{ "id": 1596917, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TAMMY DONESKI, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Doneski", "decision_date": "1997-04-21", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201495\u20141096", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "11", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3142311 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448796 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845-46" }, { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2600885 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788" }, { "page": "788" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/212/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "2789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 N.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900-01" }, { "page": "901" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591083 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" }, { "page": "95-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567120 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5563775 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780271 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 N.E.2d 1275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1280" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887231 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909169 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0318-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 942, "char_count": 22874, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.05979074455692204 }, "sha256": "f26b3d89897cc58e3a4bac3a5249d0d8114a6a5e2ef325d56ea92c25aafb34b1", "simhash": "1:39ef99fc6f4b6f29", "word_count": 3715 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:57:07.793358+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TAMMY DONESKI, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant, Tammy Doneski, was convicted of two counts of violating the Illinois Medical Practice Act of 1987 (225 ILCS 60/49 (West 1992)) for (1) representing herself to the public as being engaged in the practice of medicine, and (2) attaching the title of doctor or M.D. to her name indicating that she is engaged in the medical profession as a business. She was found to have engaged in these practices during the period of February through November 1993. Defendant appeals, raising the following issues: (1) whether count IV of the indictment properly charged the offense since it did not specify when or to whom defendant allegedly held herself out as being engaged in the practice of medicine; (2) whether the evidence failed to establish that defendant held herself out as engaged in the practice of medicine but, rather, established that she was an administrator and admittedly not a licensed or practicing physician; (3) whether the evidence established that defendant affixed the initials M.D. after her name on cards or stationery; and (4) whether defendant was unfairly surprised and deprived of the opportunity to confront witnesses when the court admitted into evidence letters first produced on the morning of trial with all but defendant\u2019s signature and the date redacted.\nDefendant was indicted on five counts for committing the offense of \"persons without license holding themselves out to the public as being engaged in diagnosis or treatment ailments of human beings\u201d in violation of the Illinois Medical Practice Act of 1987 (Act) (225 ILCS 60/49 (West 1992)). A bench trial was held on counts IV and V of the indictment, alleging, respectively, that defendant \"told personnel at the Center For Human Reproduction that she was a medical doctor\u201d and that defendant \"possessed, distributed and allowed to be distributed business cards and stationery with her name and the initials M.D. after it.\u201d\nBefore trial, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense and to dismiss count IV specifically on the ground that it was insufficient for purposes of double jeopardy. The court denied both motions. After a two-day bench trial, defendant was convicted of both counts on November 30, 1994. After hearing all factors in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court sentenced defendant to 18 months\u2019 probation, a $1,000 fine, 20 days of community service and court costs.\nThe following evidence was presented during trial. The Center For Human Reproduction (the Center) is an ob/gyn practice specializing in infertility. A new position had been created at the Center to handle patient complaints and to compile the Center\u2019s statistical results of various infertility treatments. In February or March 1993, Donna Havemann, the Center\u2019s executive vice-president, placed an ad in the Chicago Tribune to seek candidates for a quality assurance and research coordinator with \"experience in data processing and statistics.\u201d The ad indicated that applicants should have a master\u2019s degree in public health or an equivalent degree; a medical degree, medical license, or Ph.D. was not required.