{ "id": 182750, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHERDALE RANDALL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Randall", "decision_date": "1996-09-25", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201495\u20143650", "first_page": "1019", "last_page": "1031", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 1019" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778576 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781331 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236771 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477037 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477034 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2882808 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228708 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 Ill. App. 3d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5135873 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/240/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483566 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5253922 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 S. Ct. 1170", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 L. Ed. 2d 1072", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "493 U.S. 1093", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11495046, 11495080, 11495018, 11495116, 11494999, 11494973 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/493/1093-04", "/us/493/1093-05", "/us/493/1093-03", "/us/493/1093-06", "/us/493/1093-02", "/us/493/1093-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602841 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307262 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 L. Ed. 2d 834", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1340390 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/514/0765-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 U.S. 102", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2605710 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 1003", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2881696 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/1003-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5410451 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "exclusion of two persons because they were employed by United States Postal Service insufficient race-neutral explanation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383430 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unemployed status of prospective juror's husband and son pretextual explanations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5382457 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "explanations that one juror was too old and another unemployed were clearly pretextual and not race-neutral" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 913", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 252528 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "State's reason found \"pretextual\" where other jurors who had male children closer in age to defendant were not similarly excused" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0913-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4809650 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "If the State fails to articulate legitimate race-neutral reasons for its peremptory challenge of even one venireperson, then the defendant's conviction must be reversed and a new trial granted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555073 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5211240 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258596 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 829", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5799275 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839", "parenthetical": "where a prosecutor does not rely solely on one reason in the explanation of his peremptory challenge, the challenge can be deemed race-neutral on another reason given" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228767 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 N.E. 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1920, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 N.Y. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 294337 ], "year": 1920, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/230/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4809564 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 352", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6223686 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358-59" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "1865-66" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "1866" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "409" }, { "page": "1869" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3492006 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5516622 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 809", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906781 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0809-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545304 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5394202 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278448 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" }, { "page": "227" }, { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97-98" }, { "page": "88-89" }, { "page": "1723-24" }, { "page": "97-98" }, { "page": "88-89" }, { "page": "1723-24" }, { "page": "1866" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 1107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 914", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887305 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "922" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0914-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 N.E.2d 1360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 994", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887279 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "999" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0994-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228767 