{ "id": 75369, "name": "JO ANN RICHTER, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. STANDARD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Richter v. Standard Mutual Insurance", "decision_date": "1996-05-02", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201494-0732", "first_page": "501", "last_page": "511", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 501" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "331 N.E.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2503559 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 N.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2638226 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/184/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 1062", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3126478 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1064-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/1062-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 N.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592553 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 1327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1334" }, { "page": "1334" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2627039 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" }, { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5450406 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0210-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 816, "char_count": 24342, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.505882454708161e-08, "percentile": 0.5187495487188636 }, "sha256": "61b94769ecdcf352e4b4d12bb1884312840962ba4ab15551ba727ad2bb277885", "simhash": "1:a33f2de66f738efd", "word_count": 3688 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:15:35.504495+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JO ANN RICHTER, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. STANDARD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Jo Ann Richter, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against defendant, her insurer, Standard Mutual Insurance Company, seeking a declaration that plaintiff\u2019s settlement with and execution of an unlimited release with the underinsured motorist, Dovie Vowell, and her insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), did not prejudice defendant\u2019s subrogation rights. Defendant appeals the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County which found that defendant\u2019s subrogation rights were not prejudiced by plaintiff\u2019s release and settlement with Vowell and State Farm and, therefore, plaintiff was not barred from recovering under the underinsured motorist provisions of her insurance policy with defendant. Plaintiff cross-appeals the order of the circuit court finding that the underinsured driver had the financial ability to satisfy any judgment defendant may obtain on a potential subrogation claim under plaintiff\u2019s underinsured motorist policy.\nDefendant presents a single issue for our consideration on appeal, whether plaintiff\u2019s settlement and release with the underin-sured motorist and State Farm without defendant\u2019s knowledge and consent bars plaintiff\u2019s claim for underinsured motorist coverage. We affirm; accordingly, we need not resolve the issue raised in plaintiff\u2019s cross-appeal.\nI\nOn May 25, 1989, plaintiff\u2019s vehicle was struck from the rear by a car driven by Dovie Vowell, and plaintiff sustained injuries. At the time, Vowell was insured by State Farm with bodily injury limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence. Plaintiff owned an automobile liability policy issued by defendant that included under-insured motorist coverage with a limit of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence.\nOn February 23, 1990, William M. Gibbons, claims examiner for defendant, sent a letter to Ireal Spann, claims adjuster for State Farm, indicating defendant\u2019s right of lien and subrogation arising out of plaintiff\u2019s claim against State Farm for medical expenses she incurred. Gibbons contacted Spann again, by letter dated April 16, 1991, reiterating defendant\u2019s subrogated interest in medical expense payments made to plaintiff. In the same letter, Gibbons informed Spann of plaintiff\u2019s retention of counsel and further stated that plaintiff\u2019s attorney had no right of recovery to any portion of defendant\u2019s subrogation claim. State Farm subsequently settled the medical subrogation claim with defendant.\nIn the interim, on May 2, 1991, plaintiff initiated suit against Vowell seeking to recover monetary damages in excess of $15,000 for personal injuries sustained in the May 25, 1989, accident. Defendant was informed of the complaint filed in the circuit court of St. Clair County in a letter from plaintiff\u2019s attorney dated January 30, 1992, in which plaintiff\u2019s counsel notified defendant that plaintiff\u2019s damages could exceed Vowell\u2019s policy limits of $50,000. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney requested information regarding plaintiff\u2019s underinsured motorist coverage in effect on the date of the accident, her policy limits, a copy of her policy, and \"any other information with respect to proceeding on an underinsured motorist claim on plaintiff\u2019s behalf.