{ "id": 906781, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD RADOVICK, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Radovick", "decision_date": "1995-10-06", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201492\u20143831", "first_page": "809", "last_page": "822", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 809" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "177 N.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2790543 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 1234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236913 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141932 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3115107 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 766", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557658 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456-58" }, { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160428 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3608671 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.E.2d 1121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5435369 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "593 N.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2919727 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/250/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 95", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6171852 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 N.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2989587 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0589-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1182, "char_count": 32813, "ocr_confidence": 0.715, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.291710709099418e-07, "percentile": 0.6199575728160214 }, "sha256": "5a7d3594ae673d3437982bc4b768703797efc6707a2ec41f04723c9f7a94c7c6", "simhash": "1:8f6e6034fe0edda5", "word_count": 5512 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:19:22.263448+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD RADOVICK, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ZWICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Ronald Radovick, was indicted and convicted following a jury trial of the first degree murder of Regina Newton. The trial court entered judgment and subsequently sentenced defendant to a term of 75 years in the Department of Corrections. Defendant now appeals.\nRegina Newton was forcibly drowned in the late evening hours of April 2, 1991, near the Maple Lake fisherman\u2019s overlook in the Cook County Forest Preserve. She had been severely beaten before being killed. While defendant admitted at his trial that he, John Janes and another friend, Donald Grant, were near the scene of the murder when Newton was killed, he testified that he and Grant did not participate in the murder. Defendant instead asserted Janes alone killed Newton.\nThe State\u2019s case against defendant was based principally upon the grand jury testimony of friends of the defendant, Joanne, Robert, Maggie and Jennifer Schell. Initially, Joanne Schell told police that the defendant had spent April 2 and April 3 with her in the Schell home. However, several months later, Joanne recanted her statements and told prosecutors that she and her family had been threatened by defendant and coerced into providing him with an alibi. The four Schells testified before the grand jury that they had been threatened by defendant and that defendant admitted helping Janes kill Regina Newton. By the time of trial all of the Schells had recanted significant portions of their grand jury testimony. The trial court ruled that the State would be permitted to introduce the Schells\u2019 grand jury testimony in its entirety as substantive evidence against the defendant.\nIn addition to presenting his own testimony that he did not participate in the killing, defendant called both John Janes and Donald Grant as witnesses on his behalf. At the time of defendant\u2019s trial, however, Janes had been indicted and refused to testify, asserting his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Grant was not indicted and appeared in court on defendant\u2019s behalf. Grant told the court before testifying that he had consulted with a lawyer and wished to testify as a defense witness. After the trial court repeatedly admonished Grant regarding his fifth amendment rights and after the court appointed a lawyer to discuss his fifth amendment rights with him, Grant changed his mind and declined to testify.\nFollowing the loss of Grant as a witness, defendant sought to introduce prior testimony made by Grant to the grand jury which supported defendant\u2019s version of events. Specifically, Grant testified before the grand jury that he spent the evening of April 2 with the defendant, Janes and Newton driving around in defendant\u2019s car. Newton and Janes were arguing with one another and, at one point, Janes became \"pissed off about something\u201d and slapped Newton. Janes said, \"take her to Maple Lake.