{ "id": 927702, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO HILL et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hill", "decision_date": "1995-12-06", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201494\u20142929", "first_page": "683", "last_page": "693", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 683" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "272 N.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 2d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2471655 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/133/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 N.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 948", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5246183 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0948-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260348 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228708 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 N.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3608513 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 N.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3539638 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 N.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 Ill. App. 3d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3585087 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" }, { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/170/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 N.E.2d 346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill. App. 3d 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2747319 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/2/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 N.E.2d 130", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5603066 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 N.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365859 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "398 Ill. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2460017 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/398/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 N.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill. App. 3d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2837660 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809127 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 N.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2969592 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 N.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365859 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" }, { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809127 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0198-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 996, "char_count": 23071, "ocr_confidence": 0.718, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2908994258666143e-07, "percentile": 0.6197527346188909 }, "sha256": "62043f692d6b49bade3fec2900925084122dc0d9ae57551b5b379eb5643596b3", "simhash": "1:6a6cf840f67faed6", "word_count": 3755 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:06:50.617449+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO HILL et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe brothers Hill (defendants) were convicted by a jury of the attempted first degree murders of Jose Tanon and Elizabeth Perez, aggravated battery with a firearm, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. Defendants were sentenced to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment for each count of attempted murder, and 12 years for aggravated battery with a firearm, the sentences to run concurrently.\nOn appeal, defendants raise issues as to whether: (1) the evidence was sufficient to establish the element of specific intent to kill Elizabeth Perez required to sustain a conviction for attempted first degree murder; (2) the testimony of witnesses Jose Tanon and Yesenia Chavallo was inconsistent, impeached, and improbable, and thus insufficient to establish defendants\u2019 guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) allegedly erroneous jury instructions on attempted first degree murder require reversal.\nJose Tanon (Jose) testified that on April 15, 1993, at approximately 2 p.m., he observed Lorenzo Hill selling narcotics in front of Jose\u2019s two-flat building located at 1727 Artesian Street in Chicago. Jose, his common-law wife, Elizabeth Perez (Elizabeth), and their three young children occupied the building\u2019s first floor, while Jose\u2019s relatives lived on the second floor. Jose knew defendants Lorenzo, a/k/a \"Sosa,\u201d and Ramon, a/k/a \"Mani,\u201d Hill, both in their mid-twenties, \"from the neighborhood\u201d in which all had resided for 15 years.\nJose approached Lorenzo at the conclusion of a drug transaction and told him \"I don\u2019t want nobody dealing in front of my house.\u201d Lorenzo replied, \"I can deal anywhere I want, and if you (Jose) don\u2019t like it, I\u2019ll f... you and your family up.\u201d Jose and Lorenzo then parted company.\nAt 8 p.m. that evening, Jose was reading on the second floor of his building, which was illuminated, while Elizabeth and the children were on the first floor. Jose heard gunshots fired at his building and, from the second-floor window, observed a late model turquoise Oldsmobile driving away. Jose could not identify the car\u2019s occupants. Jose later observed bullet holes in the front wall of the first-floor bedroom, living room, and windows.