{ "id": 182692, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF BARBARA BLINDERMAN, f/k/a Barbara Reib, Petitioner-Appellee, and WILLIAM REIB, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Blinderman", "decision_date": "1996-08-13", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201494\u20142557", "first_page": "26", "last_page": "36", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 26" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 Ill. App. 3d 996", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5163597 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "999" }, { "page": "999" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/237/0996-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 N.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5385512 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 934", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887239 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "945" }, { "page": "945" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0934-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 N.E.2d 977", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 1060", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2569305 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1066" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/1060-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 N.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2962516 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 958", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3164374 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391-92" }, { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 801", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887286 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0801-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 1084", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5289195 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1092" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/1084-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 N.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3512645 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" }, { "page": "703-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 N.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 Ill. App. 3d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2965135 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/252/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2432543 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542808 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 N.E.2d 1264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. App. 3d 947", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5255121 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "954" }, { "page": "954" }, { "page": "954" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/223/0947-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 N.E.2d 933", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5367027 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" }, { "page": "33-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Reib" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 993", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3591680 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Reib" }, { "page": "999-1000" }, { "page": "999-1000" }, { "page": "1001" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0993-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 887, "char_count": 21569, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0733604108636944e-07, "percentile": 0.560286719418777 }, "sha256": "ba659d2dec30bdaaaab7884f8851ccf536e5ba295f840e013a7832ea161d5b01", "simhash": "1:c3ed4dd4bdd3e465", "word_count": 3512 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:57:33.654874+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF BARBARA BLINDERMAN, f/k/a Barbara Reib, Petitioner-Appellee, and WILLIAM REIB, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is the second appeal involving these parties. See In re Marriage of Reib, 114 Ill. App. 3d 993, 449 N.E.2d 919 (1983) (Reib). Following remand, the circuit court valued Reib and Reib, Inc. (R&R), respondent William\u2019s company, at $483,000 and awarded petitioner Barbara one-half of that amount plus prejudgment interest. The court subsequently granted Barbara attorney and accountant\u2019s fees. Respondent appeals, contending the circuit court abused its discretion in (1) considering the testimony of petitioner\u2019s expert, (2) granting attorney and accountant\u2019s fees, (3) evaluating respondent\u2019s company, R&R, and (4) allowing prejudgment interest. Respondent also contends the court exceeded the mandate of the appellate court in hearing certain evidence. For reasons which follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.