{ "id": 520991, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRED KOGER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Koger", "decision_date": "1997-04-16", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201496\u20140334", "first_page": "764", "last_page": "767", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 764" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "595 N.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5209366 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 N.E.2d 1214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1222-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 986", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2474002 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "998-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/198/0986-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 N.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5251673 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 N.E.2d 1059", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1062, 1064" }, { "page": "1062" }, { "page": "1062, 1064" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156128 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206, 209" }, { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206, 209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0201-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 457, "char_count": 6573, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.665651525889828e-08, "percentile": 0.4057817656550633 }, "sha256": "4febef9da46a836ba10154ceb50f9b1bd668d89063ecd5f04e1c1bc3d7103422", "simhash": "1:7928d1291a645dff", "word_count": 1112 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:23:12.186621+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRED KOGER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Fred Koger, Grant Smith and Nicholas Tang, who was known to defendant as Melik, committed an armed robbery of two men. Melik killed the victims while defendant stood nearby with a shotgun. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with six counts of first degree murder and one count of armed robbery. A jury convicted defendant of the armed robbery and first degree murder of both victims, and he was sentenced to natural life in prison for the murders. He appeals the murder convictions and sentence. We affirm.\nFACTS\nOn November 7, 1995, defendant, Smith and Melik met at Mario Gray\u2019s house. Melik said that he knew two men who he believed had marijuana and suggested that they rob these men at gunpoint. A man named Jamier Allen testified that during this conversation he heard Melik say he was going to kill the victims. Allen stated that defendant and Smith agreed no one would be killed, and the three men decided to commit the crime. Melik left the house to set up a meeting with the victims in an alley near Gray\u2019s house at approximately 2:30 p.m. on the pretext of making a drug deal.\nThe three men were armed when they arrived in the alley; defendant was carrying a shotgun. Melik told the passenger, Stevenson Earl, to get out of the car and turn over his valuables. He then had Earl lie on the ground at the rear of the car. At gunpoint, defendant ordered the driver, Arthur Loud, Jr., to lie on the ground by Earl. Smith put his gun on the passenger seat and searched the car while the other two men guarded the victims.\nMelik silently stood behind Earl and shot him in the head, execution-style, from a distance of 6 to 18 inches. He killed Loud in the same manner. The three defendants then ran down the alley, appeared to exchange something, and continued to run. Eventually, they met back at Gray\u2019s house. Defendant asked Melik why he had killed the two men; Melik answered that he had \"something personal for them.\u201d\nTwo days later, when the police arrested defendant they found a watch belonging to one of the victims. Defendant was questioned for several hours at the police station and gave a written confession. He was subsequently charged with six counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9\u20141(a)(1) (West 1994)) and one count of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18\u20142 (West 1994)).\nDefendant sought to quash the arrest and suppress his confession, but the trial court denied both motions. Defendant also filed a motion in limine to bar the introduction of his prior conviction for aggravated discharge of a firearm. The trial court denied the motion in a written order, finding that the conviction\u2019s probative value outweighed the prejudice to defendant.\nAfter the close of the State\u2019s case, defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. Defendant unsuccessfully renewed this motion after the close of all of the evidence. A jury convicted defendant of the armed robbery and first degree murder of both victims. The trial court sentenced defendant to natural life in prison for the murders, and defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. Because the trial court had not sentenced defendant for the armed robbery conviction, a second sentencing hearing was later held. Defendant was sentenced to 30 years for the armed robbery, and he filed a second notice of appeal. This court consolidated the two appeals.\n(The discussion of issues I through IV is not to be published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23).)\nV\nA\nDefendant next contends that the mandatory life imprisonment provision in section 5\u20148\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u2014l(a)(l)(c)(ii) (West 1994)) violates article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution because it does not consider the defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential.\nDefendant was sentenced to natural life under section 5\u20148\u20141 because he was convicted of a double homicide. Article I, section 11, requires that criminal penalties be determined in accordance with the seriousness of the crime, keeping in mind the objective of returning the defendant to a useful place in society. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 11. However, a defendant\u2019s rehabilitation potential need not be given more weight than the severity of the offense. People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 206, 209, 464 N.E.2d 1059, 1062, 1064 (1984). The legislature is assumed to have considered the relevant factors in establishing sentences, and the resultant scheme is presumptively proper. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 206, 464 N.E.2d at 1062.\nIllinois courts have upheld section 5\u20148\u20141 against similar constitutional challenges where the defendant was either the actual killer (Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 206, 209, 464 N.E.2d at 1062, 1064) or an accomplice to the killer (People v. Driskel, 224 Ill. App. 3d 304, 317, 586 N.E.2d 580, 588 (1991)). In addition, two courts have found that section 5\u20148\u20141 is constitutional when applied to defendants who have been found guilty by accountability.\nIn People v. Foster, 198 Ill. App. 3d 986, 998-99, 556 N.E.2d 1214, 1222-23 (1990), the defendant asserted that the trial judge\u2019s discretion was unduly limited because the statute did not allow him to consider the difference between a perpetrator and a defendant guilty by accountability. The court rejected the defendant\u2019s contention, reasoning that the focus of section 5\u20148\u20141(a)(1)(c) was the nature of the homicides, not the defendant\u2019s role in them. This reasoning was followed in People v. Perry, 230 Ill. App. 3d 720, 722, 595 N.E.2d 736, 738 (1992).\nIn this case, defendant was found guilty of two execution-style murders. We agree with the reasoning of the courts in Perry and Foster and find that section 5\u20148\u20141 is not unconstitutional under article I, section 11, as applied to those found guilty by accountability.\n(The discussion of the following issue is not to be published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R.23).)\nCONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCUSKEY and SLATER, JJ\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, and Ronald Boyer (argued), of Boyer & Thompson, of Watseka, for appellant.", "Michael Kick, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Domenica Osterberger (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRED KOGER, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201496\u20140334\nOpinion filed April 16, 1997.\nRobert Agostinelli, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, and Ronald Boyer (argued), of Boyer & Thompson, of Watseka, for appellant.\nMichael Kick, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (John X. Breslin and Domenica Osterberger (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0764-01", "first_page_order": 782, "last_page_order": 785 }