\nPolice officer Sebastian responded to Jose\u2019s phone call reporting the incident, spoke briefly with Jose, took note of the bullet holes, and \"canvassed the area\u201d before leaving.\nFifteen minutes later, at approximately 9 p.m., Jose heard a car brake sharply outside his building, followed by rapid-fire gunshots. Jose, seated near the second-story window, observed Ramon Hill firing a handgun from the open passenger-seat window of a red, four-door Oldsmobile, and Lorenzo Hill firing a handgun through the car\u2019s rear window. Jose testified that Ramon, upon observing him looking out of the second-floor window, aimed and fired two shots in his direction. The car then sped off.\nElizabeth testified that when the shots were fired, she grabbed her children and \"threw [her] body on top of them.\u201d Elizabeth then \"felt a sharp pain in [her] left calf.\u201d Elizabeth observed that the children were \"hysterical\u201d and \"vomiting\u201d but otherwise unharmed, and that her calf was red and beginning to swell. Elizabeth screamed, \"I\u2019ve been shot.\u201d\nJose ran downstairs, observed that the front window was shattered and his family was hysterical, and called the police. Officers Flores and Domenech responded and asked Elizabeth if she wanted medical attention for the injury to her left calf. Elizabeth declined, not wishing to leave her children to go to the hospital. The officers observed several bullet holes throughout the first-floor apartment, including three in the front door. Jose identified Ramon and Lorenzo as the shooters and accompanied the officers to the Hill residence, which was, at the time, unoccupied. Jose told the officers that the defendants had threatened him earlier in the day.\nAt approximately 8:50 p.m., Yesenia Chavallo (Yesenia), Jose\u2019s sister, was parking her car in the alley adjacent to the Artesian Street residence, when she observed, from \"about 20 feet\u201d of \"well-lighted\u201d pavement, the red Oldsmobile with the Hill brothers firing from its open windows. Yesenia\u2019s boyfriend was with her and the two retreated down the alley. Yesenia testified that the Hills fired several shots in succession. Yesenia spoke with the officers and independently identified the defendants.\nOfficer Flores, as the State is quick to note, is a \"rookie\u201d with 18 months of experience. He wrote the reports on this incident which contained some inconsistencies, omissions, and inaccuracies. His first report did not list Elizabeth as a victim, and indicated that the defendants threatened Jose two weeks prior to, and not on the day of, the shooting. Flores was asked by his superiors to \"rewrite the report,\u201d which he did, the revised version indicating that Elizabeth was \"struck by a bullet\u201d causing \"minor bruising\u201d to her calf. Flores testified that the mistakes in the initial report were \"oversights.\u201d\nAt trial, each defendant presented an \"alibi\u201d witness. Luz Castro, Lorenzo\u2019s girlfriend and mother of his child, testified that Lorenzo picked her up from work at 5 p.m. on the day of the shooting. Leida Rodriquez, Ramon\u2019s girlfriend, testified that Ramon picked her up from work around 9:15 p.m. on the night of the. shooting.\nRonald Recupido, who lived at 1734 W. Artesian, across the street and a few houses down from Jose\u2019s building, testified that he heard \"shots\u201d around 8:30 or 9 p.m. on the night in question. Ronald saw a car drive past, brake sharply in front of Jose\u2019s house, and two men fire from the car\u2019s open windows. Ronald, however, testified to his \"belief\u201d that the car\u2019s occupants were \"around 150 pounds\u201d and were wearing baseball hats turned backwards. Ronald stated that the defendants, seen in open court, were \"much larger\u201d than the men he saw in the car.\nOver defendants\u2019 objection, the jury was instructed:\n\"To sustain the charge of attempt first degree murder of Jose Tanon, the State must prove the following propositions:\n(1) That defendant performed an act which constituted a substantial step toward the killing of Jose Tanon; and\n(2) That defendant did so with the intent to kill Jose Tanon.\nTo sustain the charge of attempt first degree murder of Elizabeth Perez, the State must prove the following propositions:\n(1) That the defendant performed an act which constituted a substantial step toward the killing of Elizabeth Perez; and\n(2) That defendant did so with the intent to kill Elizabeth or another.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nDuring deliberations, the jury sent out a note asking, \"Does first degree attempted murder define 'intent to kill an individual\u2019 as any person or a particular intended victim?\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Defendants moved for a directed verdict based on improper jury instruction which was denied by the trial court.\nThe jury sent out a second note questioning the instructions as to Elizabeth which stated, \"Jury instruction sheets for attempt first degree murder of Jose Tanon and Elizabeth Perez are different. See second proposition. 'Kill Elizabeth or another.\u2019 On Jose Tanon, it ends, 'to kill Jose Tanon.\u2019 Shouldn\u2019t these be the same? Shouldn\u2019t they both end 'or another\u2019? What\u2019s the difference if another is included or deleted?