{ "id": 75267, "name": "EYVIND J. ERICKSEN III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF WILLOW SPRINGS et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Ericksen v. Village of Willow Springs", "decision_date": "1995-12-19", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201494\u20143880", "first_page": "210", "last_page": "216", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 210" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "621 N.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 Ill. App. 3d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2920933 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/250/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222781 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 N.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5373273 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 N.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 1051", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2881599 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 N.E.2d 1237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2526927 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 1217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5440905 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" }, { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 N.E.2d 1231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. App. 3d 1011", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499612 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/218/1011-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 1116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 1083", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3632940 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1087" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/1083-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 644, "char_count": 14069, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.2869363881871977e-08, "percentile": 0.3312291566033386 }, "sha256": "ed3202fb961da2dc31c3fb65d39d4ab2200b987fc620184652ccd0608aefb89a", "simhash": "1:2b2efc5917409c60", "word_count": 2267 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:15:35.504495+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EYVIND J. ERICKSEN III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF WILLOW SPRINGS et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Eyvind Ericksen appeals from the orders of the circuit court of Cook County granting defendants Village of Willow Springs\u2019 and Leland Brannam\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 1992)) and denying plaintiffs motion for reconsideration. The trial court found that plaintiffs complaint was time-barred by a one-year statute of limitations. On appeal, plaintiff contends that: (1) the \"law of the case\u201d doctrine precluded the trial court from dismissing his complaint; and (2) his complaint was timely filed because the \"discovery rule\u201d postponed the commencement of the statute of limitations period. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.\nAccording to plaintiff, he was hired as an auxiliary officer by the Willow Springs police department (Department) in 1982 and as a full-time patrol officer in 1988. On January 12, 1992, he was instructed by his shift commander to initiate a roadblock at an accident scene. At the accident scene, plaintiff\u2019s vehicle was struck from behind by another vehicle. As a result, plaintiff suffered injuries to his back, was treated at a hospital and underwent physical therapy. Plaintiff did not return to work for six weeks following the accident. During this time plaintiff applied for and received workers\u2019 compensation benefits pursuant to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1992)).\nUpon plaintiff\u2019s return to active duty, defendant Leland Bran-nam (Brannam), the Department\u2019s chief of police, accused plaintiff of exaggerating his injuries to avoid returning to work, instructed the mechanic who repaired plaintiffs patrol car to conceal the extent of the damage to the vehicle, accused plaintiff of conspiring with the Illinois State Police to falsify details of the accident, drafted reports of misconduct which were materially false and placed them in plaintiffs personnel file, told Department employees not to associate with or speak to plaintiff, and harassed plaintiff. Plaintiff further alleged that Brannam falsely communicated to defendant Village of Willow Springs\u2019 (Village) president and board of trustees that plaintiff had filed a fraudulent workers\u2019 compensation claim and should be terminated, while, at the same time, Brannam concealed evidence which would disprove this allegation.\nOn May 12, 1992, the police and fire committee of the Village board of trustees determined that plaintiff should be terminated. On May 13, Brannam informed plaintiff that he would not be reappointed as a patrol officer. When plaintiff asked why he had been terminated, defendant Brannam stated that he was not at liberty to offer any explanation and was not able to offer anything in writing concerning the termination. On May 14, the Village board of trustees accepted the police and fire committee\u2019s decision to terminate plaintiff.\nIn late July or early August 1992, Tom Borsilli, a Department officer, told plaintiff that he was fired because of the workers\u2019 compensation claim he had filed. Plaintiff claims that this was the first time he became aware of the reason for his termination and of Brannam\u2019s involvement in his termination.\nOn May 25, 1993, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants. Count I of the complaint alleged that the Village terminated plaintiff\u2019s employment in retaliation for his workers\u2019 compensation claim. Count II alleged that Brannam had interfered with plaintiff\u2019s economic advantage.\nDefendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 1992)), arguing that plaintiff had failed to file his complaint within the one-year statute of limitations mandated by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/8 \u2014 101 (West 1992)).\nOn October 25, 1993, at a hearing before Judge Nicholson on defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, plaintiff argued that his complaint was timely filed pursuant to the \"discovery rule,\u201d which postpones the commencement of the statute of limitations until a plaintiff knew or should have known of his or her injury and knew or should have known that the injury was wrongfully caused. Judge Nicholson treated defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss as one filed pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615, as opposed to section 2 \u2014 619, and granted plaintiff 21 days to amend his complaint to include allegations encompassing the discovery rule. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which was substantially identical to his first complaint except for the inclusion of the discovery rule allegations. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619, again contending that plaintiff\u2019s action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations mandated by the Tort Immunity Act.\nIn response to defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, plaintiff submitted a personal affidavit. The affidavit related plaintiff\u2019s history with the Department; that he was informed by Brannam on May 13, 1992, that he would not be reappointed as a patrol officer; and that he asked Brannam why he had been terminated, to which Brannam replied that he was \"not supposed to tell [plaintiff] that\u201d and that he was not able to give plaintiff anything in writing concerning the termination. The affidavit further reflected plaintiff\u2019s conversation with Tom Borsilli, an officer of the Department, in July or early August of 1992, regarding the reason for plaintiff\u2019s termination.\nPrior to a hearing on defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, the case was reassigned to Judge Duncan-Brice. Judge Duncan-Brice determined that plaintiffs complaint was not timely filed and granted defendants\u2019 section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss.\nPlaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the trial court\u2019s dismissal of his amended complaint, arguing that the determination of when plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury was a question of fact for the jury. Judge Duncan-Brice denied plaintiff\u2019s motion.\nPlaintiff appeals from the trial court\u2019s orders dismissing his complaint and denying his motion for reconsideration. He contends that the trial court erred in granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss because Judge Nicholson\u2019s order constituted the \"law of the case\u201d and Judge Duncan-Brice should not have altered it absent a change in circumstances. Plaintiff also contends that his complaint was timely filed because the \"discovery rule\u201d applied to postpone the commencement of the statute of limitations period to the date of his conversation with Borsilli when plaintiff claims he first became aware of his injury and that it was wrongfully caused.\nA ruling must be based upon a full litigation of an issue and decision of that issue before it can qualify as the law of a case. (McDonald\u2019s Corp. v. Vittorio Ricci Chicago, Inc. (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1087, 466 N.E.2d 1116 (holding that a \"trial court order becomes the 'law of the case\u2019 only if there is a final and appealable order\u201d).) An interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of all of the controversy between the parties. (Moore v. One Stop Medical Center (1991), 218 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 578 N.E.2d 1231.) An interlocutory order may be modified or revised by a successor court at any time prior to final judgment. Towns v. Yellow Cab Co. (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 113, 382 N.E.2d 1217.\nIn Towns, our supreme court defined a judgment as \"a determination by the court on the issues presented by the pleadings which ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties in the lawsuit.\u201d (Towns, 73 Ill. 2d at 119.) The Towns court further stated that a judgment as to fewer than all of the rights of the parties is not appealable and is therefore subject to revision unless there is a finding by the trial court not to delay appeal. Relying on Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (58 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), the Towns court held that a denial of the defendant\u2019s motion based on res judicata is interlocutory because it concerns a preliminary matter, namely, the sufficiency of the defendant\u2019s defense, and does not dispose of the claim between the parties. Towns, 73 Ill. 2d at 120.\nHere, Judge Nicholson\u2019s October 25, 1993, order, striking plaintiff\u2019s initial complaint and granting him leave to file an amended complaint, did not constitute the law of the case with respect to the applicability of the discovery rule. Judge Nicholson\u2019s order did not address the applicability of the discovery rule but merely granted plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to include allegations encompassing the discovery rule. Judge Nicholson\u2019s order was not final and appealable. It was not a judgment as defined by the court in Towns because it did not resolve the dispute between the parties but merely resolved a preliminary matter, namely, the sufficiency of plaintiff\u2019s complaint. Judge Duncan-Brice\u2019s order was the first ruling on the statute of limitations issue. Her order did not revise or modify the October 25, 1993, order entered by Judge Nicholson.