{ "id": 1260367, "name": "DOUGLAS GIST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MACON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendant (Decatur Herald and Review, a Division of Lee Enterprises, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees)", "name_abbreviation": "Gist v. Macon County Sheriff's Department", "decision_date": "1996-10-18", "docket_number": "No. 4-95-0979", "first_page": "367", "last_page": "381", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 367" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "493 U.S. 1036", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11462587, 11462778, 11463047, 11462638, 11463093, 11463002, 11462939 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/493/1036-01", "/us/493/1036-03", "/us/493/1036-06", "/us/493/1036-02", "/us/493/1036-07", "/us/493/1036-05", "/us/493/1036-04" ] }, { "cite": "505 N.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724", "parenthetical": "Steigmann, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 956", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3609002 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "993", "parenthetical": "Steigmann, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0956-01" ] }, { "cite": "750 F.2d 970", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 628946, 3805683 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "996", "parenthetical": "en banc" }, { "page": "996", "parenthetical": "Bork, J., concurring, joined by Wilkey, Ginsburg, and MacKinnon, JJ." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/750/0970-01", "/us-app-dc/242/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 N.J. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 712184 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605" }, { "page": "1018" }, { "page": "605" }, { "page": "1018" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/136/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 N.W.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10640271 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/378/0875-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 F.2d 1221", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 853596 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/583/1221-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 U.S. 657", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6218419 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694", "parenthetical": "Blackmun, J., concurring" }, { "page": "593", "parenthetical": "Blackmun, J., concurring" }, { "page": "2699", "parenthetical": "Blackmun, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/491/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 417", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Nw. U. L. Rev.", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "hereinafter Comment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "738 F. Supp. 1499", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7394841 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/738/1499-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 F. Supp. 1110", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3664144 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/584/1110-01" ] }, { "cite": "736 P.2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Wash. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1187850 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/108/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Vt. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Vt.", "case_ids": [ 8544526 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing privilege with approval in dicta" }, { "parenthetical": "citing privilege with approval in dicta" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/139/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Vt. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Vt.", "case_ids": [ 4794266 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/152/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 S. Ct. 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 L. Ed. 2d 774", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "881 F.2d 1426", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11294050, 11293989 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/881/1426-02", "/f2d/881/1426-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 F.2d 54", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1361752 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/639/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 769", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5448671 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3151315 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 F.2d 113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 956561 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/556/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 1362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1363" }, { "page": "1363" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3356104 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747" }, { "page": "747" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 F.2d 615", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1202712 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" }, { "page": "617-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/643/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 N.E.2d 1212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1215", "parenthetical": "finding privilege applies even where publisher knows statements he is reporting are false" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 1032", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3536992 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1035-36", "parenthetical": "finding privilege applies even where publisher knows statements he is reporting are false" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/1032-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 F. Supp. 406", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4028363 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "for privilege to apply, court must compare complained-of publications not with the events which actually transpired but with what was actually stated in the governmental proceeding or report" }, { "page": "409" }, { "page": "416" }, { "page": "416-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/455/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 U.S. 448", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12026770 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "inaccurate summarizations of public proceedings not protected under Cox" }, { "parenthetical": "inaccurate summarizations of public proceedings not protected under Cox" }, { "parenthetical": "inaccurate summarizations of public proceedings not protected under Cox" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/424/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 U.S. 524", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6216556 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "2612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/491/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 97", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180397 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103", "parenthetical": "\"[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need *** of the highest order\"" }, { "page": "405", "parenthetical": "\"[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need *** of the highest order\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 469", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11643989 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "imposition of liability for the \"accurate publication\" by the press of information lawfully obtained and available in the public record would be inconsistent with the first and fourteenth amendments" }, { "parenthetical": "imposition of liability for the \"accurate publication\" by the press of information lawfully obtained and available in the public record would be inconsistent with the first and fourteenth amendments" }, { "parenthetical": "imposition of liability for the \"accurate publication\" by the press of information lawfully obtained and available in the public record would be inconsistent with the first and fourteenth amendments" }, { "page": "492" }, { "page": "347" }, { "page": "1044", "parenthetical": "noting the responsibility of the news media \"to report fully and accurately the proceedings of government\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1059", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "U. Ill. L. Rev.", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1080-83", "parenthetical": "discussing and criticizing post-Catalano cases permitting a showing of actual malice to overcome the privilege" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678", "parenthetical": "citing a variety of appellate court cases reaching opposite conclusions on the issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467335 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493", "parenthetical": "citing a variety of appellate court cases reaching opposite conclusions on the issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 F.2d 262", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1874526 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272", "parenthetical": "\"Illinois law is in disarray on the question whether actual malice defeats the privilege of fair summary\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/713/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 N.E.2d 1357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1364", "parenthetical": "noting reporters \"serve as conduits through which information flows from the reporters' sources to the public\"" }, { "page": "1364", "parenthetical": "noting \"reporters do not and cannot guarantee the truth of their stories; instead, they serve as conduits through which information flows from the reporters' sources to the public\" (emphasis in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 955", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5099530 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "965", "parenthetical": "noting reporters \"serve as conduits through which information flows from the reporters' sources to the public\"" }, { "page": "965" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/244/0955-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360-61" }, { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473789 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167-68" }, { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 N.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2879392 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 N.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2852216 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 N.E.2d 1033", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1039" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249364 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 1225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1233" }, { "page": "1234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 861", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927584 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" }, { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0861-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "134" }, { "page": "134" }, { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777540 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "27" }, { "page": "27" }, { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"gist\" or \"sting\" of a report of a supreme court decision was that the plaintiff, after having been convicted, was granted a new trial, and the newspaper's report that the plaintiff had begun to serve his sentence was immaterial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5073840 