{ "id": 159556, "name": "GRIGOLEIT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Grigoleit Co. v. Department of Employment Security", "decision_date": "1996-07-08", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201495\u20140905", "first_page": "64", "last_page": "72", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 64" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 879", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467814 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0879-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 N.E.2d 1121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. App. 3d 803", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499350 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/218/0803-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 N.E.2d 3", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365834 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "654 N.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" }, { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291525 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141089 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 N.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2934533 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146286 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 N.E.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3437425 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2716760 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 N.E.2d 1266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3499334 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 988", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3544841 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0988-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 N.E.2d 1351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1355" }, { "page": "1356" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 1094", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3443736 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1099" }, { "page": "1100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/1094-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 745, "char_count": 18608, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2563446501072372e-07, "percentile": 0.6113759914188047 }, "sha256": "6570502302c68ac357242020acc0692f2a891a378ea772954e7e4e304c45b316", "simhash": "1:8951981f6a53a427", "word_count": 3050 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:31.167440+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GRIGOLEIT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, the Grigoleit Company, brought this action for administrative review of a decision by the Board of Review of the Illinois Department of Employment Security (Board) that claimant, Karen Smith, was eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The circuit court affirmed the Board\u2019s decision and plaintiff appeals, arguing claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits under either section 601(A) or section 602(A) of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Act) (820 ILCS 405/601(A), 602(A) (West 1994)). We disagree and affirm.\nSmith was employed as a production worker by plaintiff from March 10, 1984, to November 7, 1994. It is undisputed that in her 101/ 2 years as an employee of plaintiff, Smith missed only five days of work and never received a disciplinary warning of any kind. On November 3, 1994, plaintiff posted a notice informing all production workers that they would be required to work on Saturday, November 5, 1994. Although Saturdays were not normally scheduled workdays, plaintiff\u2019s employment policy required employees to report to work according to any posted schedule changes. Smith reported to work on November 5, 1994, but early in her shift, the production line malfunctioned and Smith was told it would not become operational again that day. Smith\u2019s supervisor then asked her to sweep the work area. Smith\u2019s response to her supervisor was that she had come to work to run the production line but not to clean, and that she wanted to go home. Smith\u2019s supervisor told her she would lose the day\u2019s pay if she left work; nonetheless, Smith chose to leave work.\nOn Monday, November 7, 1994, Smith reported to work and worked her full scheduled shift. After finishing her shift, Smith was instructed to pick up a letter in the management office. The letter informed Smith that by leaving work early on November 5, 1994, and failing to provide notification of her leave, she had committed misconduct and had forfeited her work schedule. The letter stated that if Smith wanted to continue working for plaintiff, she was to provide a written explanation of her conduct by 10 a.m., November 9, 1994.\nOn November 9, 1994, Smith delivered a statement to plaintiff\u2019s office explaining the events of Saturday, November 5, 1994. Later that day, Sharon LeCates, a resources and compliance manager for plaintiff, notified Smith that her letter was not sufficient to reinstate her and that, according to company policy, before she would be scheduled for work, she had to submit an \"offer to work\u201d to the company. Smith never submitted an offer to work to plaintiff.