{ "id": 5412648, "name": "Gladys Mier, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. A. E. Staley, Jr., Deceased, et al., Defendants.-(The Citizens National Bank of Decatur, Ex'r of the Will of A. E. Staley, Jr., Deceased et al., Defendants-Appellees.)", "name_abbreviation": "Mier v. Staley", "decision_date": "1975-05-08", "docket_number": "No. 12616", "first_page": "373", "last_page": "385", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 373" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "143 N.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Ill.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2786451 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/11/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2938565 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 N.E.2d 884", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2907099 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ill. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5102474 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/309/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill.2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959565 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 N.E.2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill.App.3d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5392661 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 N.E.2d 659", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5392724 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 N.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5390491 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "398 Ill. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2460093 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/398/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 N.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2843105 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/43/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 6", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill,2d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405316 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "412 Ill. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2665536 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 N.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill.2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5321421 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 N.E.2d 51", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2953563 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 N.E. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2725267 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2957771 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 N.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 Ill. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2479037 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/382/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 N.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill.2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2832377 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110-111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ill.App. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5542530 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/255/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 N.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5380608 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0418-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 980, "char_count": 26497, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.208181147751725e-07, "percentile": 0.9405235594816532 }, "sha256": "74eb3e7e497387d32f2b1e29b4054bad2558924d7850541ace909d48009657fb", "simhash": "1:b5fd20d52c0eb34e", "word_count": 4253 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:05.902616+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Gladys Mier, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. A. E. Staley, Jr., Deceased, et al., Defendants.\u2014(The Citizens National Bank of Decatur, Ex\u2019r of the Will of A. E. Staley, Jr., Deceased et al., Defendants-Appellees.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SIMKINS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff is appealing from the dismissal of certain counts of an amended complaint which alleged causes of action based on negligence by the defendants.\nThe complaint alleged that Ms. Mier was injured at the A. E. Staley Manufacturing Company when she fell off a manlift in the factory. The factory workers, members of the Allied Industrial Union, were on strike at the time of the injury. The directors and officers of the corporation, in response to this situation, decided to use office personnel to continue work at the factory. Ms. Mier had been employed as a clerk at Staley Manufacturing for 29 years.\nIn two counts Ms. Mier alleges that the directors and officers, by their official action, were negligent in directing office personnel to work in the factory knowing that the machinery there was dangerous to unexperienced persons. In two more counts she alleges that this action by the directors and officers was wilful and wanton negligence.\nIn separate counts she also alleges that Lumbermans, the general . liability insurer of Staley Manufacturing, and Self-Insurers Service, the safety service organization of Staley, negligently performed safety inspections and thereby caused her injury.