{ "id": 1596916, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLEN BERNARD MANIKOWSKI, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Manikowski", "decision_date": "1997-05-02", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201494\u20140627", "first_page": "157", "last_page": "166", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 157" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "569 N.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2534946 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3514519 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 N.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2657433 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 1219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1220" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2575305 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 N.E.2d 1216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1220" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. App. 3d 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5255203 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/223/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3128740 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 N.E.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2858962 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 1257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260148 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 L. Ed. 2d 674", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 688", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "530 N.E.2d 460", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5554744 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0024-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1090, "char_count": 22982, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.464442497273101e-08, "percentile": 0.5175467758931119 }, "sha256": "beb19aa849238c62a3932b0c649656600247aee18b58dc5ba098f9eaada4d3d4", "simhash": "1:ea8159b27d4d0ece", "word_count": 3715 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:57:07.793358+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLEN BERNARD MANIKOWSKI, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KUEHN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOur founding fathers enshrined certain freedoms into the constitution. Those freedoms \u00e1re our birthright, a legacy passed down from our ancestors. Although we tend to take them for granted, the liberty they embody and guarantee is the strength of our democracy. Liberty has been our nation\u2019s call to arms. For some of us, liberty\u2019s guarantee has not come easy.\nDefendant was drafted into the Army in 1968. Thereafter, he was sent to war in South Vietnam. In 1970, he was transported home. He spent six months in an Army hospital healing wounds sustained from enemy engagement. Battlefield scars are not the only evidence of his bravery. He returned home with two Purple Hearts, the Bronze Star, and the Army Commendation Medal for meritorious achievement in combat. He returned home a war hero. That home is now an Illinois prison cell.\nThis is a case where a man who placed his life in harm\u2019s way for the sake of his country\u2019s values, who stood up for liberty\u2019s promise, did not enjoy its full measure. His trial differed markedly from trials enjoyed by most defendants. He was not allowed to confront the witnesses against him or to participate in his defense. Such rights, traditional to our notion of fair play, were bypassed.\nSeven years ago, a trial was conducted in defendant\u2019s absence. He was convicted and sentenced to a 10-year prison term. According to the State, defendant was afforded every right traditionally afforded the criminally accused. If those rights were lost, it was defendant\u2019s fault. According to the State, defendant elected not to avail himself of his rights by willfully failing to attend trial.\nDefendant now claims that his failure to appear for trial was not his fault and was due to events beyond his control. He seeks an opportunity to present evidence to establish that he did not willfully avoid trial or voluntarily surrender constitutional rights associated with trial presence.\nThis appeal asks us to overturn a summary dismissal of defendant\u2019s postconviction petition. The petition, supported by defendant\u2019s affidavit, asserts that a breakdown in travel plans prevented defendant\u2019s timely appearance for trial. Defendant seeks an opportunity to be heard on why he failed to attend his trial. He ultimately hopes to prove that his conviction was a product of an unjustified forfeiture of his constitutional rights.\nInitially, we note that the hearing defendant seeks is readily available under the same statutory provisions that permitted the trial to be conducted in his absence, while the hearing he seeks in this appeal may not withstand a motion to dismiss the petition. See 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 4.1(e) (West 1992). Our decision is confined to the order from which defendant appealed. The summary dismissal order mounts a question of whether defendant\u2019s postconviction petition is frivolous and patently without merit. