{
  "id": 927608,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICIA JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Johnson",
  "decision_date": "1995-11-22",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:06:50.617449+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICIA JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPatricia Johnson (defendant) was found guilty by a jury on three counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1 (West 1992)) and two counts of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2 (West 1992)) and was sentenced to natural life and 30 years, respectively, to be served concurrently. Defendant now appeals.\nOn appeal, defendant raises issues as to whether: (1) a new trial must be granted where she was entitled to, but did not receive, a hearing on her fitness for trial while under medication; (2) the trial court erred in limiting defense counsel\u2019s inquiry into prospective jurors\u2019 possible bias, knowing one of the victims was a 10-month-old child; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to question prospective jurors about the law of accountability. We affirm but remand for a hearing as to the facts surrounding defendant\u2019s use of psychotropic medication.\nOn January 16, 1992, defendant and codefendant Reynaldo Travieso (Travieso) drove to the apartment of Juan and Olga Hernandez to collect money owed Travieso in connection with a drug transaction involving Travieso and Juan Hernandez. Once inside the Hernandez residence, Travieso beat Juan and Olga Hernandez, and the Hernandez\u2019 10-month-old daughter, Evelyn, with a pistol. Travieso then slit the throats of Juan and Olga. All three victims died as a result of Travieso\u2019s brutality.\nDefendant was complicit in Travieso\u2019s actions, having foreknowledge of Travieso\u2019s intent, aiding him logistically in the slayings, and robbing the victims of money and jewelry, later \"pawning\u201d the jewelry and using some of the money to purchase narcotics. After her arrest, defendant confessed to her involvement in the triple homicide.\nDefendant contends that her constitutional right to due process was violated where the trial court failed to sua sponte order a fitness hearing upon receiving a report from the Psychiatric Institute that defendant was \"mentally fit for trial with medication.\u201d Recent precedent of the Illinois Supreme Court has construed section 104\u2014 21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104\u2014 21(a) (West 1992)) as conferring upon defendants, as a matter of entitlement, the right to a mental competency hearing if they are being given psychotropic drugs under medical supervision during the pendency of their prosecution or sentencing. (People v. Gevas (1995), 166 Ill. 2d 461; People v. Brandon (1994), 162 Ill. 2d 450, 643 N.E.2d 712.) Most recently, the supreme court found that where the relationship between a defendant\u2019s use of psychotropic medications and the existence of a bonafide doubt of his fitness is not fully developed in the record, the reviewing court must remand for clarification of the circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s use of psychotropic medications. (People v. Kinkead (1995), 168 Ill. 2d 394.) In the instant appeal, defendant\u2019s psychiatric evaluation indicated only that she was receiving \"medication\u201d administered by \"the jail or Cermak Hospital.\u201d While quite probably medication in this context is of a psychotropic variety, the specific medication or series of medications taken by defendant is unknown. Further unknown is the amount or amounts prescribed, the medical reasons for the prescription, the timing of the medication, and in what way the drug or drugs affected defendant\u2019s trial fitness. Accordingly, we remand for the limited purpose of determining the particulars of defendant\u2019s use of psychotropic medication pursuant to Kinkead\u2019s directive.\nDefendant next argues that she was improperly precluded from asking prospective jurors if they could \"be fair,\u201d considering Evelyn Hernandez\u2019 infancy. The trial court observed that, hopefully, all people would be troubled by the murder of a 10 month old. However, there is a distinction between a person\u2019s visceral reaction to such a crime and his or her ability to sit as a disinterested juror. The responsibility for both initiating and conducting voir dire lies with the trial court, and the manner and scope of that examination rest within the trial court\u2019s discretion. Abuse of that discretion will be found only if, after review of the entire record, it is determined that the conduct of the trial court thwarted the selection of an impartial jury. (People v. Williams (1994), 164 Ill. 2d 1, 645 N.E.2d 844.) Our review of the record does not lend credence to defendant\u2019s claim of a biased jury, and we find no error in this instance.\nDefendant further challenges the voir dire in this matter, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to question the first four venire members on the law of accountability. Although voir dire questions \"shall not directly or indirectly concern matters of law or instructions\u201d (107 Ill. 2d R. 234), it is not error to allow the prosecutor to briefly recite accountability principles and inquire as to whether potential jurors could follow the law as related to those principles. (See People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 1, 447 N.E.2d 353.) Here, as in Davis, the prosecutor\u2019s inquiry did not improperly concern matters of law or instruction, and we reject defendant\u2019s claim of error.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part and cause remanded.\nRIZZI and CERDA, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREIMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Michael J. Pelletier and Jack Hildebrand, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Peter Fischer, and Kim A. Novi, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICIA JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201494\u20140294\nOpinion filed November 22, 1995.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Jack Hildebrand, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Peter Fischer, and Kim A. Novi, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0656-01",
  "first_page_order": 676,
  "last_page_order": 679
}