\u201d Gibbons responded to plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s request in a letter dated February 6,1992, in which Gibbons stated that plaintiff\u2019s policy included underinsured motorist coverage for bodily injury of $100,000 per person, with an aggregate limit of $300,000 for each occurrence. Gibbons further explained that defendant would deduct the $50,000 plaintiff could recover from the tortfeasor from her underinsured motorist coverage. Additionally, Gibbons requested a copy of the complaint plaintiff filed against Vowell. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney, on February 11, 1992, sent Gibbons the requested medical records and a copy of the complaint. On March 10, 1992, Joe Macklin, liability supervisor for defendant, sent a fax to plaintiff\u2019s attorney, acknowledging plaintiff\u2019s likely underinsured motorist claim and requesting a current address for Vowell. As of March 10, 1992, there was no mention of settlement negotiations between plaintiff and State Farm in any correspondence between plaintiff\u2019s attorney and defendant.\nOn April 8,1992, Michael Constance, the attorney for State Farm, sent a letter to Spann, stating that he had \"spoken to plaintiff\u2019s counsel several times and because of the potential underinsured motorist exposure and because of the high medical bills plaintiff would not accept less than $50,000.\u201d Constance then requested that State Farm forward him a check in that amount for plaintiff and her attorneys. Constance further indicated that he would prepare the release for plaintiff\u2019s signature. Plaintiff signed the release of claims on April 23, 1992. Plaintiff received two checks from State Farm in the sum of $49,074.90 and $925.10. The draft for $925.10 represented defendant\u2019s medical payments to plaintiff. On April 28, 1992, plaintiff\u2019s counsel sent a letter to defendant informing it of plaintiff\u2019s settlement of her claim against Vowell and demanding settlement of her underinsured motorist claim in the amount of $50,000. A copy of the stipulation for dismissal of the lawsuit plaintiff intended to file with the court was included.\nOn May 1, 1992, Macklin sent a memo to Gibbons indicating that defendant had not received prior notification of the settlement between plaintiff, Vowell, and State Farm and that defendant had not approved the settlement. Macklin also stated that the file did not evidence any agreement to waive defendant\u2019s subrogation rights against Vowell. Based on the information on file, Macklin determined that plaintiff was barred from recovery under the underinsured motorist coverage of the policy because she failed to notify defendant and obtain its consent before entering into the settlement.\nMacklin prepared a draft \"denial\u201d letter to be sent to plaintiff\u2019s attorney stating that plaintiff lost the benefit of her underinsured motorist coverage because she failed to give defendant advance notice of the settlement with the tortfeasor, thereby prejudicing the company\u2019s subrogation right. On May 7, 1992, Macklin sent a memo and the \"denial\u201d letter to Maurice Kepner, defendant\u2019s attorney. Macklin wanted Kepner to review the \"denial\u201d letter to make sure that \"all of [the] i\u2019s are dotted and t\u2019s are crossed\u201d so that the company would not be estopped from asserting the \"loss of subrogation rights\u201d defense. On May 11, 1992, Kepner sent the denial letter to plaintiff\u2019s attorney.\nOn July 30, 1992, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against defendant seeking a declaration that her settlement with Vowell did not prejudice defendant\u2019s subrogation rights and, therefore, plaintiff had not lost the benefit of the underinsured motorist coverage in her policy. On March 8, 1994, a hearing was held on plaintiff\u2019s motion for declaratory judgment.\nAt the March 8, 1994, hearing, on direct examination, Spann read to the court the letter from Constance dated April 8, 1992, in which Constance informed Spann that plaintiff\u2019s attorney refused to accept less than the full amount of Vowell\u2019s liability coverage ($50,000) due to plaintiff\u2019s potential underinsured motorist coverage in addition to the extensive medical bills plaintiff incurred. When asked by plaintiff\u2019s counsel what conclusions, if any, Spann drew from that part of the letter referencing the potential underinsured motorist exposure, the following exchange occurred:\n\"A. Well, that would mean to me that Miss Richter intended to pursue an underinsured claim against her company.\nQ. Okay. And at that time, did you know who her company was?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And who was that?\nA. Standard Mutual Insurance Company.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Spann testified that at the time of the letter he did not know who provided plaintiff\u2019s underinsured motorist coverage. However, Spann testified later, on redirect, that he assumed defendant was the carrier of plaintiff\u2019s underinsured motorist coverage since defendant had filed a lien for repayment of their medical payments to plaintiff.\nMacklin was called as an adverse witness for plaintiff. Macklin testified that he requested information regarding Vowell in his fax to plaintiff\u2019s attorney dated March 10, 1992, because \"we had been presented with a potential underinsured motorist bodily injury claim.\u201d Macklin stated that he requested the information so that defendant could do an assets check on Vowell \"to see when we got to the position where and if State\u2019s Farm\u2019s limit was tendered, we would have the information available to us to waive or preserve our subrogation rights.