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the trial court\u2019s summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings.\nDefendant and his brother, James, were arrested in the summer of 1987. Defendant was working for a Florida company that contracted to deliver a car from Florida to its Chicago owner. En route to Chicago, defendant was stopped for speeding in Massac County. The State Police were primed to suspect drugs under the circumstances of defendant\u2019s trip. They asked for consent to search the car and its belongings. According to the troopers, defendant, free to resume his trip and leave their presence, chose to execute a consent to search. The search engaged several troopers and their dog. Defendant was asked to drive the car to a nearby service station, where it was placed on a rack and its undercarriage was examined. A compartment housing a package of cocaine was found under the car.\nDefendant disavowed any knowledge of the compartment or the drugs it contained. The defendant\u2019s brother, the car\u2019s owner, and a Florida businessman also denied knowledge. Of the various suspects whose ignorance was in question, defendant was the only one empowered to prevent detection of the drugs. Defendant\u2019s ignorance was supported by his willingness to allow the search when free to drive away.\nOn June 25, 1990, he failed to appear for his scheduled trial. A decision was reached to start without him. He claims that the judge was told that he was unavoidably delayed. He claims that the judge was asked to delay the trial until he could get to court. He claims that he arrived two days late only to learn that his trial was over, his defense went unheard, and the jury was about to deliberate his fate.\nOn June 27, 1990, fearing the outcome of a trial he did not attend, defendant violated his bail conditions and fled the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois. He remained a fugitive from justice until 1993. He was discovered living an unremarkable life near his hometown of Clinton, Iowa. In August of 1993, he became a prisoner of the State of Illinois. He currently serves a 10-year prison term imposed on the verdicts returned in his absence.\nDefendant has no idea of what happened at his trial. He lacks any firsthand knowledge of what happened. Moreover, he cannot consult a record of what happened. There is no report of proceedings. The trial cannot be chronicled because the notes taken to preserve what happened have disappeared.\nPresumably, the judge determined, upon an affirmative tender of substantial evidence from the State, that defendant willfully avoided trial. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 4.1. Presumably, trial proceeded on the premise that defendant voluntarily surrendered his rights as a matter of choice.\nIn August of 1994, defendant petitioned for postconviction relief. The petition was summarily dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit.\nDefendant\u2019s appeal tenders two reasons for the reversal of the summary dismissal. One of those reasons is ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. Defendant raises the issue of counsel\u2019s failure to pursue a collateral attack of the conviction by a motion pursuant to section 115 \u2014 4.1(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.\nSection 115 \u2014 4.1(e) provides:\n\"When a defendant who in his absence has been either convicted or sentenced or both *** appears before the court, he must be granted a new trial or new sentencing hearing if the defendant can establish that his failure to appear in court was both without his fault and due to circumstances beyond his control. A hearing *** must be held before any such request may be granted. At such a hearing both the defendant and the State may present evidence.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 4.1(e) (West 1992).\nSince defendant seeks a hearing to establish the nonwaiver of his bypassed rights and section 115 \u2014 4.1(e) requires such a hearing, defendant argues that counsel was incompetent in filing a postconviction petition rather than a motion pursuant to section 115 \u2014 4.1(e).\nThe thrust of the postconviction petition challenges the non-waiver of rights lost by virtue of trial in absentia. In light of the substance of defendant\u2019s claim, it is difficult to understand the strategy behind counsel\u2019s course of action. It defies reason to consciously forego a section 115 \u2014 4.1(e) motion.\nThe petition presents a serious question of timeliness. It is clearly filed beyond the time constraints imposed on postconviction relief under section 122 \u2014 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 (West 1992). The question is joined by the allegation that delay was not due to defendant\u2019s culpable negligence. Such a question does not arise under section 115 \u2014 4.1(e). The potential relief it provides is not limited by the passage of time. Moreover, section 115 \u2014 4.1(e) requires the precise evidentiary hearing unsuccessfully pursued by the petition.