{ "id": 1544411, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRIAN WILSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wilson", "decision_date": "1997-01-24", "docket_number": "Nos. 2\u201495\u20141422 through 2\u201495\u20141424 cons.", "first_page": "169", "last_page": "174", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 169" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222762 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307259 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543208 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307263 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113", "parenthetical": "declaring void a sentence issued in error under section 5-8-4(a) of the Code" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 947", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182725 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "952" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0947-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 944", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5239251 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "947" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/226/0944-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591661 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3218603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223611 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "327-28" }, { "page": "325" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0320-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 502, "char_count": 10640, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4545923006371206e-07, "percentile": 0.8043845413381243 }, "sha256": "9351d6d74c2541adcf2fdeab65a5f40f98a26843c77b3d00b5f411e94f1ed5be", "simhash": "1:fbaa412e5a446cb6", "word_count": 1762 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:24:46.991294+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRIAN WILSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn October 20, 1994, defendant, Brian Wilson, was charged with aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(b)(8) (West 1994)). On January 10, 1995, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1994)). Defendant posted bond for both offenses. On February 22, 1995, while on pretrial release, defendant was charged with forgery (720 ILCS 5/17\u20143(a)(2) (West 1994)) and aggravated battery of a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(b)(6) (West 1994)).\nOn July 28, 1995, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to all charges. In exchange for the guilty plea, the State agreed to nolpros the forgery charge and recommended a sentence cap of nine years\u2019 imprisonment for the three remaining counts. After describing the sentencing possibilities to defendant, admonishing him of his rights, and ensuring that he properly waived those rights, the trial court accepted the plea agreement and continued the case for sentencing.\nOn September 15, 1995, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. However, at the sentencing hearing on October 2, 1995, defendant withdrew the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court then imposed concurrent nine-year terms of imprisonment on each of the three remaining counts. Defendant\u2019s motion to reduce his sentence was denied by the trial court, and defendant thereafter filed this timely appeal.\nDefendant has two contentions on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in imposing a concurrent, rather than a consecutive, sentence on the charge of aggravated battery of a peace officer; and (2) the trial court erred in imposing a nine-year sentence on the charge of unlawful possession.\nThe State initially contends that this case is controlled by our supreme court\u2019s recent opinion in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996). The State argues that we do not have jurisdiction to hear defendant\u2019s appeal under Evans. We disagree with the State.\nIn Evans, two defendants entered into negotiated plea agreements with the State before separate trial courts. Under the general terms of the agreements, each defendant was to plead guilty to one set of charges in exchange for the dismissal of other charges and recommended specific sentences of imprisonment. In both cases, after carefully complying with Supreme Court Rule 402 (134 Ill. 2d R. 402), the trial courts concurred in the negotiated plea agreements and sentenced the defendants to the recommended terms of imprisonment. Thereafter, each defendant filed motions to reduce their sentences. In both cases, the trial courts denied the motions because the sentences imposed were the products of negotiated, rather than open, plea agreements. Both appellate courts reversed and remanded, instructing the trial courts to exercise their discretion in considering the motions to reduce sentences under Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)). Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 322.\nThe supreme court agreed with the trial courts and held that Rule 604(d) does not apply to negotiated plea agreements. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. The court stated that the defendants were attempting \"to hold the State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally modifying the sentences to which they had earlier agreed. Such a practice flies in the face of contract law principles. [Citation.] It is also inconsistent with constitutional concerns of fundamental fairness.\u201d Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. In other words, under the defendants\u2019 argument, an accused\n\"could negotiate with the State to obtain the best deal possible in modifying or dismissing the most serious charges and obtain a lighter sentence than he would have received had he gone to trial or entered an open guilty plea, and then attempt to get that sentence reduced even further by reneging on the agreement.\u201d Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327-28.\nAs a result of negotiated plea bargaining, \"the guilty plea and the sentence 'go hand in hand\u2019 as material elements of the plea agreement.\u201d Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 325. Therefore, the court held that \"following the entry of judgment on a negotiated guilty plea, even if a defendant wants to challenge only his sentence, he must move to withdraw the guilty , plea and vacate the judgment so that, in the event the motion is granted, the parties are returned to the status quo.\u201d Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332.