\u201d\nThe trial court sought to cure the apparent confusion by presenting the jury with a note stating, \"The instruction as to Elizabeth Perez is based upon the argument of transferred intent. The instruction as to Jose Tanon is not. Please follow the instructions.\u201d\nThe jury returned, finding each defendant guilty of attempted first degree murder (two counts), aggravated discharge of a firearm, and aggravated battery with a firearm.\nDefendants first argue that the evidence was insufficient to establish the element of specific intent to kill Elizabeth and thus the conviction for her attempted murder must be reversed.\nDefendants correctly set out the law relating to attempted murder. An individual commits the offense of attempted murder when, with specific intent to kill, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of murder. (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4 (West 1992).) Proof of a specific intent to kill is an indispensable element of attempted first degree murder. (People v. Trinkle (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 730, 353 N.E.2d 18, affd (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 198, 369 N.E.2d 888.) While the question of a defendant\u2019s intent is one for the trier of fact, an attempted murder conviction will be reversed when the requisite intent is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Henry (1971), 3 Ill. App. 3d 235, 278 N.E.2d 547.\nAlthough defendants contend they lacked a specific intent to kill Elizabeth, it is difficult to ignore the notions that (1) defendants threatened both Jose and \"his family,\u201d and (2) spraying a house with gunfire constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of murder. Further, the defendants appear to ignore the theory of transferred intent explicitly applied to the count for Elizabeth.\nThe law is well settled that where a person shoots at one with intent to kill and murder, but kills one whom he did not intend to injure, he is not absolved from answering for the crime of murder. (People v. Marshall (1947), 398 Ill. 256, 75 N.E.2d 310.) Moreover, the doctrine of transferred intent is applicable in attempted murder cases. (See People v. Burrage (1994), 269 Ill. App. 3d 67, 645 N.E.2d 455; People v. Humes (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 255, 397 N.E.2d 130; People v. Swaney (1971), 2 Ill. App. 3d 857, 276 N.E.2d 346.) Accordingly, if the evidence established that defendants had a specific intent to kill Jose, which the jury found, then that intent is transferred to Elizabeth under the doctrine of transferred intent, and defendants\u2019 convictions were proper. Thus, the only way to challenge the sufficiency of their convictions for the attempted murder of Elizabeth is to show that the State did not prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, their specific intent to kill Jose.\nThe necessary specific intent to kill may be shown by surrounding circumstances, including the character of the assault and the use of a deadly weapon. (People v. Migliore (1988), 170 Ill. App. 3d 581, 525 N.E.2d 182.) Such intent may be inferred if one willfully does an act, the direct and natural tendency of which is to destroy another\u2019s life. (Migliore, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 586.) It is the jury\u2019s function to determine the existence of the requisite intent, and that determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that a reasonable doubt exists as to the defendant\u2019s guilt. Migliore, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 586.\nExamination of the circumstances surrounding the \"drive-by\u201d supports the jury\u2019s finding of a specific intent to kill. The jury considered Lorenzo Hill\u2019s threat to Jose and his family on the day of the shooting, and the two separate drive-by shootings. The first from a \"turquoise color Oldsmobile or Chevrolet\u201d at 8:30 p.m., followed a half-hour later by a second drive-by from a red four-door Chevrolet. This indicates that defendants were not content with the results of the first drive-by, which in isolation might have been viewed as a warning or an act of general, unfocused mayhem. The second incident rather clearly demonstrates that merely shooting up Jose\u2019s house was unsatisfactory. The logical inference being that defendants intended actual harm to the building\u2019s occupants, which, when automatic weapons are involved, may reasonably be interpreted as an intent to kill.\nAdditionally, the jury heard Jose\u2019s testimony that Ramon Hill \"looked up at me in the second story window and fired some shots at me.\u201d Investigators found several bullet holes near and above the second-floor window. This case is very different from People v. Trinkle, cited by defendants, where a heavily intoxicated patron fired shots at the exterior of the bar from which he had just been \"cut-off.\u201d There, the appellate court reversed the conviction for attempted murder, finding no specific intent to kill. The court reasoned that the Trinkle defendant had an unfocused aim directed at the building housing the bar rather than a specific individual within the bar. (Trinkle, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 734.) In the instant appeal, defendants threatened Jose and his family, not their property, and the second drive-by suggests that property damage alone was not the desired result. Intent can be inferred when it has been shown that the defendant voluntarily and willingly committed an act, the natural tendency of which is to destroy another\u2019s life. (People v. Winters (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 402, 502 N.E.2d 841.) There was ample evidence to justify the jury\u2019s concluding that defendants had a specific intent to murder Jose.