{ "id": 75415, "name": "NANCY BENBENEK, Indiv. and as Parent Guardian and Next Friend of Nancy Benbenek, Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Benbenek v. Chicago Park District", "decision_date": "1996-05-01", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201493\u20144372", "first_page": "930", "last_page": "934", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 930" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278377 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" }, { "page": "7-8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2832377 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2897157 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" }, { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 1117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249072 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/1117-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307266 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5385376 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906790 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0234-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 419, "char_count": 7005, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.331214254511841e-07, "percentile": 0.6289602212329753 }, "sha256": "00686fbaa6a0163c4d2682a74ca74a8893c458a9f253ce9e2419e11f69285baf", "simhash": "1:b716cc102f0db6d6", "word_count": 1162 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:15:35.504495+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "NANCY BENBENEK, Indiv. and as Parent Guardian and Next Friend of Nancy Benbenek, Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TULLY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Nancy Benbenek, individually and as parent guardian and next friend of Nancy Benbenek, a minor, filed this action in the circuit court of Cook County against defendants, the Chicago Park District and Mike Dalpino, seeking damages for injuries sustained by the minor after a fall from a balance beam in a gym show sponsored by the park district. Count I of plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint sought damages from defendants for willful and wanton conduct in failing to provide adequate supervision at the gym show. Defendants moved to dismiss count I of the plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, pars. 2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619 (now 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619 (West 1994))). The circuit court granted defendants\u2019 motion and dismissed count I with prejudice. Following a bench trial based on count II of the amended complaint, the trial court entered a judgment for defendants which is not at issue in this appeal. Rather, it is from the dismissal of count I that plaintiff appeals to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301).\nFor the following reasons, we affirm.\nISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW\nThe sole issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action.\nOPINION\nIn reviewing an order on a motion to dismiss, we apply a de novo standard of review. Dace International, Inc. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d 234, 237 (1995); see also Toombs v. City of Champaign, 245 Ill. App. 3d 580, 583 (1993). The issue presented in the case at bar involves the statutory interpretation of section 3 \u2014 108 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (hereinafter the Act) (745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1994)). Interpretation of a statute is a question of law (Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (1995)), the determination of which lies exclusively with the court (Federal Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 271 Ill. App. 3d 1117, 1122 (1995)).\nPlaintiff argues that count I of her amended complaint states a valid cause of action under the Act and, therefore, should not have been dismissed by the circuit court. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that (1) section 3 \u2014 108 of the Act does not shield a public entity from liability where there is willful and wanton conduct; and (2) in failing to provide properly trained spotters, properly trained instructors, a balance beam adjusted at a safe height for a child of plaintiff\u2019s age, and adequate floor padding at the gym show, defendants acted in a willful and wanton manner and should, thus, be held liable for plaintiff\u2019s injuries. We disagree.\nWhen reviewing a proffered interpretation of a statute, a court should first consider the statutory language itself as the best evidence of the drafters\u2019 intent. Where the language of an act is certain and unambiguous, a court should enforce the law as enacted by the legislature. Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen, 45 Ill. 2d 75, 84 (1970). \"It is never proper for a court to depart from plain language by reading into a statute exceptions, limitations or conditions which conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent.\u201d Certain Taxpayers, 45 Ill. 2d at 84.\nSection 3 \u2014 108(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part that \"neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a failure to supervise an activity on or the use of any public property.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 108(a) (West 1994). Contrary to plaintiff\u2019s assertions, the plain language of the statute does not provide an exception where a public entity or a public employee acts in a willful and wanton manner.\nAlthough no limiting exception was drafted into section 3 \u2014 108(a), the General Assembly did include such limiting language in other provisions of the Act. See, e.g., 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 106, 3 \u2014 109 (West 1994). In fact, sections 3 \u2014 106 and 3 \u2014 109 specifically state exceptions where willful and wanton conduct is involved. Clearly, if the General Assembly wished to limit the immunity provided under section 3 \u2014 108(a) to situations where there was no willful or wanton conduct, it could have simply included such language as it did in sections 3 \u2014 106 and 3 \u2014 109. However, it did not. The use of certain language in one instance and different language in another indicates that different meanings and results were intended. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 100 (1964). If the General Assembly intended the words \"[n]either *** is liable for an injury\u201d to encompass an exception for situations involving willful and wanton conduct, it would not have included express limitations for willful and wanton conduct in other sections of the Act.\nFurthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court followed a similar line of reasoning in West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1 (1992). That case involved the statutory language of section 3 \u2014 104 of the Act, which states in pertinent part that a municipality is \"[not] liable under this Act for an injury caused by the failure to initially provide regulatory traffic control devices\u201d. 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 104 (West 1994). The plaintiff argued that section 3 \u2014 104 did not grant immunity where the municipality had notice of the existence of a dangerous condition. The West court stated that the language of the statute was unconditional and made no reference to notice or any other type of limitation. West, 147 Ill. 2d at 7. Moreover, the supreme court noted that, because other provisions within the Act expressly include such notice limitations, obviously the legislature intended to grant absolute immunity under section 3 \u2014 104. West, 147 Ill. 2d at 7-8.\nSimilarly, in the case sub judice, section 3 \u2014 108(a) contains no limitation for willful and wanton conduct, whereas other sections of the Act do include such a limitation. Therefore, section 3 \u2014 108(a) unequivocally grants absolute immunity to public entities and their employees from liability resulting from a failure to supervise. Thus, we find that because the park district is immune from all liability arising from the alleged failure to supervise, count I of plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Because section 3 \u2014 108 of the Act grants absolute immunity, we need not consider whether defendants\u2019 acts and omissions rose to the level of willful and wanton conduct.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nRIZZI, P.J., and GREIMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TULLY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Margaret Therese Kinnally, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Donald J. Suriano, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NANCY BENBENEK, Indiv. and as Parent Guardian and Next Friend of Nancy Benbenek, Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201493\u20144372\nOpinion filed May 1, 1996.\nMargaret Therese Kinnally, of Chicago, for appellant.\nDonald J. Suriano, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0930-01", "first_page_order": 948, "last_page_order": 952 }