\nShe also alleges a products liability claim against the manufacturer of the manlift. This count was not dismissed and is not before us on appeal.\nThe counts against the directors, officers, insurer, and safety service organization were dismissed by the trial court on the ground that section 5(a) of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, \u00a7 138.5(a)) barred a common-law negligence action against these parties. The trial court also found there was no just reason for delay of enforcement or appeal.\nOn appeal the plaintiff raises these issues: (1) Whether directors and officers are within the categories of persons granted immunity from suit for work-related injuries by the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, (2) If they are granted immunity, is the statute constitutional, (3) Whether the statute can constitutionally grant immunity to a safety-service organization retained by the employer, (4) Whether tire statute can constitutionally grant immunity to the insurer of the employer, (5) Whether if was proper for the trial court to stay plaintiff\u2019s discovery.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges a work-related injury. Defendants\u2019 answers claim that the action is barred because of provisions of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. That act does not bar every action arising from employment, only action against certain parties.\n\u201c(a) No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer, his insurer, his broker, any service organization retained by the employer, his insurer or his broker to provide safety service, advice of recommendations for the employer or the agents or employees of any of them for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act, * * Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, \u00a7 138.5(a).\nA right of action is retained by the employee against other persons however. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, \u00a7 138.5(b).\nThe arguments in reference to the directors and officers of A. E. Staley Manufacturing Company will be considered first.\nThe statute bars actions against the employer, fellow employees and agents of the employer for injuries arising out of employment. Plaintiff first argues that directors and officers of the corporation do not fall within these categories. The issue, as it appears in the context of this case, is a question of first impression in tiffs State.\nEmployer is defined in the Act as \u201cEvery person, firm, public or private corporation * * * who has any person in service or under any contract for hire, express or implied, oral or written * * Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, \u00a7 138.1(a) 2.\nEmployee is defined as \u201cEvery person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written * * (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, \u00a7 138.1 (b)2.)\nAgent of the employer is not defined by the Act.\nPlaintiff argues that the directors are not her employers because her employer is the corporate entity, A. E. Staley Manufacturing Company. Further, when acting in an official capacity, they are not co-employees because they have none of the characteristics of employees. Agents, it is urged, is synonymous with employees. A similar argument is presented as to the officers.\nIllinois adheres to the \u201cdual capacity\u201d doctrine in determining whether a person is an employee who may receive Workmen\u2019s Compensation. (B. W. Sales Co. v. Industrial Com., 35 Ill.2d 418, 220 N.E.2d 405.) Under that doctrine a person who is an officer or director is not precluded from obtaining Workmen\u2019s Compensation benefits if he was acting in his capacity as an employee and not in his official capacity as an officer or director.\nThe obverse side of these decisions would be that such a person, in his official capacity, is the employer and therefore not entitled to benefits. Nothing in the Act would indicate that the definition of employer would differ depending on whether it was a question of obtaining benefits or obtaining immunity.\nIn Ryan v. State Auto Parts Corp., 255 IlLApp. 422, the court denied compensation benefits to an executive manager. The court states, \u201cThe Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act contemplates the relation of master or employer, on the one hand, and servant or employee on the other. One who is an officer of a corporation, while acting as such, represents the corporation and his acts are the acts of the corporation. He makes the contracts of employment of the corporation with the employees, and it would be an obvious misnomer to call him an employee while so acting for the corporation. * * *\n\u2018It is therefore generally held that executive officers of private corporations and members of partnerships are not entitled to compensation for injuries sustained in connection with tire industry carried on by them, because a person cannot be at one and the same time employer and employee.\u2019 \u201d Ryan v. Auto Parts Corp., 255 Ill.App. 422, 424.\nThis reasoning applies with equal force to directors of the corporation.\nPlaintiff argues that only the corporate entity is the employer and its immunity does not extend to its human instrumentalities. She argues that the corporate veil should not be pierced when the effect would be to extend immunity.