{ "id": 520938, "name": "JOANNA ADAMSKA KOPERSKI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Koperski v. Amica Mutual Insurance", "decision_date": "1997-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201496\u20140046", "first_page": "494", "last_page": "499", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 494" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 1031", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3282947 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279-80" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "278-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 N.E.2d 1021", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2497269 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0904-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 N.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 Ill. App. 3d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2866005 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/260/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 N.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ZWICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff brought this action seeking a declaration of her right to recovery under the underinsured motorist provision contained in the automobile insurance policy issued by defendant, Arnica Mutual Insurance Company (Arnica). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, finding that Arnica was obligated to provide coverage to plaintiff because the vehicle that was responsible for plaintiff\u2019s injuries was an \"underinsured motor vehicle\u201d as defined by the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a\u20142(4) (West 1994)). Arnica appeals the grant of summary judgment for plaintiff.\nThe undisputed facts establish that on September 15, 1989, while vacationing at Yellowstone Park, plaintiff was a passenger in a rental car operated by her husband and was injured when the car was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by Gary Dale Tamminga. Tamminga was also driving a rented car, which was insured under a policy issued by National Casualty Company that carried \"split limits\u201d of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence. Tamminga also had excess coverage for a vehicle he owned under a policy issued by State Farm Insurance Company that carried \"split limits\u201d of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence. Thus, the total amount of liability coverage carried by Tamminga equaled $125,000 per person and $350,000 per occurrence.\nPlaintiff brought suit against Tamminga in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. This action was dismissed in August 1994, pursuant to a settlement agreement under which plaintiff received $25,000 from National Casualty and $100,000 from State Farm, as payment of the full amount of the per-person limits under their respective policies.\nNo insurance was provided for in the rental agreement for the vehicle in which plaintiff was riding when she was injured. Plaintiff\u2019s family vehicles were insured by Arnica under a policy that provided underinsured motorist coverage and carried a \"single limit\u201d of $300,000 for each accident.\nPlaintiff and Arnica filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action. Arnica asserted that because the $350,000 combined total of the \"per occurrence\u201d limits of Tamminga\u2019s policies exceeded plaintiff\u2019s $300,000 \"single limit\u201d under the Arnica policy, the vehicle driven by Tamminga was not underinsured. Plaintiff contended that the $300,000 \"single limit\u201d in her policy must be compared to Tamminga\u2019s combined per-person liability limits of $125,000 in determining whether his vehicle was underinsured. Plaintiff argued that after the statutory setoff was applied, she was entitled to recover up to $175,000 of coverage under the underinsured motorist provision in her Arnica policy. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff\u2019s position and entered summary judgment in her favor. Arnica has challenged that ruling, claiming that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statutory language that defines an underinsured motor vehicle.\nThe entry of summary judgment is appropriate where there are no questions of fact and judgment can be entered as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2\u20141005 (West 1994); Kolakowski v. Voris, 83 Ill. 2d 388, 398, 415 N.E.2d 397 (1980); Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Tabor, 267 Ill. App. 3d 245, 247, 642 N.E.2d 159 (1994). The interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law that is properly decided by summary judgment. Tabor, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 247. Courts of review consider the entry of summary judgment de nova. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992).\nSection 143a\u20142(4) of the Illinois Insurance Code defines an underinsured motor vehicle as follows:\n\"For the purpose of this Code the term 'underinsured motor vehicle\u2019 means a motor vehicle whose ownership, maintenance or use has resulted in bodily injury or death of the insured, as defined in the policy, and for which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability insurance policies or under bonds or other security required to be maintained under Illinois law applicable to the driver or to the person or organization legally responsible for such vehicle and applicable to the vehicle, is less than the limits for underinsured coverage provided the insured as defined in the policy at the time of the accident. The limits of liability for an insurer providing underinsured motorist coverage shall be the limits of such coverage, less those amounts actually-recovered under the applicable bodily injury insurance policies, bonds or other security maintained on the underinsured motor vehicle.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/143a\u20142(4) (West 1994).\nIn construing a statutory provision, the primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 540-41, 605 N.E.2d 539 (1992). To accomplish this goal, courts may consider the reason and necessity for the law, the evils to be remedied, and the objectives to be attained. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d at 541. A court charged with the construction of a statute will assume that the legislature did not intend to produce an absurd or unjust result. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d at 541; Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 557, 591 N.E.2d 427 (1992). A statute must be read as a whole, and all relevant parts must be considered by the court. See Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397, 634 N.E.2d 712 (1994); Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d 5, 9, 666 N.E.2d 909 (1996). If the language used in the statute is clear, it is unnecessary for the court to resort to other tools of statutory interpretation. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392, 667 N.E.2d 91 (1996).\nArnica has argued that the clear and unambiguous language found in section 143a\u20142 requires that the determination of whether a vehicle is underinsured is not controlled by the value of the benefits actually received from the underinsured\u2019s carrier but, rather, upon the limits of coverage stated in the underinsured\u2019s liability policy. We do not agree.\nPrior cases have held the statutory definition of an \u201cunderinsured motor vehicle\u201d contained in the first sentence of section 143a\u20142(4) is unambiguous and have ignored the legislative history supporting this provision. See Golladay v. Allied American Insurance Co., 271 Ill. App. 3d 465, 648 N.E.2d 157 (1995); Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Tabor, 267 Ill. App. 3d 245, 642 N.E.2d 159 (1994); Purlee v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 260 Ill. App. 3d 11, 631 N.E.2d 433 (1994); Moriconi v. Sentry Insurance of Illinois, Inc., 193 Ill. App. 3d 904, 550 N.E.2d 637 (1990).\nHowever, we find the better-reasoned approach is that expressed in Hathaway v. Standard Mutual Insurance Co., 285 Ill. App. 3d 67, 673 N.E.2d 725 (1996), where the court stated that the legislative history of section 143a\u20142(4) must be considered in order to prevent an absurd or an unjust result. Hathaway, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 71. Although that decision centered upon the recovery of underinsured motorist benefits when multiple claimants are involved, the reasoning employed also governs the case at bar.\nIt is established that the legislature\u2019s intent in enacting the underinsured motorist statute was to place the insured in the same position he would have occupied if the tortfeasor had carried adequate insurance. Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 555. Accordingly, this provision is designed to assure compensation for an insured\u2019s injuries in an amount equal to, but not exceeding, the limit of underinsured motorist coverage specified in the insured\u2019s policy. Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 556.\nThe aim of this coverage is to provide protection for the difference between the insured\u2019s claim and the amounts available from the underinsured driver. Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 556. Accordingly, section 143a\u20142 must be construed to allow an insured to \"fill the gap\u201d between the benefits paid by the culpable driver\u2019s liability carrier and the limit of underinsurance coverage specified in the insured\u2019s policy. Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 556; Hathaway, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 73; Banes v. Western States Insurance Co., 247 Ill. App. 3d 480, 482-83, 616 N.E.2d 1021 (1993).\nContrary to the approach taken in previous cases, we hold that the first sentence of section 143a\u20142 cannot be read in isolation to defeat this purpose. Hathaway, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 73-74, quoting Hoglund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 148 Ill. 2d 272, 279-80, 592 N.E.2d 1031 (1992). When the language of section 143a\u20142 is considered in its entirety, along with the drafters\u2019 intent, it is clear that the relevant factor is the amount the injured party can actually recover from the tortious driver. See Cummins, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 13; Banes, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 486. Here, that amount cannot exceed $125,000.\nThus, the insured is entitled to claim benefits in an amount equal-ling the limit of his underinsured motorist coverage, and the insurer has the right to claim a setoff for benefits received from the underinsured\u2019s carrier. Under this scenario, the insured is afforded the full value of the coverage purchased, and the insurer is obligated to pay benefits only up to the limit of the coverage selected by the insured, less those amounts actually recovered from the tortfeasor\u2019s liability insurer. See Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 556-57; Hathaway, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 69; Cummins, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 9.\nThis construction of section 143a\u20142 is consistent with the public policy behind the statute, the policyholder\u2019s reasonable expectations and the coverage intended to be provided by the policy. See Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 279. To hold otherwise would nullify the bargained-for coverage under the policies and allow the insurance provider to receive premiums that it did not earn. See Hoglund, 148 Ill. 2d at 278-80. We are secure in the knowledge that such a windfall to underinsurance providers was not intended by the legislature or contemplated by the insurance industry.\nArnica also contends that in determining whether Tamminga\u2019s vehicle was underinsured, the $350,000 per-occurrence maximum provided by Tamminga\u2019s \"split limits\u201d policies must be compared to the $300,000 single limit specified in the policy issued by Arnica. This argument has no merit. The accident operates to trigger the inquiry as to the extent of the coverage carried by the tortfeasor. Because plaintiff was the sole party injured in the September 15, 1989, accident, the maximum amount of coverage that would ever be applicable to this incident was the $125,000 per person limit. See generally Tabor, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 250-51.\nWe hold, therefore, that the trial court correctly determined that Tamminga\u2019s vehicle was underinsured after comparing the plaintiff\u2019s underinsurance coverage to the benefits she received from Tamminga\u2019s liability insurer. That comparison revealed that plaintiff was entitled to claim $175,000 in underinsurance benefits. It is precisely for this protection that plaintiff negotiated and paid a premium for the $300,000 limit on her underinsured motorist coverage.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nTHEIS and QUINN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ZWICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Brenner & Moltzen, Ltd., of Chicago (Sheldon A. Brenner and Jane E. Reames, of counsel), for appellant.", "Topper & Weiss, Ltd., of Chicago (Barry Weiss, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOANNA ADAMSKA KOPERSKI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201496\u20140046\nOpinion filed March 31, 1997.\nBrenner & Moltzen, Ltd., of Chicago (Sheldon A. Brenner and Jane E. Reames, of counsel), for appellant.\nTopper & Weiss, Ltd., of Chicago (Barry Weiss, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0494-01", "first_page_order": 512, "last_page_order": 517 }