{ "id": 75226, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MITCHELL S. LOPEMAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lopeman", "decision_date": "1996-05-17", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201495\u20140485", "first_page": "1058", "last_page": "1061", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 1058" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75281 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544-45", "parenthetical": "adopting analysis of \"punishment\" for double jeopardy purposes used in Dvorak" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631", "parenthetical": "suspending a professional license and prosecuting a criminal charge do not constitute double jeopardy" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 968", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2973736 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "975", "parenthetical": "suspending a professional license and prosecuting a criminal charge do not constitute double jeopardy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0968-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 435", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605295 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "1901" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 869", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873" }, { "page": "876" }, { "page": "875-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927660 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" }, { "page": "551" }, { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 855", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156820 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "858" }, { "page": "857" }, { "page": "857" }, { "page": "857" }, { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0855-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 N.E.2d 329", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335-36" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909177 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272-73" }, { "page": "273" }, { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0260-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 416, "char_count": 6446, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.33154616350219646 }, "sha256": "a54220732bddd5528ef15701677c39a9d5d512d1d65113b7997000c1f7f1a41d", "simhash": "1:b0ac758733d3c3f5", "word_count": 1038 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:15:35.504495+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MITCHELL S. LOPEMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Mitchell S. Lopeman, was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(2) (West 1994)) on March 9, 1995. The deputy sheriff asked defendant to submit to a breath test to determine the level of alcohol in his body; defendant refused to consent. Due to his refusal, defendant was served with a notice of statutory summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license. See 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.1 (West 1994). The arresting officer filed a report indicating that he had found defendant\u2019s car in a ditch and that defendant had refused to submit to the breath test. The report also stated that defendant had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, slurred his speech, exhibited instability in walking and standing, and \"failed all field sobriety tests given.\u201d\nPursuant to the summary suspension statute, defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license was suspended for six months beginning April 24, 1995. On May 11, 1995, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the DUI charge, alleging that the suspension of his license constituted former jeopardy and that a later criminal prosecution would violate the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. See U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 10. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and defendant appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.\nThe double jeopardy clause is violated and one proceeding is barred only when three conditions are met: (1) the civil action constitutes \"punishment\u201d for purposes of double jeopardy, (2) the civil and criminal proceedings are based on the same offense, and (3) there are separate civil and criminal proceedings. In re P.S., 169 Ill. 2d 260, 272-73, 661 N.E.2d 329, 335-36 (1996).\nThe court in People v. Fasbinder, 278 Ill. App. 3d 855, 858 (1996), recently rejected a similar double jeopardy argument regarding a DUI prosecution from a defendant whose driver\u2019s license had been summarily suspended. The Fasbinder court relied on the analysis in People v. Dvorak, 276 Ill. App. 3d 544, 658 N.E.2d 869 (1995), to uphold the validity of dual administrative and criminal proceedings.\nThe court in Dvorak noted that \" 'whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve.\u2019 \u201d Dvorak, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 547, 658 N.E.2d at 873, quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487, 501, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1901 (1989). The court recognized that Illinois courts have upheld the suspension of a defendant\u2019s professional license even after a related criminal conviction. Dvorak, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 551, 658 N.E.2d at 876, citing Kaplan v. Department of Registration & Education, 46 Ill. App. 3d 968, 975, 361 N.E.2d 626, 631 (1977) (suspending a professional license and prosecuting a criminal charge do not constitute double jeopardy). Acknowledging that courts in many other states had upheld similar DUI-related proceedings, the court found that although the suspension of a driver\u2019s license \"may have the incidental effect of deterring impaired drivers,\u201d the summary suspension statute is \"fairly characterized as a remedial civil sanction rather than as punishment for double jeopardy purposes.\u201d Dvorak, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 551, 658 N.E.2d at 875-76. Thus, the separate administrative and criminal proceedings in this case did not violate defendant\u2019s double jeopardy rights.\nOur supreme court recently found in In re P.S. that prosecuting a defendant for unlawful possession of a controlled substance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 561/2, par. 1402(c)) after his car had been forfeited in a civil proceeding pursuant to the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1992)) was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. After reviewing this reasoning, the Fasbinder court held that the categorical approach used in P.S. would not apply in the context of summary license suspensions because civil forfeiture statutes are generally considered punitive, while the goal of the summary suspension statute is to increase highway safety by protecting the public from the special risk of harm presented by impaired drivers. Fasbinder, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 857. Further, the government receives a financial benefit from forfeiture provisions that it does not get from the summary suspension of a driver\u2019s license. Fasbinder, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 857.\nAfter distinguishing P.S., the court in Fasbinder concluded that the reasoning in Dvorak was still applicable and upheld the constitutionality of dual administrative and criminal proceedings. Fasbinder, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 857; see also People v. Eck, 279 Ill. App. 3d 541, 544-45 (1996) (adopting analysis of \"punishment\u201d for double jeopardy purposes used in Dvorak). We agree and also find that the defendant\u2019s double jeopardy rights in this case were not violated because the \"same-elements test\u201d was not satisfied. Fasbinder, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 857, citing P.S., 169 Ill. 2d at 273, 661 N.E.2d at 336.\nIn the criminal prosecution, the State had to prove that defendant was acting under the influence of alcohol. 625 ILCS 5/11\u2014 501(a)(2) (West 1994). However, defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license was suspended because he refused to submit to a test designed to determine the level of alcohol in his blood; whether he was acting under the influence of alcohol was not at issue in this case. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.1(d) (West 1994). Because the administrative summary suspension and criminal prosecution required proof of different elements, there was no violation of the double jeopardy clause. See P.S., 169 Ill. 2d at 277, 661 N.E.2d at 337.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.\nAffirmed and remanded for further proceedings.\nMICHELA and SLATER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert C. Strodel (argued), of Law Offices of Robert C. Strodel, Ltd., of Peoria, for appellant.", "Kevin W. Lyons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MITCHELL S. LOPEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201495\u20140485\nOpinion filed May 17, 1996.\nRobert C. Strodel (argued), of Law Offices of Robert C. Strodel, Ltd., of Peoria, for appellant.\nKevin W. Lyons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1058-01", "first_page_order": 1076, "last_page_order": 1079 }