{ "id": 75319, "name": "KACEY L. STIFF, by her Mother and Next Friend, Deana S. Stiff, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. EASTERN ILLINOIS AREA OF SPECIAL EDUCATION et al., Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees (John E. Heldman et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Stiff v. Eastern Illinois Area of Special Education", "decision_date": "1996-05-29", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201495\u20140387", "first_page": "1076", "last_page": "1082", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 1076" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "650 N.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 252057 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" }, { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427298 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172-73" }, { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" }, { "page": "729" }, { "page": "729" }, { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777563 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104-05" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "621 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 859", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2963107 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0859-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 661, "char_count": 13738, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.615127473715101e-08, "percentile": 0.4504534820369836 }, "sha256": "c2a39b1d5bcee0ebd03b3f6ae7a88549699382fa4c2cde59d1f0d264eb3d609d", "simhash": "1:d720a42e4acd8618", "word_count": 2209 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:15:35.504495+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KACEY L. STIFF, by her Mother and Next Friend, Deana S. Stiff, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. EASTERN ILLINOIS AREA OF SPECIAL EDUCATION et al., Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees (John E. Heldman et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn July 1994, plaintiffs, Deana S. Stiff, as mother and next friend of Kacey L. Stiff, and Harold M. Stiff, filed an amended complaint against defendants Eastern Illinois Area of Special Education (EIASE), a special education organization consisting of several school units, and Sharon Kayle Grewell, Jeffrey N. Reynolds, John E. Held-man, Pamela S. Richardson, Susan Sprind, and James A. Bossert, teacher employees of EIASE, alleging that defendants\u2019 actions during a field trip where Kacey sustained a leg injury were negligent and constituted willful and wanton conduct. In February 1995, a jury trial was held. At the close of plaintiffs\u2019 evidence, the trial court granted a directed verdict as to the willful and wanton counts, and the jury subsequently found defendants liable in negligence.\nDefendants appeal, arguing that (1) section 24 \u2014 24 of the School Code (Code) granted them immunity from plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 24 \u2014 24); (2) sections 2 \u2014 201 and 2 \u2014 109 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) granted them immunity from plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, pars. 2 \u2014 201, 2 \u2014 109); (3) sections 2 \u2014 202 and 2 \u2014 109 of the Act granted them immunity from plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, pars. 2 \u2014 202, 2 \u2014 109); and (4) the trial court erred by denying defendants\u2019 motions for directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. Plaintiffs cross-appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict as to the willful and wanton counts.\nBecause we agree with defendants\u2019 first argument and disagree with plaintiffs\u2019 argument, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn May 1991, plaintiffs filed their initial complaint, alleging that defendants\u2019 failure to properly supervise the activities of the students was negligent and constituted willful and wanton conduct. In July 1991, defendants moved to dismiss all counts of that complaint. The trial court subsequently denied that motion, and defendants appealed. This court in Stiff v. Eastern Illinois Area of Special Education, 251 Ill. App. 3d 859, 621 N.E.2d 218 (1993), affirmed the trial court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of the sufficiency of the pleadings on the issue of negligence in light of the supreme court\u2019s decision in Cates v. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d 76, 619 N.E.2d 715 (1993), which partially abrogated parental immunity.\nUpon remand, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, and defendants moved to dismiss all counts of that complaint. The trial court denied that motion, specifically finding that immunity pursuant to section 24 \u2014 24 of the Code did not attach to defendants \"because of the Appellate Court\u2019s decision [(Stiff)] in which they applied the Cates versus Cates decision *** to the circumstances of this case.\u201d\nAt the trial, the evidence showed the following. During 1989 through 1991 school years, Kacey, who is an epileptic, was enrolled in a special education program at the treatment and learning center, which operates under the auspices of EIASE. Sharon Grewell was Kacey\u2019s teacher and Jeffrey Reynolds was her adaptive physical education teacher.