{ "id": 159576, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD MOULTON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Moulton", "decision_date": "1996-07-16", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201495\u20140787", "first_page": "102", "last_page": "107", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 102" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "595 N.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 Ill. App. 3d 1094", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5215403 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/229/1094-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5554869 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 1016", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249207 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/1016-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 N.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278519 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 N.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2873294 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/259/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 N.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5341225 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 N.E.2d 1025", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5121271 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 N.E.2d 948", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5801908 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/219/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780271 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 Ill. App. 3d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5214694 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/229/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 N.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3616349 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/171/0306-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 707, "char_count": 12804, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2586457254325268e-07, "percentile": 0.7823832586378588 }, "sha256": "d404c816c35d9b8e094a1b45c1e4a6cf366ddbab75886db9cd01c01dcb30ae21", "simhash": "1:931e7d585b521904", "word_count": 2180 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:31.167440+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD MOULTON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SLATER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Richard Moulton was charged with home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11 (West 1994)), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 4(a) (West 1994)) and attempted criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4; 5/12 \u2014 13(a)(1) (West 1994)). Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the home invasion charge was granted on the basis that it failed to state an offense. See 725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 1(a)(8) (West 1994). The State appeals, contending that the charge was improperly dismissed. We affirm.\nSection 12 \u2014 11 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) states in part:\n\"Home Invasion, a) A person who is not a peace officer acting in the line of duty commits home invasion when without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present or he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another and remains in such dwelling until he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present and\n***\n(2) Intentionally causes any injury to any person or persons within such dwelling place.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11 (West 1994).\nIn this case, the information charged that on July 30, 1995, the defendant:\n\"not a peace officer acting in the line of duty, knowingly, and without authority, entered the dwelling of Deborah Moulton, *** having reason to know Deborah Moulton to be present within that dwelling and intentionally caused injury to Deborah Moulton in that he struck her in the face with his fist, and did then and there, thereby, commit the offense of HOME INVASION in violation of Chapter 720, Section 5/12 \u2014 11 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes.\u201d\nThe marriage between the defendant and the victim, Deborah Moulton, had been dissolved on March 7, 1995. Under the terms of a marital settlement agreement, Deborah was granted exclusive possession of the marital residence until March of 1997, at which time it was to be sold and the proceeds divided evenly between the parties. However, the defendant and Deborah retained joint legal title to the residence. On March 30, 1995, a plenary order of protection was entered prohibiting the defendant from entering or remaining in the marital residence. That order was in effect on the date of the alleged offenses.\nIn dismissing the home invasion charge, the trial court ruled that a joint owner of a dwelling place could not be charged with home invasion. The court principally relied upon this court\u2019s decision in People v. Wyant, 171 Ill. App. 3d 306, 525 N.E.2d 591 (1988), which affirmed the dismissal of a charge of criminal trespass to land brought against a joint tenant who trespassed on marital property after exclusive possession had been granted to the complainant.\nOn appeal, the State contends that dismissal was improper because the information stated an offense, notwithstanding the fact that the dwelling referred to in the charging instrument may have been owned by the defendant. The State argues that the purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the allegations in the charging instrument, not the sufficiency of the evidence, and the merits of a case are not to be decided \"within the vacuum of a motion to dismiss.\u201d Alternatively, the State maintains that Wyant is distinguishable from this case and does not require dismissal of the home invasion charge.\nWhen an information is challenged before trial, it must strictly comply with the pleading requirements set forth in section 111 \u2014 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/111 \u2014 3 (West 1994)). People v. Hughes, 229 Ill. App. 3d 469, 592 N.E.2d 668 (1992). \"Section 111 \u2014 3(a) demands that the charging instrument be in writing, stating the name of the offense and the relevant statutory provision violated, setting forth the nature and elements of the offense and the date and county in which the offense occurred, and naming the accused if known or a reasonably certain description.\u201d People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 51, 630 N.E.2d 811, 815 (1994). An information that fails to set forth the nature and elements of the crime sought to be charged does not state an offense and is subject to dismissal. People v. Wilder, 219 Ill. App. 3d 437, 579 N.E.2d 948 (1991). To vest a court with jurisdiction in a criminal case, the information must charge the accused with a crime (People v. Ikpoh, 242 Ill. App. 3d 365, 609 N.E.2d 1025 (1993); if the facts alleged may all be true but nevertheless fail to constitute an offense, the charge is insufficient (People v. Latham, 13 Ill. App. 3d 371, 299 N.E.2d 808 (1973)). A trial court determines the sufficiency of a charging instrument as a matter of law and our review of that determination is de novo. People v. Smith, 259 Ill. App. 3d 492, 631 N.E.2d 738 (1994).\nIn this case, the trial court found that the home invasion statute did not apply to defendant because he was a co-owner of the dwelling that he was charged with invading. In other words, the court ruled that even if the allegations contained in the information were true, they failed to state an offense. Under such circumstances, dismissal of the information was proper if a co-owner of a dwelling is not subject to prosecution under the home invasion statute.