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"gist\" or \"sting\" of a report of a supreme court decision was that the plaintiff, after having been convicted, was granted a new trial, and the newspaper's report that the plaintiff had begun to serve his sentence was immaterial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/343/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "816 F.2d 313", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1678128 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/816/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 F.2d 378", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 803572 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/448/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 F. Supp. 481", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4146360 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/489/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 F.3d 1222", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10515316 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1228" }, { "page": "1228" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/8/1222-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 496", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108062 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "only substantial truth, not literal truth, is required in defense of a defamation action" }, { "parenthetical": "only substantial truth, not literal truth, is required in defense of a defamation action" }, { "parenthetical": "only substantial truth, not literal truth, is required in defense of a defamation action" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 U.S. 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 379234 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289", "parenthetical": "suggesting that state law requiring literal and complete truth as a defense might violate the first amendment" }, { "page": "712", "parenthetical": "suggesting that state law requiring literal and complete truth as a defense might violate the first amendment" }, { "page": "731", "parenthetical": "suggesting that state law requiring literal and complete truth as a defense might violate the first amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/376/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 N.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791" }, { "page": "791" }, { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 888", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5421430 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890" }, { "page": "890" }, { "page": "890" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/253/0888-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 N.E.2d 408", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2842621 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/43/0286-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1438, "char_count": 31174, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.70130669671586e-07, "percentile": 0.8284996538408224 }, "sha256": "ac7cccf86ba9b6099abcb58983c3ce90493a49a6d9f6e4adb526ecca792a05c1", "simhash": "1:d2e20c16ff00c0c9", "word_count": 5025 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:51:55.867701+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DOUGLAS GIST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MACON COUNTY SHERIFF\u2019S DEPARTMENT, Defendant (Decatur Herald and Review, a Division of Lee Enterprises, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn March 1995, plaintiff, Douglas Gist, sued defendants, the Decatur Herald and Review (Decatur Herald), TCI Cablevision of Decatur (TCI), and the Macon County Sheriff\u2019s Department, for defamation. Plaintiff based his suit on a Crime Stoppers\u2019 \"Most Wanted Fugitives\u201d flyer which the sheriff\u2019s department compiled and the Decatur Herald distributed. TCI produced a television segment based upon this flyer. In August 1995, the trial court granted motions to dismiss filed by the Decatur Herald and the sheriff\u2019s department. In November 1995, the court granted TCI\u2019s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by granting Decatur Herald\u2019s and TCI\u2019s motions to dismiss. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint \u2014 which the trial court dismissed \u2014 alleged essentially the following. On August 1, 1994, the Macon County State\u2019s Attorney filed a complaint charging plaintiff with burglary to a motor vehicle. On that same day, the trial court issued a warrant for plaintiff\u2019s arrest. However, the warrant was never served on plaintiff. On October 26, 1994, plaintiff spoke with someone from the sheriff\u2019s department about the outstanding warrant, and a \"no-charge\u201d was issued. (Plaintiff\u2019s counsel was unable to explain to this court what a \"no-charge\u201d is, and we have no independent knowledge of such a creature in the law.)\nOn October 31, 1994, the Decatur Herald circulated a Crime Stoppers\u2019 flyer as an insert in its daily paper. The flyer (appended to this opinion), captioned \"Most Wanted Fugitives,\u201d featured plaintiff\u2019s name, picture, and the charge for which he was wanted, along with similar information concerning others wanted on outstanding warrants. Textual information appears to the right of the pictures, including (1) the prefatory statement \"Fugitives featured in this publication are wanted as of October 6, 1994. Warrants must be verified before arrest\u201d; (2) a warning (\"IMPORTANT: These fugitives should be considered dangerous and might possibly be armed\u201d); and (3) the credited source of the information (\"This is an official quarterly publication compiled by the Macon County Sheriff\u2019s Warrants and Extradition Division with aid from local and state police agencies\u201d). While the parties at oral argument were unable to explain who actually formatted and published the flyer, plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged only that \"the Macon County Sheriff\u2019s Department printed and distributed over 50,000 copies of the flyer\u201d to be added as an insert in the Decatur Herald. TCI made and aired a television segment based on the flyer.