\nHowever, the court also noted that, in situations where the trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing defendants, \"[b]oth good public policy and common sense dictate that defendants *** be allowed to challenge only their sentences without being required to withdraw their guilty pleas.\u201d Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332, citing People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 110 (1988); People v. Wallace, 143 Ill. 2d 59, 60 (1991).\nThus, the distinguishing feature of Evans is that the defendants there agreed to specific sentences in exchange for their guilty pleas. In those situations, the trial courts exercised no discretion in sentencing the defendants. In contrast, defendant here agreed to a sentence cap of nine years rather than a specific sentence. Thus, the trial court had the discretion to determine the appropriate sentence for defendant in relation to the cap. The State\u2019s reading of Evans is therefore too broad because the same policies which apply to open guilty pleas apply in a case such as this, where the trial court has the discretion to sentence defendant.\nOur decision is supported by case law from this court. In People v. Soles, 226 Ill. App. 3d 944, 947 (1992), we held that a defendant who pleaded guilty in exchange for a sentence cap of 20 years was entitled to file a motion to reduce his sentence because he only \"agreed to accept any *** sentence if the trial court properly exercised its discretion in imposing it.\u201d In other words, \"it is at least a fair inference from Soles that, if a trial court exercises no discretion in imposing the sentence, a defendant may not challenge it.\u201d People v. Wendt, 283 Ill. App. 3d 947, 952 (1996). In this case, rather than merely imposing an agreed-upon sentence, the trial court had the discretion to sentence defendant to any term within the nine-year cap agreed to between the parties. Thus, contrary to the State\u2019s argument, we have jurisdiction to review defendant\u2019s appeal.\nDefendant\u2019s first contention is that the trial court erred in imposing concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences for the aggravated battery charges. We agree.\nSection 5\u20148\u20144(h) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20144(h) (West 1994)) governs sentencing in a case such as this. That section states:\n\"If a person charged with a felony commits a separate felony while on pre-trial release ***, the sentences imposed upon conviction of these felonies shall be served consecutively regardless of the order in which the judgments of conviction are entered.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20144(h) (West 1994).\nIn this case, defendant was charged with aggravated battery, a felony, and posted bond for that offense on December 17, 1994. While on release, he allegedly committed the felony of aggravated battery of a peace officer on February 9, 1995. As even the trial court stated to defendant, the sentences for these offenses \"could be mandatory consecutive.\u201d Under section 5\u20148\u20144(h) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20144(h) (West 1994)), the sentences were in fact \"mandatory consecutive\u201d because defendant committed \"a separate felony [the aggravated battery of a peace officer] while on pre-trial release.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20144(h) (West 1994). It was therefore error for the trial court to impose concurrent sentences for the two aggravated battery felonies.\nAs a result of the trial court\u2019s error, we must determine how to dispose of defendant\u2019s appeal. It is well settled that \"[a] sentence which does not conform to a statutory requirement is void.\u201d People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995) (declaring void a sentence issued in error under section 5\u20148\u20144(a) of the Code). As the Arna court further stated, where an order \"imposing concurrent terms [is] void, the appellate court [has] the authority to correct it at any time.\u201d Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 113, citing People v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (1987). Because the trial court\u2019s sentences in this case were void for noncompliance with section 5\u20148\u20144(h) of the Code, we vacate defendant\u2019s concurrent sentences for aggravated battery and aggravated battery of a peace officer and remand the case for a determination of the appropriate sentences to be imposed consecutively.\nWe also note that, pursuant to section 5\u20148\u20141(c) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141(c) (West 1994)), defendant\u2019s new sentences for these offenses cannot be increased to a term greater than the nine years previously imposed. See People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367, 371 (1995); People v. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d 439, 446-47 (1995).\nBefore concluding, we also briefly note defendant\u2019s second contention: the trial court erred in sentencing him to a nine-year sentence for unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Defendant was charged with possessing less than 15 grams of cocaine in violation of section 402(c) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1994)). This offense is a Class 4 felony punishable by a nonextended term of one to three years\u2019 incarceration and an extended term of three to six years\u2019 incarceration. 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141(a)(7) (West 1994). The trial court therefore erred in sentencing defendant to a nine-year term of imprisonment in contravention of the authorized maximum extended term. See Ama, 168 Ill. 2d at 113. Thus, defendant\u2019s sentence for unlawful possession of a controlled substance is void. Accordingly, on remand the trial court must not sentence defendant to more than six years\u2019 imprisonment for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the maximum extended-term sentence possible under the Code.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this order.\nReversed and cause remanded with directions.\nINGLIS and RATHJE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (William L. Browers and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRIAN WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNos. 2\u201495\u20141422 through 2\u201495\u20141424 cons.\nOpinion filed January 24, 1997.\nRehearing denied February 11, 1997.\nG. Joseph Weller and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (William L. Browers and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0169-01", "first_page_order": 187, "last_page_order": 192 }