\nDefendant answered the ad with a resume indicating that she was a candidate in the combined M.D./Ph.D. program at the University of Chicago, and that she had received a bachelor of science degree at the University of Chicago in 1988. An enclosed cover letter stated that she was \"in the process of completing [her] doctoral thesis research\u201d and had \"indefinitely postponed entering a medical residency program at this juncture\u201d so that she may \"pursue other options within the healthcare industry.\u201d In fact, defendant had not received a bachelor\u2019s degree from the University of Chicago or any other university and she was never enrolled in an M.D./Ph.D. combined program.\nDefendant interviewed with the medical director of the Center, Dr. Norbert Gleicher. He offered defendant the position, which she accepted. While Dr. Gleicher admitted that defendant never indicated that she was licensed to practice medicine in the State of Illinois, he was under the impression that she had completed the M.D./Ph.D. program at the University of Chicago.\nAfter hiring defendant, Dr. Gleicher instructed Donna Havemann to have defendant\u2019s name put on the letterhead and on business cards followed by the designation \"M.D./Ph.D.\u201d and the title \"Director of Quality Assurance and Data Management.\u201d Defendant\u2019s name tag, worn on her lab coat at the clinic, bore the same initials and title.\nDr. Gleicher testified that he introduced defendant to staff members as \"Dr. Doneski\u201d and she never corrected him. Dr. Gleicher also introduced her externally as \"Dr. Doneski\u201d and heard the other staff members refer to defendant as \"Dr. Doneski.\u201d In the Center\u2019s brochures and inserts, defendant was introduced as a graduate of the M.D./Ph.D. program of the University of Chicago. The State\u2019s other witnesses, Benetta Herman and Douglas Rabin, staff members at the Center, also testified that defendant was referred to and introduced as \"Dr. Doneski.\u201d Ms. Herman stated that, on one occasion, she had called defendant \"Tammy.\u201d Defendant instructed Ms. Herman to call her \"Dr. Doneski\u201d rather than \"Tammy.\u201d Donna Havemann also testified that she recognized defendant\u2019s signature as \"Dr. Doneski\u201d on an \"on-call schedule.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Gleicher testified that defendant was not hired as a physician, was not to function as a practicing physician, and was not on the Center\u2019s malpractice policy as a physician. He stated that no one could make an appointment to see defendant for patient care and admitted that defendant\u2019s title was put on her name tag to identify her function as director of quality assurance. According to Dr. Gleicher, defendant had never treated a patient during her employment at the Center.\nDefendant\u2019s responsibilities at the Center included taking and writing up patients\u2019 complaints, analyzing patient questionnaires, and reporting the outcome to Dr. Gleicher. Dr. Gleicher reviewed and revised defendant\u2019s work. Defendant did not offer to treat or suggest any treatment in her written work. Defendant was also given a pager and was made available for after-hours calls from patients seeking their test results. These were all nonmedical staff functions, requiring neither a Ph.D. nor an M.D.\nPrior to hiring defendant, Dr. Gleicher did not ask to see defendant\u2019s diplomas. In the fall of 1993, he received a visit from two investigators from the department that licenses physicians and other healthcare professionals. He provided them with printed materials that showed that defendant was not employed as a practicing physiclan. Approximately one week later, Dr. Gleicher received notification from the University of Chicago that defendant never graduated from either its M.D. or its Ph.D. program. Dr. Gleicher confronted and then fired defendant.\nIn response to a subpoena for documents containing defendant\u2019s signature and indicia that she held herself out as a medical doctor, the Center produced, on the morning of trial, 14 letters written by defendant during the course of her employment at the Center. The Center asserted a privilege under section 8 \u2014 2101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2101 (West 1992)), and the court allowed the letters to be admitted in redacted form, with all but the letterhead, date, and closing signature excised. Defendant objected both to receipt of the documents in redacted form and to their production on the morning of trial. The letters were admitted in completely redacted form over defendant\u2019s objection. On six of these letters, defendant had placed \"M.D.\u201d and \"Ph.D.\u201d following her signature.\nDefendant made a motion for a directed finding at the conclusion of the State\u2019s case in chief, which was denied.