\nIn People v. Wyant, the defendant and the complainant had been married, and the complainant had received exclusive possession of the marital home when they were divorced. However, pending sale of the home, the title remained in joint tenancy. Defendant was charged with criminally trespassing on the marital property (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 21 \u2014 3(a)). The trespass statute provided that it was an offense to enter upon the land \"of another\u201d after receiving notice that entry was forbidden. In affirming dismissal of the complaint, this court stated that the purpose of the statute was to prevent violence or threats of violence, and we noted that a \"joint tenant entering his own property does not present the inherent threat of violence to his co-owners as does an interloper who refuses to leave.\u201d Furthermore, \"where a divorce decree grants exclusive possession, the civil courts provide relief.\u201d Wyant, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 308, 525 N.E.2d at 592.\nThe State maintains that, unlike the criminal trespass statute at issue in Wyant, the language of the home invasion statute evidences \"the legislative intent to protect persons in their homes from all unauthorized entries.\u201d Although we agree that determining the legislature\u2019s intent is critical to properly construing the statute, our conclusion concerning that intent is somewhat different from that proffered by the State.\nThe cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 589 N.E.2d 508 (1992). In determining that intent, a court may consider not only the language of the statute, but also the reason and necessity for the law, the evil sought to be remedied, and the purposes to be achieved. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 589 N.E.2d 508. Examining the legislative history of a statute is an appropriate aid to making such a determination. See Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 589 N.E.2d 508; People v. Holt, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 649 N.E.2d 571 (1995).\nOur examination of the legislative history of the home invasion statute reveals that, as originally proposed, the phrase \"of another\u201d was not included in the statute. See 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 28, 1978, at 70 (statement of Senator Netsch) (\"A person commits home invasion when without authority, he knowingly enters within a dwelling place when he knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present ***\u201d). During discussion of the statute, Senator Knuppel asked:\n\"Well, Senator Netsch, let\u2019s suppose a husband and wife are ... are separated for one reason or another and he\u2019s staying at the hotel and they\u2019re trying to get things patched up and he goes hunting and he gets wet and cold and his extra clothes that he wants are in the house where the ... where his wife lives and he comes to the door and she says I damn well aren\u2019t going to let you in and he says to hell with you and he breaks the glass. He\u2019s got his shotgun with him, reaches in, opens the door and goes in and she says something, throws a skillet at him and he knocks the hell out of her.\u201d 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 28, 1978, at 78-79 (statements of Senator Knuppel).\nSenator Netsch responded that she would \"give him fifteen years.\u201d Senator Knuppel then expressed concern that the proposed statute could be used\n\"in instances of domestic strife where it\u2019s not really intended to be used at all and I think that therefore, it\u2019s ... it\u2019s a bad amendment and it does require more thought, it does require more refinement when you\u2019re talking about a penalty from ... from six to thirty years and the people that could be involved. He might have entered there even in ... with good intentions and then after he got in there, she had burned the meat and he had come home with his shotgun and you know, and he busts her one when she throws the skillet at him. I... I just really ... I think it\u2019s a bad ... I think it\u2019s a bad amendment. I think it\u2019s subject to abuse. I think it needs more than what it\u2019s got to be a Class X penalty.\u201d 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 28,1978, at 79 (statements of Senator Knuppel).\nAfter additional discussion, Senator Netsch responded:\n\"And I would say that while I recognize, Senator Knuppel, that there are situations of domestic strife to which perhaps this bill should not be applied, I think, in fact, they would not be then. It seems to me that if you have a, if I may use the expression, just an ordinary good old household domestic battle in which a couple of people beat one another up and break a few arms and that ... that normal kind of activity that the State\u2019s Attorney is not likely to press charges under a home invasion Statute even if the language specifically covered the set of circumstances. I think it is more likely to be a regular battery case or something of that sort.\u201d 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 28, 1978, at 85-86 (statements of Senator Netsch).\nTwo days later, Senator Netsch made a motion to adopt a conference committee report which made \"changes *** in the definition of home invasion to meet questions that were raised on the Floor by Senator Rock and Senator Knuppel.\u201d 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 30, 1978, at 83 (statement of Senator Netsch). The changes Senator Netsch referred to included the addition of the phrase \"of another\u201d following \"dwelling place.\u201d See 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 30, 1978, at 85 (statement of Senator Netsch). As explained that same day by Representative Getty during proceedings in the House of Representatives, \"Now we have, through the Conference Committee, made a clarification raised by some Senators that would provide that it must be the home of another so you could not commit that offense in your own home.\u201d 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 30, 1978, at 135.\nIt is apparent that the legislature did not intend for the home invasion statute to apply to cases of domestic violence involving married couples. It is unclear, however, whether the statute applies in cases where, as here, the parties are recently divorced and the defendant retains an ownership, but not a possessory, interest in the dwelling.\n\"[C]riminal or penal statutes must be strictly construed and may not be extended in their application to cases which do not, by the strictest construction, come under their provisions.\u201d People v. Parvin, 125 Ill. 2d 519, 525, 533 N.E.2d 813, 815 (1988). Nothing is to be taken by intendment or implication against a defendant beyond the literal and obvious meaning of the statute. People v. Hiatt, 229 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 595 N.E.2d 733 (1992). The statute provides that to commit home invasion a person must enter the dwelling place of another. Strict construction of the statutory language requires us to find that the defendant, as a joint tenant of the property, does not fall within the scope of the statute.\nFor the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCUSKEY and MICHELA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SLATER" } ], "attorneys": [ "William Poncin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Macomb (John X. Breslin and Rita Kennedy Mertel (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Robert P. Nolan (argued), of De Kalb, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD MOULTON, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201495\u20140787\nOpinion filed July 16, 1996.\nWilliam Poncin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Macomb (John X. Breslin and Rita Kennedy Mertel (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert P. Nolan (argued), of De Kalb, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0102-01", "first_page_order": 120, "last_page_order": 125 }