\nBecause the jury properly found that defendants had the requisite intent as to Jose, and this intent is transferred to Elizabeth, defendants\u2019 challenge to their convictions for the attempted first degree murder of Elizabeth is rejected.\nIn fact, argument can be made that defendants were chargeable with the attempted murders of the children as well. Defendant Lorenzo threatened Jose\u2019s family. Certainly Jose\u2019s three children are encompassed by this threat, and their presence amidst the defendants\u2019 indiscriminate gunfire, shielded by Elizabeth\u2019s body, suggests that defendants made a substantial step toward their murder. At oral argument, counsel for defendants argued, in support of his position that there was no specific intent to kill Elizabeth, that extension of defendants\u2019 murderous intent to the children highlighted the defects in the reasoning and application of the doctrine of transferred intent. In response, we note that extension of the specific intent to kill Jose to the children proceeds quite logically. They were no less the object of defendants\u2019 intent than Elizabeth, and we see no distinction in the fact Elizabeth was struck by a bullet. It is not the function of this court to retry defendants on charges not brought by the State. We note, however, that had defendants been charged with three additional counts of attempted murder, one for each child present, we would not have hesitated to affirm those convictions given the facts of this case.\nDefendants next challenge the reliability of the testimony of Jose and his sister Yesenia. Defendants argue that their testimony was \"inconsistent, impeached, and improbable, and thus insufficient to establish defendants\u2019 guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d\nA conviction for attempted murder will be reversed where the evidence presented is so unsatisfactory or improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. (People v. Helton (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 726, 506 N.E.2d 307.) The critical inquiry when reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, construing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267.\nThe complained-of inconsistencies include the fact (1) Lorenzo may have threatened Jose two weeks prior to, and not on the day of, the shooting; (2) Elizabeth was not listed as a victim in the initial police report; and (3) Yesenia made a pretrial statement that she did not \"see anything\u201d at 8:30 on the night of the shootings.\nIt is the jury\u2019s function to assess the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. (People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 51, 538 N.E.2d 453.) It is not the function of the reviewing court to retry the defendant or to substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for that of the trier of fact. People v. Eyler (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 173, 549 N.E.2d 268.\nThe inconsistencies raised by defendants came out of Officer Flores\u2019 initial incident report. Although the State is unconvincing, and perhaps disingenuous, in its attempt to \"pin\u201d the errors entirely on Flores, nothing raised by defendants affects the validity of the jury\u2019s verdicts. Moreover, there is no question as to the admissibility of the evidence considered by the jury. They heard the arguments raised here on appeal and rejected them in the course of rendering guilty verdicts. We will not disturb those verdicts on the grounds argued by defendants.\nDefendants next assert error in the jury instructions on attempted first degree murder. Defendants argue that the State was \"wrongly permitted, over objection, to urge guilt to attempt first degree murder of Elizabeth based on the legally irrelevant theory of transferred intent.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Further, defendants claim the trial court\u2019s instructing the jury on transferred intent is reversible error. This argument essentially revisits the one made earlier contending defendants lacked a specific intent to kill Elizabeth. Contrary to defendants\u2019 characterization of the \"legal irrelevancy\u201d of the transferred intent doctrine, this doctrine remains alive and well and was applied correctly by the State, trial court, and jury. See People v. Burrage (1994), 269 Ill. App. 3d 67.\nThis case presents a routine example of the doctrine\u2019s application, and one which speaks favorably to the policy considerations behind the doctrine. The jury found that defendants had a specific intent to kill Jose, and spraying his home with bullets was a substantial step in pursuit of this intent, which was transferred to Elizabeth. The alleged \"confusion\u201d on the part of the jury, as seen in their correspondence with the trial court, was remedied by the trial court\u2019s explanation of the differences in the language \"or another\u201d included in the instruction relating to Elizabeth. See People v. Franklin (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 948, 588 N.E.2d 398 (trial court properly gave attempted murder jury instructions including term \"or another\u201d).\nDefendants argue relatedly that the State\u2019s failure to allege transferred intent in the charging instrument \"effectively allowed the State to amend the charge and to prosecute defendants omitting an essential element of its own indictment or information.