{ "id": 1295575, "name": "GEORGE K. PRICE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FCC NATIONAL BANK, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Price v. FCC National Bank", "decision_date": "1996-11-22", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201495\u20144210", "first_page": "661", "last_page": "665", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 661" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "594 N.E.2d 1243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5210120 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159578 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 N.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542333 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" }, { "page": "10-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1637", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(9)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 F.3d 472", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11932153 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/4/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 C 2164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1601", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 507, "char_count": 11290, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.862460984849339e-08, "percentile": 0.4590312022052251 }, "sha256": "aa8d2b86411a96f49e254da6ec68d8c874bd91dec347983c1b0355538b58ce77", "simhash": "1:55bf158eddddfc22", "word_count": 1841 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:02:27.033630+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GEORGE K. PRICE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FCC NATIONAL BANK, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs George K. Price and Harry Schuman appeal from the dismissal of their action alleging violation of the Illinois Credit Card Issuance Act (815 ILCS 140/6 (West 1994)), breach of contract and common law fraud against FCC National Bank (FCC). We affirm.\nFCC offers Visa and Mastercard bank credit cards under the name \"First Card.\u201d Plaintiffs maintain bank credit cards with FCC. The privileges and obligations of holding a First Card are set forth in the cardholder agreement (agreement). Prior to April 1, 1991, the agreement provided that all cardholders had a \"grace period\u201d of 25 days after receipt of a billing statement to pay an outstanding balance without incurring a finance charge. On April 1, 1991, the agreement was amended to provide that a finance charge would accrue unless payment was made on or before the \"payment due date\u201d printed on the billing statement. The grace period was the time between the billing date and the payment due date.\nFCC breaks its cardholders into two groups: cardholders who have paid their previous month\u2019s balance in full, which is the group plaintiffs seek to represent; and (2) cardholders who have not paid the total amount due on their bill. For those in category one, previous month full payers, FCC inserts a payment due date on their next monthly billing statement that is 20 days from the statement\u2019s billing date. However, FCC does not assess finance charges against any customer who pays his balance within 25 days after the billing date. For those in category two, those who have run a balance on their previous month\u2019s bill, FCC sets due dates on these cardholders\u2019 statements that are 25 days from the billing date, but because these cardholders have not paid their previous month\u2019s balance in full, they are assessed finance charges until that balance is paid in full.\nPlaintiffs originally filed suit on March 30, 1992, in federal court, claiming that FCC\u2019s practice of inserting a payment due date of 20 days after the billing date but not charging finance charges until 25 days after the billing date violated the Truth in Lending Act. 15 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1601 through 1693 (1988). Plaintiffs\u2019 suit also alleged that this practice violated the Illinois Credit Card Issuance Act (815 ILCS 140/6 (West 1994)), was a breach of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 (West 1994)), and a breach of contract. Plaintiffs also sought class certification. The district court dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, finding that FCC\u2019s grace period was authorized by the disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act. Price v. FCC National Bank, 92 C 2164 (N.D. Ill. 1992). The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs\u2019 state claims. The seventh circuit affirmed. Price v. FCC National Bank, 4 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1993).\nPlaintiffs then brought suit in state court alleging violation of the Illinois Credit Card Issuance Act, breach of contract and common law fraud. Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 1994). The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiffs\u2019 claim alleging violation of the Credit Card Issuance Act failed to state a claim since the agreement provides that Delaware law would apply, and plaintiffs\u2019 breach of contract and fraud claims fail to state claims since plaintiffs have not been damaged. Plaintiffs appeal.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges the defendant violated section 6 of the Credit Card Issuance Act, which states, in pertinent part:\n\"\u00a7 6. Disclosure to applicants.\n(a) Except as provided in Section 25 of the Retail Installment Sales Act, relating to sellers or holders under a retail charge agreement and in subsection (c), a credit card issuer shall disclose, either on an application for a credit card or on literature accompanying the application, on or with any credit card account solicitation, and on each periodic billing statement mailed to a card holder, the following:\n* * *\n(3) the grace period, which is defined as the period within which any credit extended under such credit plan must be repaid to avoid incurring an interest charge represented in terms of an annual percentage rate of interest, and if no such period is offered such fact shall be clearly stated.\u201d 815 ILCS 140/6 (West 1994).\nPlaintiffs contend that defendant violated section 6 of the Credit Card Issuance Act, as well as committed common law fraud and breach of contract, when it represented, by means of a false payment due date, a period that is shorter than the period within which any credit extended must be repaid to avoid incurring an interest charge.\nCredit card disclosure requirements are also addressed in the federal Truth in Lending Act, which requires credit card issuers to disclose in each periodic billing statement:\n\"[t]he day by which or the period (if any) within which payment must be made to avoid additional finance charges, except that the creditor may, at his election and without disclosure, impose no such additional finance charge if payment is received after such date or expiration of such period.