\nFollowing dissolution of Barbara and William Reib\u2019s marriage, Barbara appealed the circuit court\u2019s awards of property and maintenance, contending the court failed to value the parties\u2019 assets properly. The appellate court reversed the circuit court\u2019s determination that the parties\u2019 marital debts exceeded the value of their marital assets because the court heard no evidence regarding the value of Mainway Financial Corporation (Mainway) and R&R, two of William\u2019s companies. Reib, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 999-1000. R&R was an insurance agency engaged in risk management and was the parent company of Mainway. Mainway had a subsidiary, Main Insurance Company (Main Insurance). On remand, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that R&R had a value of $483,000 as of December 31, 1981. The court thereafter awarded Barbara $241,500, or one-half of R&R\u2019s value, plus interest from September 22, 1981, the date of the original circuit court\u2019s judgment. The court granted Barbara\u2019s petition for attorney and accountant\u2019s fees.\nLawrence Lipsky, a certified public accountant (CPA) and tax lawyer, testified without objection as Barbara\u2019s expert witness. He had testified many times regarding the valuation of companies but never concerning the value of an insurance agency. Lipsky examined the tax records, work papers, cash receipts, corporate disbursements and general ledger of R&R, as well as some records for Mainway. These records were supplied to Lipsky by William\u2019s CPA, Leonard Frumm. R&R\u2019s 1981 tax return showed a cash balance of $776,611 and indicated that William had been paid $121,208 in commission. William\u2019s commission for 1982 was $129,000. Lipsky opined that R&R had a value of $517,099 as of December 31, 1981. He arrived at that number by using a four-year (1978-81) average of R&R\u2019s gross revenues and using a multiplier of 1.5, which is the commonly accepted rule of thumb for the price at which an insurance agency is sold. Lipsky relied, in part, upon a publication to ascertain the 1.5 multiplier. He added the net book value of the company and a federal tax refund to determine the final amount.\nOn cross-examination, Lipsky testified he had never done any accounting work for risk management companies. His knowledge of R&R\u2019s business came from the tax returns. He was unsure of the number of clients R&R had. William was R&R\u2019s only employee. R&R owed over a million dollars in accounts payable and sustained a loss of $36,727 for 1981. The publication Lipsky relied on for the valuation formula required the net renewal commissions for the most current year but Lipsky used total commissions instead. Lipsky would not have adjusted the multiplier had he known how many accounts R&R had at the time of his evaluation. Lipsky considered the 1.5 multiplier conservative.\nFrumm, William\u2019s CPA, was called as an adverse witness by Barbara and testified as an expert for William. Frumm prepared tax returns.for R&R and Mainway. R&R\u2019s 1981 tax return showed a $636,367 investment in Mainway. Mainway reported a loss of $1,577,125 for 1980 and a net operating loss of $7,261,052 from years prior to 1980. Frumm believed R&R had a value of negative $211,105 on December 31, 1981.\nAccording to Frumm, R&R had only one client by the end of 1981. R&R reported a loss for 1981, yet William was paid over $121,000 in commissions. In 1981, R&R earned a gross income of $200,000; traveling and entertainment expenses of $19,000 were paid, as were outside consulting expenses of $34,560 and legal expenses of $19,885. Frumm agreed with Lipsky\u2019s gross income figure but disagreed with the 1.5 multiplier. Although R&R owed Mainway $636,367, Frumm did not calculate that amount into R&R\u2019s value. Frumm wanted to write the loan off as a bad debt but William persuaded him not to do so until 1983. Frumm admitted that had he written off the loan to Mainway, R&R\u2019s value as of December 31, 1981, would have been approximately $425,000.\nThe circuit court concluded that R&R\u2019s value as of December 31, 1981, was $470,000. The court requested each party to submit a memorandum setting forth argument concerning a proper \"allocation.\u201d Subsequently, the court determined that R&R\u2019s value was $483,000. The court set a date to determine how the assets were to be distributed and eventually ordered that Barbara was entitled to $241,500. No transcript of this hearing is contained in the record.\nBarbara\u2019s counsel thereafter filed a petition for attorney fees and costs as well as reimbursement for the fees and costs associated with retaining Lipsky as an expert. William unsuccessfully moved to dismiss Barbara\u2019s petition for attorney fees.\nAt the hearing on the petition for attorney fees, Barbara\u2019s counsel testified that the fee petition reflected his work. The petition also alleged that William was a successful businessman; in the late 1980s, Barbara\u2019s counsel had investigated William\u2019s financial success. William\u2019s tax returns for the last three years were requested but were never received. Barbara testified that she was unable to pay her attorney fees and costs. Following the hearing, the court awarded Barbara attorney fees and costs of $49,573 and accountant\u2019s fees of $8,000. William appeals.\nI\nWilliam initially contends the circuit court abused its discretion in permitting Lipsky to testify as an expert witness because he had no experience in valuing a company such as R&R.\nIllinois Supreme Court Rule 220(a)(1) (repealed effective January 1, 1996) provided:\n\"An expert is a person who, because of education, training or experience, possesses knowledge of a specialized nature beyond that of the average person on a factual matter material to a claim or defense in pending litigation and who. may be expected to render an opinion within his expertise at trial.