\u201d When the four arrived at Maple Lake, the defendant sat in the car with Grant in a parking lot while Janes went with Regina Newton down to a trail near the water, away from the car. The parking lot was near a hill and a drop-off led down to the water. Grant and defendant could not see Janes and Newton from their vantage point. When Grant and defendant heard Newton screaming, defendant left Grant and went down to the trail to see what was happening. Grant stayed by the car. Grant testified that he heard defendant scream \"look what you are doing!\u201d Grant then went to the edge of the parking lot to see what was happening below near the water, he saw the defendant \"half way down there.\u201d Janes at this time was standing in the water over Newton\u2019s body, kicking her in the stomach. Janes was screaming, \"Die bitch!\u201d The trial court held that this grand jury testimony was hearsay and could not be properly admitted into evidence.\nDefendant first argues that he was denied his fundamental right to present his defense by the trial court\u2019s repeated warnings to Don-aid Grant regarding self-incrimination. Defendant claims these warnings were excessive and \"drove Grant from the witness stand.\u201d We agree.\nJust prior to Grant\u2019s taking the witness stand as part of the defendant\u2019s case, the prosecutor, outside the presence of the jury, asked the court to advise Grant of his fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination. The prosecutor also requested that counsel be appointed for Grant if Grant appeared without a lawyer. At this point, counsel for the defendant indicated that Grant had a private attorney named James Porn who had already spoken with Grant regarding his testimony. Defense counsel objected to the prosecution\u2019s request that Grant be admonished, arguing that the State was simply trying to intimidate Grant.\nThe record then shows the following exchange between the court and Grant:\n\"THE COURT: I don\u2019t know what your lawyer told you, I want somebody in front of you. You have the right to have [cjounsel. I have a duty to tell you that before you testify that you have right to have the advice of counsel and make sure what the legal ramifications of you testifying here and after you learn what the real ramifications are then you could decide to testify which is fine with me. If you decide not to testify that is fine with me, too, but I want to make sure you understand what is being said and done before you do it. Do you want to talk to the [pjublic [d]efender. Fine. You can talk to him. You can follow his advice. You don\u2019t have to follow his advice. He will just tell you these are the rules. These are the possible exposures if you do wish to testify. Fine. What you tell him is held in confidence. No one knows about it. The [c]curt never finds out about it. State never finds out about it. Defense doesn\u2019t find out about it. You have a private lawyer. Fine. If you want for purposes before your testimony today in this court if you want to just converse with the P.D. I will appoint him. You\u2019re not giving up any rights that you have. I just want to make sure that you\u2019re fully advised because after the P.D. talks to you I will just ask not what you said, but did he advise you of your rights. Yes. Does he wish to testify? Yes. Fitness; no problem. If you say no and you want to exercise some rights you have, I have no problem with that. See once you take the stand it\u2019s all over with. Then you have to testify. I just want to make sure that you understand.\n* * *\nDo you want to talk to the P.D. one time; it\u2019s between you and him?\nMR. GRANT: I don\u2019t really think it\u2019s necessary. I spoke with my attorney. He said nothing really could be done and answer whatever they want.\nTHE COURT: May I ask the name of your lawyer?\nMR. GRANT: James Porn. Suite 2505 on 180 North La Salle.\u201d\nFollowing the judge\u2019s statements to Grant, the prosecutor and defendant\u2019s attorney attempted to reach attorney James Porn on the telephone, but were told by a switchboard operator that he was not at his desk. They reported this fact to the court. The trial court, then recognizing that a conflict of interest would occur if a public defender were appointed to represent Grant, suggested that a special attorney from the public defender\u2019s multiple defendant unit be appointed for Grant. Defense counsel objected to such a procedure, noting that Grant had already indicated that he had spoken with an attorney and had been advised to testify. Defense counsel also noted that Grant had already testified before the grand jury. The trial court did not address defense counsel\u2019s objections, but returned to the courtroom and again addressed Grant:\n\"THE COURT: We can\u2019t reach [Mr. Porn]. [The] State has made a phone call. It was made along with [cjounsel for the [defendant here. [You are] twenty some years of age. [You have a] right to have an attorney. I forget [sic] that the P.D.