{ "id": 1156773, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT A. CARROLL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Carroll", "decision_date": "1996-03-22", "docket_number": "No. 4 \u2014 94 \u2014 0307", "first_page": "464", "last_page": "468", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 464" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3565049 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567019 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489221 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1177" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738482 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 N.E.2d 904", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "909", "parenthetical": "mild impropriety" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. App. 3d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2467291 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339", "parenthetical": "mild impropriety" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/199/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 F.2d 789", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1870423 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794-95" }, { "page": "794-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/711/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 1342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1343" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 968", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249368 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "970" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0968-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 N.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2854078 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" }, { "page": "740-41", "parenthetical": "\" 'any doubt which you have which would defeat the State's theory I submit must be reasonable. It's got to fit together, it's got to make sense in light of all the other evidence in the case' \"; remarks at least bordered on impropriety" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2510654 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" }, { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/0187-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 621, "char_count": 10182, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.731176013418267e-08, "percentile": 0.5305496575282961 }, "sha256": "5453ba12b0816a9a22bd1f76752fbe09922c7bd5a8b80dd9aa7e2003e2b81854", "simhash": "1:125e16409fe21e51", "word_count": 1682 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:33:42.611238+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT A. CARROLL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Scott A. Carroll was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(2), (a)(3) (West 1992)) and sentenced to 60 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant appeals, contending he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor improperly defined reasonable doubt during closing argument. We affirm.\nAt trial, Keith Wilson testified that around 8:45 p.m. on August 28, 1993, he walked with defendant and Gary Dean Thomas to William Doug Scoggins\u2019 Jacksonville home. There, the group smoked some marijuana. Approximately 30 minutes after Scoggins invited them inside, defendant pulled out a .22-caliber H&R nine-shot revolver and fired two shots into Scoggins\u2019 head. Scoggins had his back to defendant and was bent over to place his pet snake into its cage. Wilson witnessed Scoggins fall to the floor. Wilson ran into the kitchen. He heard additional shots fired, but he did not see who fired them. Defendant and Thomas joined Wilson in the kitchen and the three of them left Scoggins\u2019 home through the back door at approximately 9 p.m.\nAlbert Lynn Charlesworth testified that he and Wilson attended a barbecue at defendant\u2019s trailer home on Sunday afternoon, August 29, 1993. After they finished eating, defendant told Charlesworth that he had shot and killed Scoggins. Defendant stated that he, Thomas, and Wilson went to Scoggins\u2019 home and when Scoggins turned his back, he shot Scoggins twice in the back of the head with his .22-caliber nine-shot revolver. Thomas then took the gun and shot Scoggins once in the forehead. Defendant retrieved the gun and shot out Scoggins\u2019 eyes. Defendant and Thomas searched the house for valuables, then left with Wilson through the back door.\nCharlesworth testified that the police contacted him after he had told his family that defendant had admitted shooting Scoggins. Charlesworth agreed to be fitted with an eavesdropping device, and on September 7, 1993, Charlesworth arranged to visit defendant at his home. The taped conversation of Charlesworth and defendant was entered into evidence. Defendant told Charlesworth that he had not seen Wilson since the police had taken him in for questioning and that he needed to talk to him. Defendant stated that Thomas could not say anything to the police because Thomas had shot Scoggins once in the forehead after defendant shot Scoggins twice \"back here.\u201d Scoggins was still breathing after Thomas fired, so defendant \"shot his eyeballs out.\u201d Defendant stated he tried to dispose of the gun in Alton but he could not get rid of it. Defendant admonished Charles-worth not to say anything about what he had heard because \"nobody\u2019s going to jail [and] it\u2019s just going to be case closed.\u201d\nDefendant was taken into custody shortly after the taped conversation. Defendant\u2019s cellmate, Jeff Sprague, testified that defendant told him an essentially identical account of the murder. However, defendant told Sprague that Jon Surratt drove Wilson, Thomas, and him to Scoggins\u2019 house. Surratt waited in the car while defendant, Wilson, and Thomas went inside to buy marijuana. When Scoggins produced a bag of marijuana, defendant and Thomas shot him in the manner previously described. After Sprague told the police about defendant\u2019s confession, Sprague\u2019s residential burglary charge was reduced to burglary. Sprague stated he was not offered the reduction in exchange for his testimony.\nThe physical evidence was consistent with Wilson\u2019s eyewitness accpunt. Scoggins was found lying on his back next to his partially open snake cage. He had been shot five times with a .22-caliber weapon. There were two gunshot wounds to the back of Scoggins\u2019 head, one to the right side of his nose, one wound to his left lower eyelid, and one wound that actually pierced his right eyeball. The police did not release this information to the public. The police discovered a .22-caliber nine-shot H&R revolver hidden in a baby crib in defendant\u2019s trailer home. Grooves on the bullet fragments taken from Scoggins\u2019 skull were consistent with the rifling characteristics of this gun. Because of the mutilated condition of the bullet fragments, however, the gun could not be positively identified or eliminated as the weapon that fired the bullets into Scoggins\u2019 skull.