{
  "id": 906767,
  "name": "THE COUNTY OF COLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "County of Coles v. Property Tax Appeal Board",
  "decision_date": "1995-10-27",
  "docket_number": "No. 4\u201494\u20140271",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE COUNTY OF COLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe County of Coles (County) sought judicial review of a decision by the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) regarding the assessment of property owned by Tabor Grain Company (Tabor). Tabor moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that under section 111.4 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Act) (Pub. Act 87\u20141189, art. 5, \u00a7 2, eff. September 24, 1992 (1992 Ill. Laws 3408, 3432-33), amending 35 ILCS 205/111.4 (West 1992)), the complaint for administrative review should have been filed in the appellate court. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, and the County appeals. We affirm.\nIn this case of first impression, this court is asked to interpret the language of section 111.4 of the Act, which \u2014 effective September 24, 1992 \u2014 provided in pertinent part:\n\"Final administrative decisions of the Property Tax Appeal Board are subject to review under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law, except that in every case where a change in assessed valuation of $300,000 or more was sought, that review shall be afforded directly in the Appellate Court for the district in which the subject property involved in the Board\u2019s decision is situated, and not in the circuit court.\u201d (Emphasis denotes additions.) Pub. Act 87\u20141189, art. 5, \u00a7 2, eff. September 24, 1992 (1992 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3007, 3027 (West); 1992 Ill. Laws 3408, 3432-33), amending 35 ILCS 205/111.4 (West 1992).\nSection 111.4 of the Act was repealed by Public Act 88\u2014455 (Pub. Act 88\u2014455, art. 32, \u00a7 32\u201420, eff. January 1, 1994 (1993 Ill. Laws 3497, 3830)), but identical language was added (Pub. Act 88\u2014455, art. 16, \u00a7 16\u2014195, eff. January 1, 1994 (1993 Ill. Laws 3497, 3636)) as section 16\u2014195 of the Property Tax Code (see 35 ILCS 200/16\u2014195 (West Supp. 1993)). At issue in the present case is how \"a change in assessed valuation\u201d is to be measured.\nTabor owns a grain elevator and associated structures located on approximately three acres of land in Coles County, Illinois. The County assessor\u2019s office determined the assessed valuation of the Tabor property for the 1990 tax year was $720,290. Tabor appealed the assessment to the County Board of Review (Board of Review), and the Board of Review affirmed.\nOn December 11, 1990, Tabor filed a petition for review of the Board of Review\u2019s decision with PTAB. In its petition, Tabor stated that the county assessor\u2019s assessment of the property was $720,290, that the Board of Review\u2019s assessment was also $720,290, and that Tabor\u2019s assessed valuation of its property was $260,978. After receiving Tabor\u2019s petition, PTAB requested from the Board of Review a written explanation of the Board of Review\u2019s actions, pursuant to PTAB Rule 1910.40(a). (86 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1910.40(a), at 2366-67 (1991).) PTAB provided a form entitled \"Notes on Appeal\u201d for the Board of Review to supply its written explanation. In the Notes on Appeal, received by PTAB on November 13, 1991, the Board of Review \"stipulated\u201d that its revised opinion of the assessed valuation of the Tabor property was $532,000. PTAB conducted an evidentiary hearing in July 1992. On February 10, 1993, PTAB filed its decision, concluding that a reduction in the assessment of the property to $339,649 was supported by the evidence. On March 17, 1993, the County filed its complaint for administrative review in the circuit court.\nThe various figures are shown on the following chart:\nCounty Assessor\u2019s Office $720,290\nBoard of Review $720,290\nIn the PTAB:\nTabor petition for review\n(November 11, 1990)\n\u2014County Assessor\u2019s assessment $720,290 (A)\n\u2014Tabor\u2019s assessed valuation $260,978 (B)\nBoard of Review Notes on Appeal\n(November 13, 1991)\n\u2014Revised opinion $532,000 (C)\nPTAB decision (February 10, 1993) $339,649\nIn its July 30, 1993, motion to dismiss, Tabor contended that the proper measure of change for purposes of section 111.4 of the Act was the difference between the assessed valuation approved by the Board of Review, $720,290 (figure A), and the valuation advanced by Tabor on appeal to PTAB, $260,978 (figure B). That difference was $459,312, well above the $300,000 threshold set by the Act, placing jurisdiction in the appellate court. The County, however, contended that the calculation should be based on the difference between the Board of Review\u2019s revised assessment in the proceedings before PTAB, $532,000 (figure C), and Tabor\u2019s assessment, $260,978 (figure A), yielding an amount of $271,022. Because this amount was less than $300,000, the County asserted its complaint was properly filed in the circuit court. The circuit court accepted Tabor\u2019s interpretation of section 111.4 of the Act and dismissed the County\u2019s complaint.\nWe first note that the Attorney General, on behalf of the PTAB, agrees with the circuit court\u2019s construction of the Act and urges us to affirm.