{ "id": 150185, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMYN KAPADIA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kapadia", "decision_date": "1996-06-13", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201494\u20143453", "first_page": "714", "last_page": "718", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 714" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "530 N.E.2d 1118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3587730 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555329 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 1337", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1342" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 U.S. 241", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 572499 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" }, { "page": "1083" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/337/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 1061", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3116124 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/1061-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599591 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 N.E.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2853523 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300-01" }, { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 605", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6178839 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0605-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 506, "char_count": 8990, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.380125665320789e-08, "percentile": 0.3907266408195999 }, "sha256": "4b635de6271e95cd7c1f0931899f2fe8a871ae2ae61b39d4159aca01a7c2736d", "simhash": "1:2f6896973f46aee6", "word_count": 1447 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:30.087160+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMYN KAPADIA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CAHILL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe court found defendant guilty of burglary and arson after a bench trial and sentenced him to an extended concurrent term of 14 years\u2019 imprisonment for burglary and arson. We affirm.\nDefendant argues on appeal that: (1) he was denied a fair trial because the trial court failed to act impartially at sentencing; (2) the trial court erred when it considered defendant\u2019s post-trial statements in aggravation; and (3) the court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to an extended term.\nWe first address the fair-trial argument. Defendant argues that the court abandoned the role of an impartial trier of fact when it continued the sentencing hearing and ordered the State to call a witness in aggravation. The witness, a deputy sheriff, overheard defendant make racial slurs directed at the victims and the judge after the court\u2019s finding of guilt. The deputy related what he heard to the judge. The judge directed the deputy to inform the prosecution and the defense of the remarks.\nAt the sentencing hearing, the State asked for substantial prison time. The State argued that the following aggravating factors warranted a substantial sentence: (1) the nature of the offense \u2014 starting a fire near a residential area; (2) the defendant\u2019s criminal background \u2014 two prior felony convictions; and (3) the effect of the offense on the community \u2014 fear of religious reprisal.\nBefore the defense offered evidence in mitigation, the trial judge noted for the record that he was told by a deputy sheriff of comments made by the defendant to the deputy sheriff shortly after the defendant was found guilty. He also noted for the record that he had directed the deputy sheriff to relate the information to the State and defense. The court then asked whether the parties wished to call the deputy as a witness. The State responded: \"Not today, your honor. I learned today he was transferred to another courtroom of which I was unaware.\u201d The defense responded: \"No.\u201d\nThe judge then said that he would not consider the post-trial remarks of the defendant in aggravation. But the defense in mitigation argued that the State had, in fact, offered evidence in aggravation to race and racially motivated activity that was not part of the trial record. In response to the defense making this point, the court continued the sentencing hearing and ordered the deputy sheriff subpoenaed as a witness.\nWhen the sentencing hearing continued, Deputy Joseph Bennet testified in aggravation. He said that when defendant\u2019s trial ended he was escorting defendant to the lockup and defendant said: \"You can tell the judge for me [defendant\u2019s name] that he\u2019s a [expletive] and [expletive] the [J]ews.\u201d During cross-examination the deputy admitted that defendants frequently make derogatory comments directed at the judiciary. The State then called deputy sheriff Joseph Boyle. Boyle also heard the defendant make anti-Semitic remarks.\nThe record reveals that the court then considered the evidence presented in aggravation and mitigation, including that of the deputies. The court sentenced the defendant to concurrent extended terms of 14 years for both burglary and arson.