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe material in this section is not to be published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. 166 Ill. 2d R. 23.\nAlthough it is somewhat unclear from his brief, plaintiff appears to challenge three separate defamatory statements in the flyer. First, plaintiff asserts as defamatory the statement that, as of October 6, 1994, a warrant existed for his arrest in connection with a charge of burglary to a motor vehicle. Second, he asserts as defamatory the heading of the flyer, \"Most Wanted Fugitives.\u201d Third, he seems to allege that the warning inside the box on the right side of the flyer, stating \"[t]hese fugitives should be considered dangerous and might possibly be armed,\u201d defames him. We consider all three statements in reviewing the trial court\u2019s decision.\nA. Truth and Protected Opinion as a Defense\nThe material in this section is not to be published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. 166 Ill. 2d R. 23.\nB. Defense of Substantial Truth\nDefendants contend that the trial court\u2019s decision was proper because the flyer\u2019s statements were substantially true. We agree.\nIn Illinois, an allegedly defamatory statement is not actionable if it is substantially true, even though it is not technically accurate in every detail. Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 293, 253 N.E.2d 408, 412 (1969); Lemons v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 253 Ill. App. 3d 888, 890, 625 N.E.2d 789, 791 (1993). While this rule is rooted in the United States Constitution (see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 289, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 712, 84 S. Ct. 710, 731 (1964) (suggesting that state law requiring literal and complete truth as a defense might violate the first amendment); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 115 L. Ed. 2d 447, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991) (only substantial truth, not literal truth, is required in defense of a defamation action)), it is also logically driven, as \"falsehoods which do no incremental damage to the plaintiff\u2019s reputation do not injure the only interest that the law of defamation protects.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993). Moreover, \"[a] fussy insistence upon literal accuracy 'would condemn the press to an arid, dessicated [sic] recital of bare facts.\u2019 \u201d Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp. 481, 486 (D. Mass. 1980), quoting Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 384 (4th Cir. 1971).\nA defendant bears the burden of establishing the \"substantial truth\u201d of his assertions, which he can demonstrate by showing that the \"gist\u201d or \"sting\u201d of the defamatory material is true. Lemons, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 890, 625 N.E.2d at 791. When determining the \"gist\u201d or \"sting\u201d of allegedly defamatory material, a trial court must \"look at the highlight of the article, the pertinent angle of it, and not to items of secondary importance which are inoffensive details, immaterial to the truth of the defamatory statement.\u201d Vachet v. Central Newspapers, Inc., 816 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1987). While substantial truth is normally a question for the jury, where no reasonable jury could find that substantial truth had not been established, the question is properly one of law, which this court may review de novo. See Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1228.\nHere, the essence of the matter is that plaintiff was wanted on an arrest warrant as of October 6, 1994, for burglary to a motor vehicle, which is entirely true. That plaintiff \"might possibly be armed\u201d or \"should be considered dangerous\u201d or was a \"most wanted\u201d fugitive \u2014 to the extent the statements can even be considered as applying to plaintiff or asserting facts about him \u2014 are all secondary details, immaterial to the truth of the Crime Stoppers flyer. Viewing the three allegedly defamatory statements under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s decision was also proper in light of the \"substantial truth\u201d of the flyer.\nOur conclusion squares with similar results reached by this court and other courts in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Lemons, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 890, 625 N.E.2d at 791 (where the plaintiff was caught shoplifting by store employees and then pulled a knife, newspaper article\u2019s statements that employees were \"security guards,\u201d the plaintiff was convicted of four rather than three offenses, and one employee was \"stabbed\u201d as opposed to cutting himself in trying to disarm the plaintiff were of little relevance); Haynes, 8 F.3d 1222 (where the plaintiff admitted or it was incontestably established that he drank heavily, lost his job, assaulted a police officer, walked out on his children, and committed bigamy, statements that the plaintiff left his children home alone on some nights, was fired for drinking rather than for being caught with alcohol, and preferred to spend money on his car rather than his children paled by comparison); Vachet, 816 F.2d 313 (where the plaintiff admitted being arrested for harboring a fugitive, whether the plaintiff was arrested on a warrant for that charge was an irrelevant detail); Wilson v. United Press Ass\u2019ns, 343 Ill. App. 238, 98 N.E.2d 391 (1951) (\"gist\u201d or \"sting\u201d of a report of a supreme court decision was that the plaintiff, after having been convicted, was granted a new trial, and the newspaper\u2019s report that the plaintiff had begun to serve his sentence was immaterial).\nC. Privileges\n1. Absolute Privilege as a Defense\nThe material in this section is not to be published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. 