{ "id": 1156753, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREDDIE HILL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hill", "decision_date": "1996-04-01", "docket_number": "No. 5 \u2014 94 \u2014 0312", "first_page": "871", "last_page": "876", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 871" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "183 N.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5351970 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/25/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 N.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "542 N.E.2d 930", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2653715 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 N.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 Ill. App. 3d 740", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 680617 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/264/0740-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2788568 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 N.E.2d 969", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "975" }, { "page": "975-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 833", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5372842 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" }, { "page": "841-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0833-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 735, "char_count": 13207, "ocr_confidence": 0.715, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.001843850830546e-08, "percentile": 0.31577535987619354 }, "sha256": "f42d8aa26e87c3e45ac5700380ac9f9b8cc8052c01eda2a2219a59d283c6d5a2", "simhash": "1:8f5475b4136b9e8a", "word_count": 2071 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:33:42.611238+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREDDIE HILL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KUEHN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Freddie Hill, was charged with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance in violation of section \"401(d)(2) [sic]\u201d of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/401(d)(ii) (West 1992)). After a jury trial in the circuit court of Madison County, defendant was found guilty. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison. Defendant appeals.\nWe must determine whether statements, made outside the presence of defendant, were properly admitted as an integral part of the drug transaction and the res gestae of the offense.\nThe centerpiece of the State\u2019s case was a July 7, 1993, recording. The recording was made pursuant to a court-authorized overhear targeting defendant as a suspected drug dealer. The recording contained conversations which occurred prior to the eavesdrop of defendant.\nOn July 7, 1993, Ronald Raglin, under the direction of the Alton police department, was wired for sound in anticipation of a rendezvous with defendant. Raglin, a police informant, was taken to \"Little Mexico,\u201d an area of Alton that defendant was known to frequent. He was activated for sound and instructed on what to do. Thereafter, he exited the vehicle, left the police officers, and walked the streets of \"Little Mexico\u201d in search of defendant. Raglin walked. As he walked, he talked. He talked to monitoring officers. He talked to two of defendant\u2019s brothers. On occasion, he talked to himself. The recording, containing discussions between Raglin and people other than defendant, was admitted and played in its entirety over defendant\u2019s objection. The recording was only partially audible. No transcripts were used. The State called a number of witnesses, Raglin, the monitoring officers, and Elizabeth Barnes, to interpret unintelligible sounds and explain events that occurred during inaudible passages. The recording, and testimony that deciphered it, informed the jury of the following facts.\nThe recording begins with instructions and precautionary advice given by the monitoring officers to Raglin. Thereafter, Raglin begins his search for defendant. He conveys his position to monitoring officers as he walks. He first encounters Sammy Hill, defendant\u2019s brother. Although defendant was the target of the covert operation, Raglin asks Sammy Hill to sell him cocaine. Sammy replies that he has no cocaine to sell, but he suggests that Raglin visit the home of another brother, Robert Hill, if he wants to buy cocaine. Raglin proceeds to the home of Robert Hill. Although defendant was the target of the covert operation, Raglin asks Robert Hill to sell him cocaine. Robert replies that he does not sell cocaine out of his house. The journey continues. Raglin encounters Eric Johnson, whom he later describes at trial as \"another partner or relative\u201d of defendant. Raglin expresses concern that something is wrong. His fear intensifies when Johnson drives past him and ignores his effort to buy cocaine.\nAfter these encounters, Raglin finds the defendant seated in his car, accompanied by an unknown male passenger. Raglin asks defendant to sell him cocaine, and defendant replies \"no.\u201d Defendant exits the car and walks away. Raglin turns to the passenger and asks him to sell cocaine. The passenger declines but agrees to talk to defendant on Raglin\u2019s behalf. The passenger exits the car and walks toward defendant. Raglin follows but is told by defendant to \"hold on just a minute.