{ "id": 1260369, "name": "ROBERT K. ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CHICAGO BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Anderson v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners", "decision_date": "1996-10-30", "docket_number": "No. 1-96-0628", "first_page": "832", "last_page": "836", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 832" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "321 N.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 900", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5309182 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/0900-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 N.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2841383 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222752 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 N.E.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57340 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 780", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6200638 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788" }, { "page": "557" }, { "page": "1569-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 724", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180873 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "1279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 N.E.2d 961", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307266 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0247-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 609, "char_count": 9295, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.226684795779869e-08, "percentile": 0.43132379532551895 }, "sha256": "4e3510c23b86767499e01c06c7e15d55d07e51cad220470eb2dfcfc45537a78e", "simhash": "1:9fb4768b623eae21", "word_count": 1527 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:51:55.867701+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROBERT K. ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CHICAGO BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCARIANO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from a final order of the circuit court denying plaintiff Robert K. Anderson\u2019s challenge to the nominating petition of Arthur J. Fitzgerald as a candidate for Republican ward committeeman of the 47th ward of the City of Chicago. Since this case was filed, the election was held and Mr. Fitzgerald was elected to that party office. The sole issue on appeal is whether his nominating petition had the requisite number of signatures to be placed on the ballot.\nThe contest focuses on a challenge to one signature, that of James N\u00fcrnberg. It is undisputed that Mr. N\u00fcrnberg was injured in a fire and that as a result of that injury Mr. N\u00fcrnberg is confined to a wheelchair and communicates \"with his eyes and nodding his head up and down.\u201d His wife, Jacalyn N\u00fcrnberg, was appointed as his guardian by the probate court after the accident. Mr. N\u00fcrnberg is a registered voter in the 47th ward. On the nominating petition at issue in this matter, Mr. Nurnberg\u2019s signature was executed at a proper time and place by his wife in his presence and in the presence of the proper authority, following his nodded assent when asked if he wished to execute Mr. Fitzgerald\u2019s petition. Anderson challenges the signature, claiming that Mrs. Nurnberg\u2019s execution of her husband\u2019s signature violated section 7 \u2014 10 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 10 (West 1992)) (the Code). That challenge was rejected by a hearing examiner appointed by the Chicago Board of Elections (the Board), by the Board itself, and by the circuit court.\nJudicial review of an electoral board\u2019s decision is a check on unsupported or arbitrary decision making. In the case at bar, we find that the question presented is one of statutory construction and reviewable, therefore, de novo. \"[I]n cases involving an agency\u2019s interpretation of a statute which the agency is charged with administering, the agency\u2019s interpretation is considered relevant but not binding on the court.\u201d Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254, 659 N.E.2d 961 (1995).\nThe specific challenge brought by Mr. Anderson directly raises a constitutional issue:\n\u201cWe have recognized that, 'as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.\u2019 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730[, 39 L. Ed. 2d 714, 723, 94 S. Ct. 1274, 1279] (1974). To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes. Each provision of these schemes, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects \u2014 at least to some degree \u2014 the individual\u2019s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends.\u201d Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547, 557, 103 S. Ct. 1564, 1569-70 (1983).\nThe core of Anderson\u2019s argument is that section 7 \u2014 10 mandates that petitions be signed personally by the voter, rather than with any form of assistance. The language of section 7 \u2014 10 can be read that way. That section, after defining the forms to be employed in nominating petitions, goes on to state:\n\u201cSuch petition shall be signed by qualified primary electors residing in the political division for which the nomination is sought in their own proper persons only and opposite the signature of each signer, his residence address shall be written or printed.\u201d 10 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 10 (West 1992).\nAnderson claims that the clause \u201cin his own proper person\u201d precluded Mrs. N\u00fcrnberg from executing the petition in her husband\u2019s name, even observing the proper safeguards as to where, when and before whom the petition is to be signed, an argument we equate with the requirement that James N\u00fcrnberg can participate in the petition process only by overcoming his disability and regaining the ability to sign his name.