{
  "id": 75248,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAMON TORRES, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Torres",
  "decision_date": "1996-05-08",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAMON TORRES, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE COLWELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Ramon Torres, appeals his convictions of theft (720 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 1(a)(4)(A) (West 1994)) and attempted retail theft (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4(a), 16A \u2014 3(a) (West 1992)). Defendant contends that his convictions must be vacated because the stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea and the trial court failed to admonish him in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 402 (134 Ill. 2d R. 402). We affirm.\nOn March 3, 1994, the State charged defendant by information with theft and attempted retail theft. Following a preliminary hearing, the theft charge was dismissed. On April 28, 1994, the State charged defendant by indictment with the theft offense. On May 18, 1994, defendant filed a motion to suppress physical evidence. The trial court denied the motion to suppress on August 15, 1994. On August 25, 1994, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to suppress. The trial court subsequently denied the motion to reconsider.\nOn September 12, 1994, defendant waived his right to a jury trial and filed a written jury trial waiver. On September 20, 1994, defendant\u2019s counsel informed the court that defendant would proceed with a stipulated bench trial. At the beginning of the stipulated bench trial on October 3, 1994, defendant\u2019s counsel stated: \"Your Honor, at this time we would have a stipulated bench trial to present to the court regarding facts that would support the, a finding of guilt[.]\u201d The prosecutor then asked that, following the stipulated bench trial, \"the matter be set over for sentencing.\u201d Defendant\u2019s counsel agreed with the prosecutor\u2019s statement.\nAfter this conversation, the State presented the stipulated facts. Following the State\u2019s recital of the stipulated facts, the trial court asked defendant\u2019s counsel the following: \"[Tjhat\u2019s a stipulation as to [the] facts?\u201d Defendant\u2019s counsel responded affirmatively. The trial court then accepted the stipulation and found that the stipulated evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty of both offenses. The trial court did not admonish defendant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402.\nAt a sentencing hearing on October 31, 1994, the trial court sentenced defendant on the theft conviction to 364 days\u2019 periodic imprisonment and to a period of probation ending December 16, 1996. The court also ordered defendant to pay costs for both convictions. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on November 14, 1994.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that he was entitled to the admonishments required by Rule 402 because the stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea. A stipulated bench trial, in which the defendant preserves a defense for appeal, is tantamount to a guilty plea when a defendant stipulates not only to the evidence, but also to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict. People v. Westerfield, 245 Ill. App. 3d 398, 400 (1993); see People v. Horton, 143 Ill. 2d 11, 22 (1991). If the stipulated bench trial is tantamount to a guilty plea, the trial court must admonish the defendant pursuant to Rule 402. Westerfield, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 400.\nIn Horton, the supreme court determined under what circumstances a stipulated bench trial is tantamount to a guilty plea. Horton involved two stipulated bench trials. In the first trial, defense counsel stipulated to the facts and, in closing argument, conceded that the evidence was sufficient to convict. In holding that the proceeding was not tantamount to a guilty plea, the supreme court found that, because the statements made during the closing argument were not evidence, the defendant had not stipulated to the sufficiency of the evidence. Horton, 143 Ill. 2d at 21-22. In the second stipulated bench trial, the supreme court held that the proceeding was tantamount to a guilty plea because defense counsel expressly stated that the defendant was stipulating to the sufficiency of the evidence. Horton, 143 Ill. 2d at 22.\nIn the present case, defense counsel did not explicitly state that defendant was stipulating to the sufficiency of the evidence. Defense counsel\u2019s comment regarding the stipulated bench trial was vague, and its exact meaning was unclear. We cannot say that the comment amounted to a stipulation regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. Unlike the second stipulated bench trial in Horton, defense counsel in the present case never expressly stipulated to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict. See People v. Silas, 278 Ill. App. 3d 400, 402 (1996). Therefore, defendant\u2019s stipulated bench trial was not tantamount to a guilty plea.\nDefendant relies on Westerfield to support his argument that the stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea. In Westerfield, the appellate court held that Rule 402 admonishments were required because defense counsel stipulated to the sufficiency of the evidence. Westerfield, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 401-02. We note that, in Westerfield, before the State read the stipulated statement of facts, defense counsel specifically stated that he agreed \" 'that there\u2019s sufficient evidence to prove [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 \u201d Westerfield, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 399. In contrast to Westerfield, defense counsel in this case made only a vague comment which did not amount to an express stipulation as to the sufficiency of the evidence.\nWe affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Ogle County.\nAffirmed.\nDOYLE and RATHJE, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE COLWELL"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "G. Joseph Weller and Paul Alexander Rogers, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.",
      "Douglas P. Floski, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (William L. Browers and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAMON TORRES, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201494\u20141317\nOpinion filed May 8, 1996.\nG. Joseph Weller and Paul Alexander Rogers, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDouglas P. Floski, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (William L. Browers and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0599-01",
  "first_page_order": 617,
  "last_page_order": 620
}