\u201d Raglin then returns to the car. Raglin sees Elizabeth Barnes join defendant and his unknown passenger, receive cocaine from defendant, and walk toward Raglin. Barnes approaches Raglin and delivers .9 of a gram of cocaine. Raglin tenders payment and asks her if the cocaine is \"Freddie\u2019s dope.\u201d Barnes says that it is.\nThe information involving the actual transaction rested more on what Raglin and Barnes testified to than the audible content of the recording.\nPrior to commencement of trial, defendant filed a motion in limine challenging the admissibility of recorded conversations with individuals other than defendant. Defendant sought to limit the tape\u2019s use to those portions that involved Raglin\u2019s contact with defendant. The only audible words spoken by defendant were \"no\u201d and \"hold on just a minute.\u201d Defendant asserted that all other conversations were hearsay, prejudicial, and nonprobative. The State\u2019s response was twofold. It argued that all conversations contained on the tape were necessary to show the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. It also argued that Elizabeth Barnes was an accountable participant in the crime. Her statements, it urged, were admissible as statements of a coconspirator acting in furtherance of the conspiracy to deliver cocaine. The court denied defendant\u2019s motion and allowed the tape to be played in its entirety.\nOn appeal, defendant narrows the issue of error to the admission of conversations with monitoring officers, defendant\u2019s brothers, contact with Eric Johnson, and Raglin\u2019s gratuitous commentary to himself. Defendant contends that portions of the tape, recording events that occurred in defendant\u2019s absence, contained nonprobative, highly prejudicial hearsay. The State insists that the playing of the entire tape was necessary to show the circumstances surrounding the offense and the informant\u2019s efforts to locate the defendant. The State urges that the challenged evidence was a part of the res gestae of the criminal offense.\nThe prejudicial effect of certain conversations and commentary is not in dispute. The officers\u2019 precautionary advice to Raglin before he exits their car conveys concern over Raglin\u2019s safety and cautions against potential violence. Moreover, the informant\u2019s commentary during his search for the defendant conveys an air of fear and danger in dealing with the Hill brothers. Conversations with Sammy and Robert Hill establish that both brothers are drug dealers. The conversations insinuate defendant\u2019s guilt as part of a family drug business. Raglin\u2019s label of Eric Johnson as \"another one of [defendant\u2019s] partners [or] relatives\u201d bolsters guilt by association that flows from conversations with defendant\u2019s siblings.\nThe question mounts as to any legitimate purpose or reason for injecting this matter into defendant\u2019s trial. The recording could easily have been played from a point immediately prior to Raglin\u2019s encounter with defendant without diminishing the recording\u2019s intended purpose or harming the continuity of the recorded transaction. After the defendant is found, recorded conversations bear relevance to defendant\u2019s guilt. The State justifies the admission of third-party conversations as part of the res gestae of the offense. The State claims that the other conversations were necessary to show the circumstances surrounding the offense and the informant\u2019s efforts to locate the defendant.\nThe issue is clearly framed. Res gestae is the only tendered reason for admitting the third-party conversations into defendant\u2019s trial. It is a reason that visits wisdom upon the many legal scholars who have criticized the notion of res gestae for its imprecision. E.g., 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence \u00a7 268, at 206-08 (4th ed. 1992); M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 803.2, at 700-01 (6th ed. 1994); 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence \u00a7 1745, at 191-93 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976). The Fourth District Appellate Court per Justice Steigmann recently lamented the continued use of this \"archaic relic\u201d and agreed with Professor Michael Graham that \" '[n]othing short of complete abandonment of res gestae as an explanation of admissibility permits rational analysis of exceptions [to] the hearsay rule.\u2019 \u201d People v. Giles, 261 Ill. App. 3d 833, 841, 635 N.E.2d 969, 975 (1994), quoting M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 803.2, at 624 (5th ed. 1990). The uselessness of res gestae in analyzing the admissibility of extrajudicial statements is not a novel position. Our supreme court noted in 1961 that res gestae is an \"amorphous concept *** applied indiscriminately to a multitude of situations *** [that] not only fails to contribute to an understanding of the problem but may actually inhibit any reasonable analysis.\u201d People v. Poland, 22 Ill. 2d 175, 180, 174 N.E.2d 804, 806 (1961).