{ "id": 1172399, "name": "In re BETTIE JO R., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee; Irene R. et al., Respondents-Appellees)", "name_abbreviation": "In re Bettie Jo R.", "decision_date": "1995-12-19", "docket_number": "No. 1-94-2548", "first_page": "401", "last_page": "406", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 401" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "578 N.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. App. 3d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498771 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/218/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "618 N.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2945747 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 N.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 1059", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5293563 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1062" }, { "page": "1062" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/1059-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 556, "char_count": 11658, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0052889892850951e-07, "percentile": 0.5399569627418432 }, "sha256": "813b93b858f259a7fb921f74c298ddc9fdb548881a0321ee1af0b696976d28ea", "simhash": "1:cbdba4b6dfdeaf92", "word_count": 1887 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:03:41.906832+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re BETTIE JO R., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee; Irene R. et al., Respondents-Appellees)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent Bettie Jo R. appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County closing her case and terminating her wardship. On appeal, respondent contends that the circuit court: (1) improperly applied section 2 \u2014 31, as amended, of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 31(1) (now 705 ILCS 405/ 2 \u2014 31(1) (West 1992))), rather than the preamendment section; and (2) erred in determining that respondent\u2019s best interests no longer necessitated that her wardship continue.\nOn August 1, 1979, a petition for adjudication of wardship was filed in behalf of respondent when she was four years old. The trial court, upon finding probable cause to believe that respondent was neglected, appointed the Guardianship Administrator of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), as temporary guardian. On July 25, 1980, the trial court ordered that DCFS retain custody and guardianship of respondent.\nOn June 3, 1982, respondent\u2019s aunt filed a supplemental petition requesting that the trial court vacate its July 25, 1980, order of guardianship and appoint her as respondent\u2019s guardian. The court granted the petition on August 6, 1982. On November 17, 1988, respondent\u2019s aunt filed a second supplemental petition requesting that the trial court vacate her guardianship and reappoint DCFS as respondent\u2019s guardian because respondent was \"out of her control.\u201d The trial court granted this petition on January 27, 1989. On June 19, 1992, DCFS filed a supplemental petition seeking a continuation of custody and guardianship of respondent if the court determined, after a review of respondent\u2019s present and future status, that it would be in her best interest. The record does not contain an order as to this petition; however, in August 1992, respondent was placed in the custody and guardianship of Hazel Tanner, a nonrelative.\nAt a permanency planning hearing regarding respondent\u2019s case on June 9, 1994, the State\u2019s Attorney, in respondent\u2019s absence, requested that the trial court close respondent\u2019s case. DCFS caseworker Edweena Hamilton, who had been assigned to respondent\u2019s case in October 1993, presented a \"Uniform Progress Report\u201d (report) detailing respondent\u2019s progress from December 1993 to June 1, 1994. In the report, Hamilton stated the following: respondent\u2019s goal was \"independence\u201d; respondent had made \"good progress\u201d toward this goal and had adjusted well to her placement with Tanner; the whereabouts of respondent\u2019s father remained unknown and respondent\u2019s mother had not made herself available to DCFS; respondent was attending the Academy of Scholastic Achievement (ASA), working toward a high school diploma; respondent\u2019s grades from ASA were not available at the time the report was completed; respondent had a one-year-old daughter who attended day care at ASA while respondent was in class; and DCFS provided respondent\u2019s tuition for the spring/summer program at ASA. Hamilton concluded her report by recommending that \"[respondent\u2019s] case be continued for further progress reporting.\u201d\nHamilton also testified that respondent was 19 years old and currently in school, she was doing well in her placement with Tanner and she was doing well in school. While Hamilton had initially written in the report that respondent\u2019s case should be continued, Hamilton now felt that if respondent\u2019s case were closed, respondent would be able to maintain her goal of independence. When Hamilton was asked whether she believed it would be in respondent\u2019s best interest to close her case, Hamilton replied, \"Yes.\u201d On cross-examination, Hamilton stated that DCFS paid for respondent\u2019s tuition at ASA and that respondent\u2019s child received on-site day care at ASA while respondent was in class. With respect to respondent\u2019s financial resources should her case be closed, the following colloquy occurred:\n\"Q. [assistant Public Guardian, respondent\u2019s counsel:] Do you know how Bettie Jo would pay for school if she wasn\u2019t receiving money from DCFS and the case was closed?\nA. [Hamilton:] There are programs available to her out there that she could apply for that. I could direct her to [them] if the case was closed.\nQ. Would she be accepted to those programs? Do you know? Are you speculating that she can get money?\nA. I\u2019m speculating that she probably would be accepted.\u201d\nAfter hearing this evidence, the trial court, relying on subsection (1) of section 2 \u2014 31 of the Act, as amended, effective July 24, 1991 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 31(1) (now 705 ILCS 405/2\u2014 31(1) (West 1992))), stated that \"[p]ursuant to statute these cases are to be automatically closed at age 19 unless the Court finds good cause why they should remain open. There has been no evidence offered to suggest a reason to keep this case open.\u201d Respondent\u2019s counsel then voiced an objection to the court\u2019s application of the amended statute, arguing that preamendment section 2 \u2014 31, providing for the automatic termination of the wardship of a minor at age 21, should be applied instead. In reply to this objection, the trial court stated that \"[t]he statute also says that any party can petition the Court for closure after age 18 and that\u2019s what\u2019s taking place today.