\nThese obvious advantages are overshadowed, however, by the fact that a section 115 \u2014 4.1(e) motion clears a path to test error that occurred in the conduct of defendant\u2019s trial. Postconviction petitions must demonstrate a process flawed by error of constitutional magnitude. Such petitions do not subject trial error to judicial review. A section 115 \u2014 4.1(e) motion, however, opens the entire underlying judgment and sentence to further scrutiny. See 725 ILCS 5/115\u2014 4.1(g) (West 1992); People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 530 N.E.2d 460 (1988). Since defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence have never been reviewed, even an unsuccessful effort pursued under section 115\u2014 4.1(e) harbors an advantage. It provides a direct appeal of the conviction and sentence.\nWhether pursuit of a less advantageous course constitutes constitutionally deficient representation is a question we need not reach. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Defendant suffers no prejudice by virtue of counsel\u2019s choice. Strickland, 466 U.S. 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052. We measure prejudice by whether counsel\u2019s conduct resulted in an adverse outcome that, but for counsel\u2019s error, might otherwise have been different. People v. Moore, 133 Ill. 2d 331, 339, 549 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (1990).\nCounsel\u2019s pursuit of postconviction relief under section 122 \u2014 1 does not foreclose pursuit of a section 115 \u2014 4.1(e) motion. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d at 31-32, 530 N.E.2d at 463. We refuse to find prejudice as a result of representation that does not preclude the precise remedy that draws that representation into question. A section 115 \u2014 4.1(e) motion remains a viable, albeit untried, collateral remedy available to defendant. We note again that defendant can obtain the hearing he seeks pursuant to section 115 \u2014 4.1(e). He need only file such a motion.\nThe other reason tendered for a reversal of the petition\u2019s summary dismissal directly challenges the order. Defendant argues that the petition makes a substantial showing of a constitutional claim and merits a hearing.\nThe State\u2019s initial counter to this contention is an attack on the timeliness of the petition. It argues that defendant waited too long to file for relief and that delay was clearly defendant\u2019s fault. Since this matter did not proceed beyond summary dismissal, the question of the petition\u2019s timeliness was not raised or addressed below. We refrain from a ruling based on a theory not considered and not a part of the decision from which defendant appealed.\nWe address the summary dismissal order. It is based on a determination that the petition is frivolous and patently without merit.\nThe petition alleges the deprivation of the right to be present at trial. This right envelops a host of rights guaranteed to the criminally accused. These rights remain inviolate. Despite the value assigned to them, they can be waived by defendant\u2019s voluntary absence from trial. People v. Davis, 39 Ill. 2d 325, 330, 235 N.E.2d 634, 636-37 (1968).\nA trial in absentia, by definition, involves the deprivation of constitutional rights. If rights are not voluntarily waived by willful avoidance of trial, it follows that the proceedings are constitutionally infirm.\nDefendant sought a hearing to prove that he had not willfully avoided trial. Hence, he sought to establish that he had not voluntarily surrendered the constitutional rights enjoyed by defendants who attend trial. He attached an affidavit that detailed his efforts to appear. The affidavit sets forth the following facts.\nOn three prior occasions, defendant appeared on time for court proceedings. Defendant was on notice of his trial setting. He scheduled his travel from California to permit his presence for the start of trial. He boarded a plane from California on June 24, 1990. The flight included a stop in Phoenix, Arizona. The plane landed in Phoenix but did not depart due to heat and weather conditions. Defendant contacted his lawyer, advised her of his predicament, and requested her to ask the court to continue his case until he could get to Metropolis.\nDefendant\u2019s plans for travel from St. Louis to Metropolis were frustrated by his late arrival in St. Louis. He boarded the first available bus headed to Paducah, Kentucky. It left St. Louis the evening of June 26, 1990.\nDefendant arrived in Paducah the morning of June 27, 1990, unaware that his trial was in progress. He did not immediately travel the final 10 miles to the Metropolis courthouse. He called his lawyer and was told that she was in court.\nDefendant did not report to court. He waited until midday, when he again called his lawyer. Defendant and his lawyer engaged in conversation. As a result of the conversation, defendant grew uneasy about his situation. His lawyer was insistent that he appear in court.\nThereafter, he called his brother\u2019s lawyer. His brother was a co-defendant. His brother\u2019s lawyer detailed the week\u2019s events. He told defendant that the trial started without him the morning of June 25, 1990. He told defendant that his witnesses were not heard, that the trial was over, and that jury deliberation on the verdict would begin that afternoon. Defendant feared the outcome of such a trial. Defendant refused to appear and fled.