\u2019s Office is representing a [c]o-defendant here. I can get somebody from [the public defenders special unit] which is a separate office or I can get a private attorney and see to it that he\u2019s paid. If you want to pass that and call another witness and talk to him for fifteen, twenty minutes. Fine. [I] cannot make you have an attorney or talk to an attorney. My question to you is if you don\u2019t want to be put in that position and your lawyer \u2014 you\u2019re telling me he told you to tell the truth; you got other problems. Don\u2019t worry about it. Fine. You talk to the private lawyer; fine. If you don\u2019t want to talk to the private lawyer; fine. I will provide you one free of charge if you want one. I will get a lawyer in the building here. It won\u2019t cost you nothing [sic], but then again you have a right to say I don\u2019t want to talk to no [sic] lawyer. I will testify. It\u2019s up to you. You\u2019re the witness here. You have the right to testify. You\u2019ve been subpoenaed in. I just want to make sure. I\u2019m not trying to scare you. Understand the facts. Do you want me to get a private lawyer to talk to you without charge to you? Pass it. Call in other witnesses and then come back?\nMR. GRANT: I will testify. I don\u2019t see no [sic] reason why.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m not saying you have anything to hide. You\u2019re telling me basically you wish to testify. You do not wish me to appoint a private attorney to explain what your rights and options are. You don\u2019t want to discuss this and make arrangements to get the [special unit] in and talk to you today. It would be done right now.\nMR. GRANT: I don\u2019t see why.\nTHE COURT: You see no reason why.\nMR. GRANT: Yeah.\nTHE COURT: Okay. I have no problem with that.\u201d\nAt this point in the proceedings, Donald Grant had twice declined counsel and twice indicated that he wished to testify. The prosecutor then requested that the court \"formally\u201d advise Grant of his rights. The court obliged:\nTHE COURT: All right young man, your name in full.\nMR. GRANT: Donald R. Grant.\nTHE COURT: Do you understand you\u2019re here in court today and you may be called to testify as a witness and you would be testifying under oath. Do you understand that?\nMR. GRANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: You also understand certain rights as a [djefen-dant [sic]. Right to an attorney. Right to have any attorney you can afford. If you can\u2019t afford one or you would like to talk to him do you understand that I can appoint an attorney to represent you without charge.\n\u2756 * *\nI would see to it that a private attorney in this building would talk to you, advise you of all your rights and it would be with no cost to you. We would see to it that the attorney was reimbursed for his cost at no expense. Do you understand that?\nMR. GRANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: My understanding is that you do not want to talk to any attorney at all, is that correct?\nMR. GRANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: You also understand that anything that you say here under oath may and can be used against you in any criminal proceeding?\nMR. GRANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Knowing that do you still wish to testify without the advice of counsel\u2014\nMR. GRANT: Yes, sir.\u201d\nDespite the fact that Grant stated for a third time that he wished to testify without consulting with counsel, the court persisted:\n\"THE COURT: You\u2019re telling me you discussed your potential testimony in full with your attorney and after hearing what you testified your own private attorney told you there\u2019s no problem with that; go to court and testify; is that what you\u2019re telling the Court or telling him you got a subpoena to go to court. I am not asking what your testimony is. I just want to make sure.\u201d\nGrant replied that he had told his attorney \"a little bit\u201d about the case, \"just, you know, the basics,\u201d and that his attorney had advised that he had \"[njothing to worry about now.\u201d The prosecutor then requested that an attorney be appointed for Grant in light of the fact that it appeared that Grant had not fully advised his own counsel of the situation. The trial court agreed and ordered that an independent attorney be found for Grant. Following consultation with the special court-appointed attorney, Grant invoked his fifth amendment rights and declined to testify.\nThis court has recognized that, while the trial court need not inform a witness of his or her fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the court has the discretion to do so, particularly when the witness appears in court unrepresented. (People v. Morley (1994), 255 Ill. App. 3d 589, 597, 627 N.E.2d 397.) It has also been recognized, however, that a judge\u2019s conduct in admonishing a defense witness has the potential to improperly interfere with the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial. (See, e.g., Webb v. Texas (1972), 409 U.S. 95, 34 L. Ed. 2d 330, 93 S. Ct. 351; People v. Mancilla (1993), 250 Ill. App. 3d 353, 620 N.E.2d 1163; People v. Blalock (1993), 239 Ill. App. 3d 830, 607 N.E.2d 645.) In Morley, for example, this court stated that the trial court which elects to admonish a witness \" 'must walk the fine line between, on the one hand, fully advising the witness of the danger of self-incrimination and the right not to testify, and, on the other hand, threatening the witness to an extent which materially impairs the defendant\u2019s due process right to present witnesses in his defense.