\u201d The trial court then ordered respondent\u2019s case closed and terminated her wardship.\nOn June 24, 1994, the Cook County public guardian, in behalf of respondent, filed a motion to reconsider the trial court\u2019s decision to close respondent\u2019s case. At the hearing on the motion on June 27, respondent was called as a witness. She testified that she needed DCFS\u2019 assistance to complete her education, locate an apartment and find a job. She further stated that she had asked her caseworker how to obtain money for school and day care for her daughter and that her caseworker, in response, suggested that she apply for public assistance. The trial court subsequently denied respondent\u2019s motion to reconsider.\nOn appeal, respondent first contends that the trial court, in terminating her wardship, incorrectly applied subsection (1) of amended section 2 \u2014 31 of the Act, providing for automatic termination of a wardship at age 19, rather than the preamendment section, providing for automatic termination at age 21. Respondent argues that the preamendment section was applicable because the original petition to adjudicate her a ward of the court was filed in 1979 pursuant to the preamendment section. Respondent further argues that subsection (1) of amended section 2 \u2014 31 was not applicable because that section only applies to those cases in which \"a petition was filed after *** [July 24, 1991].\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 31(3) (now 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 31(3) (West 1992)).\nThe State argues that the trial court correctly applied amended section 2 \u2014 31 because DCFS\u2019 supplemental petition for the court\u2019s review of the custody and guardianship of respondent was filed on June 19, 1992, after the Act was amended.\nThe trial court\u2019s pronouncement that section 2 \u2014 31 \"also says that any party can petition the Court for closure after age 18 and that\u2019s what\u2019s taking place today\u201d indicates that the trial court based its decision to terminate respondent\u2019s wardship on subsection (2) of section 2 \u2014 31. Given that subsection (2) is identical in both preamendment section 2 \u2014 31 and amended section 2 \u2014 31, it is unnecessary for us to address the applicability or inapplicability of subsection (1) of amended section 2 \u2014 31, providing for automatic termination of a minor\u2019s wardship at age 19.\nSubsection (2) of section 2 \u2014 31, provides:\n\"(2) Whenever the court finds that the best interests of the minor and the public no longer require the wardship of the court, the court shall order the wardship terminated and all proceedings under this Act respecting that minor finally closed and discharged. The court may at the same time continue or terminate any custodianship or guardianship theretofore ordered but the termination must be made in compliance with Section 2 \u2014 28.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 31(2) (now 705 ILCS 405/2\u2014 31(2) (West 1992)).\nA trial court\u2019s decision to terminate a respondent\u2019s wardship under this section will be reversed on review \"only if the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order.\u201d (In re T.B. (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062, 574 N.E.2d 893, 896.) \"A finding of the trial court is against the manifest weight of the evidence if a review of the record clearly demonstrates that the result opposite to the one reached by the trial court was the proper result.\u201d T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d at 1062.\nIt is well settled that the purpose of the Act is to serve the best interest of the minor. (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 2 (West 1992); In re B.M. (1993), 248 Ill. App. 3d 76, 79, 618 N.E.2d 374 (holding \"the best interest and welfare of the child is the standard applicable to proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act\u201d (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1992))).) In In re Shawn B. (1991), 218 Ill. App. 3d 374, 578 N.E.2d 269, the trial court, acting pursuant to preamendment section 2 \u2014 31, terminated Shawn\u2019s wardship at age 18. On appeal, this court reversed, holding that terminating wardships at age 18 \"without ensuring that [the minors] are prepared to become useful and independent members of society *** fails to satisfy the court\u2019s statutory obligation to act in the best interests of the child.\u201d (Shawn, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 381-82.) In evaluating whether or not Shawn was a useful and independent member of society, this court recognized that Shawn had been unable to secure a permanent residence or legitimate, steady employment. The record reflected that Shawn\u2019s placement in several group homes, shelters and schools was unsuccessful in that Shawn had run away on numerous occasions.\nIn the case at bar, respondent did not exhibit an inability to be a useful and independent member of society as did the minor in Shawn. Here, caseworker Hamilton testified that respondent was doing well and that, in her opinion, respondent would be able to achieve her goal of independence even if her case was closed. Respondent has resided with Hazel Tanner since 1992, thereby demonstrating her ability to maintain a permanent residence. While respondent testified that she needed assistance in paying tuition for her education and that she prefers to remain at the Academy of Scholastic Achievement because of the day care facilities, no evidence was presented to show that respondent would be unable to receive other financial assistance for this program.\nWe find that the trial court properly applied subsection (2) of section 2 \u2014 31 of the Act and that its determination that respondent\u2019s best interest no longer required her wardship was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the circuit court\u2019s order, closing respondent\u2019s case and terminating her wardship, is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSCARIANO, P.J., and DiVITO, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Patrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Lee Ann Lowder, Anne Scheitlin Johnson, and Susan S. Wigoda, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Gunta Zenta Hadac, and Ronald DeWald, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re BETTIE JO R., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee; Irene R. et al., Respondents-Appellees).\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201494\u20142548\nOpinion filed December 19, 1995.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied March 27, 1996.\nPatrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Lee Ann Lowder, Anne Scheitlin Johnson, and Susan S. Wigoda, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Gunta Zenta Hadac, and Ronald DeWald, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0401-01", "first_page_order": 419, "last_page_order": 424 }