{
  "id": 150262,
  "name": "JOHN MACHULIS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Machulis v. Farmers Insurance Exchange",
  "decision_date": "1996-06-14",
  "docket_number": "No. 1\u201494\u20142463",
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1992,
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    {
      "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 376",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:30.087160+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "JOHN MACHULIS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE ZWICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from the trial court\u2019s order dismissing the case on the pleadings pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 1994)). After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm.\nThe plaintiffs\u2019 14-year-old daughter was struck by a car and she sustained $375,000 in medical expenses. The plaintiffs\u2019 automobile insurance included a personal injury benefit which covered $5,000 of the medical costs. Plaintiff also owned a \"Special Personal Umbrella Policy\u201d and brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that it covered the remaining $370,000.\nThe issue is whether the plaintiffs\u2019 umbrella policy covers medical payments made by the plaintiffs on behalf of their daughter, beyond the $5,000 benefit included in their automobile insurance. The trial court ruled that the umbrella policy was meant to provide \"third party coverage\u201d and dismissed the case on the pleadings. We review the court\u2019s finding under a de nova standard. Whiting v. Prestige Casualty Co., 238 Ill. App. 3d 376, 606 N.E.2d 397 (1992).\nThe leading case on the issue of whether an umbrella policy covers injuries to the insured is Hartbarger v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 107 Ill. App. 3d 391 (1982). In Hartbarger, the insurance company argued that its umbrella policy was a policy of liability insurance only and that it was not intended to cover uninsured motorist claims such as the one the plaintiff had presented. The court stated that \"[a]n umbrella liability policy is generally designed to protect the insured from a judgment against him in an amount greater than that provided for in the underlying policies.\u201d Hartbarger, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 394. The court also wrote that \"an umbrella liability policy is entirely different from an automobile policy\u201d and concluded that the policy at issue was intended only \"to protect the insured against excess judgments.\u201d Hartbarger, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 396.\nPlaintiffs attempt to distinguish Hartbarger by pointing out that their policy did not include the word \"liability\u201d in its title, as they claim the insurance policy at issue in Hartbarger did. Plaintiffs also argue that, because \"damages\u201d was interpreted in the case of Zegar v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 211 Ill. App. 3d 1025 (1991), to include \"medical payments,\u201d the use of the word \"damages\u201d in their policy should similarly include the medical payments they made on behalf of their daughter. Finally, plaintiffs assert that, because the policy does not exclude the coverage of medical payments, it is reasonable to conclude that the parties intended such coverage be included in the umbrella policy. We disagree.\nThe absence of the word \"liability\u201d in the title of the umbrella policy is not significant. The term \"umbrella policy\u201d is defined by Black\u2019s as \"[a] form of insurance protection against losses in excess of the amount covered by other liability insurance.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 808 (6th ed. 1990). In light of this definition, it is not surprising that the word \"liability\u201d was not included as part of the umbrella policy title. The inclusion of the word \"liability\u201d would have been redundant.\nPlaintiffs, in making their argument that the umbrella policy was not meant to be a policy of liability insurance only, overlook that the premium payment listed on the policy\u2019s declaration page states that coverage is for \"personal liability,\u201d not personal injury. Clearly, if the policy was designed to cover both the excess medical expenses of the plaintiffs themselves and the excess of judgments brought against them, the policy would have been described more appropriately in the declaration page.\nMoreover, the terms of the umbrella policy cover only \"damages\u201d that the plaintiff must pay \"legally or by agreement\u201d with the written consent of the defendant. Plaintiffs have not argued that they were \"legally\u201d compelled to pay their daughter\u2019s medical expenses or that they paid her expenses after first obtaining the consent of the defendant. We find unpersuasive plaintiffs\u2019 argument that their daughter\u2019s medical expenses represent \"damages\u201d in the context of the terms of this policy. The plaintiffs\u2019 reliance on Zegar is misplaced. In Zegar, the court merely stated the obvious proposition that medical expenses may be viewed as a component of an injured party\u2019s legal damages in a tort action. Zegar, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 1028.\nFinally, the fact that the umbrella policy does not contain an exclusion for the types of benefits claimed by the plaintiffs is not controlling. It is axiomatic that exclusions are relevant in construing an insurance policy only when the policy provides coverage in the first instance. Hartbarger, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 394; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Case Foundation Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 115 (1973).\nWe conclude that, in the absence of a judgment or settlement against the plaintiffs, plaintiffs\u2019 umbrella policy does not provide coverage. Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed the case on the pleadings.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nEGAN and RAKOWSKI, JJ\u201e concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE ZWICK"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Steven J. Seidman and Monico, Pavich & Spevack, both of Chicago (Barry A. Spevack, of counsel), for appellants.",
      "Worker & Power, of Chicago (Danny L. Worker and Julie A. Hoffman, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JOHN MACHULIS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201494\u20142463\nOpinion filed June 14, 1996.\nSteven J. Seidman and Monico, Pavich & Spevack, both of Chicago (Barry A. Spevack, of counsel), for appellants.\nWorker & Power, of Chicago (Danny L. Worker and Julie A. Hoffman, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0829-01",
  "first_page_order": 847,
  "last_page_order": 850
}