\u2019 \u201d Morley, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 597, quoting People v. Schroeder (1991), 227 Cal. App. 3d 784, 788-89, 278 Cal. Rptr. 237, 239.\nOur supreme court, in People v. King (1993), 154 Ill. 2d 217, 608 N.E.2d 877, addressed the issue of whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in admonishing a defendant\u2019s witness. The court held that, in order for a trial judge\u2019s admonitions to a potential witness to violate the due process rights of the accused, the admonitions must meet two tests. First, the admonishments given to the witness must be \"somehow improper.\u201d The court stated, for example, that the judge\u2019s comments could be \"unnecessarily strong\u201d or \"threatening.\u201d (King, 154 Ill. 2d at 224.) Second, the court\u2019s statements must be a possible cause of the witness\u2019 decision not to testify.\nSubsequently, in Morley, this court noted that a trial judge\u2019s comments could amount to an abuse of discretion if they \"actively encourage[dj\u201d a witness not to testify or can be said to have \"badger[edj a witness\u201d into remaining silent. (Morley, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 597, citing United States v. Arthur (6th Cir. 1991), 949 F.2d 211.) After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s comments in this case satisfy both requirements set out by King.\nFirst, the extent of the court\u2019s warnings to the witness in this case was clearly excessive. The court informed the witness that he had the right not to testify at least six times, and the witness indicated on at least three separate times that he wished to testify, despite the court\u2019s admonitions. Here, the court repeatedly badgered the witness, again and again discussing the possibility that he might wish to speak with a lawyer and reconsider his position. The court\u2019s statements were made even though Grant indicated he had already consulted with and been advised by his own private lawyer regarding his testimony.\nSecond, the court\u2019s repeated warnings to Grant were an obvious factor in his decision to take the fifth amendment. It is abundantly clear from the record that Grant wanted to testify on defendant\u2019s behalf. He came to court on two separate occasions and spoke with defense counsel on the phone before the trial. Grant had previously waived the fifth amendment when testifying before the grand jury and had elected to give police statements shortly after the murder. The State argues that, because Grant consulted with court-appointed counsel before invoking the fifth amendment, the trial court\u2019s comments could not have influenced Grant\u2019s decision not to testify. A more reasonable inference, however, is that the court\u2019s repeated admonishments contributed to his decision not to testify, particularly after the court appointed a new lawyer for him after being informed of his private attorney\u2019s advice. The only conclusion Grant could draw from this sequence of events is that the judge believed he had been given bad advice from his counsel and that the new counsel\u2019s advice should be followed. It is not surprising, therefore, that after he had consulted with appointed counsel, Grant elected for the first time to assert his fifth amendment right not to testify. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the court\u2019s excessive and repeated lecturing of Donald Grant was a significant factor in influencing Grant\u2019s ultimate decision not to testify and could have influenced the ultimate outcome of defendant\u2019s trial. Grant was defendant\u2019s sole occurrence witness and could have convinced the jury that defendant did not participate in Newton\u2019s murder. In such a case, we must reverse defendant\u2019s conviction and remand the cause for further proceedings. See People v. King (1992), 228 Ill. App. 3d 519, 525, 593 N.E.2d 694, aff\u2019d (1993), 154 Ill. 2d 217, 226.\nBecause we believe that several issues raised by the defendant in his current appeal may recur on remand, we elect to consider these issues out of concern for judicial economy. We first consider defendant\u2019s claim that Donald Grant\u2019s grand jury testimony should have been admitted into evidence once he asserted his fifth amendment rights under the former-testimony exception or the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule. Should Grant again invoke his fifth amendment rights on remand, the issue will again be presented to the trial court.\nIn Illinois, a witness\u2019 previous testimony may be admitted into evidence at trial, as an exception to the hearsay rule, if the witness has become unavailable and the current opponent of the testimony had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the earlier hearing. (People v. Horton (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 413, 416, 358 N.E.2d 1121; In re J.S. (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 154, 157, 505 N.E.2d 1128; People v. Aldaco (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 672, 676, 437 N.E.2d 905.) It is only the second element that is in dispute in this case, as both the defendant and State agree that Grant\u2019s decision to take the fifth amendment rendered him \"unavailable\u201d for purposes of the rule.