{ "id": 520996, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN K. STEINMETZ, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Steinmetz", "decision_date": "1997-03-21", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201494\u20141341", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "7", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5438887 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" }, { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 U.S. 501", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179579 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505-06" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "1693-94" }, { "page": "506" }, { "page": "131-32" }, { "page": "1694" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/425/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820113 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249202 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927608 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810276 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55975 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307256 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" }, { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592134 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477551 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0450-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 751, "char_count": 15091, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.047637391450604e-08, "percentile": 0.37436082180853014 }, "sha256": "e63f64d7eb86f940c4086866c723faf10552a6301ccc0e233e9e502e4d38f4a1", "simhash": "1:dbaad030528268d7", "word_count": 2441 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:23:12.186621+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN K. STEINMETZ, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COLWELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, John Steinmetz, was convicted of felony retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16A\u20143(a) (West 1992)). Defendant appeals, contending that (1) the trial court should have conducted a hearing on defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial where the record shows that defendant was taking psychotropic medication at the time of trial; (2) the court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance to obtain medical records to support his insanity defense; and (3) the court erred in requiring defendant to stand trial in his jail uniform.\nDaniel Meier, a part-time security guard at a Jewel store, saw defendant take 10 packs of cigarettes from a display and put them in a shopping basket carried by a male companion. As defendant and his companion proceeded down aisle 5, defendant put the cigarettes in his jacket pocket. He then went to the front of the store and sat down. After his companion went through the checkout line and paid for items in the basket, defendant started to leave the store.\nMeier detained the pair because defendant had not paid for the cigarettes. When Meier confronted defendant, he initially denied that he had any cigarettes. He then gave Meier two packs, then another two packs. The remaining packs fell to the floor and defendant tried to kick them under a display case. Defendant then said that he had forgotten to pay for the cigarettes.\nAn information filed December 16, 1993, charged defendant with retail theft. The charge was enhanced to a felony because defendant had prior theft convictions.\nDefendant filed a motion requesting a hearing on his fitness to stand trial. The motion asserted, among other things, that defendant advised defense counsel that he had undergone psychiatric care for bipolar disorder and was then taking lithium, Valium, and Doxepin. The motion also recited defense counsel\u2019s personal observations of defendant and concluded that he was unable to understand the nature of the proceedings or assist in his defense.\nOn February 18, 1994, the court found defendant unfit to stand trial. The court ordered him placed in the custody of the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities for evaluation and treatment.\nThe court held another fitness hearing on August 25, 1994. Defense counsel stipulated to the contents of a report from the Elgin Mental Health Center. The report, prepared by psychologist Connie Kinast, states that defendant had been prescribed psychotropic medication, specifically, Diazepam and lithium carbonate. Kinast concluded that defendant was fit to stand trial.\nDefense counsel contended, however, that defendant remained unfit. Defendant testified. After considering the report, defendant\u2019s testimony, and counsels\u2019 arguments, the court found defendant fit to stand trial, on the same date of August 25, 1994, and set the case for trial on September 19, 1994.\nOn September 16, defendant filed and the court heard a motion to continue the trial date but apparently did not rule on the motion. The motion alleged that defendant was not prepared for trial because his \"extensive mental health history\u201d was \"being compiled.\u201d The motion further alleged:\n\"Most of these in-patient hospitalizations do appear to impact on the defendant\u2019s mental state at the time of the commission of the alleged offense as each appear [sic] to be related to the same ongoing and longstanding mental disorders and disabilities.\u201d\nThe motion asserted that the mental health records were expected to arrive within the next week. The court denied the motion for a continuance on September 19, 1994, the day of trial.\nOn September 19, 1994, defense counsel said that he expected to receive the records at any time. He requested a continuance of no more than one week to receive and review the records. The court denied the motion. Defense counsel then requested a brief continuance to permit defendant to change into street clothes rather than having defendant tried in his jail uniform. The court denied that motion as well and the cause proceeded to trial.