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 220(a)(1).\nFailure to object to an expert\u2019s qualifications results in a waiver on appeal. See Mundell v. La Pata, 263 Ill. App. 3d 28, 33, 635 N.E.2d 933 (1994). A reviewing court will consider the issue if it finds plain error; that is, an error which is so egregious it deprives the complaining party of a fair trial and substantially impairs the integrity of the judicial process. La Pata, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 33-34. A circuit court has broad discretion in determining whether a witness has been qualified to testify as an expert. In re Marriage of Hunter, 223 Ill. App. 3d 947, 954, 585 N.E.2d 1264 (1992).\nWilliam failed to object to Lipsky\u2019s qualifications and, therefore, has waived the issue on appeal. William contends the issue of waiver is not relevant because this court must determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in considering Lipsky\u2019s testimony. William\u2019s argument, however, is directed to Lipsky\u2019s qualifications. Accordingly, the issue is waived.\nNotwithstanding waiver, the circuit court properly considered Lipsky\u2019s testimony. A party seeking to have a witness qualified as an expert must lay a proper foundation showing the expert has some knowledge or experience in the area about which he expresses his opinion. In re Marriage of Hunter, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 954. An expert witness\u2019 opinion may not be based upon conjecture or speculation. Dyback v. Weber, 114 Ill. 2d 232, 244, 500 N.E.2d 8 (1986).\nWilliam contests Lipsky\u2019s qualifications to testify concerning the valuation of R&R; however, this contention is without record support. Lipsky, a CPA since 1949 and a tax lawyer, has testified as to the valuation of companies \"quite a number\u201d of times. Although this was the first time he conducted a valuation of an insurance agency, Lipsky reviewed all the work reports and tax documents supplied to him by William\u2019s CPA. Lipsky knew what a risk manager was; understood R&R\u2019s business generally; relied upon all the documentation supplied to him; used a conservative multiplier; and was aware of the differences between Mainway and Main Insurance, although he treated them similarly for accounting purposes. William contends that Lipsky did not follow the very formula which he relied on; however, the instances in which he did not follow the formula were justified because R&R\u2019s tax returns and documentation did not contain all the required numbers. William also asserts Lipsky was unqualified, but William ignores Frumm\u2019s acknowledgement that had he written off R&R\u2019s debt, R&R\u2019s value would have been approximately $425,000, substantially similar to Lipsky\u2019s estimate.\nThe circuit court neither abused its discretion nor committed plain error in considering Lipsky\u2019s testimony. See In re Marriage of Hunter, 223 Ill. App. 3d 947, 954, 585 N.E.2d 1264 (1992).\nII\nWilliam next argues the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Barbara attorney and accountant\u2019s fees because (1) the petition was not specific, (2) there was no showing that Barbara was financially unable to pay and that William was financially able to pay, and (3) accountant\u2019s fees and costs are not allowed under section 508 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act). 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 1994).\nA spouse seeking an award of attorney fees and costs must show financial inability to pay the fees as well as the financial ability of the other spouse to pay them. In re Marriage of Einhorn, 178 Ill. App. 3d 212, 221, 533 N.E.2d 29 (1988). When awarding fees under the Act, a circuit court must consider the nature of the controversy, the question at issue, the significance or importance of the subject matter, the degree of responsibility involved, the standing or skill of the attorney, and the time and labor involved. In re Marriage of Powers, 252 Ill. App. 3d 506, 508, 624 N.E.2d 390 (1993). The award of attorney fees and the amount to be paid by the parties is within the discretion of the circuit court and will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Head v. Head, 168 Ill. App. 3d 697, 704, 523 N.E.2d 17 (1988).\nWilliam contends the court abused its discretion because Barbara\u2019s counsel testified only in generalities about the time he spent on the case and the petition was not specific. At the hearing on the petition for attorney fees, the court required Barbara\u2019s counsel to verify the hours set forth in the petition. William\u2019s counsel stipulated that the petition would stand as Barbara\u2019s counsel\u2019s direct testimony and Barbara\u2019s counsel could supplement the petition through narrative testimony. William\u2019s counsel cross-examined Barbara\u2019s attorney about the petition. Prior to conducting the hearing, the court denied William\u2019s motion for a continuance and granted Barbara\u2019s motion to bar William from testifying because William failed to appear for a deposition and also did not submit his tax returns as requested. William was not present on the day of the hearing.