\nWhen considering whether the prior testimony of an unavailable witness may be put into evidence under the former-testimony exception, we consider whether the party opposing the admission of the testimony has had a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Our supreme court recently recognized that the test does not lend itself to a per se determination (People v. Rice (1995), 166 Ill. 2d 35, 39, 651 N.E.2d 1083); instead, the focus of the test must be on whether \"the motive and focus of the cross-examination at the time of the initial proceeding [were] the same or similar to that which guides the cross-examination during the subsequent proceeding.\u201d (Rice, 166 Ill. 2d at 41.) Because the issue is one of the admissibility of evidence, the standard of review is whether the trial court\u2019s decision amounted to an abuse of discretion.\nAfter considering the proper test, we cannot find error in the trial court\u2019s decision to refuse to put into evidence Donald Grant\u2019s prior grand jury testimony. In United States v. DiNapoli (2d Cir. 1993), 8 F.3d 909, the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, considered the question of whether prosecutors necessarily have a similar motive to develop the testimony of a grand jury witness as they would have when that witness takes the stand at trial. The court found that simply because the prosecutor has tendered a witness to the grand jury does not necessarily guarantee that the witness\u2019 testimony would be vigorously challenged:\n\"If a prosecutor is using the grand jury to investigate possible crimes and identify possible criminals, it may be quite unrealistic to characterize the prosecutor as the \u2019opponent\u2019 of a witness\u2019 version. At a preliminary state of an investigation, the prosecutor is not trying to prove any side of any issue, but only to develop the facts to determine if an indictment is warranted.\u201d (DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 913.)\nWe find this logic persuasive and consistent with our own supreme court\u2019s recent decision in Rice. As the defendant\u2019s brief recognizes, the State may have presented Grant\u2019s testimony to the grand jury for any number of reasons, perhaps simply to \"lock in\u201d Grant\u2019s previous statements to police that Janes had killed Regina Newton. If the State had not yet developed sufficient facts implicating the defendant at the time of the grand jury hearing, prosecutors would have had little motive to challenge Grant\u2019s version of events at this time.\nIn short, the purpose for which the State offered Grant\u2019s grand jury testimony and the purpose for which Grant\u2019s testimony was later offered by defendant at trial are not so similar as to require us to conclude that the State had a meaningful opportunity to effectively cross-examine Grant. In light of the proper standard of review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit Grant\u2019s testimony under the former-testimony exception to the hearsay rule.\nAs an alternative basis for admitting Grant\u2019s grand jury testimony, defendant asserts the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule. An extrajudicial statement may be admitted into evidence under this exception if it contains sufficient indicia of reliability so as to be rendered trustworthy. (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284, 301, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 312, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1048-49; People v. Bowel (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 58, 66, 488 N.E.2d 995; People v. Mack (1992), 238 Ill. App. 3d 97, 102, 606 N.E.2d 165.) The key to successfully invoking this exception is a showing that the hearsay statement was made under such objective circumstances as to provide considerable assurance of its reliability. (Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d at 67; Mack, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 102.) Guideposts to be considered in assessing whether the exception is properly applied include whether: (1) the statement was made spontaneously or shortly after the crime to a close acquaintance; (2) the statement was corroborated by other evidence; (3) the statement was self-incriminating and a declaration against interest; and (4) there was an adequate opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant. (Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 312, 93 S. Ct. at 1048; Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d at 67.) Again, because the issue is one of the admissibility of evidence, the trial court must not be reversed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. People v. Ward (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455-56, 463 N.E.2d 696.\nThe four factors set out by Chambers certainly do not support defendant\u2019s position. First, Grant\u2019s grand jury statements, made on April 5, 1991, were not made at a time spontaneously or shortly after the commission of the crime and were not made to a close acquaintance.