\nWhen the Board of Review determines that a revision in assessment appears to be just, it shall make any required changes in the county clerk\u2019s assessment books and attach to the book an affidavit signed by at least two members of the Board of Review certifying that the assessments are correct. (35 ILCS 205/110 (West 1992) (now 35 ILCS 200/16\u201485 (West Supp. 1993)).) If th\u00e1t \"final [Board of Review] action\u201d results in a changed assessment, the Board of Review shall mail notice to the taxpayer, stating the assessed value of the property for that year. (35 ILCS 205/108d (West 1992) (now 35 ILCS 200/12\u201450 (West Supp. 1993)).) There is no statutory provision allowing the Board of Review to revise its \"final [Board of Review] action,\u201d but the County points out that the PTAB\u2019s \"Notes on Appeals\u201d form states \"[w]ill the [Board of Review] stipulate in this appeal?\u201d and \"[i]f yes, state revised opinion of assessed value.\u201d The County did stipulate in this case to a revised opinion of $532,000 (figure C).\nThe rules of the PTAB provide that a petition for appeal shall:\n\"[S]tote the assessed value of the land, and the assessed value of the improvements (structures), and the total assessed value as placed on the property by the local assessor and by the [Board of Review]. The petition must also state the assessed valuation which the contesting party claims to be correct.\u201d (86 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1910.30(g), at 2366 (1991).)\nIf \"a change in assessed valuation of $100,000 or more is sought,\u201d then the Board of Review shall serve a copy of the petition on all interested taxing districts. (35 ILCS 205/111.2 (West 1992) (now 35 ILCS 200/16\u2014180 (West Supp. 1993)).) There is no dispute that the PTAB properly used figures A and B from Tabor\u2019s petition to determine whether a copy of the petition had to be served on all taxing districts.\nIt is logical that any change in the assessed valuation must be measured from the benchmark of the \"final [Board of Review] action.\u201d Section 111.2 of the Act anticipates that the \"change in assessed valuation\u201d will be measured at the time a petition for review is filed with PTAB, in order to determine which parties must be notified of the filing of the petition. (35 ILCS 205/111.2 (West 1992) (now 35 ILCS 200/16\u2014180 (West Supp. 1993)).) The amount of change sought is fixed at the instant a petition is filed with PTAB. Where the same or substantially the same words or phrases appear in different parts of the statute, they should be given a consistent meaning unless a contrary legislative intent is clearly expressed. (Village of Southern View v. County of Sangamon (1992), 228 Ill. App. 3d 468, 472-73, 592 N.E.2d 639, 642.) Thus, the amount of change sought, for purposes of both sections 111.2 (change in assessed valuation of $100,000) and 111.4 (change in assessed valuation of $300,000) of the Act, is determined at the time a petition is filed with PTAB. We hold that \"change in assessed valuation\u201d is the difference between the final decision of the Board of Review (figure A), and the proposed assessment (figure B), both as contained in the petition filed with PTAB. This interpretation is consistent with the past tense language of section 111.4 of the Act: \"valuation of $300,000 or more was sought\u201d (emphasis added) (Pub. Act 87\u20141189, art. 5, \u00a7 2, eff. September 24, 1992 (1992 Ill. Laws 3408, 3432-33), amending 35 ILCS 205/111.4 (West 1992)). Such a rule has the advantage of certainty. Subsequent actions of the parties do not alter the amount of change that was sought.\nApplying this rule to the present case, it is clear that the amount of change sought was greater than $300,000. Accordingly, the County should have sought review of PTAB\u2019s decision in the appellate court. It did not do so. Unfortunately, there is no mechanism for the transfer of an action for administrative review when it is wrongly filed in the circuit court instead of the appellate court. (See Hardee\u2019s Food Systems, Inc. v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 173, 507 N.E.2d 1300.) The circuit court did not err in dismissing the County\u2019s complaint.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Coles County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTEIGMANN and GARMAN, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE COOK"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "C. Stephen Ferguson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Charleston, for appellant.",
      "William J. Warmoth, of Brainard, Bower & Kramer, of Charleston, for appellee Tabor Grain Company.",
      "Jim Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Barbara E. Pitts, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee Property Tax Appeal Board."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE COUNTY OF COLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201494\u20140271\nOpinion filed October 27, 1995.\nC. Stephen Ferguson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Charleston, for appellant.\nWilliam J. Warmoth, of Brainard, Bower & Kramer, of Charleston, for appellee Tabor Grain Company.\nJim Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Barbara E. Pitts, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee Property Tax Appeal Board."
  },
  "file_name": "0945-01",
  "first_page_order": 963,
  "last_page_order": 967
}