\nOn November 10, 1994, Smith filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits. On December 2, 1994, a claims adjudicator determined Smith was ineligible for benefits under sections 500(C) and 601(A) of the Act (820 ILCS 405/500(0, 601(A) (West 1994)). On December 6, 1994, Smith filed a request for reconsideration of the claims adjudicator\u2019s determination with the Illinois Department of Employment Security. On December 27, 1994, a hearing was held before a referee.\nAt the December 27, 1994, hearing, the issues were (1) whether Smith voluntarily left her job without good cause attributable to her employer, which would disqualify her from receiving benefits under section 601(A) of the Act; or (2) whether Smith was discharged for misconduct connected with her work, which would disqualify her under section 602(A) of the Act; and (3) whether Smith was able to, available for, and actively seeking work during a two-week period under review, as required by section 500(C) of the Act.\nSmith, her supervisor, and LeCates testified at the hearing regarding the events of November 5, 1994, and the subsequent actions taken by plaintiff and Smith. The referee issued his decision on December 28, 1994. The referee found Smith did not anticipate that she would be discharged if she left work early on November 5, 1994, but only that she would be docked a day of pay if she did so. Thus, the referee determined Smith did not resign from her job, constructively or otherwise, when she left work on November 5, 1994, and was not disqualified from receiving benefits under section 601(A) of the Act.\nThe referee further determined that in leaving work early on November 5, 1994, Smith had not engaged in an act of misconduct and therefore was not disqualified from receiving benefits under section 602(A) of the Act. Finally, the referee determined Smith was ineligible for benefits for the period November 6, 1994, through November 19, 1994, because she had not been available for, nor actively seeking, employment during that time.\nIn January 1995, plaintiff filed an appeal of the referee\u2019s decision with the Board. The Board determined that by refusing to schedule Smith to work after November 7, 1994, and by requiring her to submit an offer to work without the guarantee that such an offer would be accepted, plaintiff caused Smith\u2019s separation from work. Accordingly, the Board concluded section 601(A) of the Act was inapplicable to Smith\u2019s claim for benefits.\nHaving affirmed the referee\u2019s finding that Smith did not voluntarily leave her employment, the Board then examined whether Smith had engaged in misconduct under section 602(A) of the Act and found that she had not. In support of its finding, the Board noted Smith had never received any disciplinary warnings prior to November 5, 1994. Finally, the Board affirmed the referee\u2019s finding regarding Smith\u2019s ineligibility under section 500(C) of the Act for the period November 6, 1994, through November 19, 1994.\nPlaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court on June 9, 1995, alleging Smith was disqualified from receiving benefits based on sections 601(A) and 602(A) of the Act, and contending the Board\u2019s decision otherwise was contrary to the law and the evidence presented.\nA hearing on the complaint was held on October 20, 1995, and the circuit court issued its decision on October 23, 1995. The circuit court determined the evidence supported the Board\u2019s findings and affirmed the Board\u2019s decision.\nThe receipt of unemployment insurance benefits is conditioned on the claimant satisfying the eligibility requirements of the Act. 820 ILCS 405/100 et seq. (West 1994); Burke v. Board of Review, Illinois Department of Labor, 132 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 1099, 477 N.E.2d 1351, 1355 (1985). Section 601(A) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that a claimant \"shall be ineligible for benefits for the week in which he [or she] has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employing unit.\u201d 820 ILCS 405/601(A) (West 1994). Plaintiffs first argument on appeal is that by leaving work on November 5, 1994, and failing to seek future assignments of work in accordance with company policies, Smith voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to her employer and is therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under section 601(A) of the Act.\nPlaintiff cites the cases of Collier v. Department of Employment Security, 157 Ill. App. 3d 988, 510 N.E.2d 623 (1987), and Popoff v. Department of Labor, 144 Ill. App. 3d 575, 494 N.E.2d 1266 (1986), for the proposition that \"[a]n employee who leaves work because of dissatisfaction with the type of work or hours assigned does not leave for good cause and is not entitled to benefits.\u201d In each of those cases, the court held the employee who voluntarily quit his or her job due to dissatisfaction with the reduction of his or her work hours had not left for good cause attributable to the employer. However, in neither of those cases was there doubt that the employee voluntarily chose to leave his or her employment; the only issue was whether the employee voluntarily left for good cause attributable to the employer. Yet the issue here is whether Smith \"voluntarily left\u201d her employment or was discharged by plaintiff. Thus, the only authority offered by plaintiff in support of its position is unpersuasive on the issue before us.