\nSecond, Grant\u2019s version of events is not well corroborated. The fact that Grant\u2019s testimony matches the defendant\u2019s version of events is not a particularly strong corroborating factor as both men were friends and potential suspects in the crime. Both men knew Regina Newton, both men went with her to the place where she was murdered and both men left the scene together after her death. Police testimony and testimony from the Schells\u2019 grand jury hearings indicated that Grant and the defendant discussed their stories before speaking with the police. It is not surprising, therefore, that their stories are similar.\nThird, Grant\u2019s statements to the grand jury are not \"in a very real sense\u201d incriminating or \"unquestionably\u201d against Grant\u2019s interest, as was the case with the statements at issue in Chambers. (See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 301, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 312, 93 S. Ct. at 1048-49.) Although Grant\u2019s statements place him near the scene of the murder, and could be characterized as being inculpatory in this respect, they are also statements which are clearly self-serving in that they indicate Grant had nothing to do with Newton\u2019s death.\nFinally, defendant argues that the fourth consideration under Chambers, whether the State has had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Grant, should not be applied to this case or should be applied in his favor because Grant\u2019s testimony to the grand jury was offered by the State. We do not agree. As we have already discussed, simply because the State tenders a witness to the grand jury does not necessarily mean that the State has had a meaningful opportunity to challenge that witness\u2019 version of events. Our consideration of the particular facts in this case, and review of Grant\u2019s grand jury testimony itself, leads us to conclude that the State\u2019s motive in presenting Grant\u2019s testimony to the grand jury was significantly different than its motive would have been in confronting Grant at defendant\u2019s trial. This means that the State had not been given a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Grant.\nBriefly stated, all four of the factors discussed by the Chambers decision weigh against admitting Grant\u2019s grand jury testimony into evidence as a declaration against penal interest. Accordingly, we do not view Grant\u2019s statements to the grand jury as having the indicia of reliability necessary to require that they be admitted under that exception. The court committed no error in denying their admission.\nWe next turn our attention to defendant\u2019s claim that the trial court improperly admitted irrelevant and prejudicial statements contained in the Schells\u2019 grand jury testimony. Specifically, defendant claims that the trial court improperly failed to redact the Schells\u2019 grand jury testimony which contained prior consistent statements, double hearsay and evidence of other crimes.\nSection 115\u201410.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115\u201410.1 (West 1994)) provides that prior inconsistent statements of a witness may be admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule if: (1) the statement is inconsistent with the witness\u2019 testimony at trial; (2) the witness is subject to cross-examination; and (3) the statement was made under oath at a trial, hearing or other proceeding. Defendant does not dispute that this statutory exception could properly have been used by the State to put into evidence those portions of the Schells\u2019 grand jury testimony which were inconsistent with their trial testimony. Defendant claims, however, that the court\u2019s decision to put into evidence and to send back with the jurors during their deliberations the entire and unredacted grand jury testimony of all four Schells amounts to reversible error. The State asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the unredacted transcripts, relying upon People v. Salazar (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 424, 456-58, 535 N.E.2d 766.\nIn Salazar, our supreme court held that section 115\u201410.1 does not require the trial court to make a \"quantitative or mathematical analysis\u201d as to whether all of the witness\u2019 prior statements are \"inconsistent\u201d under the rule in order for them to be admissible, and that the court has broad discretion in determining the extent to which the exception can be used to put into evidence former testimony which would otherwise be hearsay. In Salazar, for example, the trial court allowed the State to put into evidence a witness\u2019 entire tape-recorded statement under section 115\u201410.1, even though the inconsistencies between the tape and the witness\u2019 in-court testimony were found to be \"few.\u201d The court justified the admission of this evidence, in part, by noting that the facts of each particular case are unique and that the legislature, in passing the statute, meant for the trial court to have broad leeway in interpreting the rule. The court noted, in some cases, \"a mere tendency to be inconsistent will be enough\u201d while, in other cases, \"more than a mere tendency would be needed.\u201d Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d at 458.