\nEven were this correct, it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that officers and directors are not immune.\nThe statute also grants immunity to \u201cagents\u201d of the employer. No case has been found which interprets this word as it is used in this Act.\nIn other contexts, officers and directors are referred to as agents of the corporation. See 13 I.L.P. Corporations \u00a7 414 (1955), where it states:\n\u201cA corporation can act only through its authorized officers and agents * * * and in its dealings with third persons it is represented by its board of directors or by officers or agents to whom the board has duly designated certain powers.\u201d\nThe word \u201cagents\u201d was not contained in the original act. It was added in 1969 by P.A. 76 \u2014 282 \u00a7 1, effective July 1, 1969. In addition to \u201cagents,\u201d the legislature extended immunity to certain other categories of persons. This was apparently a legislative response to Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill.2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769. In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court, interpreting the Florida Workmens Compensation Act, held that the employer\u2019s insurer could be held liable, as a third-party tortfeasor, for damages resulting from a negligent safety inspection.\nThe legislative response was to clarify and extend immunity to persons not specifically mentioned by the prior Act.\nStatutes should be construed so that no word is made superfluous and each has a purpose. (Skillet Fork River Outlet Union Drainage District v. Fogle, 382 Ill. 77, 46 N.E.2d 73.) The rule has particular force when the word is an addition to an existing statute.\nIn statutory construction, the purpose is to give effect to the intention of the legislature. (In re Armour, 59 Ill.2d 102, 319 N.E.2d 496.) It is apparent that the general purpose of the amendment was to clarify and enlarge the class of persons who are entitled to immunity from suit.\nDirectors and officers are not specifically included in the statutory definition of employer, although obviously they are closely identified with the employer as indicated by the cases dealing with the \u201cdual capacity\u201d doctrine. To hold that \u201cagents\u201d has no meaning in addition to the meaning of employer or employee would not be consistent with the rules of statutory construction.\nTo hold that directors and officers, acting in their official capacities, are \"agents\u201d of the employer is fully consistent with the rationale of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. The purpose of the Act is to provide employees with a prompt, sure remedy for their injuries and to require that the costs of industrial accidents be borne by the industry rather than its individual members. O'Brien v. Rautenbush, 10 Ill.2d 167, 139 N.E. 2d 222.\nFor these reasons, we hold that directors and officers acting in their official capacities, are granted immunity.\nPlaintiff argues that this grant of immunity is constitutionally impermissible for want of due process and equal protection of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and article II, section 19, of the 1870 Illinois Constitution, and that it violates article I, section 12 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution; that the statute further violates article IV, section 22 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution or article IV, section 13 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.\nAs a statute is presumed valid, the burden of proving unconstitutionality is upon the party challenging it. Jaris v. Public School Teachers\u2019 Pension 6- Retirement Fund, 58 Ill.2d 15, 317 N.E.2d 51.\nThe sum of these constitutional guaranties is that the legislature may not' act arbitrarily to make class legislation or deny a right to a remedy. Nor can it act arbitrarily so as to deny' due process or equal protection. However, the legislature can reasonably pass laws in the exercise of the police power for the public good.\nWe consider that plaintiff\u2019s argument that this statute denies her due process is answered by the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court in Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill.2d 407, 137 N.E.2d 842. In Moushon, the plaintiff claimed that the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act violated due process rights if it was construed to bar a suit against the employer, which suit attempted to recover certain elements of damage not recoverable under Workmen\u2019s Compensation.\nThe court stated:\n\u201cBy the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, the legislature required the employer to give up certain defenses and required the employee to give up certain recoverable elements of damage of a common-law negligence action; and this we have held many times is a reasonable exercise of the legislature\u2019s police power for the promotion of the general welfare. [Citations.] This court has never considered one to have such a vested right in the common-law rules governing negligence actions as to preclude the legislature from substituting a statutory remedy of this type for tire common-law remedy.\u201d Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill.2d 407, 412, 137 N.E.2d 842, 845.