166 Ill. 2d R. 23.\n2. Conditional Privileges\nThe Decatur Herald and TCI both assert they were protected by a conditional privilege. We agree.\nIn Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 619 N.E.2d 129, 134 (1993), our supreme court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts approach to determine whether a qualified privilege should be recognized in a given situation. See Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7\u00a7 593 through 599 (1977). Conditional privileges generally fall into three categories: (1) sit\u00faations which involve some interest of the person who publishes the defamatory matter; (2) situations which involve some interest of the person to whom the matter is published or of some third person; and (3) situations which involve a recognized interest of the public. Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 29, 619 N.E.2d at 135. A court should look only to the occasion giving rise to the defamation action when determining as a matter of public policy whether the occasion created some recognized duty or interest which makes communication of the defamatory statement in that situation conditionally privileged as a matter of law. Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 27, 619 N.E.2d at 134; see Quinn v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 276 Ill. App. 3d 861, 871, 658 N.E.2d 1225, 1233 (1995); Barakat v. Matz, 271 Ill. App. 3d 662, 668, 648 N.E.2d 1033, 1039 (1995). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of a conditional privilege. Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 27, 619 N.E.2d at 134.\nHere both defendants were protected by a conditional privilege. The publication of the Crime Stoppers flyer was conditionally privileged under category three, as a situation which involved a recognized interest of the public. Section 598 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, entitled \"Communication to One Who May Act in the Public Interest,\u201d sets forth this privilege:\n\"An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that\n(a) there is information that affects a sufficiently important public interest, and\n(b) the public interest requires the communication of the defamatory matter to a public officer or a private citizen who is authorized or privileged to take action if the defamatory matter is true.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 598, at 281 (1977).\nComments d and f to section 598 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts compel recognition of a conditional privilege for the type of publication at issue in this case. Comment d states, \"[t]he rule stated in this Section is applicable when any recognized interest of the public is in danger, including the interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 598, Comment d, at 282-83 (1977). Comment f, entitled \"Communications to private citizen to prevent crime or apprehend criminal,\u201d states:\n\"The privilege stated in this Section affords protection to a private citizen who publishes defamatory matter to a third person even though he is not a law enforcement officer, under circumstances which, if true, would give to the recipient a privilege to act for the purpose of preventing a crime or of apprehending a criminal or fugitive from justice.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 566, Comment f, at 283-84 (1977).\nIn light of these comments to the Restatement, we hold that the trial court correctly concluded defendants\u2019 publications were conditionally privileged.\nHowever, a determination that a qualified privilege exists does not end the inquiry. If a defendant demonstrates the existence of a qualified privilege, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate abuse of the privilege. Quinn, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 871, 658 N.E.2d at 1234. Prior to the adoption of the Restatement approach to conditional privileges, a plaintiff could establish abuse of a qualified privilege only by a showing of actual malice, i.e., showing defendant knew the statement to be false or acted in reckless disregard to the truth or falsity of the statement. Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 Ill. 2d 345, 349-50, 243 N.E.2d 217, 221 (1968). Following the adoption of the Restatement (Second) approach, a plaintiff could additionally establish abuse by showing \"any reckless act which shows a disregard for the defamed party\u2019s rights, including the failure to properly investigate the truth of the matter, limit the scope of the material, or send the material to only the proper parties.\u201d Kuwik, 156 Ill. 2d at 30, 619 N.E.2d at 136.\nHere, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how either defendant abused its conditional privilege. Plaintiff set forth no facts tending to show either of the defendants acted in bad faith in circulating the flyer. According to the allegations in the plaintiff\u2019s complaint, the sheriff\u2019s department printed and distributed the flyer to be inserted in the Decatur Herald, which in turn reasonably relied on the sheriff\u2019s department as a source of the compilation. The defendants cannot be expected to verify the existence of each individual outstanding warrant for all fugitives pictured on these flyers; such time-consuming verification procedures would greatly reduce the effectiveness and timeliness of these flyers. The flyer at issue here was limited in its scope; the flyer simply stated that plaintiff was wanted on an outstanding arrest warrant as of October 6, 1994, and noted the charge on which the warrant was based. Further, the timing of the publication was proper because it occurred not long after the most current information was compiled by the sheriff\u2019s department. Last, plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges nothing improper regarding the manner in which the communication was made (as an insert in the newspaper), and, given that such programs depend upon the widest possible circulation for their success, it was proper for the public at large to receive the communication.