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 352", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6223686 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" }, { "page": "412" }, { "page": "1871" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0352-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1199, "char_count": 28513, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4033042124423952e-07, "percentile": 0.645146300035253 }, "sha256": "f861d4be707b1078a7d371a6b940f141a8a728ecd824ff35d6aec1b033fcb316", "simhash": "1:3ebb605569c6cdea", "word_count": 4590 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:57:33.654874+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHERDALE RANDALL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nSherdale Randall (defendant) was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to 47 years in prison. On appeal, defendant raises issues as to whether:\n(1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce numerous prior consistent statements of three State witnesses;\n(2) the State\u2019s race-neutral reasons for striking black venire members were sufficient to rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986); and\n(3) defendant was denied a fair trial when, during opening statements, the prosecutor stated that he represented \"you [the jury], the People of the State of Illinois.\u201d\nDefendant was charged with first degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Michael Anderson (Anderson) on April 6, 1993. Anderson lived in the same neighborhood as the defendant and was known as \"Weasel\u201d or \"911\u201d because he was thought to be a police informant.\nAfter jury selection, defendant moved the trial court to recognize a Batson violation arising from the State\u2019s use of four of its seven peremptory challenges to remove blacks from the venire. The trial court found that there had been a prima facie showing of discrimination under Batson. Following a hearing on defendant\u2019s Batson motion, the trial court found that the State had provided race-neutral explanations for each of its peremptory challenges and defendant, therefore, had failed to prove purposeful discrimination.\nAt trial, testimony from officers at the scene indicated that at approximately 10 p.m., Anderson was shot three times in the back with a .45-caliber handgun. There were no eyewitnesses to the shooting and no physical evidence linking defendant to the crime. Defendant was, essentially, found guilty based on the testimony of three State witnesses \u2014 Tiffany McMillen, Theresa Strong and Tajuania Jackson.\nTiffany McMillen (McMillen) testified that she was living at 5942 South Ada in Chicago with her roommate, Tajuania Jackson. On the evening of April 6, 1993, McMillen was standing outside her residence when she heard three \"shots\u201d fired near her home. Ten seconds later, she observed defendant run past her house carrying a handgun at his side. McMillen relayed her observation to Tajuania Jackson.\nOn cross-examination, McMillen testified that in April 1994, she went to the office of defendant\u2019s lawyer where she gave a statement to defense counsel, which was reduced to writing and signed by Mc-Millen, stating that she could not identify defendant as one of the men who ran past her house or that one man was carrying a gun.\nOn redirect, McMillen testified, over defense objection, that she told police, an assistant State\u2019s Attorney and a grand jury that she observed defendant carrying a gun immediately after hearing the three shots. The trial court allowed this prior consistent statement, finding defense counsel had attempted to establish an inference of recent fabrication through introduction of the statement given counsel in April 1994. McMillen also testified that she was visited 10 to 20 times by members of defendant\u2019s family, who encouraged her to give the statement to defendant\u2019s lawyer. When asked, McMillen stated that she was \"threatened\u201d into giving the statement and was \"followed\u201d to the lawyer\u2019s office by defendant\u2019s cousin and brother.\nTajuania Jackson (Jackson) testified that on the day following the shooting, she approached defendant, with the intent of \"playing a joke on him,\u201d and told him that she had seen defendant \"running\u201d the night before, to which defendant responded that he had shot Anderson last night but \"the motherf \u2014 r wouldn\u2019t go down.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Jackson testified that she did not know who had fired the shots, nor did she observe defendant fleeing the scene. She also testified that following the shooting, her boyfriend, Eric McMillen, was taken into custody and questioned in connection with Anderson\u2019s murder, but he was released after she told police about defendant\u2019s admission.\nOn redirect, Jackson testified that defendant was already under arrest for Anderson\u2019s murder when she volunteered defendant\u2019s admission to an assistant State\u2019s Attorney.\nTheresa Strong (Strong) testified that several days prior to the shooting, she observed defendant and Anderson engaged in conversation. When Strong later asked defendant \"what he was doing talking to Anderson,\u201d defendant responded that he was attempting to \"get Anderson alone\u201d for the purpose of \"killing him.\u201d Defendant further volunteered that \"someone was paying him to do it.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Strong testified that in April 1994, she too went to defendant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s office and gave a written statement in which she denied having seen defendant and Anderson engaged in conversation. Strong further stated that she had \"lied\u201d to police and the grand jury about defendant\u2019s statement that he was being paid to kill Anderson. Strong also testified that she was currently being held in Cook County jail for contempt of court for her failure to appear in court in this matter.