\nPlaintiff asserts that classifying directors and officers as immune persons, rather than as third-party tortfeasors liable to suit, is arbitrary and capricious, a violation of equal protection. To be constitutional, classifications must be based on some real and substantial difference in persons and bear a rational relation to the purposes of the statute. (Grasse v. Dealer\u2019s Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124.) As one of the purposes of the statute is to transfer the costs of injury from individual members to the industry as a whole, the classification is reasonable here.\nAcceptance of plaintiff\u2019s argument would lead to more arbitrariness than its rejection. Directors and officers of a corporation could be sued for damages caused by their decisions, while persons who make exactly the same kind of decisions in a partnership or sole proprietorship would be shielded from liability because of their identity as employer.\nTie similarity between the officers and directors, on the one hand, and employers and employees, on the other, are such that it is not arbitrary to put them in the same classification.\nWhether a particular legislative enactment violates the special legislation provisions of the Illinois Constitution (article IV, \u00a7 22, Illinois\nConstitution of 1870; article IV, \u00a7 13, Illinois Constitution of 1970), is a Matter decided upon standards very similar to those involved in equal protection issues. In Youhas v. Ice, 56 Ill,2d 497, 500, 309 N.E.2d 6, 8, it was stated:\n\u201c[T]he prohibition against special legislation does not mean that a law must affect every person in the State alike. Rather, it means that * * a law shall operate uniformly throughout the State in all localities and on all persons in like circumstances and conditions. (People ex ret Vermilion County Conservation Dist. v. Lenover, 43 \u00cdll.2d 209, 217, 251 N.E.2d 175.)\u2019 The authority of the legislature to make classifications is clear. \u2018If there is a reasonable basis for differentiating between the class to which the law is applicable and the class to which it is not, the General Assembly may constitutionally classify persons and objects for the purpose of legislative regulation or control, and may pass laws applicable only to such persons or objects. (Hunt v. County of Cook, 398 Ill. 412, 76 N.E.2d 48.)\u2019 Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51 Ill.2d 103, 111, 281 N.E.2d 317, 322.\u201d\nSince these conditions are met, it is not special legislation.\nPlaintiff also asserts that immunity results in a violation of the constitutional provisions giving every person a remedy for his injuries. Article 1, \u00a7 12, Illinois Constitution of 1970; article II, \u00a7 19, Illinois Constitution of 1870.\nThese sections do not require that any specific form of remedy be provided plaintiff; rather, they are the expression of a philosophy that some remedy be provided. Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District, 51 Ill.2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659.\nPlaintiff can recover for her injuries through the comprehensive provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act.\nFor these reasons we hold that the trial court was correct in dismissing Counts IA and IB, which were based on the negligence of the officers and directors. Similarly, the counts alleging wilful and wanton negligence were properly dismissed because of the statutory bar. The Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act bars all suits for accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, \u00a7 138.2). It is generally held that injuries caused by wilful and wanton negligence of the employer are to be compensated by the Act; the only injuries, if any, outside the Act would be intentional torts. See 2 Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 68.13 (1973).\nThe trial court also dismissed the count which alleged that negligent safety inspections by Self-Insurers Service, Inc. (S.I.S.), proximately caused plaintiff\u2019s injuries. The court held that the action was barred by section 5(a) of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, \u00a7 138.5(a)).\nThe complaint alleges that S.I.S. is a safety service organization retained by the employer. As such, the statute clearly grants it immunity from common-law suit. The only question presented therefore is whether the statute is constitutional.\nThe statute provides that immunity is granted to:\n\u201cthe employer, his insurer, his broker, any service organization retained by the employer, his insurer or his broker to provide safety service, advice or recommendations for the employer or the agents or employees of any of them # III. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, \u00a7 138.5(a).\nThe substance of plaintiff\u2019s argument is that it is arbitrary and unreasonable to provide immunity to anyone other than the employer and employees, and possibly the Workmen\u2019s Compensation carrier. Of course, the burden of proving that a statute is unconstitutional is upon the party asserting that position. Jaris v. Public School Teachers\u2019 Pension Ir Retirement Fund, 58 Ill.2d 15, 317 N.E.2d 51.\nIt is relevant here to examine the history of the statute to determine the purpose of the legislature and whether it has acted arbitrarily.\nPrior to 1969, the statute provided immunity only to the employer and his employees. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 48, \u00a7 138.5(a).) Additions were made as a legislature response to Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill.2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769. In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court, interpreting the Florida Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, held that the insurer of the employer, could be held liable as a third-party not granted immunity,- for negligent safety inspection.\nIn Nelson, the insurer had argued that it would be contrary to public policy to permit recovery because the effect would be to lessen safety inspections which ultimately would result in less protection to employees. The supreme court, in rejecting this contention, stated:\n\u201c* * * whether we look to the law of Florida or Illinois, such a question of public policy is for the legislature not for the courts.\u201d (Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill.2d 69, 110-111, 199 N.E.2d 769, 792.)\nIt is presumed that the General Assembly acted with knowledge of the judicial decisions concerning prior and existing law. Towns v. Kessler, 10 Ill.App.3d 356, 293 N.E.2d 761.\nThe legislature can exercise the police power for the protection of the health, safety and general welfare of the people. However, it cannot exercise these powers arbitrarily. Grasse v. Dealer\u2019s Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124.\nIn determining the constitutionality of a statute, the court is not concerned with the wisdom of the legislation, and the General Assembly has wide discretion in exercising the police power. Grasse v. Dealers Transport Co.\nIn Reid v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 59 Ill.2d 194, 319 N.E.2d 769, the Illinois Supreme Court, interpreting the Illinois law prior to the 1969 amendments, held that the employer\u2019s workmen\u2019s compensation carrier was immune from a suit based on a negligent safety inspection. This interpretation of legislative intent indicates the importance of safety inspections and their benefit to employees.\nAcknowledging these considerations, plaintiff argues that extension of immunity to safety service organization is nonetheless an arbitrary classification.\n\u201c[T]he legislature has authority to make broad classifications and, as was declared in Bagdonas v. Liberty Land and Investment Co., 309 Ill. 103 at 109. \u2018The legislature is not required to be scientific, logical or consistent in its classifications. In order to authorize a judicial review of such classifications it must clearly appear that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require with equal force its extension to others not included. Tire legislature may determine upon what differences a distinction may be made for the purpose of statutory classification, between provisions otherwise having resemblance, if such power is not arbitrarily exercised and the distinction has a reasonable basis. * * Holiday Inns of America v. Industrial Com., 48 Ill.2d 528, 532, 271 N.E.2d 884, 887.\nIn Allen v. Employers Service Corp. (Fla. App. 1971), 243 S.2d 454, the Florida court held that a safety service company had the same immunity as the employer or his insurer for negligent safety inspections. To hold otherwise, the court said, would be an effective deterrent to using safety experts and would lessen the benefits of inspections to employees.\nPlaintiff asserts there is no rational distinction between safety organizations employed by the employer and those employed by third parties, such as lessors or manufacturers of goods sold to the employer.\nThe legislature has chosen to encourage the use of experts by granting to the safety organization the same immunity the employer has and there is a characteristic distinguishing Self-Insurers Service, Inc., from safety organizations employed by others. A grant of immunity to those safety services would extend to them an immunity their employer does not possess. We find that this is a distinction upon which it is rational to make classifications. Whether this is the best means of promoting safety is not for us to say. That is the legislature\u2019s choice, and we find it is not arbitrary. As to the other constitutional issues raised, we find our discussion concerning these same issues in regard to the officers and directors to be dispositive.\nPlaintiff\u2019s count against Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company was also dismissed on the ground that the action was barred by section 5(a) of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. The same constitutional issues are raised. A preliminary question, however, is whether Lumbermen\u2019s is within the categories of parties granted immunity.\nThe statute' grants immunity to the employer\u2019s insurer. It does not \u2022specifically limit immunity to the Workmen\u2019s Compensation carrier. Lumbermens is the general liability carrier of the employer in this case. The alleged negligence is negligent safety inspections.\n- As the insurer of the employer, Lumbermens falls within the letter of the law. The basic rule in statutory construction is to determine the intent of the legislature. In re Armour, 59 Ill.2d 102, 319 N.E.2d 496.