\n3. Privilege of Fair and Accurate Summary\nDefendants were additionally protected by the privilege which protects fair and accurate summaries of governmental proceedings. Our supreme court first recognized this privilege in Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 112,114-15, 214 N.E.2d 746, 747-48 (1966), which adopted the definition of this privilege as set forth in the first Restatement of Torts:\n\"The publication of a report of judicial proceedings, or proceeding of a legislative or administrative body or an executive officer *** or a municipal corporation or of a body empowered by law to perform a public duty is privileged, although it contains matter which is false and defamatory, if it is\n(a) accurate and complete or a fair abridgment of such proceedings, and\n(b) not made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed.\u201d Restatement of Torts \u00a7 611, at 293 (1938).\nThus, under Lulay, this privilege is qualified because a plaintiff can defeat it by showing that a defendant made a defamatory statement in the course of reporting governmental proceedings but did so with common law malice.\nIn Catalano v. Pechous, 83 Ill. 2d 146, 167-68, 419 N.E.2d 350, 360-61 (1980), the supreme court modified this privilege in accordance with the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 611 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts dropped part (b) from the above definition, and, in a sense, created a \"hybrid\u201d privilege: \"conditional\u201d in that only those reports of governmental proceedings which are accurate and complete or fair abridgments of the proceedings are privileged; \"absolute\u201d in that once the prerequisites of the privilege are met, the privilege cannot be defeated by a showing of malice. See Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comments a, b, at 297-98 (1977). Section 611 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides as follows:\n\"The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding *** is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, at 297 (1977).\nThus, under the Restatement (Second) approach, actual or common law malice will not defeat the privilege once the prerequisites of the privilege have been met. After noting the privilege is not absolute but \"broader in its scope\u201d than traditional qualified privileges, the Restatement (Second) stresses \"the interest of the public in having information made available to it as to what occurs in official proceedings and public meetings.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment a, at 297 (1977). The accuracy of the summary, not the truth or falsity of the information being summarized, is the benchmark of the privilege, because the one reporting on the proceeding or meeting is simply acting as the public eye, reporting information \"that any member of the public could have acquired for himself.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment i, at 301 (1977); see also Martin v. State Journal-Register, 244 Ill. App. 3d 955, 965, 612 N.E.2d 1357, 1364 (1993) (noting reporters \"serve as conduits through which information flows from the reporters\u2019 sources to the public\u201d); W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7 115, at 836 (5th ed. 1984) (the rationale underlying the privilege is that \"any member of the public, if he were present, might see and hear for himself [what is contained in a governmental report or stated in governmental proceedings], so that the reporter is merely a substitute for the public eye\u201d).\nIn discussing why malice no longer defeats the privilege, the Restatement (Second) of Torts comments:\n\"The privilege *** permits a person to publish a report of an official action or proceeding ***, even though the report contains what he knows to be a false and defamatory statement. The constitutional requirement of fault is met in this situation by a showing of fault in failing to do what is reasonably necessary to insure that the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment b, at 298 (1977).\nDespite these comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Catalano appears to have caused confusion in the appellate courts as to whether actual malice might still be raised to defeat this privilege. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 272 (7th Cir. 1983) (\"Illinois law is in disarray on the question whether actual malice defeats the privilege of fair summary\u201d); Berkos v. National Broadcasting Co., 161 Ill. App. 3d 476, 493, 515 N.E.2d 668, 678 (1987) (citing a variety of appellate court cases reaching opposite conclusions on the issue); Note, Reports upon Public Proceedings and Documents: Absolutely Protected by Constitutional Privilege, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1059, 1080-83 (1985) (discussing and criticizing post-Catalano cases permitting a showing of actual malice to overcome the privilege). However, decisions of the United States Supreme Court suggest that a constitutional barrier prevents actual malice from overcoming the privilege. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328, 95 S. Ct. 1029 (1975) (imposition of liability for the \"accurate publication\u201d by the press of information lawfully obtained and available in the public record would be inconsistent with the first and fourteenth amendments); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103, 61 L. Ed. 2d 399, 405, 99 S. a. 2667, 2671 (1979) (\"[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need *** of the highest order\u201d). Moreover, other decisions support the conclusion that it is the accuracy of the press\u2019 report \u2014 the degree to which it tracks the material contained in the public record \u2014 and not the underlying truth or falsity of the public record itself which forms the basis of the privilege and renders notions of actual malice irrelevant. See Cox, 420 U.S. at 492, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 347, 95 S. Ct. at 