\u201d When asked on direct examination what decision defendant made regarding preservation of its subrogation rights with respect to Vowell, Macklin stated that no decision regarding defendant\u2019s subrogation rights could be made until defendant was notified that State Farm had tendered its limit.\nOn September 22, 1994, the circuit court entered its order finding that plaintiff\u2019s signing of a general release did not prejudice defendant\u2019s right of subrogation because the release did not specifically include an amount designated as covering defendant\u2019s subrogation rights. The circuit court further found that Vowell\u2019s insurance company and her attorney had sufficient knowledge regarding plaintiff\u2019s intent to pursue an underinsured motorist claim against her insurance carrier so as to preserve defendant\u2019s subrogation rights against Vowell despite the release plaintiff signed. Additionally, the court found that defendant, upon learning of the dismissal, could have filed a petition to intervene and to set aside the order of dismissal; however, defendant failed to take the appropriate action to safeguard its subrogation rights against Vowell. The court concluded that defendant was not prejudiced by plaintiff\u2019s failure to notify defendant of her settlement with Vowell such that plaintiff forfeited her right to pursue a claim under the underinsured motorist coverage of her policy. Defendant appeals.\nII\nDefendant contends that its subrogation rights were prejudiced by plaintiff\u2019s signing of a general release in favor of Vowell because plaintiff failed to notify defendant of her intent to settle her claims against Vowell and Vowell\u2019s insurer, State Farm. Defendant asserts that a provision in the policy issued to plaintiff excludes claims against the underinsured motorist provisions where an \"insured, his legal representative or any person entitled to payment under this coverage shall, without written consent of the Company, make any settlement with any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor.\u201d The provision also states that \"the Company shall be subrogated to all the insured rights of recovery\u201d and that \"the insured shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.\u201d Defendant claims that, by executing the release, plaintiff prejudiced its subrogation claim against the underinsured motorist. Further, defendant argues that plaintiff is properly barred from the policy\u2019s under-insured motorist coverage because coverage under this provision does not apply if the insured settles with any party who is potentially legally liable without first obtaining defendant\u2019s written consent. We disagree.\nOur supreme court in Home Insurance Co. v. Hertz Corp., 71 Ill. 2d 210, 375 N.E.2d 115 (1978), set forth the rule:\n\"[A]n unlimited release executed by an insured-subrogor for consideration not specifically including an amount designated as covering the insurer\u2019s subrogation interest does not bar a subsequent subrogation action by an insurer-subrogee against the tortfeasor, if the tortfeasor or his insurance carrier had knowledge of the insurer-subrogee\u2019s interest prior to the release.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 71 Ill. 2d at 215, 375 N.E.2d at 118.\nCrucial to the disposition of this case is whether State Farm or Vowell had notice of defendant\u2019s subrogation rights. The facts indicate that Spann, claims adjuster for State Farm, received a letter from the attorney for State Farm regarding his discussions with plaintiff\u2019s attorney concerning plaintiff\u2019s reluctance to settle for less than Vowell\u2019s policy limits \"because of the potential underinsured motorists exposure.\u201d At the hearing on plaintiff\u2019s motion for declaratory judgment, Spann testified that he read the letter to mean that plaintiff intended to pursue an underinsured motorist claim against her insurer. Spann further testified that while he did not know exactly who provided plaintiff\u2019s underinsured motorist coverage, he assumed defendant was the carrier since defendant had filed a lien for repayment of defendant\u2019s medical payments to plaintiff. The record does not indicate that plaintiff had any other insurance policies relevant to the accident here. Defendant was the only insurer that had dealings with Spann concerning this occurrence. Therefore, no other inference can be drawn from the letter. Additionally, it is common practice for insurance companies to include subrogation provisions in standard automobile insurance policies. In light of the letter to Spann, coupled with defendant\u2019s securing its subrogation rights against State Farm for plaintiff\u2019s medical expenses, we conclude that State Farm had notice of defendant\u2019s subrogation interest. Further, the release plaintiff signed did not include an amount designated as covering defendant\u2019s subrogation interest. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s subrogation rights survived the settlement between plaintiff and Vowell and State Farm. Consequently, defendant\u2019s subrogation interest was not prejudiced by the settlement.