\nOn redirect, Strong acknowledged that she had given police, the State\u2019s Attorney and the grand jury testimony to the effect that defendant had admitted his plan to kill Anderson for profit. Strong further testified that she was coerced to give the statement to defense counsel and that she was threatened by defendant\u2019s friends and family, two of whom drove her to defense counsel\u2019s office and remained outside the door until she had given her statement.\nDefense counsel objected to the admission of the \"prior consistent statements\u201d of McMillen, Jackson and Strong on hearsay grounds. The trial court overruled these objections and, based in large part on the testimony of these three witnesses, defendant was convicted of Anderson\u2019s murder.\nWe first address the trial court\u2019s rulings to allow the State to introduce prior consistent statements. Generally, a witness\u2019 prior consistent statement is not admissible to corroborate a witness\u2019 trial testimony. People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 227 (1991); People v. Clark, 52 Ill. 2d 374, 389 (1972). However, an exception to this general rule exists where prior consistent statements are used to rebut a charge or an inference that a witness is motivated to testify falsely or that a witness\u2019 trial testimony is of recent fabrication. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d at 227; People v. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d 317, 340-41 (1987). In such situations, prior consistent statements are admissible to show that a witness told the same story before any motive to give false testimony came into existence or before the time of the alleged fabrication. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d at 227. A trial court\u2019s decision as to the admissibility of evidence shall not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Radovick, 275 Ill. App. 3d 809, 817 (1995).\nAt trial, McMillen testified to observing defendant run past her house carrying a handgun immediately following the shooting. Defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination elicited the fact that in April 1994, she \"volunteered\u201d a statement indicating her inability to identify either defendant or a gun. Although defendant\u2019s cross-examination did not directly \"charge\u201d McMillen with a motive to testify falsely, the inference that her trial testimony was of recent fabrication is clear. Also, the timing element is satisfied, since Mc-Millen\u2019s prior statements to the police, assistant State\u2019s Attorney and grand jury were made \"before the time of the alleged fabrication.\u201d Moreover, the fact that McMillen testified to threats and coercion from defendant\u2019s camp supports the trial court\u2019s ruling to admit. Accordingly, since an inference of recent fabrication was made and Mc-Millen\u2019s prior consistent statements were made before the time of the alleged fabrication \u2014 literally at trial \u2014 the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prior statements into evidence.\nJackson testified that, in response to her goading, defendant admitted shooting and killing Anderson. On cross-examination, defense counsel suggested that Jackson implicated defendant in order to exonerate her boyfriend, who had been questioned in connection with Anderson\u2019s murder. Contrary to defendant\u2019s argument, there simply is no prior consistent statement issue in Jackson\u2019s testimony.\nFirst, the State did not introduce or refer to an earlier statement. Rather, the defense introduced Jackson\u2019s statement to the police into evidence (defense exhibit 4) and asked Jackson to read from the statement. This strategy was employed in hope of eliciting that Jackson\u2019s statement to the police implicating defendant was given after her boyfriend\u2019s arrest, thereby establishing her motive to lie and discrediting her trial testimony. Although the State did not bolster Jackson\u2019s trial testimony, it could have since the defense clearly \"opened the door\u201d to this issue. Since the State made no reference to a prior consistent statement, no error obtains.\nDuring trial, Strong was held in contempt of court for failure to appear and testify pursuant to the State\u2019s subpoena. She was held in Cook County jail for five days before testifying. The State\u2019s redirect revealed that Strong had been told \"not to go to court\u201d by Monte Moore and Eric Wilkerson, both of whom are members of defendant\u2019s family. Moore also drove Strong to defense counsel\u2019s office and instructed her to give exculpatory testimony on defendant\u2019s behalf. Strong testified to receiving physical threats should she not comply with Moore\u2019s instructions.\nOn cross-examination, defense counsel suggested that Strong\u2019s trial testimony implicating defendant was given in order to procure her release from custody. The State sought to introduce Strong\u2019s prior consistent statements given to the police, State\u2019s Attorney and grand jury. The trial court overruled defendant\u2019s hearsay objection, finding, \"I think there is an inference out there with the jury that this [Strong\u2019s trial testimony] was a recent fabrication so the objection will be overruled.\u201d More accurately, however, defense counsel\u2019s questioning Strong about her incarceration for contempt suggests a motive to testify falsely \u2014 in order to \"get out of jail\u201d \u2014 and thus the prior consistent statements were properly admitted.\nDefendant argues that, even if the trial court was correct to observe an inference of recent fabrication or a motive to testify falsely, Strong\u2019s motive to lie arose before the statements were made to police, the State\u2019s Attorney and grand jury. If the motive to testify falsely exists before the consistent statements were made, they should not be admitted. People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 501 (1983); People v. Davis, 130 Ill. App. 3d 41 (1984).