming, of counsel), for appellants Lyn Zielinski, George Frederick Mueller, Phillip Randy Mueller, and Daniel Archer Mueller.\nPhillip J. Schmidt, of Chicago, for appellant J. Arnold Mueller.\nPorikos, Rodes & Economos, P.C., of Arlington Heights (Theodore Rodes, Jr., of counsel), for appellees.\nCowen, Crowley & Nord, P.C., of Chicago (Richard A. Cowen and Daniel J. Fumagalli, of counsel), for Estate of George Archer Mueller." }, "file_name": "0128-01", "first_page_order": 146, "last_page_order": 159 }