\nIn determining that intent, it is relevant to consider the history of the amendment. This legislature enactment was a response to an Illinois Supreme Court case (Nelson v. Union Wire Rope) which held that the employer\u2019s general liability and workmens compensation carrier would be liable for negligent safety inspections and that the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act would be n\u00f3 bar. The statutory language, as amended, does not differentiate between the employer\u2019s workmen compensation insurer and the general liability insurer. This court has no power to restrict the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. Bovinette v. City of Maseoutah, 55 Ill.2d 129, 302 N.E.2d 313.\nIn view of the language of the statute, and its legislative history, w\u00e9 hold that the general liability insurer is immune from suit when the1 basis alleged is negligent safety inspections.\nPlaintiff assets that the statute, as interpreted, is unconstitutional.\nA primary doctrine in constitutional law is that a court will address constitutional questions only to the extent required by the case before it. (Grasse v. Dealer\u2019s Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124.) In the case at bar, we are concerned only with whether the legislature may constitutionally grant immunity to the employer\u2019s general liability insurer for negligent safety inspections.\nThe apparent purpose of the amendment is to promote industrial safety inspections. (Towns v. Kessler, 10 Ill.App.3d 356, 293 N.E.2d 761.) The legislature has the power to promote safety by whatever means are reasonable. Reasonable means are those appropriate to the purpose of the Act, and a court cannot declare a statute unconstitutional merely on the basis that this ..might not be the best possible means. People v. Warren, 11 Ill.2d 420, 143 N.E.2d 28.\nIn Reid v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 59 Ill.2d 194, 319 N.E.2d 769, the supreme court stated that such inspections benefit the employees and, if liability were to result, it is likely that insurers would choose not to make them, thereby harming the employees,\nSince industrial safety is a legitimate legislature concern and this grant of immunity may improve safety, it was an appropriate measure to enact.\nThe final argument is that classifying general liability insurers with other immune persons is arbitrary and unreasonable.\nAn appellate court, in Towns v. Kessler, considered exactly this question in relation to workmen\u2019s compensation carriers. They state:\n\u201cInsofar as we can determine, it would promote safety as effectively for insurers to make recommendations on safety practices or to install them as it would for others to do so. Since they are not mere volunteers or interlopers, but might be encouraged to do so by reason of a direct financial interest, it would appear to be logical to encourage them by an immunity from liability under the limited circumstances set forth in this amendment to the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act.\u201d (10 Ill.App.3d 356, 361, 293 N.E.2d 761, 765.)\nThis reasoning is also applicable to the general liability insurer. We therefore hold that the classification is not arbitrary.\nThe final issue that is presented is whether it was error for the trial court to stay plaintiff\u2019s discovery against the defendants. Discovery was. stayed under Supreme Court Rule 201(c)(1). (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, \u00a7 201(c)(1).) That rule provides that the court may deny discovery as justice requires.\nThe stay was ordered after the trial court had dismissed the complaint on the grounds that section 5(a) of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act barred the suit. Although leave was granted to amend the complaint, the amended complaint was also later dismissed on the same grounds. Under these circumstances, where the trial court had already dismissed the complaint, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the extensive discovery requested until plaintiff\u2019s right to sue had been established.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the action of the trial court in dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint against the defendants must be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed;\nGREEN and CRAVEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SIMKINS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Harold F. Tenney, of Armstrong, Winters, Prince, Tenney, Featherstun, and Johnson, of Decatur, for appellant.", "Samuels, Miller, Schroeder, Jackson & Sly, of Decatur; Ensel, Jones, Blanchard & LaBarre, of Springfield, and Seyfarth, Shaw, Fair weather & Geraldson, of Chicago (Jerald E. Jackson and Alfred B. LaBarre, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Gladys Mier, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. A. E. Staley, Jr., Deceased, et al., Defendants.\u2014(The Citizens National Bank of Decatur, Ex\u2019r of the Will of A. E. Staley, Jr., Deceased et al., Defendants-Appellees.)\n(No. 12616;\nFourth District\nMay 8, 1975.\nHarold F. Tenney, of Armstrong, Winters, Prince, Tenney, Featherstun, and Johnson, of Decatur, for appellant.\nSamuels, Miller, Schroeder, Jackson & Sly, of Decatur; Ensel, Jones, Blanchard & LaBarre, of Springfield, and Seyfarth, Shaw, Fair weather & Geraldson, of Chicago (Jerald E. Jackson and Alfred B. LaBarre, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0373-01", "first_page_order": 397, "last_page_order": 409 }