\nThe State argues that the court\u2019s opinion in Salazar is sufficient to justify the ruling by the court below. We are unpersuaded. Although the Salazar opinion indicates that the trial court\u2019s discretion under section 115\u201410.1 is broad, it does not indicate that section 115\u201410.1 can be used by the State to admit wholly irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial evidence. In this case, for example, there is a host of information contained in the grand jury testimony which should have been excluded and which had the tendency to unfairly prejudice the defendant\u2019s case. The most egregious abuse of discretion occurred when the State introduced through grand jury testimony evidence that implicated defendant in other murders.\nThe established rule of law is that evidence of other crimes or offenses is not admissible for purposes of showing that the defendant has a disposition or propensity to commit crime. (People v. McKibbins (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821.) In determining whether evidence of other crimes may be admitted for some other proper purpose, such as to prove modus operandi, intent, motive or identity, the trial court is charged with weighing the probative value of the tendered evidence against its prejudicial eifect upon the defendant. (People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 22, 473 N.E.2d 840.) The record indicates clearly that the trial court failed to do so in admitting the Schells\u2019 grand jury testimony in toto. Included in the testimony from Joanne Schell was that defendant had told her that he was going to kill a guy on Wednesday and that he and Grant had previously killed three men. This evidence was extremely prejudicial, particularly in a murder trial, and had no probative value whatsoever to the issues before the court. Nonetheless, the trial court ruled that it was just \"boasting\u201d and that the jurors would likely see this for what it was. This conclusion by the trial court ignores the proper legal standard of admissibility. In our view, the admission of this evidence was clear and reversible error. (See People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 568 N.E.2d 1234; People v. Gregory (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 601, 177 N.E.2d 120.) On remand, any reference to other murders must not be admitted into evidence.\nWe must also conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in not redacting other portions of Joanne, Robert, Maggie and Jennifer Schell\u2019s grand jury testimony. The transcripts of the Schells\u2019 grand jury testimony contained very few prior inconsistent statements. Most of the testimony was either consistent or contained evidence on matters about which the declarant was never questioned at trial. The sheer volume of consistent or new testimony contained in these transcripts and the court\u2019s failure to redact anything from the transcripts, even statements which were clearly inadmissible and unfairly prejudicial to defendant\u2019s case, compels us to conclude that the trial court failed to exercise any discretion in ruling on defendant\u2019s request that these transcripts be redacted. In addition to improperly bolstering the Schells\u2019 trial testimony, the admission of these transcripts was improper because they contained double hearsay and evidence of other crimes. Defendant\u2019s brief contains over four pages of summarized grand jury testimony put into evidence by the State under section 115\u201410.1. Our review of this testimony indicates that almost all of it should have been excluded as it does not fall within the unambiguous statutory exception. On remand, the trial court is directed to admit only those portions of the grand jury transcripts which can reasonably be characterized as \"inconsistent\u201d with trial testimony, in conformity with the plain language of section 115\u201410.1.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcNAMARA, P.J., and EGAN, J., concur.\nWe also note that the court later compounded its error by instructing the jury with Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.13 (3d ed. 1992). This instruction relates to the proper use by the jury of defendant\u2019s prior convictions in assessing his credibility. In light of the fact that the jury received no evidence whatsoever that the defendant had any prior convictions, references to other crimes committed by the defendant during the course of the trial could not help but to confuse the jurors, leading them to believe that defendant had been convicted of the murders referred to in Joanne Schell\u2019s testimony.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ZWICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Anna Ahronheim, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Kathleen Bom, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD RADOVICK, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201492\u20143831\nOpinion filed October 6, 1995.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Anna Ahronheim, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Kathleen Bom, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0809-01", "first_page_order": 827, "last_page_order": 840 }