1044 (noting the responsibility of the news media \"to report fully and accurately the proceedings of government\u201d); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539, 105 L. Ed. 2d 443, 459, 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2612 (1989) (holding that a newspaper may not be punished for the publication of the name of a rape victim where the name was lawfully obtained from a sheriffs department release and noting that had the defendant newspaper \"merely reproduced the news release prepared and released by the [Sheriffs] Department, imposing civil damages would surely violate the First Amendment\u201d); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976) (inaccurate summarizations of public proceedings not protected under Cox); Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (for privilege to apply, court must compare complained-of publications not with the events which actually transpired but with what was actually stated in the governmental proceeding or report); O\u2019Donnell v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 145 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1035-36, 491 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1986) (finding privilege applies even where publisher knows statements he is reporting are false); Martin, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 965, 612 N.E.2d at 1364 (noting \"reporters do not and cannot guarantee the truth of their stories; instead, they serve as conduits through which information flows from the reporters\u2019 sources to the public\u201d (emphasis in original)). This approach makes sense because the privilege is circumscribed by definition \u2014 one must either make a complete and accurate report, or, if a summary is made, the summary must be \"fair\u201d for the privilege to apply.\nWith these principles in mind, it is clear that the fair summary privilege protects the defendants in the present case because they accurately published information obtainable through public records. An outstanding warrant for plaintiffs arrest did exist as of October 6, 1994. The existence of an arrest warrant is a matter of public record and inherently involves some official action by the judiciary. The flyer was complete and accurate in reporting plaintiffs fugitive status as of October 6, 1994. Even were it not, as discussed above, the flyer was beyond a doubt substantially true, making the privilege applicable. See Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, Comment f, at 300 (1977) (\"substantially correct account of the proceedings\u201d is all that is required to invoke the privilege).\nIn support of our conclusion, we note that other courts have found this privilege applicable under very similar circumstances. In Mathis (455 F. Supp. at 409), two allegedly libelous newspaper articles described the arrest and arraignment of two brothers for kidnapping and bank robbery. Both articles erroneously pictured the plaintiff as one of the two suspects, but the erroneous picture was supplied by the Philadelphia police department. The second article contained a further error. In describing the second arrestee (who had the same name as the plaintiff and in whose place plaintiff\u2019s picture appeared), the article gave, as the supposed age and address of the suspect, the age and address of the plaintiff, again based on information supplied by the police. Although neither article credited law enforcement as the source of the information, the misinformation was compiled by the \"night command,\u201d the official source of information regarding the activities of Philadelphia detectives. Mathis, 455 F. Supp. at 416. The Mathis court concluded that the police had issued an \"informal report\u201d to the press involving the suspects, such that the privilege set out under section 611 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts applied. Comparing the articles with the \"informal report\u201d supplied by the police, the court found that the articles were \"accurate\u201d and that the privilege could not have been forfeited by simple negligence in failing to discover the truth of the information. Mathis, 455 F. Supp. at 416-17.\nLikewise, in Porter v. Guam Publications, Inc., 643 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1981), the \"Police Blotter\u201d section of defendant\u2019s newspaper accurately reported, based on a police compilation of criminal complaint and arrest reports, that the plaintiff had been arrested and booked for theft of a motor vehicle and some cash. While true, the police bulletin itself was based on false charges filed by the complainant, and no complaint or arrest warrant was ever issued. Porter, 643 F.2d at 616. The Porter court reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment should have been granted based on Guam\u2019s statutory privilege for \"fair and true\u201d reports of \"judicial\u201d or \"other public official\u201d proceedings. Porter, 643 F.2d at 617-18.\n4. Privilege of Neutral Reportage\nBoth defendants here were also protected by the privilege of neutral reportage, which this court adopted in Krauss v. Champaign News Gazette, Inc., 59 Ill. App. 3d 745, 747, 375 N.E.2d 1362, 1363 (1978). The Krauss court, relying on the decision in Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), summarized the privilege as follows:\n\"[T]he doctrine of neutral reportage gives bent to a privilege by the terms of which the press can publish items of information relating to public issues, personalities, or programs which need not be literally accurate. If the journalist believes, reasonably and in good faith, that his story accurately conveys information asserted about a personality or a program, and such assertion is made under circumstances wherein the mere assertion is, in fact, newsworthy, then he need inquire no further. Unless it is shown that the journalist deliberately distorts these statements to launch a personal attack of his own upon the public figure or the program, that which he reports under such circumstance is privileged.