{ "id": 159563, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY J. MAZAR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Mazar", "decision_date": "1996-07-26", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201495\u20140499", "first_page": "662", "last_page": "664", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 662" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "600 N.E.2d 1197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5785693 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/235/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 1134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3559978 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 N.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2875659 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0574-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 361, "char_count": 5029, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.006153061433311363 }, "sha256": "5500751f8252a52eecbf27641bf790d259742588d5d28605ef2c6501a81b7354", "simhash": "1:1ae8fde17c47c626", "word_count": 838 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:31.167440+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY J. MAZAR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MICHELA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Anthony J. Mazar, was convicted of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 1(a) (West 1994)), theft (720 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West 1994)), fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014 204(a) (West 1994)), reckless driving (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 503(a) (West 1994)) and operating a motor vehicle with only one red taillight (625 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 201(b) (West 1994)). He was sentenced to concurrent, five-year terms of imprisonment on the burglary and theft convictions. On appeal, the defendant claims that reversible error occurred when the trial court allowed him to represent himself at a competency hearing conducted prior to trial. We affirm.\nPrior to his arraignment on the charges against him, the defendant asked the trial court for permission to represent himself. He informed the court that he had attained his GED and had served in the United States Marine Corps. The defendant also told the court that he had, within the previous year, defended himself in a criminal trial in Cook County and won his acquittal. The trial court allowed the defendant to proceed pro se and appointed attorney J.D. Flood to act as the defendant\u2019s adviser.\nLater, the defendant filed a response to the State\u2019s discovery request which was titled \"Information that personify Jesus and vindicate Anthony J. Mazar.\u201d The body of the document consisted of various references to and quotations from Scripture. Based on the filing of this document, the court sua sponte scheduled a competency evaluation of the defendant. When the court announced its decision to evaluate the defendant\u2019s competency, the trial judge said to the defendant:\n\"From my conversations with you to date, I have no question in my own mind that you are competent to stand trial and competent to represent yourself. Your behavior in court and your comments are to the point and lucid, and I don\u2019t see any great problems. This is a precautionary measure, more than anything else, because I feel that those matters are of record, and I feel that if there is a conviction in this case and an attorney is appointed to represent you on appeal, I feel that one of the first things that attorney will raise is whether or not you were competent to stand trial simply on the basis of those documents. *** So, since the question is likely to come up down the line, I think the question ought to come up sooner rather than later, and that\u2019s why I am asking that a determination be made now.\u201d\nSubsequently, the defendant was examined by a licensed clinical psychologist. The psychologist testified that the defendant \"has a full understanding of his civil rights. He has a better-than-average understanding of judicial procedure. The testimony Your Honor provided me indicates that he is perfectly competent to understand what is going on around him at the time that it is occurring.\u201d At the competency hearing, the trial court allowed the defendant to represent himself with the assistance of attorney Flood. Neither the defendant nor Flood asked any questions of the court\u2019s psychologist.\nAfter the defendant was found competent to stand trial and to represent himself, the case proceeded to a bench trial. The court found the defendant guilty of the charges against him and imposed sentence on the convictions.\nThe defendant\u2019s sole contention on appeal is that the court erred in failing to appoint counsel to represent him at the competency hearing.\nBecause a proper waiver of counsel requires the defendant to have use of his mental faculties, it is error to allow a defendant to represent himself once a bona fide doubt regarding the defendant\u2019s competence has arisen. People v. Heidelberg, 33 Ill. App. 3d 574, 338 N.E.2d 56 (1975); People v. Rath, 121 Ill. App. 3d 548, 459 N.E.2d 1134 (1984); People v. Allensworth, 235 Ill. App. 3d 185, 600 N.E.2d 1197 (1992).\nIn the case at bar, we find that there was no bona fide doubt about the defendant\u2019s competence at the time of the competency hearing. The trial judge clearly stated that he believed that the defendant was competent and was holding the hearing only to clarify the matter in case of an appeal. Moreover, we find that the court\u2019s statements are bolstered by the fact that the defendant made coherent, logical objections and observations prior to the hearing. In the absence of a bona fide doubt regarding the defendant\u2019s competence, we hold that it was not error to allow the defendant to represent himself at the competency hearing.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Grundy County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOLDRIDGE, P.J., and SLATER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MICHELA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "David W. Neal, State\u2019s Attorney, of Morris (John X. Breslin and Nancy Rink Carter, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY J. MAZAR, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201495\u20140499\nOpinion filed July 26, 1996.\nStephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nDavid W. Neal, State\u2019s Attorney, of Morris (John X. Breslin and Nancy Rink Carter, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0662-01", "first_page_order": 680, "last_page_order": 682 }