\nMeier was the State\u2019s only witness. Defendant testified that he was taking medication every day. Without the medication, he felt dizzy and occasionally blacked out. At the time of trial, he was taking medication to calm him, but it was not working very well. He remembered nothing about being in the Jewel store that night. He had talked with doctors at a Veterans\u2019 Administration (VA) hospital and at the Elgin Mental Health Center about his memory problems.\nThe court instructed the jury on the insanity defense, but the jury found defendant guilty. The court denied defendant\u2019s post-trial motion and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.\nDefendant first contends that the court should have sua sponte ordered a fitness hearing because the record reveals that defendant was taking psychotropic medication at the time of trial. The State responds that defendant had a fitness hearing and is not entitled to another.\nDue process prohibits the prosecution of a defendant who is unfit to stand trial. People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450, 455-56 (1994). A defendant is considered unfit if, because of a mental or physical condition, he is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings or to assist in his defense. 725 ILCS 5/104\u201410 (West 1992); People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 512 (1991). The circuit court has a duty to order a fitness hearing whenever a bona fide doubt exists of a defendant\u2019s ability to understand the charges and participate in his defense. People v. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d 394, 407 (1995).\nAt the time of trial, section 104\u201421(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provided that \"[a] defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs or other medications under medical direction is entitled to a hearing on the issue of his fitness while under medication.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/104\u201421(a) (West 1992). In a line of recent cases beginning with Brandon, the supreme court has held that a trial court must order a fitness hearing when it receives information that a defendant is taking psychotropic medication, even if defendant does not request one. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d at 457; People v. Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d 464, 476-77 (1996). If the record does not fully disclose the circumstances of defendant\u2019s use of psychotropic drugs, the remedy is a partial remand for the taking of evidence on this question. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d at 415.\nOf course, defendant acknowledges that the trial court conducted a fitness hearing within a month of the trial date and found defendant fit to stand trial. However, defendant complains that this was merely a \"general\u201d fitness hearing that did not specifically consider the effects of the psychotropic medication. Defendant argues that, \"[h]ad there been a full-blown hearing on the issue of the medication\u2019s effects, the psychologist making the report presumably would have been required to testify to the bases for her conclusions, so that the court could determine whether the medication being given, while perhaps calming defendant, nevertheless affected defendant\u2019s ability to make cognitive decisions about how to proceed at trial.\u201d\nNeither section 104\u201421(a) nor the Brandon line of cases creates a right to a separate fitness hearing on the effect of psychotropic medication on a defendant\u2019s ability to understand and participate in the proceedings. The statute and cases merely provide that a defendant\u2019s ingestion of psychotropic drugs is one circumstance that may raise a bona fide doubt of his fitness to stand trial.\nIn this case, the trial court relied on Kinast\u2019s report in concluding that defendant was fit for trial. The one-page report notes that defendant was then being prescribed Diazepam and lithium carbonate and concludes that defendant was fit for trial. The only logical conclusion that can be drawn from the report is that Kinast considered the medications\u2019 effect in reaching her conclusion that defendant was fit for trial. If defendant wanted to explore the bases of Kinast\u2019s conclusions, he could have subpoenaed her to testify at the hearing or perhaps obtained an independent evaluation. Instead, defendant stipulated to the contents of the report and relied on his own testimony to attempt to establish his continuing unfitness.\nWe decline to hold that Brandon\u2019s nonwaiver rule requires a trial court not only to order a hearing sua sponte if defense counsel fails to request one, but also to override counsel\u2019s trial strategy in the conduct of that hearing. Whether to present the testimony of a particular witness is generally a question of trial strategy. People v. Jones, 155 Ill. 2d 357, 369 (1993). Here, defendant\u2019s use of psychotropic drugs was known to the psychologist conducting the evaluation and to the trial court. Defendant had the opportunity to present additional evidence. Under these circumstances, defendant is not entitled to a second opportunity to establish his unfitness for trial.\nPeople v. Johnson, 276 Ill. App. 3d 656 (1995), and People v. Guttierez, 271 Ill. App. 3d 301 (1995), on which defendant relies, are distinguishable. In those cases, although the trial court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel were aware of reports stating that defendants were \"mentally fit for trial, with medication,\u201d the courts failed to conduct the required fitness hearings.