\nDefendant argues that Strong\u2019s motive to lie arose out of a \"fear of incarceration\u201d that preceded her arrest for contempt. The sole support for this contention is found in Strong\u2019s statement to defendant\u2019s attorney wherein she stated the reason she was untruthful to the police and grand jury \"was because she was threatened with incarceration if she did not give the answers the police wanted her to give.\u201d Given the coercive nature of Strong\u2019s statement to defense counsel, and the rather clear implication of counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Strong \u2014 that she would \"say anything\u201d to avoid more jail time \u2014 the prior statements were admissible, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s rulings in this regard.\nWe next examine defendant\u2019s contention that the State violated his constitutional rights by using its peremptory challenges to exclude black members of the venire. Defendant contends that the reasons given by the prosecution for its use of four peremptory challenges to exclude black venire members were pretextual and insufficient to rebut the trial court\u2019s finding of a prima facie showing of discrimination under Batson. The State seeks to minimize this issue by observing that this case involves a black defendant, victim and occurrence witnesses. However, this is not a significant part of the equation.\nBatson provides a three-step process for the evaluation of racial discrimination claims in jury selection. The defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. If the defendant satisfies this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for excluding the venire member in question. Third, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88-89, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24; Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1865-66 (1993).\nA race-neutral explanation is one based upon something other than the race of the juror. In assessing the explanation, the focus of the court\u2019s inquiry is on the facial validity of the prosecutor\u2019s explanation. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 406, 111 S. Ct. at 1866. The reasons given by the State need not rise to the level necessary to justify exclusion for cause, but they must constitute more than a mere denial of discriminatory motive. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88-89, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24. The prosecutor must give clear and reasonably specific, legitimate, race-neutral reasons related to the particular case. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor\u2019s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 406, 106 S. Ct. at 1866. A trial court\u2019s finding that the State excused black venire members for race-neutral reasons will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. People v. Andrews, 155 Ill. 2d 286, 293-94 (1993).\nHaving made these observations, we now consider the charade that has become the Batson process. The State may provide the trial court with a series of pat race-neutral reasons for exercise of peremptory challenges. Since reviewing courts examine only the record, we wonder if the reasons can be given without a smile. Surely, new prosecutors are given a manual, probably entitled \"Handy Race-Neutral Explanations\u201d or \"20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations.\u201d It might include: too old, too young, divorced, \"long, unkempt hair,\u201d free-lance writer, religion, social worker, renter, lack of family contact, attempting to make eye-contact with defendant, \"lived in an area consisting predominantly of apartment complexes,\u201d single, over-educated, lack of maturity, improper demeanor, unemployed, improper attire, juror lived alone, misspelled place of employment, living with girlfriend, unemployed spouse, spouse employed as school teacher, employment as part-time barber, friendship with city council member, failure to remove hat, lack of community ties, children same \"age bracket\u201d as defendant, deceased father and prospective juror\u2019s aunt receiving psychiatric care.\nRecent consideration of the Batson issue makes us wonder if the rule would be imposed only where the prosecutor states that he does not care to have an African-American on the jury. We are reminded of the musing of Justice Cardozo, \"We are not to close our eyes as judges to what we must perceive as men.\u201d People v. Knapp, 230 N.Y. 48, 63, 129 N.E. 202, 208 (1920).\nIn the present case, the trial court found that the defendant had made a prima facie showing of discrimination and required the State to present race-neutral reasons for its exclusion of four black venire members. The sufficiency of those explanations will be examined below.\n(1) Annie Scott\nThe State gave the following reasons for its exclusion of Ms. Scott:\n\"Judge, she was an employee for the City, her daughter was employed for the City, a retired worker, she had previously been a juror. That\u2019s an important factor. She\u2019s a juror in which she said it was a civil case but in actuality, when she explained, it was a criminal case, so she didn\u2019t know about burdens, an important factor she was a juror before, a burden issue here.\nShe was a female black, Judge, but again, she did have ties with City employees which you\u2019ll notice, Judge, is a recurrent theme through the exclusion of our witnesses. *** I would point out this courtroom is extremely warm, she\u2019s an elderly woman, we\u2019re worried about her ability physically to be able to sustain the required concentration that would be necessary.\nI don\u2019t want to state just the age factor itself, it was looking at her and her physical appearance, not a matter of just an old person being on the jury, not that at all, a matter of looking at her, watching her demeanor during the questions that were posed by the Court.\u201d\nThe State\u2019s bases for challenging Ms. Scott can be summarized as follows: (1) her inability to recall the difference between the burden of proof in civil and criminal cases; (2) she and her daughter were city employees; and (3) she appeared frail.