\nThe defense argues that the trial judge abused his discretion when he recessed the sentencing hearing and, on his own motion, ordered a witness subpoenaed. We disagree. The implication is that the scope of a judge\u2019s inquiry at a sentencing hearing must be confined to weighing evidence in aggravation and mitigation presented by the prosecution and the defense. We have found no case that prohibits a court from summoning a witness at a sentencing hearing on its own motion. To the contrary, Illinois law vests wide discretion in the court at sentencing:\n\" 'His task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly relevant \u2014 if not essential \u2014 to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant\u2019s life and characteristics. And modern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial.\u2019 [Citation.] Very recently the court in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 18 L. Ed. 2d 326[, 87 S. Ct. 1209], announced its continuing adherence to Williams.\nIn Illinois, too, we have long held that the judge in determining the character and extent of punishment is not limited to considering only information which would be admissible under the adversary circumstances of a trial. While it must exercise care to insure the accuracy of information considered and to shield itself from what might be the prejudicial effect of improper materials [citation], 'the court is not confined to the evidence showing guilt, for that issue has been settled by the plea.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d People v. Adkins, 41 Ill. 2d 297, 300-01, 242 N.E.2d 258 (1968).\nA trial judge has wide latitude when receiving relevant evidence at sentencing. See People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 492, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1981). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s decision to order the deputies to testify.\nAt sentencing, the trial court may consider any evidence which is relevant and reliable. People v. Williams, 149 Ill. 2d 467, 490, 599 N.E.2d 913 (1992). When imposing sentence, the court must consider the nature of the crime, the character and mentality of the defendant, the effect of the crime on the community, and the message it sends to society. People v. Kloiber, 95 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 420 N.E.2d 870 (1981).\nHere defendant\u2019s statements provided insight into defendant\u2019s character, mentality, attitude, lack of remorse, and rehabilitative potential. The negative light the statements shed on defendant is consistent with the purpose of hearing evidence in aggravation. We find that the judge did not abandon his role as impartial trier of fact when he ordered the deputy sheriff to be called in aggravation, but insured that the court possessed \" 'the fullest information possible concerning the defendant\u2019s life and characteristics\u2019 \u201d before imposing sentence. Adkins, 41 Ill. 2d at 300, quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 93 L. Ed. 1337, 1342, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1083 (1949).\nDefendant next argues the court relied upon factors which were not in evidence when it sentenced defendant to an extended term. We disagree.\nThe record reveals that the defendant was found guilty of burglary and arson. Both are Class 2 felonies. The defendant had two prior felony convictions \u2014 one a Class 1 felony, the other a Class 2 felony. Defendant was eligible for an extended term no matter what other evidence was heard. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(1) (West 1992).\nThe record does not support defendant\u2019s contention that the court imposed an extended-term sentence because of defendant\u2019s slurs aimed at a particular religious group. Rather, read in context, the court\u2019s remarks at sentencing weighed defendant\u2019s statements in the context of his attitude toward the victims, his lack of remorse, and lack of potential for rehabilitation.\nThough we believe a trial judge at sentencing must measure his words carefully and err on the side of restraint, this record does not reveal a trial judge who abused his discretion when he considered the evidence of defendant\u2019s anti-Semitic remarks. He may have belabored the point, but the record as a whole reveals a trial judge who was eminently fair to this defendant, both at trial and at sentencing.\nThe defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to an extended term because of the disparity between the defendant\u2019s sentence and that of his codefendant.\nAgain, we note that the record reveals that the defendant\u2019s two felony convictions made him eligible for an extended-term sentence. The trial court evaluated all the evidence presented to him in aggravation and mitigation. The court\u2019s sentence was within the statutory guidelines and was not an abuse of discretion. People v. O\u2019Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 531 N.E.2d 366 (1988).\nNor did the court abuse its discretion in failing to consider the disparity of the sentences between codefendants. See People v. Davenport, 176 Ill. App. 3d 142, 147, 530 N.E.2d 1118 (1988).\nAffirmed.\nTHEIS and O\u2019BRIEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CAHILL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (James S. Jacobs, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Linda Woloshin, and Clare Wesolik Connolly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMYN KAPADIA, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201494\u20143453\nOpinion filed June 13, 1996.\nRehearing denied July 12, 1996.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (James S. Jacobs, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Linda Woloshin, and Clare Wesolik Connolly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0714-01", "first_page_order": 732, "last_page_order": 736 }