\nWe doubt that all extrajudicial statements challenged in this case were necessarily hearsay. We doubt that Sammy Hill\u2019s statement was introduced to prove that he had no cocaine to sell or that Robert Hill\u2019s statement was introduced to prove that he did not sell cocaine from his house. Whether the statements were introduced for the truth of the matter asserted or not, one brother\u2019s lack of cocaine to sell and another brother\u2019s practice of not selling cocaine out of his house do not prove anything in regard to defendant\u2019s guilt. Nothing said by either of defendant\u2019s brothers, Raglin, or the monitoring officers was relevant to defendant Freddie Hill\u2019s later conduct.\nThe State argues that the instructions from monitoring officers, Raglin\u2019s conversations with defendant\u2019s brothers, and even Raglin\u2019s vocal musings as he wandered the streets in search of defendant were all \"an integral part of the drug transaction and a part of the res gestae of the offense.\u201d In truth, the officers\u2019 instructions, Raglin\u2019s conversations with defendant\u2019s brothers, and Raglin\u2019s own commentary on events had nothing to do with the transaction that formed the basis of this prosecution. The circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s offense were those circumstances that occurred after defendant was found. The circumstances of the offense were circumstances that involved conduct engaged in by defendant, Elizabeth Barnes, and an unknown accomplice at the scene of the charged drug transaction.\nThe State\u2019s tender of res gestae to justify the admission of the entire recording and its contents failed to contribute to an understanding of the problem and inhibited any meaningful analysis. It resulted in a ruling that produced reversible error. The ruling allowed the admission of nonprobative extrajudicial statements that seriously prejudiced the defendant.\nRegretfully, the notion of res gestae confused the issue. We fear that it will continue to obscure rational analysis and continue to demean established evidentiary rules designed to promote the admission of reliable evidence, so long as lawyers and judges continue to adhere to its use.\nThe State advances a number of cases that recognize res gestae as an appropriate tool for determining the admissibility of other-crimes evidence. People v. Rogers, 264 Ill. App. 3d 740, 636 N.E\u201e2d 565 (1992), appeal denied, 149 Ill. 2d 658, 612 N.E.2d 521 (1993); People v. Levy, 186 Ill. App. 3d 842, 542 N.E.2d 930 (1989), appeal denied, 129 Ill. 2d 569, 550 N.E.2d 562 (1990); People v. Crocker, 25 Ill. 2d 52, 183 N.E.2d 161 (1962); but see Rogers, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 752, 636 N.E.2d at 574 (Greiman, J., specially concurring) (res gestae is likened to an entombed vampire that refuses to die. \"[N]ow and again 'Count Res Gestae\u2019 moves the cover of his coffin and *** circulate^] in the world of litigators and judges, promising them that they *** need only mutter \u2019res gestae\u2019 to cover a multitude of sins.\u201d Justice Greiman advocates a stake in the heart and a securely fastened coffin lid). The authority distinguishing other-crimes evidence admissible under res gestae from hearsay evidence under res gestae has been repudiated. Giles, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 841-42, 635 N.E.2d at 975-76.\nThe State urges that we reject Giles. It argues that the complete abandonment of res gestae analysis is \"ill founded.\u201d We disagree. The fourth district\u2019s discard of res gestae conforms with the beliefs of most legal scholars, is decidedly correct, and is a decision we choose to follow. We join our brethren in the fourth district and disavow the notion of res gestae. The doctrine serves only to confuse the determination of the admissibility of out-of-court statements or evidence of other crimes.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nCHAPMAN and MAAG, JJ., concur.\nThe indictment charges defendant Freddie Hill with a violation of section 401(d)(ii) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. This specific section establishes that it is illegal to possess any amount of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) or an analog thereof. There was no testimony that defendant possessed LSD \u2014 only a small amount of cocaine. No issue was raised on the pleadings.\nhe overhear was authorized pursuant to a petition based upon information from an unidentified confidential source. Nothing in the petition portends corroboration of the information or reliability of its source. The legality of the eavesdrop order was never tested.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KUEHN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Doris Gregory Black, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant.", "William Haine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Edwardsville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Gerry R. Arnold, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREDDIE HILL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 94 \u2014 0312\nOpinion filed April 1, 1996.\nDoris Gregory Black, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant.\nWilliam Haine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Edwardsville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Gerry R. Arnold, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0871-01", "first_page_order": 889, "last_page_order": 894 }