\nThe summary dismissal order contains a set of findings that set forth the basis for the court\u2019s ruling. The ruling determines the worth of defendant\u2019s allegations and concludes that he willfully avoided trial and voluntarily waived his rights.\nInitially, the court finds that the affidavit lacks corroboration. It questions the lack of evidence to support defendant\u2019s assertions. Specifically, the court notes an absence of attached airline or bus line tickets and an absence of attached statements from airline personnel.\nThe lack of corroborative evidence attached to the petition\u2019s face does not warrant summary dismissal. In fact, a petition that asserts facts capable of corroboration invites an evidentiary hearing.\nDefendant\u2019s petition does not have to establish the validity of his claim. To merit an evidentiary hearing, a petition must make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Howard, 94 Ill. App. 3d 797, 800-01, 419 N.E.2d 702, 705 (1981). A petition\u2019s showing is tested on the assumption that the facts asserted are true. Where the matter asserted establishes a constitutional violation, a hearing must be conducted to determine the actual facts. People v. Wren, 223 Ill. App. 3d 722, 728, 585 N.E.2d 1216, 1220 (1992); People v. Dillard, 204 Ill. App. 3d 7, 9, 561 N.E.2d 1219, 1220 (1990).\nThe trial court further finds that the facts alleged do not show a reasonable effort to attend trial. The court questions defendant\u2019s refusal to appear in court after his arrival in the Metropolis area. It notes that this failure to appear, unrelated to any breakdown in travel plans, cost defendant the opportunity to testify. Finally, it implies that defendant\u2019s conscious refusal to attend trial after his arrival negated any earlier efforts to appear.\nDefendant\u2019s alleged breakdown in travel plans frames the question of waiver. These allegations are totally discounted. The trial court finds \"no indication of reasonable efforts to attend trial.\u201d\nThe first question that the court\u2019s finding raises is whether a breakdown in travel plans can ever constitute justification for missing a scheduled trial date.\nThe State submits authority that suggests that transportation is a circumstance within defendant\u2019s control and that a breakdown in transportation is defendant\u2019s fault. The authority cited reviews the results of section 115 \u2014 4.1(e) motions. Presumably, hearings were held before requests to vacate trial-in-absentia convictions were denied. In each instance, the failed transportation claim tests the fact finder\u2019s credulity. In each instance, statutory criteria under section 115 \u2014 4.1(e) are applied, and the transportation problems are held to be defendant\u2019s fault and due to circumstances of his own making.\nThus, this court dispels a claim based on a promised ride that did not pan out (People v. Wheeler, 186 Ill. App. 3d 422, 542 N.E.2d 524 (1989)), a claim based on failed hitchhiking efforts (People v. Houston, 174 Ill. App. 3d 584, 529 N.E.2d 292 (1988)), and a claim based on the high price of a bus ticket (People v. Canal, 210 Ill. App. 3d 733, 569 N.E.2d 233 (1991)).\nThere is sound reason to harbor mistrust of failed transportation claims. They are a common excuse tendered in an effort to defeat otherwise valid trials in absentia. They are easily tendered as pretextual masks for willful avoidance of trial. We cannot countenance a failure to appear that is blamed on promised or prayed-for rides. Nor can we countenance the high price of bus tickets as a reason for defendant\u2019s absence. Ready acceptance of such claims would render pointless virtually every trial in absentia. Acceptance of such claims would effectively empower bailed defendants to prevent prosecution.\nThis does not mean that a breakdown in travel plans can never justify a failure to appear. We reject the notion that defendant\u2019s duty to arrange transportation prohibits a claim based on transportation\u2019s failure. Some travel plans can go awry without defendant\u2019s fault and due to circumstances beyond his control.\nThe allegations in this case do not cast blame on an unreliable friend, an empty pocketbook, or an uncharitable driving public. Defendant\u2019s claimed misadventures flow from an asserted act of God in the skies over Phoenix, Arizona.\nAssuming the truth of defendant\u2019s assertions, his travel plans appear reasonably calculated to assure his appearance at trial. His plans rely on common carriers that operate on a time schedule. The schedule relied upon would have enabled timely arrival for trial. The travel plans are consistent with a desire to attend trial.\nDefendant claims to have paid airfare for a flight scheduled to arrive in St. Louis the day before trial. He claims to have boarded that flight, intent on trial attendance. Had the flight gone as scheduled, he may well have arrived in time to appear for trial. The flight\u2019s delay was a circumstance beyond his control. If defendant was truly grounded in Phoenix, he did the only thing that he reasonably could do. He contacted his lawyer, told her that he was in transit, and advised her of the unavoidable delay.