\nDefendant testified on her own behalf. She stated that she never told Donna Havemann or Dr. Gleicher that she was licensed to practice medicine. She acknowledged authoring the letter to Ms. Havemann in which she stated that she was in the process of completing her doctoral thesis research and was indefinitely postponing entering a medical residency program. Defendant acknowledged that she did not receive a bachelor\u2019s degree from the University of Chicago as was listed on her resume. She also testified that she was never enrolled in the university\u2019s M.D. or Ph.D. program.\nDefendant testified that, during her employment at the Center, she did not treat or diagnose any patient, nor did she hold herself out to the public as being engaged in the business of treating or diagnosing patients. She did not engage in any conduct to solicit or establish a physician /patient relationship with anyone visiting the Center.\nOn cross-examination, defendant testified that she never told Dr. Gleicher not to mail the brochures because they falsely stated that she graduated from the M.D. and Ph.D. programs at the University of Chicago. She never told Donna Havemann to retract the Center\u2019s letterhead because defendant was not an M.D. or a Ph.D. Nor did defendant instruct Donna Havemann to correct her business cards. Defendant identified six of the State\u2019s exhibits where she signed her name followed by M.D. or Ph.D.\nAfter hearing closing arguments on both sides, the court found defendant guilty of both counts. Count IV specifically stated that defendant \"held herself out to the public as being engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of physical or mental ailments or conditions *** of human beings, to wit: told personnel at Center for Human Reproduction that she was a medical doctor.\u201d Count V specifically stated that defendant \"attached the title doctor [or] M.D. *** to her or her name indicating that she is in [sic] engaged in the treatment of human ailments or conditions as a business, to wit: possessed, distributed and allowed to be distributed business cards and stationery with her name and the initials M.D. after it.\u201d\nDefendant moved for an order of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial. She claimed that the indictment did not fairly apprise her of the conduct that is alleged to have violated the Act. She also claimed that there was no evidence that she had held herself out as being engaged in the practice of medicine. She claimed that there was no evidence that she caused or requested the initials \"M.D.\u201d to be placed after her name on business cards and stationery. Finally, defendant argued that she was unfairly surprised, denied the opportunity to prepare, and denied her constitutional right to confront witnesses when the letters were produced on the morning of trial and admitted into evidence in redacted form.\nThe court denied defendant\u2019s motion and conducted a sentencing hearing in which the court sentenced defendant to 18 months of probation, community service, and imposed a fine and costs. This appeal followed.\nFirst, we are asked to decide whether count IV of defendant\u2019s indictment charges an offense. When the sufficiency of the charging instrument is attacked, the standard of review is to determine whether the instrument strictly complies with the requirements of Illinois law. People v. DiLorenzo, 169 Ill. 2d 318, 321-22, 662 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1996); 725 ILCS 5/111 \u2014 3 (West 1992). With regard to a charging document, such as an indictment, Illinois law makes the following requirements:\n\"A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by:\n(1) Stating the name of the offense;\n(2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated;\n(3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged;\n(4) Stating the date and county of the offense as definitely as can be done; and\n(5) Stating the name of the accused, if known ***.\u201d 725 I1CS 5/111 \u2014 3(a) (West 1992).\nIt is well established that the purpose of these requirements is to advise the accused of the nature of the charges against her, to enable the accused to prepare her defense, and to serve as a bar to future prosecution for the same offense. People v. Williams, 266 Ill. App. 3d 752, 758, 640 N.E.2d 1275, 1280 (1994). \"[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether the alleged offense could be described with greater certainty, but whether there is sufficient particularity to enable the accused to prepare a proper defense.\u201d People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 54, 630 N.E.2d 811, 816 (1994).\nCount IV of defendant\u2019s indictment contains all of the statutory requirements for a charging instrument. (1) The name of the offense is stated as \"persons without license holding themselves out to the public as being engaged in diagnosis or treatment [of] ailments of human beings.\u201d (2) The statutory provision that defendant allegedly violated is listed as \"Chapter 225, Section 60/49 of the Illinois Complied Statutes, as amended.\u201d (3) The nature and elements of the offense charged are that defendant \"held herself out to the public as being engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of physical or mental ailments or conditions *** of human beings, to wit: told personnel at Center for Human Reproduction that she was a medical doctor.