{ "id": 1172400, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM MOTON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Moton", "decision_date": "1996-02-16", "docket_number": "No. 3-94-0202", "first_page": "1010", "last_page": "1013", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 1010" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333142 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176664 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/437/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 N.E.2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477048 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 1020", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 1123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5555967 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/1123-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2614740 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 N.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5272319 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/48/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 N.E.2d 1275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5147657 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/239/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5221248 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/228/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "593 N.E.2d 533", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3283080 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111039 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 N.E.2d 1115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 Ill. App. 3d 901", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 680675 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/264/0901-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 454, "char_count": 7569, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.599039884842792e-08, "percentile": 0.4899333899389501 }, "sha256": "5a18b796bba4bc551d4cd1ea9a31521fa3f44aa7ee1d821dab1f08b2aa7c0c94", "simhash": "1:3a6e5009b6d7be45", "word_count": 1242 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:03:41.906832+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM MOTON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SLATER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a stipulated bench trial, defendant William Moton was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24\u2014 1.1(a) (West 1992)). He was sentenced to serve five years in the Department of Corrections. In this appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the court improperly denied his motion to suppress statements; and (3) the court failed to obtain a written jury waiver. We find that the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient. Therefore, we reverse defendant\u2019s conviction without addressing issues (2) and (3).\nThe record establishes that defendant was initially charged by indictment on March 10, 1993, as \"William Moton.\u201d On September 15, 1993, a new indictment was returned against \"William Moton a/k/a William B. Morton a/k/a William Morten.\u201d Both instruments charged that on February 26, 1993, defendant possessed a .357 magnum handgun and that he had been previously convicted of selling cocaine, a felony, in Shelby County, Tennessee.\nOn November 4, 1993, the court heard and denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress statements. Immediately afterward, defense counsel announced that defendant wanted a bench trial. The parties stipulated that the testimony and physical evidence at trial would be the same as that adduced at the suppression hearing. The only additional evidence introduced by the State at trial was a certified copy of a felony conviction entered in Shelby County, Tennessee, against \"William B. Morton.\u201d The document was certified by the clerk of the Tennessee court on April 28, 1993.\nIn closing argument, defense counsel argued that the State had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had a prior felony conviction. The prosecutor responded that a presumption of identity of persons applied because the bill of indictment included the alias \"William B. Morton,\u201d and that defendant had made no objection to the aliases. In the alternative, the prosecutor requested an opportunity to reopen proofs and asked the court to take judicial notice that defendant\u2019s date of birth as shown on the bail bond form matched the date of birth on the Tennessee judgment of conviction. Without ruling on the prosecutor\u2019s request to reopen, the court determined that the State\u2019s evidence was sufficient and found defendant guilty as charged.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that it was never established that he used the name \"William B. Morton\u201d; therefore, it could not be presumed that the Tennessee conviction was his, and his conviction should be reversed. The State responds that the presumption of identity applies because the indictment contained the alias, \"William B. Morton,\u201d or, in the alternative, the cause should be remanded to determine whether the State should be permitted to reopen proofs.\nA conviction of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon cannot be sustained without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s prior felony conviction. (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.1 (West 1992); People v. Moore (1994), 264 Ill. App. 3d 901, 637 N.E.2d 1115.) A certified copy of the defendant\u2019s conviction may be offered as proof of an underlying conviction, and if the name on the certified record is the same as the name of the defendant on trial, a rebuttable presumption of identity arises. (People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 1, 447 N.E.2d 353; People v. Smith (1992), 148 Ill. 2d 454, 593 N.E.2d 533.) Where the presumption is not rebutted, a defendant is not prejudiced by finding that a certified copy of his prior felony conviction, without more, meets the State\u2019s burden of proving this element beyond a reasonable doubt. (Smith, 148 Ill. 2d 454, 593 N.E.2d 533; People v. Walker (1992), 228 Ill. App. 3d 76, 592 N.E.2d 1.) If the presumption does not apply or is rebutted, other evidence must be adduced to substantiate that the defendant is the person named in the record of conviction. See Walker, 228 Ill. App. 3d 76, 592 N.E.2d 1; People v. Nivens (1992), 239 Ill. App. 3d 1, 603 N.E.2d 1275.\nNeither party has provided this court with any authority, and our independent research has revealed none, for applying the presumption to a case where the State\u2019s charging instrument includes aliases. In a proper case, it is not error for the State to charge a defendant in his proper name and under an alias. (People v. Behymer (1964), 48 Ill. App. 2d 218, 198 N.E.2d 729; People v. Thomas (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 306, 309 N.E.2d 744.) However, charging a defendant under an alias raises a question of identity on the face of the charging instrument, which, if material, must be resolved by the evidence. Cf. Behymer, 48 Ill. App. 2d 218, 198 N.E.2d 729.\nIn this case, there was no identity of names giving rise to a presumption. \"Moton\u201d is the surname defendant has used throughout these proceedings. That name appears nowhere on the certified record of conviction admitted at trial. Apparently, the State did not obtain the record from Tennessee until after defendant was first indicted as \"Moton.\u201d When the document was received bearing a different name, the State simply reindicted defendant using aliases. However, at trial the prosecutor offered no evidence that defendant ever used an alias.\nThe indictment itself can no more substitute for evidence of defendant\u2019s use of aliases than it can be used to prove defendant\u2019s commission of the crime it charges. Moreover, the prosecutor\u2019s suggestion during closing argument that the court could take judicial notice of birth dates appearing on certain documents came too late. Both parties had rested, and proofs were closed. In any event, the match of birth dates appearing on documents bearing both names would give rise only to an inference of identity of persons. It would not satisfy the State\u2019s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Harris (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 1123, 404 N.E.2d 1020.\nFurther, defendant\u2019s failure to object to the aliases on the indictment or to admission of the Tennessee conviction documents did not absolve the State of its duty to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Obviously, it is not a defendant\u2019s responsibility to assist the prosecution by signalling gaps in the State\u2019s evidence.\nWithout the benefit of a presumption of identity, and lacking any evidence that defendant was the person referred to in the Tennessee conviction of \"William B. Morton,\u201d the underlying felony was not proved. Having failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, the State is not now entitled to a remand for a ruling on its request to reopen proofs. The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy forbids granting the State another opportunity to produce evidence it failed to muster in the first trial. (People v. Olivera (1995), 164 Ill. 2d 382, 393, 647 N.E.2d 926, citing Burks v. United States (1978), 437 U.S. 1, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141.) Accordingly, the defendant\u2019s conviction must be reversed outright. People v. Feld (1994), 267 Ill. App. 3d 56, 641 N.E.2d 924.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed.\nReversed.\nLYTTON and McCUSKEY, JJ\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SLATER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ronald Packowitz, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "James Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM MOTON, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201494\u20140202\nOpinion filed February 16, 1996.\nRonald Packowitz, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJames Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1010-01", "first_page_order": 1028, "last_page_order": 1031 }