\nGrewell, Reynolds, and Kacey\u2019s parents participated in several planning conferences, during which they chose programs designed to improve Kacey\u2019s balance and coordination. Through participation in various exercises, Kacey became capable of performing some maneuvers on playground equipment while her teachers stood close by, just outside of her arms\u2019 reach.\nIn October 1990, when Kacey was seven years old, defendants took Kacey and five other students on a field trip to a state park. While hiking on a trail, the group came upon a bridge which had a fallen tree lying across the handrails. The tree was between 21/z to 3 feet from the floor of the bridge. Beyond the tree there was a step, which dropped down six to eight inches to the next level of the bridge.\nReynolds unsuccessfully attempted to lift or move the tree. James Bossert, Kacey\u2019s crisis interventionist, tried to help Reynolds, but their joint efforts were unsuccessful in moving the tree. The EIASE staff members present in the park \u2014 Reynolds, Bossert, John Held-man (a teacher\u2019s assistant), Pamela Richardson (a teacher\u2019s assistant), and Susan Sprind (a student teacher) \u2014 then conferred and decided it was safe to proceed under the tree to cross the bridge.\nReynolds and Bossert crossed the bridge first, and the four male students followed. A female student crossed next, followed by Grewell and Kacey. As Grewell approached the tree, Kacey was behind her. Grewell went under the tree and stepped forward. Kacey then went under the tree as Heldman followed behind her. Sprind and Richardson were behind Heldman.\nGrewell turned back and watched Kacey walk to the edge of the step on the bridge with her right hand on the handrail. Kacey extended her left hand behind her. There was a distance of a few inches between her hand and Heldman, who had just proceeded under the tree. Kacey took a step, her leg buckled under her, and she slipped off the bridge under the handrail. Kacey fell four to six feet into a creek bed and fractured her left femur. At the time of the fall, Grewell was approximately halfway across the bridge and Reynolds, having crossed the bridge, was already on the trail.\nAt the close of plaintiffs\u2019 evidence, defendants moved for a directed verdict as to all counts of the complaint. The court granted the motion as to the willful and wanton counts, but denied the motion as to the negligence counts. Defendants renewed the motion as to the negligence counts at the close of all evidence, but the court again denied it.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Immunity Pursuant to the School Code\nDefendants first argue that section 24 \u2014 24 of the Code grants them immunity from plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims. We agree.\nSection 24 \u2014 24 of the Code provides as follows:\n\"Teachers and other certified educational employees shall maintain discipline in the schools, including school grounds which are owned or leased by the board and used for school purposes and activities. In all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the school and the school children, they stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the pupils. This relationship shall extend to all activities connected with the school program, including all athletic and extracurricular programs, and may be exercised at any time for the safety and supervision of the pupils in the absence of their parents or guardians.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 24 \u2014 24.\nIn Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education, 63 Ill. 2d 165, 172-73, 347 N.E.2d 705, 709 (1976), the supreme court interpreted section 24 \u2014 24 of the Code as conferring upon educators the status of parent or guardian in relation to their students. The supreme court further held that, in order to impose liability on educators, a plaintiff must prove willful and wanton misconduct. Kobylanski, 63 Ill. 2d at 173, 347 N.E.2d at 709.\nIn 1993, however, the supreme court in Cates narrowed parental immunity \u2014 and thus, educator immunity \u2014 by holding that a plaintiff may recover against a parent for negligence, except when the conduct is inherent to the parent-child relationship. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 104-OS, 619 N.E.2d at 729. In so holding, the supreme court wrote the following:\n\"[S]uch conduct [inherent to the parent-child relationship] constitutes an exercise of parental authority and supervision over the child or an exercise of discretion in the provision of care to the child. These limited areas of conduct require the skills, knowledge, intuition, affection, wisdom, faith, humor, perspective, background, experience, and culture which only a parent and his or her child can bring to the situation; our legal system is ill-equipped to decide the reasonableness of such matters.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 104-05, 619 N.E.2d at 729.\nThe supreme court in Cates further noted that the test for immunity is \"whether the alleged conduct concerns parental discretion in discipline, supervision and care of the child.\u201d Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 104, 619 N.E.2d at 729. The supreme court in Cates concluded that a father was not immune where he negligently operated a vehicle while his child was a passenger. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 106, 619 N.E.2d at 729.\nWe assume for our analysis that Cates applies retroactively to the circumstances of this case. Applying the principle of Kobylanski and the standard set forth in Cates, we conclude that the conduct involved in this case (1) is related to the conduct of the students during an extracurricular program, and (2) constitutes conduct inherent to the parent-child relationship,- such that the teachers \u2014 standing in loco parentis \u2014 are immune from claims of negligence. In the face of a physical obstacle, Kacey\u2019s teachers conferred, considered various possibilities, and decided that Kacey, with the teachers in close proximity, could maneuver under the fallen tree and across the bridge. In our judgment, this conduct represents a parent\u2019s discretion and decision-making in supervising her child. Especially when working with a student with a disability, a teacher (just as a parent) must exercise such discretion in deciding just how far he can push that student toward independence from her disability. The conduct involved in this case falls within the limited areas of conduct which \"require the skills, knowledge, intuition, affection, wisdom, faith, humor, perspective, background, experience, and culture which only a parent *** can bring to the situation.\u201d Accordingly, we hold that section 24 \u2014 24 of the Code bars any claim of negligence against defendants.\nWe recognize that we previously upheld the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to dismiss in this case. In our previous decision, however, we rejected the' trial court\u2019s basis for denying the motion, and we remanded for further proceedings in light of Cates. Cates was decided only after the previous appeal was filed in our court, and plaintiff was entitled to an opportunity to amend her pleadings in an attempt to state a cause of action under Cates.\nB. Directed Verdict As to the Willful and Wanton Counts\nOn cross-appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by allowing defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict as to the willful and wanton counts of their amended complaint because defendants showed utter indifference toward Kacey\u2019s safety and \"abandoned\u201d her while crossing the bridge. We emphatically disagree.\nA trial court should enter a directed verdict only where \"all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.\u201d Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14 (1967). Section 1 \u2014 210 of the Act defines willful and wanton conduct as follows:\n''[A] course of action which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 1 \u2014 210.\nFurther, willful and wanton conduct, as contemplated in section 1 \u2014 210 of the Act, consists of more than mere inadvertence, incompetence, or unskillfulness. Geimer v. Chicago Park District, 272 Ill. App. 3d 629, 637, 650 N.E.2d 585, 592 (1995).\nOur review of the record indicates that the teachers\u2019 actions could not possibly constitute willful and wanton conduct. The record shows absolutely no evidence that defendants displayed either an utter indifference toward or conscious disregard for Kacey\u2019s safety while crossing the bridge. Instead, the record shows that defendants evinced concern for their students, including Kacey. Defendants cautioned the students about how to conduct themselves on the trail and considered the various options before making a decision to cross over the bridge. Two teachers, Bossert and Reynolds, proceeded under the tree and across the bridge before anyone else. Kacey went under the tree after Grewell, and Heldman followed behind her. Grewell turned back and watched Kacey walk to the edge of the step on the bridge with her right hand on the handrail. Kacey extended her left hand behind her toward Heldman. At that point, there was a distance of just a few inches between her hand and Heldman, who had just proceeded under the tree.\nBecause the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, so overwhelmingly favors defendants, we hold that the trial court did not err by granting defendants\u2019 motion for directed verdict on the willful and wanton counts of plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions to dismiss with prejudice the negligence counts of plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; and cause remanded with directions.\nCOOK, P.J., and GARMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "John P. Ewart and Beverly J. Ring (argued), both of Craig & Craig, of Mattoon, for appellants.", "James R. Glenn (argued), of Glenn & Logue, of Mattoon, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KACEY L. STIFF, by her Mother and Next Friend, Deana S. Stiff, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. EASTERN ILLINOIS AREA OF SPECIAL EDUCATION et al., Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees (John E. Heldman et al., Defendants).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201495\u20140387\nArgued December 13, 1995.\nOpinion filed May 29, 1996.\nJohn P. Ewart and Beverly J. Ring (argued), both of Craig & Craig, of Mattoon, for appellants.\nJames R. Glenn (argued), of Glenn & Logue, of Mattoon, for appellees." }, "file_name": "1076-01", "first_page_order": 1094, "last_page_order": 1100 }