\u201d (4) Count IV recites the date and county of the offense as \"on or about February 1993 thru October 1993 at and within the County of Cook, Illinois.\u201d (5) Finally, defendant\u2019s name, Tammy Doneski, is clearly identified.\nDefendant\u2019s assertion that the indictment (1) does not sufficiently apprise defendant of the nature of the accusation and (2) subjects defendant to double jeopardy is without merit. The language in the indictment is sufficient both to inform defendant of the type of conduct that was violative of the Act and to prevent future charges from being brought against defendant for this specific offense during this time frame. While the indictment may have been more specific, we find that it met all mandatory requirements.\nNext, we are faced with the question of whether the evidence established the charged offenses. A criminal conviction will not be set aside on review unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 43, 535 N.E.2d 889, 903 (1989). It is not the function of this court to retry a defendant when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of his or her guilt. People v. Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458, 474, 544 N.E.2d 715, 722 (1989). Rather, determinations of the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are the responsibility of the trier of fact. People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 95, 572 N.E.2d 895, 900-01 (1991). On review, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 95-96, 572 N.E.2d at 901.\nDefendant claims that it takes more than just calling oneself \"doctor\u201d to violate the Illinois Medical Practice Act. Rather, a person must make representations that he or she is engaged in the practice of medicine as a business. While defendant admits that her conduct may have been morally culpable, she insists that it did not to rise to the level of being criminal. We disagree.\nHuman reproduction and infertility are highly sensitive medical issues, requiring the care and personal attention of a doctor. That defendant knowingly and intentionally adopted the title \"M.D.\u201d without possessing any of the requisite qualifications renders her conduct not only immoral but criminal in this state.\nThe Illinois legislature explicitly decided that conduct such as defendant\u2019s should be illegal in the State of Illinois by enacting the Illinois Medical Practice Act. The statute reads, in relevant part, as follows:\n\"If any person does any of the following and does not possess a valid license issued under this Act, that person shall be sentenced as provided in Section 59: (i) holds himself or herself out to the public as being engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of physical or mental ailments or conditions *** of human beings; *** or (v) attaches the title Doctor, Physician, Surgeon, M.D., D.O. or D.C., or any other word or abbreviation to his or her name indicating that he or she is engaged in the treatment of human ailments or conditions as a business.\u201d 225 ILCS 60/49 (West 1992).\nThe statute does not require that defendant hold herself out as being licensed to practice medicine in the State of Illinois, as defendant insists. Rather, the statute makes it criminal to represent oneself as being engaged in the practice of medicine when that person is not licensed to practice medicine in the State of Illinois.\nThe trial court apparently agreed with our understanding of the statute when it ruled that defendant violated the Act by having an office at the Center and holding the title \"M.D.\u201d The court rejected defendant\u2019s argument that the inclusion of her title as director of quality assurance on the letterhead and her name tag acted as a qualifier and dispelled any public perception that defendant was a medical doctor. Rather, the court found that there would be no way for the public to differentiate between quality care at the Center and medical treatment.\nWe find the evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding. By utilizing the initials \"M.D./Ph.D.\u201d while being an employee of an infertility clinic, defendant represented herself as a doctor not only to the patients at the Center but the staff and general public as well. She signed letters on the clinic\u2019s letterhead with \"M.D.\u201d or \"Ph.D.\u201d added to her signature. In her application to the Center, defendant wrote a letter to Donna Havemann falsely stating that she was in the process of completing her doctoral thesis research when, in fact, defendant had never been enrolled in either an M.D. or a Ph.D. program. Defendant never corrected Dr. Gleicher when he introduced her as \"Dr. Doneski\u201d both inside the Center and externally. She instructed a staff member to call her \"Dr. Doneski\u201d rather than \"Tammy.