\nPlaintiff asserts Smith voluntarily left her employment because under company policies, which Smith acknowledged having received, a failure to be present to perform assigned work, absent proper notification of leave, constitutes a voluntary quit. The Board argues Smith did not voluntarily leave her employment, but was discharged by plaintiff, making section 601(A) of the Act inapplicable to her claim for benefits.\nIn attempting to establish that Smith voluntarily quit her job, plaintiff relies almost exclusively on its own employment policies and offers little authority, statutory or otherwise, in support of its position. Under plaintiff\u2019s policies, Smith\u2019s departure from work on November 5, 1994, is interpreted as a voluntary quit. However, it is the Act and the cases interpreting it which control eligibility for benefits, not plaintiff\u2019s internal employment policies. Keystone Steel & Wire Division, Keystone Consolidated Industries v. Department of Labor, 37 Ill. App. 3d 704, 706, 346 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1976).\nWhether an employee voluntarily discontinued her employment is a question of intent and is to be determined from the totality of the evidence presented. Dunn v. Director, Department of Labor, 131 Ill. App. 3d 171, 174, 476 N.E.2d 77, 79-80 (1985). Under section 3 \u2014 110 of the Administrative Review Law, an administrative agency\u2019s findings concerning factual questions are prima facie true and correct and should not be disturbed on review unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 1994); Garland v. Department of Labor, 104 Ill. 2d 383, 392, 472 N.E.2d 434, 437 (1984); Peterson v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen\u2019s Pension Fund, 54 Ill. 2d 260, 262-63, 296 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1973); Burke, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 1100, 477 N.E.2d at 1356.\nSmith\u2019s testimony and conduct strongly indicate she did not intend to terminate her employment with plaintiff on November 5, 1994, nor did she anticipate that her actions would result in her discharge. Smith had never before left work early; thus, it would be reasonable to infer she was unfamiliar with the company procedure for doing so and would not have anticipated that she would be discharged for leaving early, having informed her supervisor of her intentions. Smith reported for work as scheduled on Monday, November 7, 1994, and worked her full shift. This demonstrated that she did not believe she had terminated her employment with plaintiff and was not aware that her actions of November 5, 1994, had constituted a breach of company policy punishable by discharge. When notified that she was to provide a written explanation of the events of November 5, 1994, Smith submitted her explanation in a timely manner, further demonstrating her intention to maintain employment with plaintiff\nPlaintiff also argues that its position Smith voluntarily quit her job is supported by the fact that she never submitted an offer to work as instructed. As described in the employee manual, an offer to work must be presented by an individual seeking employment with plaintiff and must set forth any requirements or conditions the individual wishes to place on her employment. The heading for the section in the employee manual addressing offers to work is \"Offers to Work from Former Employees\u201d and that section applies only to individuals who have voluntarily quit their jobs. Thus, Smith\u2019s failure to submit an offer to work must be deemed to have occurred subsequent to her termination of employment and cannot properly be considered in a determination of whether she voluntarily quit her job. Even if it were a factor in that determination, given that Smith did not intend to quit when she left work early on November 5, 1994, it is understandable that she was confused as to what she was required to do to obtain reassignment of a work schedule.\nThe record supports the Board\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff refused to schedule Smith to work after November 7, 1994, as a result of her actions on November 5, 1994. The Board correctly determined that, in so doing, plaintiff discharged Smith. For the above reasons, we concur in the Board\u2019s decision that section 601(A) of the Act is not applicable to Smith\u2019s claim for unemployment benefits.\nThe second issue presented is whether the Board erred in finding Smith did not engage in statutory misconduct. A discharge disqualifies an employee from receiving unemployment compensation if it is based on behavior that amounts to \"misconduct\u201d within the meaning of section 602(A) of the Act. Jackson v. Board of Review of the Department of Labor, 105 Ill. 2d 501, 511, 475 N.E.2d 879, 884 (1985). Section 602(A) of the Act defines \"misconduct\u201d as:\n\"the deliberate and willful violation of a reasonable rule or policy of the employing unit, governing the individual\u2019s behavior in performance of his work, provided such violation has harmed the employing unit or other employees or has been repeated by the individual despite a warning or other explicit instruction from the employing unit.\u201d 820 ILCS 405/602(A) (West 1994).\nIn reaching its decision, the Board was required to make conclusions of both fact and law. See Perto v. Board of Review, 274 Ill. App. 3d 485, 490, 654 N.E.2d 232, 236 (1995).