\nMs. Scott indicated that she had served as a juror in a \"child neglect case\u201d where the verdict had been guilty. She further stated that her prior juror experience would not affect her ability to be fair to both sides in the present case. Ms. Scott did not, as the State contends, indicate or imply an inability to differentiate between burdens of proof in civil and criminal cases. Accordingly, we find this reason fails to provide a race-neutral ground for the State\u2019s peremptory challenge of Ms. Scott.\nNor do we accept the State\u2019s exclusion of Ms. Scott by reason of her or \"her daughter\u2019s\u201d employment with the City of Chicago. First, we note that the record\u2019s only reference to Ms. Scott\u2019s employment indicates that she is retired and formerly \"worked at a bindery.\u201d The record also indicates that Ms. Scott\u2019s son works for \"PACE Transportation.\u201d Secondly, even assuming the State were correct as to Ms. Scott\u2019s employment status and her \"ties to City employees,\u201d we fail to perceive how the State\u2019s concern regarding employment with a municipality forms a legitimate and race-neutral reason for challenge. The State maintains that \"City employees are more liberal.\u201d This gross generalization has no relevance to the facts of this particular case. We further observe that defendant\u2019s jury contained Mr. Leathers, a retired government employee with two children in similar service, and Ms. Lambert, an employee of the Village of Berwyn. Generally, \"the decisive question will be whether counsel\u2019s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.\u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 409, 111 S. Ct. at 1869. We do not believe the State\u2019s reason and find it is not race-neutral.\nWe do, however, accept Ms. Scott\u2019s \"frailty\u201d and the State\u2019s concern that her attention would wane as the trial progressed as legitimate reasons for excusing her from the venire. Defendant observes that the State accepted Joseph Denaro, a white juror .older than Ms. Scott. Defendant argues that the State\u2019s explanation is not race-neutral if the State retains white venire members having the same or similar characteristics and there are no additional characteristics to meaningfully distinguish the white venire members from the black members who were challenged. See People v. Mack, 128 Ill. 2d 231, 239 (1989). However, the State\u2019s reason for challenge was not age per se, but rather the degree of Ms. Scott\u2019s fitness. Therefore, the disparity of physical fitness between Ms. Scott and Mr. Denaro, observed by the trial court, provides a meaningful distinction between the two jurors, and no error obtains. See People v. Lovelady, 221 Ill. App. 3d 829, 839 (1991) (where a prosecutor does not rely solely on one reason in the explanation of his peremptory challenge, the challenge can be deemed race-neutral on another reason given).\n(2) Terry Mays\nMs. Mays was excused because, according to the State, she \"was young and an employee of the public library system.\u201d The prosecutor reiterated his belief that city employees are \"more liberal, especially working in the Chicago Public Library.\u201d Defendant notes that the State accepted Clay Ullrick, a white juror who was 24 years old, three years her senior. Again, absent distinguishing characteristics, the State\u2019s explanation is not race-neutral if the State retains white venire members having the same or similar characteristics as the excused black venire member. Mack, 128 Ill. 2d at 239. The inquiry thus becomes whether there is a meaningful distinction between Ms. Mays and Clay Ullrick.\nAlthough we question the State\u2019s proposition that city employment somehow translates into or produces \"liberal jurors,\u201d a legitimate distinction may be drawn between a librarian and a bartender, Clay Ullrick\u2019s chosen profession. Moreover, Ullrick had numerous friends in law enforcement, making him a favorable juror despite his youth and lack of, as the State puts it, \"life experience.\u201d Thus, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s acceptance of the State\u2019s reasons as race-neutral.\n(3) Margaret Williamson\nMs. Williamson was excluded because (1) she had previously served on a jury; (2) she was a substitute school teacher; and (3) had a nephew with a conviction for armed robbery. Although the State accepted a white teacher, a former juror and a woman whose son had a criminal conviction, Ms. Williamson was a composite and the trial court was within its discretion to accept the State\u2019s reasons for her exclusion as race-neutral.\n(4) Linda Bond\nMs. Bond was excused because she was a public high school principal and \"we [the State] believe Chicago employees who work with students are much more forgiving.\u201d This reason has been found to be race-neutral. See People v. Nunn, 273 Ill. App. 3d 519, 523 (1995); People v. Hemphill, 230 Ill. App. 3d 453 (1992). Defendant observes, however, that the State did not challenge Wesley Smith, a white school teacher from Wilmette, or Stephanie Garrison, a white school teacher who sat on defendant\u2019s jury. Moreover, Ms. Bond had other, favorable characteristics, including having been the victim of a crime, having a close friend who was a crime victim and having a friend who was a police officer. Ms. Garrison had a family member who was the victim of a crime. Ms. Garrison also had formerly been a juror.\nThe State, both at trial and throughout its argument in this court, has identified \"favorable\u201d characteristics of potential jurors, including: (1) crime victim; (2) having friends or family who were crime victims; and (3) friendship with police officers. Similarly, the State has identified prior jury experience as a \"negative\u201d characteristic.