\u201d Defendant was aware that \"M.D./Ph.D.,\u201d followed her name on the Center\u2019s stationery, her name tag and business cards, yet never brought it to anyone\u2019s attention that she was not qualified to hold either title. Defendant signed her own name on the \"on-call schedule\u201d as \"Dr. Doneski.\u201d Clearly, a person not intending to hold herself out as a doctor would not conduct herself in such a manner.\nWe do not find that defendant\u2019s lack of active involvement in causing the initials \"M.D.\u201d to be placed after her name on cards or stationery rectifies her conduct. As discussed above, by failing to notify either Donna Havemann or Dr. Gleicher that she was not an \"M.D./Ph.D.,\u201d and by allowing the letterhead and business cards to continue to read \"Tammy Doneski, M.D., Ph.D.,\u201d defendant led everyone at the Center and the public at large to believe that she was a medical doctor. Moreover, the evidence established that defendant did cause the \"M.D./Ph.D.\u201d to be affixed after her signature on six different letters by signing her name in that manner. By representing herself as \"Tammy Doneski, M.D., Ph.D.,\u201d while working at a medical clinic, defendant engaged in precisely the type of conduct that the legislature intended to prohibit by enacting the Illinois Medical Practice Act.\nFinally, we consider defendant\u2019s claim that she was unfairly surprised and deprived of the opportunity to confront witnesses when the court admitted into evidence letters first produced on the morning of trial with all but defendant\u2019s signature and the date redacted. The court allowed letters with defendant\u2019s signature to be produced in redacted form after recognizing a privilege under section 8 \u2014 2101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2101 (West 1992)). Section 8 \u2014 2101 protects from disclosure all information and materials used by hospitals intended to improve quality control, patient care, and to reduce morbidity or mortality. Zajac v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, 212 Ill. App. 3d 779, 788, 571 N.E.2d 840, 845-46 (1991); 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2101 (West 1992).\nDefendant maintains that the court gave preference to the privilege at the expense of her constitutional right to confront witnesses since she could not ascertain from the redacted letters whether they were written to patients or other doctors, or whether she was \"ordering a salami sandwich or tickets to a hockey game.\u201d This argument, however, fails to recognize that section 8 \u2014 2101 (735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2101 (West 1992)) protects only medical information and if the letters did not contain such information, the privilege would not have been applicable and the court would not have ordered the letters to be redacted.\nMore significantly, the only relevant issue with respect to the letters is the manner in which defendant signed them. \"[T]he trial court is granted broad discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and its decision will not be reversed on appeal unless that discretion has been clearly abused.\u201d Zajac, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 788, 571 N.E.2d at 846. The content of the letters and to whom they were written is not only privileged and confidential, but also irrelevant since defendant was indicted for holding herself out as being engaged in the practice of medicine, and only her signature on the letters is probative of this fact. The redacted letters established that defendant personally placed the title \"M.D.\u201d after her signature on at least six different occasions, presenting herself to the public as a practitioner of medicine.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction on both counts.\nPursuant to People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 374 N.E.2d 194 (1978), and relevant statutory provisions (725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 7(h) (West 1992); 725 ILCS 130/13 (West 1992); 55 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 2002.1 (West 1992)), we hereby grant the State costs and a fee of $100 for defending this meritless appeal. Additionally, pursuant to People v. Agnew, 105 Ill. 2d 275, 473 N.E.2d 1319 (1985), and section 4 \u2014 2002.1 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 2002.1 (West 1992)), we grant the State an additional fee of $50 for oral argument of this case.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019BRIEN and GALLAGHER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Holstein, Mack & Klein, of Chicago (Michael J. Rovell and Lisa I. Fair, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Linda Woloshin, and Margaret J. Faustmann, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TAMMY DONESKI, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201495\u20141096\nOpinion filed April 21, 1997.\nHolstein, Mack & Klein, of Chicago (Michael J. Rovell and Lisa I. Fair, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Linda Woloshin, and Margaret J. Faustmann, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 21, "last_page_order": 31 }