\u201d Krauss, 59 Ill. App. 3d at 747, 375 N.E.2d at 1363.\nAlthough the first district has refused to recognize the privilege (see Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 91 Ill. App. 3d 735, 757-58, 415 N.E.2d 434, 451-52 (1980); Tunney v. American Broadcasting Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 769, 777-78 (1982)), other courts have done so. See, e.g., Edwards, 556 F.2d 113; Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980); Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1036, 107 L. Ed. 2d 774, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990); Ryan v. Herald Ass\u2019n, 152 Vt. 275, 566 A.2d 1316 (1989); Burns v. Times Argus Ass\u2019n, 139 Vt. 381, 430 A.2d 773 (1981) (citing privilege with approval in dicta); Herron v. Tribune Publishing Co., 108 Wash. 2d 162, 736 P.2d 249 (1987) (en banc); Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Sunshine Sportswear & Electronics, Inc. v. WSOC Television, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 1499 (D.S.C. 1989); see also Comment, Neutral Reportage: The Case for a Statutory Privilege, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 417 (1992) (hereinafter Comment); cf. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 694, 105 L. Ed. 2d 562, 593, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2699 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (petitioner\u2019s failure to assert neutral reportage privilege \"unwise\u201d); contra, e.g., Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978); Janklow v. Viking Press, 378 N.W.2d 875 (S.D. 1985). Our supreme court has not yet addressed this privilege. See Catalano, 83 Ill. 2d at 170, 419 N.E.2d at 362. We renew our acceptance of the privilege and conclude that it applies here. We note that plaintiff\u2019s complaint contains no assertion that the defendants abused this privilege in the instant matter.\nD. The Innocent Construction Rule\nThe material in this section is not to be published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. 166 Ill. 2d R. 23.\nIII. EPILOGUE\nThe fear of libel litigation alone is potentially a greater threat to freedom of speech than the actual litigation. See Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 605, 643 A.2d 1012, 1018 (1994). As long ago as 1984, Judge Bork noted, \"[A] remarkable upsurge in libel actions, accompanied by a startling inflation of damage awards, has threatened to impose a self-censorship on the press which can as effectively inhibit debate and criticism as would overt governmental regulation that the first amendment most certainly would not permit.\u201d Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring, joined by Wilkey, Ginsburg, and MacKinnon, JJ.). While only 10% of libel plaintiffs win their cases, the average monetary judgments against media defendants in these winning cases is a frightening $2 million. Comment, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 444 & n.200 (describing the case of the Alton Telegraph, an Illinois daily newspaper with 35,000 subscribers, which, after having lost a $9.2 million libel suit based on an article which was never published, threatened bankruptcy, settled, and was eventually sold). Thus, motions for summary judgment and like motions are exceedingly important tools for disposing of nonmeritorious defamation suits. Costello, 136 N.J. at 605, 643 A.2d at 1018; see, e.g., Porter, 643 F.2d 615 (jury award of $25,000 in plaintiff\u2019s favor in libel action reversed because the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment should have been granted). Again, as Judge Bork notes, \"The only solution to the problem libel actions pose would appear to be close judicial scrutiny to ensure that cases about types of speech and writing essential to a vigorous first amendment do not reach the jury.\u201d Oilman, 750 F.2d at 996 (Bork, J., concurring, joined by Wilkey, Ginsburg, and MacKinnon, JJ.); see also Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 153 Ill. App. 3d 956, 993, 505 N.E.2d 701, 724 (1987) (Steigmann, J., dissenting) (because of danger to first amendment freedoms presented by libel suits, courts must act with \"heightened awareness\u201d when ruling in this area). While the writing at issue here was not political speech often thought to be at the core of the first amendment, the media in this type of situation nevertheless perform an invaluable service to both law enforcement and the public at large. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s grant of defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss in the present case was absolutely proper.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nCOOK, P.J., and KNECHT, J\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James A. Martinkus and D. Douglas Aldeen (argued), both of Erwin, Martinkus, Cole & Ansel, Ltd., of Champaign, for appellant.", "Deanne F. Jones and Charles C. Hughes (argued), both of Kehart, Shatter, Hughes & Webber, P.C., of Decatur, for appellee Decatur Herald & Review.", "Garry E. Davis and Bradley T. Paisley (argued), both of Erickson, Davis, Murphy, Johnson, Griffith & Walsh, of Decatur, for appellee TCI Cablevision of Decatur." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DOUGLAS GIST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MACON COUNTY SHERIFF\u2019S DEPARTMENT, Defendant (Decatur Herald and Review, a Division of Lee Enterprises, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201495\u20140979\nArgued May 15, 1996.\nOpinion filed October 18, 1996.\nJames A. Martinkus and D. Douglas Aldeen (argued), both of Erwin, Martinkus, Cole & Ansel, Ltd., of Champaign, for appellant.\nDeanne F. Jones and Charles C. Hughes (argued), both of Kehart, Shatter, Hughes & Webber, P.C., of Decatur, for appellee Decatur Herald & Review.\nGarry E. Davis and Bradley T. Paisley (argued), both of Erickson, Davis, Murphy, Johnson, Griffith & Walsh, of Decatur, for appellee TCI Cablevision of Decatur." }, "file_name": "0367-01", "first_page_order": 385, "last_page_order": 399 }