\nThis reading of the Election Code is an intolerably Procrustean one and results in a patently unconstitutional result: the disenfranchisement of Mr. N\u00fcrnberg. Our supreme court, in Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 307, 664 N.E.2d 43 (1996), stated:\n\"Our cases support the view that legislation that affects any stage of the election process implicates the right to vote. Thus, this court has determined that the right to vote is implicated by legislation that restricts a candidate\u2019s effort to gain access to the ballot. [Citation.] It has also held that the right to vote is implicated by legislation that limits the people\u2019s right to nominate candidates [citation] and that prohibits the counting of legally cast ballots [citation].\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nIn a democratic society, there are few rights as valuable as the right to vote. That right would be a barren one if the vote were to be protected but the nomination process were to be vastly more restrictive than the voting process itself, especially in an age that advances more vigorously then ever the rights of disabled persons to become, rightfully, full participants in the mainstream of American life. Thus, strong first amendment principles are activated by any statute that purports to bar registered voters from participating in the nomination process. Mr. Anderson characterizes Mr. Nurnberg\u2019s position as \"unfortunate\u201d and opines that the Election Code simply does not present any mechanism that would allow him to sign nomination petitions except by his own hand. We cannot agree.\nWith regard to elections themselves, the Election Code evinces a strong public policy protecting the rights of those unable to physically participate due to some disability. For example, the Election Code provides:\n\"Any primary elector who may declare upon oath, properly witnessed and with his or her signature or mark affixed, that he or she requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, physical disability or inability to read, write or speak the English language, shall, upon request, be assisted in marking his or her primary ballot in the same manner as provided by this Act for general elections.\u201d 10 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 48 (West 1994).\nSee also 10 ILCS 5/17 \u2014 14 (West 1994). We regard these provisions as strong evidence of the important public policies underlying free and open elections and access to the ballot, which weigh heavily in our consideration of the issue sub judice.\nSection 3 \u2014 1.2 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1.2 (West 1994)) provides as follows:\n\"For the purpose of determining eligibility to sign a nominating petition or a petition proposing a public question, the terms 'voter\u2019, 'registered voter\u2019, 'qualified voter\u2019, 'legal voter\u2019, 'elector\u2019, 'qualified elector\u2019, 'primary elector\u2019, and 'qualified primary elector\u2019 as used in this Code or in another Statute shall mean a person who is registered to vote at the address shown opposite his signature on the petition or was registered to vote at such address when he signed the petition.\u201d 10 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1.2 (West 1994).\nWhile this provision does not define the meaning of the term \"his own proper person\u201d as used in section 7 \u2014 10, it is indicative of the broad sweep of the intent underlying the Election Code: if you are a voter, you may execute a petition.\nWhere two statutory provisions address the same subject matter, it is well established that those statutes should be construed in pari materia and that an interpretation that gives effect to both provisions must be adopted (In re Application For Judgment & Sale Of Delinquent Properties for the Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill. 2d 161, 168-69 (1995)). Here, section 3 \u2014 1.2 plainly contemplates that all voters may participate in the nominating process. The first amendment requires nothing less. In order to achieve that goal, section 7 \u2014 10 must be construed to mean that a voter who is otherwise eligible but who, because of illness or disability, cannot physically execute a petition may be granted assistance in that process. The Board\u2019s construction of the Election Code achieved that result and honored both the letter and the spirit of the Election Code. We do not perceive any error in that construction. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDiVITO and BURKE, JJ., concur.\nThat election does not moot this case. Under the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1992)), the time for filing challenges to nominating petitions, and seeking review of board decisions on those challenges, is extremely compressed. As a consequence, appellate review frequently is unavailable until after the election has been completed and the results certified. Where issues are likely to recur and involve matters of public concern, an appeal need not be dismissed as moot (see, e.g., In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Johnny Bruce Co. v. City of Champaign, 24 Ill. App. 3d 900, 321 N.E.2d 469 (1974)).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCARIANO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel J. Kelley, of Chicago, for appellant.", "James M. Scanlon, of Rieff & Scanlon, and Clark D. Pellett, both of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROBERT K. ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CHICAGO BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201496\u20140628\nOpinion filed October 30, 1996.\nDaniel J. Kelley, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames M. Scanlon, of Rieff & Scanlon, and Clark D. Pellett, both of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0832-01", "first_page_order": 850, "last_page_order": 854 }