\nWilliam contends Barbara\u2019s petition for attorney fees was inadequate, yet 136 pages of recorded billable hours were attached to the fee petition. The petition also set forth the skills of Barbara\u2019s counsel, the amount sought and alleged that the time devoted to the matter was necessary and reasonable in light of the nature and complexity of the matter. The petition further alleged William is a successful businessman and is capable of paying the fees. At the hearing, Barbara\u2019s attorney testified that in the late 1980s, he investigated William\u2019s finances and determined William had substantial sums of money at his disposal. This information also came, in part, from a previous hearing regarding arrearages on maintenance. The evidence submitted was sufficiently specific to justify the court\u2019s award.\nWilliam next argues Barbara failed to show her financial inability to pay the fees as well as his financial ability to pay them. Barbara testified, however, that she was unable to pay her counsel\u2019s fees. Barbara\u2019s 1993 financial statement showed that she had $4,085 in cash, an automobile worth approximately $4,000, a mutual fund with $2,432 and a retirement account with $44,000. Barbara owed $55,000 to her attorney, $8,000 to her accountant, and $31,300 to her husband, Leonard Blinderman. Prior to her retirement at the end of 1992, Barbara earned $28,000 per year. Barbara testified that the present case has been in court for over 10 years and all her attorney fees were reasonable. William submits Barbara did not show his financial ability to pay the fees. The record reveals, however, that William refused either to appear for a deposition or to submit tax returns. As a result of William\u2019s failure to comply with court orders, he was barred from testifying. William cannot contest Barbara\u2019s alleged failure to prove his financial ability to pay her fees where his own conduct contributed to any deficiencies in her proof. The evidence was sufficient to support the circuit court\u2019s award of attorney fees.\nWilliam next contests the circuit court\u2019s award of accountant\u2019s fees, contending section 508 of the Act does not permit such fees. William does not claim the accountant\u2019s fees were unreasonable. Expert\u2019s fees, including an accountant\u2019s fees, are recoverable under section 508(a) of the Act. In re Marriage of Winton, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1092, 576 N.E.2d 856 (1991); Head v. Head, 168 Ill. App. 3d 697, 703-04, 523 N.E.2d 17 (1988).\nThe circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Barbara attorney and accountant\u2019s fees.\nIll\nWilliam next maintains the circuit court abused its discretion in entering a judgment of valuation without considering other marital property as required under section 503 of the Act. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 1994).\nWilliam\u2019s assertion articulates one sentence of argument, a mere citation to section 503 of the Act and no citation of case law. Failure to support arguments with citation to legal authority in an appellate brief constitutes waiver of that argument. Pyskaty v. Oyama, 266 Ill. App. 3d 801, 641 N.E.2d 552 (1994). William\u2019s brief is in violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7). 134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). Accordingly, he has waived this claim.\nWaiver aside, the record does not support William\u2019s claim. After determining that R&R\u2019s value as of December 31, 1981, was $470,000, the circuit court requested both parties to submit a memorandum detailing how the property should be distributed. Subsequently, the court found that R&R\u2019s value was $483,000 and awarded Barbara one-half of that amount. Neither the parties\u2019 memoranda nor a transcript of the court\u2019s hearing on how to distribute R&R\u2019s value properly is contained in the record.\nIt is appellant\u2019s burden to provide a sufficient record to support a claim of error; absent such a record, a reviewing court will presume that the circuit court\u2019s order was in conformity with established legal principles with sufficient factual basis. Foutch v. O\u2019Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958 (1984). Any doubts which arise from the incompleteness of the record are to be resolved against the appellant. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392. William, as appellant on this issue, bore the burden of providing a sufficient record. Absent a transcript of the hearing on the distribution of the assets, there is no basis upon which to determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion. See Farm Credit Bank v. Schwarm, 251 Ill. App. 3d 205, 211, 622 N.E.2d 97 (1993). The court\u2019s order provides that the cause came \"on to be heard on the remand of the above entitled cause, and the Court *** heard the evidence, testimony of witnesses, and arguments of counsel.\u201d It must therefore be presumed that the circuit court\u2019s order was in conformity with the law and was properly supported by the evidence. See Mars v. Priester, 205 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1066, 563 N.E.2d 977 (1990).\nThe circuit court did not abuse its discretion in distributing marital assets.