\nDefendant testified that he was only boasting when he claimed to have shot Scoggins. Defendant testified that on the night of the murder, he was with his girlfriend, Karrie Wilson, at Charlotte Wilson\u2019s Jacksonville house until 8 or 8:30 p.m. Around 8:30 p.m., Cathy Powell drove Karrie and defendant to defendant\u2019s home. Defendant\u2019s mother picked him up around 9:15 p.m. to take him to his brother\u2019s birthday party. Karrie\u2019s testimony agreed with defendant\u2019s account of the evening, and several witnesses testified they saw defendant arrive at the birthday party around 9:30 p.m. Cathy Powell, however, told the police that she did not drive defendant and Karrie home from Wilson\u2019s house until 9:30 or 10:30 p.m. She told police that Keith Wilson, Gary Dean Thomas, and defendant left Charlotte Wilson\u2019s home around 7:30 or 8 p.m.\nIn closing argument, the prosecutor stated:\n\"Now, we need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this Defendant committed the offenses of first degree murder. It\u2019s not beyond all doubt or any doubt, but beyond a reasonable doubt, a doubt that has reason behind it. That\u2019s not some mythical, unattainable standard that can\u2019t be met. That standard is met every day in courtrooms ***.\u201d\nAfter deliberating 21h hours, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks during closing argument improperly deemphasized the State\u2019s burden of proof. Defendant did not object during closing argument, and the State urges us to find the issue waived. However, this court has reviewed similar remarks under the plain error exception to the waiver doctrine because of their potential for undermining such fundamental concepts of justice as the defendant\u2019s presumption of innocence and the prosecution\u2019s burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the charged offense. See People v. Thomas, 191 Ill. App. 3d 187, 197, 547 N.E.2d 735, 741 (1989).\nThe concept of reasonable doubt needs no definition, and it is prejudicial error for the court to give an involved instruction on that concept. People v. Cagle, 41 Ill. 2d 528, 536, 244 N.E.2d 200, 204 (1969); People v. Failor, 271 Ill. App. 3d 968, 970, 649 N.E.2d 1342, 1343 (1995). As with any instruction, it is for the court, not counsel, to explain the law to the jury. It is therefore improper for counsel to give an \"instruction\u201d on reasonable doubt during closing argument. United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 794-95 (7th Cir. 1983). Nevertheless, counsel are entitled to discuss reasonable doubt during closing argument. The prosecutor is entitled to present his or her view of the evidence and to suggest that the evidence does not support any reasonable doubt; defense counsel is entitled to do the same and suggest there is a reasonable doubt. Kramer, 711 F.2d at 794-95; see also 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial \u00a7 645 (1991).\nA prosecutor may argue that the State does not have the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond any doubt, that the doubt must be a reasonable one. Such an argument does no more than discuss the grammatical fact that the word \"reasonable\u201d modifies the word \"doubt.\u201d Cf. People v. Evans, 199 Ill. App. 3d 330, 339, 556 N.E.2d 904, 909 (1990) (mild impropriety). It is improper, however, to suggest to the jury that the State had no burden of proof or to attempt to shift the burden to the defendant, or to reduce the State\u2019s burden to a pro forma or minor detail. People v. Speight, 153 Ill. 2d 365, 374, 606 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (1992). It is improper for the prosecution to imply that the State\u2019s evidence enjoys a presumption of veracity which defendant must defeat or negate if he is to be acquitted. Thomas, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 196, 547 N.E.2d at 740-41 (\" 'any doubt which you have which would defeat the State\u2019s theory I submit must be reasonable. It\u2019s got to fit together, it\u2019s got to make sense in light of all the other evidence in the case\u2019 \u201d; remarks at least bordered on impropriety). It is improper for the prosecution to argue that the presumption of innocence does not remain with defendant throughout every stage of the trial and during the jury\u2019s deliberations on the verdict. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 2.03 (3d ed. 1992); cf. People v. Eddington, 129 Ill. App. 3d 745, 780, 473 N.E.2d 103, 127 (1984).\nIt is not improper for a prosecutor to argue:\n\" 'That is the same burden of proof in every case that is tried in this courtroom, every case that is tried in this county, and every case that is tried in this country. It is beyond a reasonable doubt. The penitentiary is full of people like Collins and Bracey who have been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 \u201d People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 277, 478 N.E.2d 267, 284-85 (1985).\nSee,also People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 161, 544 N.E.2d 357, 373 (1989). Nor is it error for a prosecutor to state that the standard is not \" 'an insurmountable burden, some mystical thing.\u2019 \u201d People v. Trass, 136 Ill. App. 3d 455, 467, 483 N.E.2d 567, 576-77 (1985).\nThe prosecutor\u2019s remarks in this case were not improper, and it would not have been error for the court to have overruled an objection to them if an objection had been made.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Morgan County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCARMAN and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Janieen R. Tarrance, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Charles Colburn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Jacksonville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT A. CARROLL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 94 \u2014 0307\nOpinion filed March 22, 1996.\nRehearing denied April 22, 1996.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Janieen R. Tarrance, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nCharles Colburn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Jacksonville (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0464-01", "first_page_order": 482, "last_page_order": 486 }