\u201d Contrary to defendants\u2019 assertions, a person may be properly convicted under the theory of transferred intent even if the State does not specifically allege that theory in the charging instrument. People v. Franklin, 225 Ill. App. 3d 948; People v. Forrest (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 70, 272 N.E.2d 813.\nFor the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment and sentence on the jury\u2019s verdicts.\nAffirmed.\nTULLY, J., concurs.\nApparently the Hill brothers, each over 6 feet and 300 pounds, are readily identifiable.\nLeida Rodriquez, Ramon\u2019s girlfriend, owned a \"metallic blue\u201d Chevy Cierra which Ramon was driving on the day of the shooting.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREIMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE CERDA,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent. I do not believe that it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants had the specific intent to kill Elizabeth Perez in order to be guilty of attempted murder. The evidence in this case was that shots were fired at the house at 1727 North Artesian in Chicago. Jose Tanon, the husband of Elizabeth Perez, told Officer Flores that at 8:30 p.m. on April 15, 1993, he heard shots while he was upstairs with the lights on reading a book. He later saw bullet holes in the first-floor apartment. After the police had come and then left, Tanon was again on the second floor when he heard shots and actually saw Ramon Hill and Lorenzo Hill shooting into the downstairs apartment. Then Tanon testified that Ramon Hill saw him upstairs by the window and then pointed his gun up towards him and shot twice. Elizabeth had been shot when the defendants fired shots into the downstairs apartment. At the time defendants fired shots into the first-floor apartment, there was no evidence that the lights were on in any part of the apartment or whether Elizabeth Perez and the defendants could see each other or whether the defendants saw any person on the first floor or whether they shot in any person\u2019s direction on the first floor. There simply was no evidence of this.\nIn the case of People v. Burrage (1994), 269 Ill. App. 3d 67, 645 N.E.2d 455, the court stated regarding defendant Redmond that \"the evidence did establish that during this ongoing offense he drove onto the scene within seconds after Burrage fired shots toward the building, he fired three shots in the same direction, they both aimed at Andre and that, after the shooting, Burrage got into the automobile driven by Redmond and the two of them fled the scene together.\u201d (Burrage, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 74.) The court further stated: \"The evidence establishes that Burrage had the intent to kill Andre. However, three-year-old Donte Hinton was shot instead. Burrage\u2019s intent to kill Andre is transferred to Donte under the doctrine of transferred intent. Illinois law has held that this doctrine is applicable in attempted murder cases.\u201d Burrage, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 76.\nIn our case, the evidence was that shots were first fired at the first-floor apartment. There was no evidence that any occupant of the first floor was seen by defendants or anyone else. Defendants did not shoot at any person on the first floor when the victim was hit by a random discharge of one of the defendant\u2019s weapons. One cannot be guilty of attempted murder for firing at random at a building.\nIn the case of People v. Trinkle (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 198, 369 N.E.2d 888, a bartender, believing defendant to be intoxicated, refused him further service. Defendant purchased a handgun and returned to the area of the tavern, fired a shot at the building and wounded a patron within. He was convicted of attempted murder. The supreme court stated: \"It is not sufficient that the defendant shot a gun \u2019knowing such act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Gayle Lane or another.\u2019 If this were the test, then a defendant who committed a battery with knowledge that such conduct could cause great bodily harm would be guilty of attempted murder.\u201d (People v. Trinkle, 68 Ill. 2d at 201.) The court noted that there was no evidence the defendant knew someone was standing behind the door to the bar. (Trinkle, 68 Ill. 2d 198.) The appellate court decision that the indictment was fatally erroneous was affirmed.\nThe evidence in this case only proved defendants had the specific intent to kill Tanon on the second floor.\nOn the basis that there was no evidence to prove defendants had the specific intent to kill Elizabeth Perez, I would reverse and vacate their convictions for attempted first degree murder.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE CERDA," } ], "attorneys": [ "David S. Mejia, of Chicago, for appellants.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Latisha Foster, and Carol L. Gaines, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO HILL et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201494\u20142929\nOpinion filed December 6, 1995.\nCERDA, J., dissenting.\nDavid S. Mejia, of Chicago, for appellants.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Latisha Foster, and Carol L. Gaines, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0683-01", "first_page_order": 703, "last_page_order": 713 }