\nIV\nWilliam asserts the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Barbara prejudgment interest because it was not permitted by the Act or by agreement of the parties; the court\u2019s equitable jurisdiction was not invoked; and the court made no findings concerning equitable considerations warranting an award of prejudgment interest. Barbara contends the circuit court properly granted prejudgment interest given the equitable considerations of the case.\nAlthough both parties assert the court granted prejudgment interest, the record reveals that the court intended to impose \"interest from the date of the original [circuit court] judgment\u201d and denied awarding prejudgment interest. The initial circuit court judgment, however, did not include a money judgment because the court concluded that marital debts exceeded marital assets. This finding was reversed by the Reib court. Reib, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 999-1000. Consequently, the court in the present case essentially granted prejudgment interest without intending to do so.\n\"Prejudgment interest is proper where authorized by statute, agreement of the parties, or in cases where warranted by equitable considerations.\u201d Progressive Land Developers, Inc. v. Exchange National Bank, 266 Ill. App. 3d 934, 945, 641 N.E.2d 608 (1994). Prejudgment interest must comport with justice, however, and whether equitable considerations exist is a question of fact within the sound discretion of the circuit court. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 266 Ill. App. 3d at 945.\nPrejudgment interest is not authorized by the Act and the parties did not agree that the prevailing party was entitled to prejudgment interest. Because the court did not intend to award prejudgment interest, the circuit judge did not set forth any equitable considerations to warrant the award of prejudgment interest. The court erred in awarding prejudgment interest where such grant was not intended and the court set forth no reasons justifying the award.\nThe award of prejudgment interest must be reversed.\nV\nWilliam next contends the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence because it exceeded the appellate court\u2019s mandate.\nA circuit court must follow the specific directions of the appellate court\u2019s mandate to insure that its order is in accord with the decision of the higher court. In re Marriage of Pitulla, 256 Ill. App. 3d 84, 88, 628 N.E.2d 563 (1993). When a reviewing court remands a case with instructions that are general, however, the circuit court is required to examine the appellate court\u2019s opinion and exercise its discretion in determining what further proceedings would be consistent with the opinion on remand. In re Marriage of Sunko, 237 Ill. App. 3d 996, 999, 606 N.E.2d 29 (1992). The circuit court thus has discretion to hear new evidence when the appellate court\u2019s mandate is general in nature. In re Marriage of Sunko, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 999.\nWilliam contends the circuit court exceeded the appellate court\u2019s mandate upon reversal in this case because the court was required only to determine the value of R&R as of December 31, 1981; therefore, the court erred in hearing evidence concerning R&R\u2019s business affairs after 1981. Upon reversal, the court stated that the circuit court had not been presented with evidence to establish the value of R&R other than the 1979 tax returns and remanded \"for a further evidentiary hearing\u201d and \"for further proceedings.\u201d 114 Ill. App. 3d at 1001. Accordingly, the circuit court in the present case was confronted with determining the value of R&R as of December 31, 1981. The court conducted a full evidentiary hearing in order to arrive at the proper determination. Although the court heard some evidence about R&R\u2019s business after 1981, that evidence was relevant to determining R&R\u2019s value in 1981, especially where R&R\u2019s debt was not written off until 1983. According to Frumm, William\u2019s accountant, writing off the debt in 1981, as he had recommended to William, would have greatly increased the value of R&R. The evidence was therefore relevant.\nThe circuit court did not exceed the mandate of the appellate court.\nFor the foregoing reasons, those parts of the circuit court judgment distributing the assets and awarding fees are affirmed and that part granting prejudgment interest is reversed.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nSCARIANO and BURKE, JJ, concur.\nAlthough William moved to disqualify Lipsky prior to the hearing, William\u2019s motion was based upon the delayed responses to his Supreme Court Rule 220 interrogatories. William has not raised that issue on appeal.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Angelo Ruggiero, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Zaban, Jacobs & Mayer, of Chicago (Marc S. Mayer, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF BARBARA BLINDERMAN, f/k/a Barbara Reib, Petitioner-Appellee, and WILLIAM REIB, Respondent-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201494\u20142557\nOpinion filed August 13, 1996.\nAngelo Ruggiero, of Chicago, for appellant.\nZaban, Jacobs & Mayer, of Chicago (Marc S. Mayer, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0026-01", "first_page_order": 44, "last_page_order": 54 }