\nWhether an employee\u2019s conduct amounts to statutory misconduct is a question of law and therefore subject to de novo review. See Perto, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 490, 654 N.E.2d at 236. Plaintiff alleges the following actions by Smith constituted misconduct under its policies: (1) she refused to do the work assigned her, and (2) she failed to follow the procedures detailed in the employee manual to notify her employer she was leaving work early. As discussed above, however, whether an individual is eligible for unemployment benefits is determined by the Act, not the employer\u2019s own policies.\nTo prove statutory misconduct, the employer must demonstrate (1) the employee engaged in wilful and deliberate conduct; (2) in violation of a reasonable rule or policy regulating the performance of the employee\u2019s work; and (3) the violation harmed the employer or a fellow employee; or (4) similar violations were repeated despite explicit previous warnings or instructions. Garner v. Department of Employment Security, 269 Ill. App. 3d 370, 374, 646 N.E.2d 3, 6 (1995).\nThus, to establish Smith was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits, plaintiff had to demonstrate that in telling her supervisor she did not want to clean, agreeing to a loss of pay for the day, and going home, Smith wilfully violated a reasonable rule of plaintiff which harmed plaintiff or another employee.\nPlaintiff contends first that Smith violated one of its rules by refusing to perform the work assigned her. It is undisputed that Smith was dissatisfied with the nature of the work assigned her and refused to do it. However, the evidence indicated that when Smith told her supervisor she wanted to leave early on November 5, 1994, her supervisor did not tell her she could not leave, but merely conditioned her leaving on the loss of pay for that day. The supervisor\u2019s placing conditions on her leaving was not the same as telling Smith she could not leave. Thus, Smith had reason to believe that she could leave if she accepted the preconditioned loss of pay and, we conclude, did not deliberately or willfully violate any rule or policy of plaintiff by leaving work.\nFurther, plaintiff did not demonstrate how Smith\u2019s decision to go home without pay, once it was apparent the production line would not be functioning all day, harmed plaintiff or another employee, as required by the Act. Although the statutory element of harm can be substituted with proof that the employee has repeatedly violated the rules of her employer and been warned about such behavior, the evidence established plaintiff had never before taken disciplinary action against Smith and had never issued any warnings to her regarding leaving work early. For this reason, the present case is distinguishable from Nichols v. Department of Employment Security, 218 Ill. App. 3d 803, 578 N.E.2d 1121 (1991), cited by plaintiff.\nPlaintiff further asserts Smith violated its rules by failing to follow the proper procedure for leaving work once one\u2019s shift has begun. Plaintiff\u2019s employee policies and procedures are contained in its employee manual, the most recent of which plaintiff issued to Smith in August 1993. The manual states that an employee who wants to leave work once a shift has begun must notify plaintiff \"verbally\u201d that she is leaving, and why, by calling an \"800\u201d number within four hours after the beginning of the shift. On November 5, 1994, Smith informed her supervisor she wanted to leave work and was told if she did so she would lose the day\u2019s pay. Smith accepted this consequence and went home. Although she did not telephone the 800 number as prescribed in the employee manual, she did provide her employer, through her supervisor, with verbal notice that she was leaving work. Smith\u2019s supervisor did not then instruct her to call the 800 number. If the supervisor had, and Smith had refused to comply, that may properly be viewed as a wilful and deliberate violation of a reasonable company rule. However, Smith could reasonably have believed that her discussion with her supervisor constituted sufficient notice to her employer that she was leaving work early. Smith\u2019s mere failure to telephone the 800 number did not amount to a wilful and deliberate violation of a company rule.\nWhile Smith\u2019s failure to strictly follow plaintiff\u2019s procedures may have justified her discharge, plaintiff failed to prove Smith engaged in \"misconduct\u201d as it is defined by section 602(A) of the Act. Therefore, Smith is not disqualified under section 602(A) of the Act from receiving unemployment benefits. See Pesce v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security, 161 Ill. App. 3d 879, 882, 515 N.E.2d 849, 851 (1987). Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCOOK, P.J., and McCULLOUGH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Frederic L. Kenney and Jerrold H. Stocks (argued), both of Winters, Featherstun, Gaumer, Kenney, Postlewait & Stocks, of Decatur, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Morton E. Friedman, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GRIGOLEIT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201495\u20140905\nArgued May 14, 1996.\nOpinion filed July 8, 1996.\nFrederic L. Kenney and Jerrold H. Stocks (argued), both of Winters, Featherstun, Gaumer, Kenney, Postlewait & Stocks, of Decatur, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Morton E. Friedman, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0064-01", "first_page_order": 82, "last_page_order": 90 }