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1637(b)(9) (1988).\nDefendant urges us to uphold the trial court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 action on the basis that the federal court has determined that defendant has complied with the federal Truth in Lending Act and, according to defendant, compliance with the Truth in Lending Act is complete compliance with Illinois law. Defendant claims that the court in Lanier v. Associates Finance, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 1, 499 N.E.2d 440 (1986), determined that compliance with the Truth in Lending Act is compliance with the Illinois Credit Card Issuance Act. The court in Lanier actually determined that compliance with the federal Truth in Lending Act is a defense to liability under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The court also noted that the disclosure requirements of certain Illinois consumer credit statutes are met by compliance with the federal Truth in Lending Act. The consumer credit statutes referred to by the court were the Consumer Installment Loan Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 17, par. 5420), \"An Act in relation to the *** rates of interest\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 17, par. 5410), the Retail Installment Sales Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 12V12, par. 505), and the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 12V-h, par. 565). Each of these statutes specifically states that compliance with the Truth in Lending Act is compliance with the Illinois statute. The court in Lanier stated that \"we perceive in the disclosure provisions of Illinois\u2019 consumer credit statutes a consistent policy against extending disclosure requirements under Illinois law beyond those mandated by the Truth in Lending Act, in situations where both the Act and the Illinois statutes apply.\u201d Lanier, 114 Ill. 2d at 17.\nSection 10b(l) of the Consumer Fraud Act provides that the Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to \"[a]ctions or transactions specifically authorized by laws administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this State or the United States.\u201d 815 ILCS 505/10b(1) (West 1994). The Lanier court determined that this section of the Consumer Fraud Act also provides that compliance with the Truth in Lending Act is compliance with the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. Lanier did not, however, address whether compliance with the federal Truth in Lending Act is compliance with the statute at issue here, the Illinois Credit Card Issuance Act.\nWe do address this issue and find that compliance with the federal Truth in Lending Act is indeed compliance with the Illinois Credit Card Issuance Act. When plaintiffs here filed their original complaint in 1993, the Illinois Credit Card Issuance Act provided, in pertinent part:\n\"If a credit card issuer, as required pursuant to federal law, makes disclosures of all information required to be disclosed under subsection (a) of Section 6 of this Act in connection with *** periodic billing statements, the credit card issuer shall be deemed to have complied with the requirements of subsection (a) of Section 6 of this Act.\u201d 815 ILCS 140/9 (West 1992).\nIn 1994, prior to the filing of plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint, the Illinois Credit Card Issuance Act had been amended to state, in pertinent part:\n\"A credit card issuer who complies with or is exempt from the applicable disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act and the regulations promulgated under that Act shall be deemed to be in compliance with or exempt from all provisions of subsection (a) of Section 6 of this Act.\u201d 815 ILCS 140/9(c) (West 1994).\nThe parties disagree as to whether the former statute or the amended statute, is applicable to this case. We find it unnecessary to determine whether one statute or the other applies, since the amended statute did not change the law but merely clarified the law. See Friedman v. Krupp Corp., 282 Ill. App. 3d 436 (1996); Hyatt Corp. v. Sweet, 230 Ill. App. 3d 423, 594 N.E.2d 1243 (1992). The former statute provided that a credit card issuer that makes the disclosures required by federal law complies with the disclosure requirements of section 6 of the credit card act. The amended version specifically states that compliance with the Truth in Lending Act is compliance with the disclosure requirements of section 6 the Credit Card Issuance Act. Thus, regardless of which statute applies, the fact that defendant\u2019s disclosure of the grace period complies with the Truth in Lending Act automatically means defendant\u2019s disclosure is in compliance with the Illinois Credit Card Issuance Act. Plaintiffs\u2019 claim based on the Credit Card Issuance Act was therefore properly dismissed.\nWe also find that because defendant has complied with the federal Truth in Lending Act, plaintiffs cannot state a claim for either common law fraud or breach of contract. The court in Lanier found that a disclosure in compliance with the Truth in Lending Act could not state a claim for common law fraud. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would put a creditor in the anomalous position of being guilty of common law misrepresentation by specifically complying with the mandates of the federal Truth in Lending Act. Lanier, 114 Ill. 2d at 10-11. We reach the same conclusion here and also hold that, because defendant complied with the federal law, it could not have breached its contract with plaintiffs.\nAccordingly, because defendant\u2019s disclosure of the grace period complied with the federal Truth in Lending Act, and compliance with that act is compliance with Illinois law, plaintiffs\u2019 complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.\nAffirmed.\nCOUSINS and HOURIHANE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Susman, Buehler & Watkins (Arthur T. Susman and Timothy J. Storn, of counsel), and Aaron S. Wolff, both of Chicago, for appellants.", "Lynn A. Goldstein and John C. Simons, both of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GEORGE K. PRICE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FCC NATIONAL BANK, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201495\u20144210\nOpinion filed November 22, 1996.\nRehearing denied December 30, 1996.\nSusman, Buehler & Watkins (Arthur T. Susman and Timothy J. Storn, of counsel), and Aaron S. Wolff, both of Chicago, for appellants.\nLynn A. Goldstein and John C. Simons, both of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0661-01", "first_page_order": 681, "last_page_order": 685 }