\nAs previously noted, contrary to claims raised in other cases, defendant\u2019s claim is seemingly capable of independent corroboration. Records should exist to confirm his frustrated efforts. Therefore, if defendant can prove his allegations, his efforts to attend trial were reasonable. His initial absence from trial was without his fault and due to factors beyond his control. However, his allegations only account for the first two days of trial.\nThe summary dismissal is based, in part, on defendant\u2019s willful avoidance of trial after his arrival in the area. The court notes that trial was in progress. It points out that had defendant appeared, he could have offered testimony. Defendant\u2019s conscious refusal to attend trial, when able to do so, punctuates the court\u2019s decision. It evidences a conscious surrender of rights associated with trial presence.\nWe must next determine whether defendant\u2019s conscious refusal to appear for the final stages of trial negates any earlier efforts to attend trial. If defendant\u2019s admitted misconduct validates his trial in absentia, any mistake in the original decision to proceed without him is meaningless. The mistake can stand uncorrected. A hearing need not be held.\nDefendant\u2019s decision to flee is indefensible. He should have reported to the Metropolis courthouse upon arrival in the area. By noon, he was admittedly on notice that his appearance was necessary. Shortly thereafter, he was on notice that his trial was in progress. He blames his decision on anxiety over news that the trial was over, his witnesses went unheard, and the jury was about to deliberate. No doubt, such news could evoke fear and panic. But fear and panic do not justify the breach of defendant\u2019s legal obligation. Defendant offers nothing to justify his violation of Illinois law.\nWe do not condone defendant\u2019s flight. We think it is a legitimate factor to be weighed at any hearing on his claim. Timely appearance upon arrival in the area would have tempered defendant\u2019s claim of misfortune. His flight weakens it.\nDefendant\u2019s flight does not, however, validate trial in absentia. Defendant\u2019s conduct does not cure the constitutional harm inflicted if defendant missed the start of trial due to circumstances alleged in his petition.\nThe summary dismissal suggests that defendant\u2019s appearance could have alleviated any harm inflicted by earlier proceedings. This suggestion is misplaced. An opportunity to testify could not remedy those rights already lost. If defendant unavoidably missed all but the last stage of trial, the only adequate remedy was a new trial.\nTrial in absentia commits to a course entirely dependent upon the assumption that defendant has voluntarily surrendered rights associated with trial presence. Because the decision to proceed in absentia must be made at a time when the reasons for defendant\u2019s absence are unclear, trial in absentia harbors an inherent risk that its foundation in waiver may subsequently prove invalid. If a defendant unavoidably misses the bulk of his trial, if his absence proves blameless and due to events beyond his control, the trial stands for naught. The defendant must receive a new trial. 725 ILCS 5/115\u2014 4.1(e) (West 1992).\nThe decision to discard defendant\u2019s constitutional rights was reached when his motion to continue was denied and the State\u2019s request to proceed was granted. Thereafter, defendant lost the right to assist in the selection of his jurors. With the completion of each witness\u2019s testimony, defendant\u2019s right of confrontation gradually evaporated. By the time defendant was able to appear, the trial was beyond repair. Most of the rights enjoyed by other defendants were already bypassed.\nDefendant\u2019s conscious decision to flee is not without adverse legal consequence. It does not, however, rectify an otherwise faulty decision to commence trial without him. It cannot justify or remedy an unwilling loss of constitutional rights that occurred without his fault and due to circumstances beyond his control. Liberty\u2019s promise is not that strained.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the summary dismissal of defendant\u2019s postconviction petition. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nMAAG and GOLDENHERSH, JJ\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KUEHN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Lawrence J. O\u2019Neill, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Norbert J. Goetten and Stephen E. Norris, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, and James R Benson, of Alton, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALLEN BERNARD MANIKOWSKI, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201494\u20140627\nOpinion filed May 2, 1997.\nRehearing denied June 6, 1997.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Lawrence J. O\u2019Neill, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nNorbert J. Goetten and Stephen E. Norris, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, and James R Benson, of Alton, for the People." }, "file_name": "0157-01", "first_page_order": 177, "last_page_order": 186 }