\nDefendant next contends that the court erred in denying his request for a short continuance to obtain medical records that he claims were necessary to establish an insanity defense. Although defendant testified at trial about his history of mental illness and treatment, he presented no medical opinions on this question. Thus, defendant contends, the inability to secure his medical records prior to trial hampered his ability to present a defense.\nThe granting of a motion for a continuance is within the trial court\u2019s sound discretion, and its ruling will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 281 (1985). In reviewing the denial of a continuance to secure evidence, the court should consider (1) whether defendant was diligent; (2) whether the evidence was material and might have affected the jury\u2019s verdict; and (3) whether defendant was prejudiced. People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 307 (1992).\nWe agree with the State that defendant failed to establish his diligence in securing the medical records. Nothing in the record shows when defense counsel first requested the records or documents defendant\u2019s subsequent efforts to secure their timely production.\nEven if defendant established his diligence, however, he cannot demonstrate prejudice from the absence of the records at trial. As the State points out, when the records were eventually produced, the virtually unanimous conclusion of the professionals who examined defendant was that he was faking symptoms of mental illness. Kinast\u2019s report from the Elgin Mental Health Center states that defendant had a \"tendency to exaggerate symptoms, resulting in a 'faking bad\u2019 profile.\u201d Another psychologist, John Dunne, examined defendant before sentencing. He concluded that the results of psychological tests he administered suggested a \"high likelihood of an invalid profile due to the over-reporting of psychopathology.\u201d\nA report from the VA hospital states that defendant had spoken about memory problems, but no clear memory deficit was apparent. Rather, defendant exhibited a \"selective memory loss when he chose not to recall things.\u201d Speaking of the instant offense, defendant told a nurse, \" 'I\u2019ve been doing this for years, sometimes I get caught and sometimes I don\u2019t.\u2019 \u201d\nIn light of the overwhelming opinion of the experts that defendant was faking symptoms, we conclude that defendant has not established he was prejudiced by not having the reports available at trial. Defendant does not point to anything specific in the medical records that would have supported his insanity defense. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention is that the court erred by denying his motion for a continuance on the morning of trial so that defendant could change from his jail uniform into street clothes. Defense counsel stated, \"I have already discussed this with the Jail on Friday and this morning. They advised me that would be done.\u201d The trial court stated that it was not done, but denied the motion.\nA defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial is violated when he is forced to appear before the jury in readily identifiable jail clothing. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505-06, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 131, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1693-94 (1976). However, the right not to be tried in jail clothing is, like many other rights of criminal defendants, subject to harmless-error analysis. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 506, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 131-32, 96 S. Ct. at 1694; People v. Medley, 111 Ill. App. 3d 444, 448 (1983).\nIn Medley, the court observed that defendant \"had ample opportunity to obtain civilian clothing before his trial\u201d and decried defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance as a \"delaying tactic.\u201d Medley, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 448. In this case, defense counsel represented that he contacted jail officials twice in an attempt to assure that defendant would have access to \"civilian\u201d clothing for trial and jail personnel assured him that \"it would be done.\u201d However, on the morning of trial, defendant apparently was brought to court in his jail uniform. Under these circumstances, we decline the State\u2019s invitation to find that defendant\u2019s request was merely a delaying tactic. We can perceive no tactical advantage from a delay of 15 to 30 minutes. The trial court should have granted defendant\u2019s request for a brief continuance.\nHowever, we find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. Meier saw defendant place the cigarettes in a basket, transfer them to his coat pocket, and walk past the cash registers without paying for them. When Meier confronted defendant, he first denied having any cigarettes. Then, when several packs fell out of his pocket, he attempted to kick them under a display case. Defendant\u2019s actions demonstrate his consciousness of guilt and belie his assertions that he merely forgot to pay for the cigarettes. In light of this substantial and direct evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt, defendant\u2019s appearance before the jury in jail clothing could not have affected the jury\u2019s verdict.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGEIGER, P.J., and BOWMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COLWELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and E. Joyce Randolph, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (William L. Browers and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN K. STEINMETZ, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201494\u20141341\nOpinion filed March 21, 1997.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and E. Joyce Randolph, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (William L. Browers and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 19, "last_page_order": 25 }