\nWe also reject plaintiff\u2019s argument that the discovery rule is applicable and that it postponed the commencement of the limitations period as to his cause of action. In Illinois, civil actions against local entities or their employees must be \"commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued.\u201d (745 ILCS 10/8 \u2014 101 (West 1994).) A tort cause of action accrues when all the elements of the suit \u2014 duty, breach, proximate cause and injury \u2014 are present. (Fetzer v. Wood (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 70, 569 N.E.2d 1237.) Pursuant to the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of his or her injury and knew or should have known that the injury was wrongfully caused, thereby postponing the commencement of the limitations period. Garcia v. Pinto (1993), 258 Ill. App. 3d 22, 629 N.E.2d 103.\nIn determining whether to apply the discovery rule, courts balance the increased difficulty in proving a case that results from the passage of time with the hardship to a plaintiff who was not aware of his or her right to sue. (Rozny v. Marnul (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656.) The discovery rule is appropriate when an injury is such that a plaintiff would not become immediately aware of it. (Cassiday v. Derek Bryant Insurance Brokers, Ltd. (1993), 244 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 613 N.E.2d 1201.) If the injury is the result of a single traumatic event, however, the plaintiff is found to be on immediate notice of his or her injury. Sille v. McCann Construction Specialties Co. (1994), 265 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 638 N.E.2d 676.\nThe parties have not cited cases specifically addressing the applicability or inapplicability of the discovery rule to termination of employment actions. Nor has our research revealed any. However, in Sille, a personal injury action, the court refused to apply the discovery rule, holding that the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action accrued when he was injured by a piece of concrete that had fallen from a loader onto his foot. The Sille court noted that because the plaintiff\u2019s injury was sudden and traumatic, he was placed on immediate notice of his injury. Sille, 265 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 638 N.E.2d 676.\nSimilarly, in Golla v. General Motors Corp. (1994), 261 Ill. App. 3d 143, 633 N.E.2d 193, aff\u2019d (1995), 167 Ill. 2d 353, the appellate court refused to apply the discovery rule to a product liability action. In Golla, the plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries against the manufacturer of a vehicle. The plaintiff\u2019s injuries arose from the failure of the front seat of his vehicle to lock at the time of a collision. The Golla court held that the discovery rule is not applicable to causes of action for personal injuries arising from a sudden traumatic event because the plaintiff should know of his or her injury at the time of the event.\nHere, plaintiff\u2019s injury, if any, accrued on May 13, 1992, when Brannam informed plaintiff that plaintiff would not be reappointed as a patrol officer. Additionally, the circumstances surrounding plaintiff\u2019s termination, that Brannam was not at liberty to offer any explanation or anything in writing concerning plaintiff\u2019s termination, should have put plaintiff on immediate notice that the termination may have been wrongfully caused. Plaintiff\u2019s own affidavit establishes the date of his termination and that he was given absolutely no explanation why he was not reappointed. Plaintiff\u2019s termination resulted from this discrete, isolated event with Brannam. The discovery rule, therefore, was inapplicable to plaintiff\u2019s cause of action. Accordingly, since plaintiff\u2019s injury accrued on May 13, 1992, the one-year statute of limitations expired on May 14, 1993. Plaintiff did not file his complaint until May 25, 1993, and, therefore, the trial court properly dismissed his complaint as time-barred.\nWe briefly note that while the question of when a plaintiff knew or should have known of his or her injury and that his or her injury was wrongfully caused is typically one for the jury, \"where there are undisputed facts from which only one conclusion may be drawn, the question will be one for the court.\u201d Sille, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 1055-56, 638 N.E.2d at 680; McCormick v. Uppuluri (1993), 250 Ill. App. 3d 386, 621 N.E.2d 57.\nWe hold that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff\u2019s complaint and denied his motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the orders of the circuit court of Cook County, granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for reconsideration, are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSCARIANO, P.J., and HARTMAN, J\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Fred T. Myers, of Geneva, for appellant.", "Schirott & Luetkehans, P.C., of Itasca (Phillip A. Luetkehans, Mary E. Dickson, and Matthew F. Tarbox, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EYVIND J. ERICKSEN III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF WILLOW SPRINGS et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201494\u20143880\nOpinion filed December 19, 1995.\nFred T. Myers, of Geneva, for appellant.\nSchirott & Luetkehans, P.C., of Itasca (Phillip A. Luetkehans, Mary E. Dickson, and Matthew F. Tarbox, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0210-01", "first_page_order": 228, "last_page_order": 234 }