\nDefendant cites Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Petreikis, 183 Ill. App. 3d 272, 538 N.E.2d 1327 (1989), as directly on point and dis-positive of the issues presented here. However, Petreikis is distinguishable. In Petreikis, the insurer indicated to the insured that the insurer should be supplied with the primary carrier\u2019s policy limits once the primary carrier had tendered those limits. The court found that this was not a sufficient basis for the insured to settle with the primary carrier without further contact with the insurer. In the instant case, however, defendant insurer was fully and timely informed of the pending settlement but chose not to act. The Petreikis court cited with approval the following concerning estoppel:\n\" 'Where a person stands by and sees another about to commit, or in the course of committing, an act infringing on his rights and fails to assert his title or right, he will be estopped afterward to assert it.\u2019 (18 Ill. L. & Prac. Estoppel \u00a7 30, at 102 (1956).)\u201d Petreikis, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 283, 538 N.E.2d at 1334.\nThe court concluded:\n\"The facts do not necessarily indicate conduct on the plaintiff\u2019s part inducing defendants to act to their detriment, nor do they indicate plaintiff stood by, without giving warning, while seeing defendants about to commit an act detrimental to the plaintiff\u2019s interest.\u201d Petreikis, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 283, 538 N.E.2d at 1334.\nThe instant case is the exact opposite; the defendant insurer stood by, having been given warning, while seeing plaintiff insured commit an act defendant now claims was detrimental to its interest. Petreikis supports the decision of the trial court and the decision reached by this court.\nDefendant next argues that it properly denied coverage to plaintiff pursuant to the exclusion provision, which provides that the policy does not apply under the underinsured motorist coverage when the insured settles a claim without first obtaining defendant\u2019s written consent. We disagree.\n\"It is a necessary prerequisite to recovery upon a policy for the insured to show a claim within the coverage provided by the policy.\u201d Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 144 Ill. 2d 178, 204, 579 N.E.2d 322, 333 (1991). Once the insured has brought himself within the terms of his policy, the insurer attempting to limit liability by excluding coverage under certain circumstances must affirmatively demonstrate the applicability of the policy exclusion. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Schmitt, 94 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1064-65, 419 N.E.2d 601, 603 (1981).\nWhile the record is unclear regarding the initial contact between plaintiffs attorney and defendant, it is clear that as early as February 23, 1990, defendant was aware that plaintiff had retained counsel. Gibbons, defendant\u2019s claims examiner, in a letter to Spann of State Farm on February 23, 1990, acknowledged plaintiffs retention of counsel and informed State Farm that plaintiffs attorney had no right of recovery to any portion of defendant\u2019s medical subrogation claim. On January 30, 1992, plaintiffs counsel sent defendant a letter notifying it of the complaint filed on plaintiffs behalf against Vowell and informing defendant that plaintiffs damages could exceed Vowell\u2019s policy limit of $50,000. In the same letter, plaintiffs attorney requested information regarding plaintiff\u2019s underinsured motorist coverage in effect on the date of the accident, her policy limits, a copy of her policy, and \"any other information with respect to proceeding on an underinsured motorist claim on plaintiff\u2019s behalf,\u201d clearly indicating that plaintiff intended to make a claim under these provisions of her policy. Gibbons, in a letter dated February 6, 1992, requested a copy of the complaint plaintiff filed against Vowell and forwarded to plaintiffs counsel the requested information. Plaintiffs counsel promptly sent Gibbons a copy of the complaint along with the requested medical records. Additionally, on March 10, 1992, Macklin sent a fax to plaintiffs attorney, acknowledging plaintiffs likely underinsured motorist claim and requesting a current address for Vowell. On April 28, 1992, plaintiffs attorney sent a letter to defendant, informing it of plaintiffs settlement claim against Vowell and demanding settlement of her underinsured motorist claim.\nAs demonstrated by the record, defendant had ample notice of an impending settlement between plaintiff, Vowell, and State Farm. When defendant first received a copy of plaintiffs complaint against Vowell, it could have sent a lien letter to State Farm in order to protect its subrogation rights, as it did with respect to the medical payments made to plaintiff. Further, the correspondence between defendant and plaintiff\u2019s attorney clearly indicates that plaintiff intended to make a claim against the underinsured motorist coverage of her policy, which would require State Farm to settle for the full extent of Vowell\u2019s policy limits. Defendant\u2019s policy provided, under \"PART IV\u2014 PROTECTION AGAINST UNINSURED MOTORISTS\u201d:\n\"3. Underinsured Motorists Insurance is included subject to the following:\n(a) ***\nThe company shall not be obligated to make any payment because of bodily injury to which this insurance applies until after the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds or insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe complaint against Vowell and particularly the correspondence between defendant and plaintiff\u2019s attorney regarding plaintiff\u2019s un-derinsured motorist coverage show that defendant had sufficient notice to prompt it, at the very least, to make further inquiries regarding plaintiff\u2019s suit against Vowell in order to protect its subrogation rights. In light of these facts, defendant can hardly contend it had no prior notice that plaintiff intended to settle her claim against Vowell until it received the demand letter from plaintiff\u2019s attorney on April 28, 1992. Moreover, defendant cannot deny plaintiff coverage under the policy pursuant to its exclusion clause when it is defendant who failed to take the appropriate steps to secure its rights. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant improperly denied plaintiff\u2019s claim for underinsured motorist coverage.\nIll\nFinally, defendant asserts that because it received notice of plaintiff\u2019s settlement on April 30, 1992, the day the dismissal order was to be entered, it had insufficient time to take any action to prevent entry of the dismissal order. Defendant further maintains that since its subrogation rights were prejudiced by plaintiff\u2019s execution of the release, defendant is relieved of having to take \"extraordinary\u201d steps to resurrect those rights. We disagree.\nSection 2 \u2014 408(a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) provides that anyone has a right to intervene in a particular action when \"the representation of the applicant\u2019s interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant will or may be bound by an order or judgment in the action.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 408(a)(2) (West 1992). An intervenor only needs to show an injury to an enforceable right or interest which is more than a general interest in the subject matter of the suit. Serio v. Equitable Life Assurance, 184 Ill. App. 3d 432, 435-36, 540 N.E.2d 800, 802 (1989). While usually permitted only before judgment, intervention will be granted after judgment where it is the only way to protect the rights of the intervenor. Wheeling Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 29 Ill. App. 3d 539, 541, 331 N.E.2d 172, 174 (1975).\nDefendant claims that it first learned of the settlement on April 30, 1992, the same day the settlement was entered by the trial court. Upon learning of the dismissal, defendant made no attempt to contact plaintiff\u2019s attorney or to take any legal action to protect its subrogation rights against Vowell. Instead, defendant set about determining a manner in which to deny plaintiff recovery under the underinsured motorist provisions of the policy.\nTo justify its course of action, defendant contends that it is not required to take any \"extraordinary\u201d action to protect its subrogation rights because it is plaintiff\u2019s obligation to \"do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.\u201d Defendant\u2019s argument is flawed on two acco\u00fants: first, plaintiff\u2019s signing of the release did not prejudice defendant\u2019s subrogation rights because the release did not specifically designate an amount for covering defendant\u2019s subrogation interest, and second, in the event defendant was uncertain as to the effects of the release on its rights, it would be incumbent upon defendant to take steps to safeguard its rights, especially because it might be bound by any resulting order or judgment. Filing a petition to intervene can hardly be termed an \"extraordinary\u201d step to preserve defendant\u2019s interest. Further, as an intervenor, defendant would be entitled to all the rights of an original party, including the right to seek postjudgment relief pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 1992).\nRegarding section 2 \u2014 1401 relief, defendant contends that its subrogation claim was extinguished upon execution of the release and, consequently, it would be futile for defendant to seek section 2 \u2014 1401 relief. However, as discussed above, defendant\u2019s subrogation rights were not barred by the release; therefore, defendant would have a viable claim against Vowell for the setting aside of the dismissal order. Accordingly, we find that the trial court, in light of the circumstances here, properly concluded that defendant\u2019s subrogation rights were not prejudiced by plaintiff\u2019s execution of the release of claims against Vowell such that plaintiff forfeited her coverage under the underinsured motorist provision of her policy with defendant.\nIn light of our disposition of defendant\u2019s appeal, it is unnecessary for us to address the issue raised in plaintiff\u2019s cross-appeal.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOPKINS, P.J., and RARICK, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles C. Compton, of Reed, Armstrong, Gorman, Coffey, Thomson, Gilbert & Mudge, P.C., of Edwardsville, for appellant.", "Staci M. Yandle and Michael B. Marker, both of Carr, Korein, Tillery, Kunin, Montroy & Glass, of East St. Louis, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JO ANN RICHTER, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. STANDARD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201494-0732\nOpinion filed May 2, 1996.\nCharles C. Compton, of Reed, Armstrong, Gorman, Coffey, Thomson, Gilbert & Mudge, P.C., of Edwardsville, for appellant.\nStaci M. Yandle and Michael B. Marker, both of Carr, Korein, Tillery, Kunin, Montroy & Glass, of East St. Louis, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0501-01", "first_page_order": 519, "last_page_order": 529 }