\nMs. Bond and Ms. Garrison, both educators, are distinguished in that Ms. Bond has been a crime victim and has a friend employed as a police officer. Ms. Garrison also has the \"negative\u201d characteristic of previous jury service. Since, using the State\u2019s own reasoning, these additional or distinguishing factors seem to favor Ms. Bond, we are at a loss as to why she, and not Ms. Garrison, was excused. The conclusion that best explains the State\u2019s use of a peremptory challenge to excuse Ms. Bond is that the challenge was racially motivated. See Mack, 128 Ill. 2d at 239; People v. McDonald, 125 Ill. 2d 182, 199 (1988) (The State\u2019s explanation for the exclusion of a black venire member cannot be considered race-neutral if the State failed to exclude a white venire member having the same or similar characteristic and there are no further characteristics meaningfully distinguishing the white venire member who was retained from the challenged black venire member). This we cannot excuse in the course of paying homage to the mandates of Batson.\nAccordingly, since we are unable to find a race-neutral reason for Ms. Bond\u2019s dismissal from defendant\u2019s jury, we reverse defendant\u2019s conviction and grant him a new trial. See People v. Coleman, 155 Ill. 2d 507 (1993) (If the State fails to articulate legitimate race-neutral reasons for its peremptory challenge of even one venireperson, then the defendant\u2019s conviction must be reversed and a new trial granted); People v. Washington, 272 Ill. App. 3d 913 (1995) (State\u2019s reason found \"pretextual\u201d where other jurors who had male children closer in age to defendant were not similarly excused); People v. Thornton, 256 Ill. App. 3d 708 (1993) (explanations that one juror was too old and another unemployed were clearly pretextual and not race-neutral); People v. Gaston, 256 Ill. App. 3d 621 (1993) (unemployed status of prospective juror\u2019s husband and son pretextual explanations); People v. Sims, 249 Ill. App. 3d 246 (1993) (exclusion of two persons because they were employed by United States Postal Service insufficient race-neutral explanation).\nFor the reasons set forth above, we reverse defendant\u2019s conviction and remand for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nCERDA, J., concurs.\nPeople v. Smith, 258 Ill. App. 3d 1003 (1994).\nPeople v. Kindelan, 213 Ill. App. 3d 548 (1991).\nPurkett v. Elam, 514 U.S. 102, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995).\nPeople v. Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1 (1995).\nPeople v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274 (1992).\nMack v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 1093, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1072, 110 S. Ct. 1170 (1990).\nPeople v. Fauntleroy, 224 Ill. App. 3d 140 (1991).\nPeople v. Gaston, 256 Ill. App. 3d 621 (1993).\nPeople v. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d 259 (1995).\nPeople v. Campbell, 240 Ill. App. 3d 179 (1994).\nPeople v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1 (1989).\nPeople v. Caine, 258 Ill. App. 3d 599 (1994).\nPeople v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322 (1994).\nPeople v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1 (1994).\nPeople v. Morgan, 142 Ill. 2d 410 (1991).\nPeople v. Andrews, 155 Ill. 2d 286 (1993).\nPeople v. Fair, 159 Ill. 2d 51 (1994).\nPeople v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401 (1993).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER,\nspecially concurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI respectfully dissent. The trial court\u2019s determination of whether the State has a valid, neutral-based reason for its exercise of a peremptory challenge is entitled to \"great deference\u201d and should not be disturbed on review unless the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 412, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1871 (1991).\nA potential juror possessing an unfavorable trait may be accepted while another juror possessing that same negative trait, but also possessing other negative traits, may be challenged. People v. Benson, 266 Ill. App. 3d 994, 999, 641 N.E.2d 617, 622 (1994), appeal denied, 158 Ill. 2d 554, 645 N.E.2d 1360 (1994).\nHere, Ms. Bond is a public high school principal and a renter. There were other educators selected for the jury, but all the excused potential jurors were renters. \"A venireperson may be excluded on a peremptory challenge based on the fact that he rents his home.\u201d People v. Thomas, 266 Ill. App. 3d 914, 922, 641 N.E.2d 867, 873 (1994), citing People v. Mack, 128 Ill. 2d 231, 538 N.E.2d 1107 (1989).\nThe majority has placed the trial court in an unenviable position. Even though there was a facially valid reason for excluding this juror, the trial court must second-guess the State as to why it did not exclude another person with a negative trait. The majority opinion would require the trial court to second-guess the State as to the best use of its peremptory challenges. Where there are race-neutral reasons for challenging venirepersons, the trial court need go no further and inquire whether there are other persons with more or stronger race-neutral reasons. Yet, the majority herein holds otherwise. The trial court should not have to bear that burden. I accordingly dissent.\nI concur with the remainder of the majority\u2019s well-reasoned opinion regarding the appropriate admission of prior consistent statements.\nJustice Rizzi originally heard oral argument in this case prior to his retirement. Justice Gallagher was substituted and has reviewed the record, briefs and audio recording of the oral argument.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER," } ], "attorneys": [ "Epstein, Zaideman & Esrig, P.C., of Chicago (James R. Epstein, Elizabeth A. Kaveny, and David R. Nordwall, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James Beligratis, and Patricia Melin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHERDALE RANDALL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201495\u20143650\nOpinion filed September 25, 1996.\nGALLAGHER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nEpstein, Zaideman & Esrig, P.C., of Chicago (James R. Epstein, Elizabeth A. Kaveny, and David R. Nordwall, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James Beligratis, and Patricia Melin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1019-01", "first_page_order": 1037, "last_page_order": 1049 }